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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Regional trade integration in context 
 
The countries of Africa, like others on other continents, have decided to integrate their 
economies into regional blocs. These countries do so despite the view held worldwide that 
regional integration is a very difficult process.1 However, it being difficult does not mean 
that integration cannot or should not be done. Even the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
which advocates for multilateralism, does allow regionalism among its member states.2  
 
The question, however, is “why do states even bother engaging in it”? This is more so 
because states that get involved in integration efforts more often than not have different 
legal regimes and this creates a challenge of harmonising those laws. Without this 
harmonisation, it is difficult to have common policies. The guideline to be followed here, 
therefore, is that for policies to work, laws must be implemented and enforced in respect 
of those policies. This is, of course, looking at integration from a legal point of view. 
 
However, from an economic point of view the sentiment is different. This different 
sentiment can be summed by the former South African President Thabo Mbeki’s statement 
when he said: “integration can create the basis for regional markets and industries to 
overcome the limits of small markets, to achieve economies of scale, and enhance 
competitiveness.”3 
                                                 
1 Roberts, S et al. “Understanding competition and regional integration as part of an inclusive growth 
agenda for Africa: key issues, insights and a research agenda” Paper submitted for Competition 
Commission and Tribunal Annual Conference, 26 August 2014; Moon, W et al. Regional Integration – 
Europe and Asia Compared (2017) at 103. 
2 This is done through Article 24 (“XXIV”) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Treaty. This Article sets out the basic conditions for the formation of customs 
unions and free trade areas which are forms of regional schemes or arrangements. This Article is discussed 
in detail in Chapter 2.   
3 Mbeki, T. “Statement of the Chairperson of SADC and President of South Africa,” (Speech on the 
occasion of the Launch of the SADC Free Trade Area, Sandton, Johannesburg, August 16-17, 2008. 
2 
 
 
There is as such a need to reconcile these different views in order for integration to be a 
success. The starting point should thus be to define “integration”. According to the 
integration theory4 this is a process of integrating the activities of different parts into a 
system, with the integrating parts performing certain functions in the system. Its main 
assumption is that because resources are scarce, actors depend on each other, thus 
responding to the environment by pooling resources, the latter being the initial moment of 
integration.5  
 
As a “process” integration would thus involve different phases, namely, preparation, 
cooperation, harmonisation and integration. Sometimes it is taken further to unification. It 
means, therefore, that for integration to happen member states must have gone through the 
other three phases first. And in most cases, if not all, this is politically-driven.6 
 
From the economic point of view integration can be shallow or deep. Shallow integration 
involves the removal of border barriers to trade, typically tariffs and quotas. Deep 
integration involves policies and institutions that facilitate trade by eliminating or reducing 
regulatory and behind-the-border impediments to trade, whether these impediments are 
intentional or not. These can include issues such as customs procedures or competition 
policies.7 
                                                 
Available at http://www.dfa.gove.za/docs/speeches/2008.mbek0818c.html (accessed on 18 November 
2015).   
4 This includes both political and economic approaches to integration. Political approaches include inter-
governmentalism, federalism, etc. Economic theories include market integration theory, development 
integration theory, functionalist and neo-functionalist theories, etc. Proponents of the economic integration 
theory include Ernst B. Haas and Béla Alexander Balassa. The integration theory, including the political 
and economic approaches, is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
5 Ndlovu, J.M.L. “The AU–SADC interface on peace and security: challenges and opportunities” in van 
Nieuwkerk, A et al. Southern African Security Review (2013) at 55; Ujupan, A.S. “Reconciling theories of 
regional integration: a third way approach”. University of Ulster at http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-
istanbul/virtualpaperroom/060.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2016).   
6 Nene, M.M.B. “Political and Economic Drivers of Regional Integration in Africa: A Case Study of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo” South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) Occasional Paper 
No. 106, January 2012; Spolaore, E. “What Is European Integration Really About?: A Political Guide for 
Economists” Journal of Economic Perspectives vol. 27 no. 3 (2013) 125. 
7 Rollo, J. “The Challenge of Negotiating RTA’s for Developing Countries: what could the WTO do to 
Help?” Paper presented at the WTO Conference on Multilateralising Regionalism 10-12 September 2007 
Geneva, Switzerland; Rollo, J. “Negotiating RTAs for developing countries” in Baldwin, R et al. 
Multilateralizing Regionalism: Challenges for the Global Trading System (2008) at 698. 
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To understand the meaning of regional integration first there must be an understanding of 
the notion of “regionalism”. Regionalism is a term in international relations that refers to 
the expression of a common sense of identity and purpose combined with the creation and 
implementation of institutions that express a particular identity and shape collective action 
within a geographical region. The idea that lies behind this increased regional identity is 
that as a region becomes more economically integrated, it will necessarily become 
politically integrated as well. This means that integration can take different forms: 
economic, socio-economic or political integration or combination of the three.8  
  
As this thesis deals with regional trade integration, it means that we must also understand 
the notion of regional economic integration, within which regional trade integration falls. 
Regional economic integration itself falls within a broader or general economic integration.  
 
Encyclopaedia Britannica9 defines economic integration as the unification of economic 
policies between different states through the partial or full abolition of tariff and non-tariff 
restrictions on trade taking place among them prior to their integration. This definition 
takes a narrow economic view. Balassa, on the other hand, takes an even narrower 
economic view and looks at economic integration both as a process and as a state of affairs. 
As a process, he states, “it encompasses measures designed to abolish discrimination 
between economic units belonging to different national states.”10 When viewed as a state 
of affairs, “it can be represented by the absence of various forms of discrimination between 
national economies.”11 
 
What is common between the two definitions is that states are involved. As this involves 
two or more states this means there will also be issues of international law involved – the 
legal view. This is why it is stated, above, that the guideline to be followed is that for 
                                                 
8 Mandal. C. Dictionary of Public Administration, 2007.  
9 Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 1 (2009) at 22.  
10 Balassa, B. The Theory of Economic Integration (1961) 1; Biswaro, J.M. The Quest for Regional 
Integration in the Twenty First Century: Rhetoric versus Reality – A comparative study (2012) at 8. 
11 Balassa (above).  
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economic policies to work laws must be implemented and enforced in respect of those 
policies.  
 
With regard to regional economic integration Mongelli12 takes a broader economic view 
and defines it as the degree of interpenetration of economic activity among two or more 
countries belonging to the same geographic area as measured at a given point in time. It 
may include institutional integration, which is the policy decision(s) taken by two or more 
governments of countries belonging to the same geographic area in order to promote 
economic co-operation in terms of deepening and/or widening the spheres of co-ordination 
under the terms of an agreed pact. 
 
As such regional integration can be defined as the unification of neighbouring states 
working within a framework to promote free movement of goods, services and factors of 
production, and to coordinate and harmonise their policies. It can also be defined as a 
process and a means by which a group of countries strive to increase their levels of welfare. 
It involves the recognition that partnership between countries can achieve this goal in a 
more efficient way than unilateral or independent pursuance of policy in each country.13 
 
Several studies have shown that in Africa, regional integration should have been an 
effective driver of development and one of the solutions to the problems of small market 
size, weak institutions, low human development, worsening terms of trade, conflicts 
between countries, and the poor investment climate. In this instance regional agreements 
were therefore expected to: 
 increase trade and attract more investments; 
 generate greater economies of scale based on profitable competition; 
 facilitate free movement of resources; 
 promote peace and security; and 
                                                 
12 Mongelli, F.P. “What does European institutional integration tell us about trade integration?” European 
Central Bank Occasional Paper Series no. 40 December 2005. 
13 Mutasa, C. “Regional Integration and Debt in Africa: A Comparative Report of Africa’s Regional 
Groupings” Southern African Regional Poverty Network (SARPN) Paper March 2003. 
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 improve the bargaining power of small countries in multilateral or bilateral 
negotiations with the long-term objective of generating sustainable economic 
growth and development of countries.14 
 
However, regional integration in Africa has been characterised by overlapping 
memberships of countries in many economic communities, rendering them inefficient.15 
This overlapping membership is called the “spaghetti bowl effect”.16 Bhagwati coined the 
term in 199517 to explain how the proliferation of regional agreements makes trade 
procedures more complicated by increasing the number of tariffs and rules of origin. 
 
Geographic location is one reason, among others, that justifies membership of more than 
one regional economic community (REC). It also potentially allows a country to profit 
from the benefits offered by its economic integration in the different RECs. Yet there are 
many disadvantages of multiple memberships. Results of a survey conducted by the 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) shows that 25% of countries consider multiple 
memberships as the reason for their arrears in contributions to the different RECs. Multiple 
membership is also given by countries surveyed as a reason for low programme 
implementation (23%), low level of attendance at meetings (16%), and duplication and 
conflicting programme implementation (16%).18 
 
                                                 
14 “The Rise of the South: Human progress in a diverse world”. United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) Human Development Report 2013; The World Bank. “Can Africa claim the 21st Century?” (2000); 
Ndomo, A. “Regional Economic Communities in Africa: A Progress overview” Study commissioned by 
German technical Cooperation (GTZ), Nairobi, May 2009. 
15 Economic Commission for Africa. “The Status of regional integration in Africa” Assessing Regional 
integration in Africa (ARIA IV) (2010) Chapter 2.  
16 The “spaghetti bowl effect or phenomenon” is discussed in Chapter 3 (at 111 – 112).   
17 Bhagwati, J. “U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Agreements” in Bhagwati, J et al. The 
Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements (1995); Bhagwati, J et al. “Trading preferentially: 
Theory and Policy” Economic Journal vol. 108 no. 449 (1998) 1128.  
18 Nene, M. “Political and economic drivers of regional integration in Africa: A case study of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo”. South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) Occasional Paper 
No. 106, January 2012. 
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There are four different approaches to regional economic integration: developmental 
regional integration, market regional integration, ad hoc regional cooperation, and 
functional regional integration.19 
 
Developmental regional economic integration promotes greater regional interdependence 
and argues that for regional economic integration to work, it must first and foremost focus 
on equitable regional development. In its broader meaning it requires strong state 
intervention. In the Southern African context, this means, for example, that South Africa 
cannot be allowed to develop at the expense of its poorer neighbours.20  
 
Market regional integration promotes regional interdependence, but does so by 
progressively removing the barriers to economic activity between states in the region: “the 
integrating force of the market is released through the removal of restrictions and barriers 
to regional trade, rather than through positive government interventions”.21 
 
Ad hoc regional economic integration relies heavily on bilateral agreements between 
regional states. It is considered ad hoc because it is not part of a larger plan to induce 
regional interdependence, or even part of a regional scheme. By connecting countries, 
albeit in an ad hoc manner, it does create a more integrated region.22 
 
Functional regional integration proceeds by linking particular activities and interests, one 
at a time, according to a need and an acceptability, giving each a joint authority and policy 
limited to that activity alone. This can be done through a series of shared projects across 
borders, which creates habits of cooperation and reveal the advantages of pooling efforts. 
It entails less sacrifice of sovereignty than with market integration, but does see intra-
regional economic interactions creating a ‘functional need’ for regional institution. Both 
                                                 
19 Hentz, J.J. “South Africa and the political economy of regional cooperation in Southern Africa” Journal 
of Modern African Studies vol. 43 no. 1 (2005) 21 – 51. 
20 Hentz (above) at 24. 
21 Hentz, at 25. 
22 Ibid. 
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ad hoc and functional integrations are typically anchored by projects and, in particular, 
both focus on infrastructural development.23 
 
In this thesis the economic integration is further narrowed to trade integration. Trade 
integration means the establishment of free trade between a number of countries with the 
aim of securing the benefits of international specialisation and international trade.24 In the 
context of this thesis it means trade by member states in the Southern African region among 
themselves as well as trade by them as a group with other groupings and/or countries. 
 
There are four main forms of trade integration, ranging from a loose association of trade 
partners to a fully integrated group of nation states. These are: 
(a) a free trade area (FTA), where members eliminate trade barriers between 
themselves, but each continues to operate its own particular barriers against non-
members; 
(b) a customs union, where members eliminate trade barriers between themselves and 
establish uniform barriers against non-members, in particular a common external 
tariff (CET); 
(c) a common market, which is a customs union that also provides for the free 
movement of labour and capital across national boundaries; and 
(d) an economic community or union, which is a common market that also provides 
for the unification or harmonisation of monetary, fiscal and other policies of 
members.25  
 
These are also called regional trade arrangements (RTAs) and do not have to be a process 
as stated above. The participating parties can opt whichever arrangement they want and 
stick to it, or evolve from it and develop into the other, etc. However, in most instances the 
linear approach, as outlined above, is followed.  
 
                                                 
23Hentz, at 26.  
24 Nye, J.S. “Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement” International Organization 
vol. 22 no. 4 (1968) 855 at 860; Carim, X. “Multilateral trading, regional integration and the Southern 
African Development Community” South African Journal of Economics vol. 65 no. 3 (1997) 334.  
25 These are all discussed in Chapter 3.  
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The regional bloc to be dealt with in this case is the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). However, there is also a brief look into other groupings in the 
Southern African region such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU),26 and the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).27  
 
When the SADC changed from the Southern African Development Coordinating 
Conference (SADCC) in 1992 greater emphasis was placed on “integration” rather than 
mere “cooperation”.28  Thus now regional integration features pre-eminently in the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Treaty, protocols and programmes as 
a mechanism to take the region forward. The Preamble to the SADC Treaty notes the 
SADC states’ “duty to promote interdependence and integration of their national 
economies for the harmonious, balanced and equitable development of the Region” and of 
“the need to mobilise … resources to promote … economic integration.” In addition, the 
areas of co-operation and the economic objectives of the SADC are trade-oriented and are 
premised on the increase of regional and international trade for the achievement of 
economic growth.29  
 
Further, the majority of protocols adopted by the SADC are intended to deepen regional 
economic integration. All these protocols are intended to enhance productivity and 
efficiency as well as to encourage both intra- and extra-regional trade.30  
 
                                                 
26 The SACU was established in 1910 as a Customs Union Agreement between the then Union of South 
Africa and the High Commission Territories of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. With the advent of 
independence for these territories, the agreement was updated and, on 11 December 1969, it was re-
launched as the SACU with the signing of an agreement between the Republic of South Africa, Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland. The updated union officially entered into force on March 1, 1970. After Namibia’s 
independence from South Africa in 1990, it joined SACU as its fifth member. 
27 COMESA is a free trade area with nineteen member states (Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe). It was formed in December 1994, 
replacing a Preferential Trade Area which had existed since 1981. 
28 Hull, C et al. “Abandoning Frontline Trenches?: Capabilities of peace and security in the SADC region” 
Research paper for the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), June 2009 at 19. 
29 Treaty Establishing the Southern African Development Community (SADC Treaty) Article 5. 
30 These are SADC Protocols on Trade; Mining; Energy; Transport, Communication and Meteorology; 
Fisheries; Tourism; etc. See Chapter Five for full discussions of these protocols.   
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The reasons for the pre-eminence of trade within the SADC’s legal, institutional and 
programmatic framework may be classified into three categories. These are historical 
precedents, regional economic dynamics and international economic imperatives.31 
 
What is disturbing is that, despite the existence of these RTAs in Southern Africa, 
economically the region’s, as well as the continent’s performance, remains dismal. All 
other regions of the Third World have made some progress and sub-Saharan Africa as a 
whole has not. One commentator has actually regarded it a misnomer to classify the sub-
Saharan Africa as “developing” because it is at best stagnant, and at worst regressing.32 
 
The problems or challenges faced by the SADC are mainly political in nature. One of these 
problems or challenges in the SADC is that the member countries have protectionist 
tendencies. They impose duties on all imports, and this does not augur well for a trade bloc. 
These duties sometimes act as barriers to free trade and discourage businessmen from 
importing goods. The trade laws also differ from one Member State to another. One way 
of resolving this is therefore to harmonise these trade policies or laws. 
 
Article 21 of the SADC Treaty lists a number of areas of cooperation among the member 
states, but harmonisation of law is not one of them. This is unfortunate because this aspect 
would prove to be significant in the realisation of achieving regional integration. The 
achievement of several of the objectives of the SADC requires the taking of legal measures 
to eliminate customs duties and adoption of a common external customs tariff and to 
eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade. The South African Customs Union (SACU) is in 
favour of such a move, but this needs to extent to the whole region – the SADC. 
 
From the above it is clear that the problem is primarily of governance, which is political. 
However, international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank tend to concentrate only on the economic side of the problem, while in fact 
                                                 
31 Kaime, T. “SADC and human security: Fitting human rights into the trade matrix” African Security 
Review vol. 13 no. 1 (2004) 109. 
32 Dell, S. “The Future of the International Monetary System” The future role of the United Nations in an 
independent world (1989) at 109.  
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the sub-Sahara African problem is primarily a political one. The SADC strategy of 
encompassing non-economic activities among its areas of cooperation is a realisation that 
successful integration is based on the twin foundations of economic and political 
integration. The political environment prevailing in countries joined together as a 
community is a critical factor. Economic co-operation and integration flourish better in an 
environment that is politically peaceful and stable. After all, law is “congealed politics”, 
especially at the international level.33 
 
The approach in the SADC can be contrasted with that of the European Union (EU). The 
European countries did not sign the EU Treaty simply to create mutual obligations 
governed by the law of nations. Rather, they limited their sovereign rights by transferring 
them to institutions over which they had no direct control. The southern African 
governments, on the other hand, seem not to want to limit their sovereignty.  
 
The only economic community that can work well is one where all member states perceive 
membership as beneficial to all their economies. This is in fact implicit in the SADC Treaty 
objectives. But experience shows that there must be a member country that takes the 
leading position in the Community like it is with the European Union. In the EU Germany 
is the leader because of its powerful economy. With the SADC South Africa should take 
such a responsibility because of its advanced technology and powerful economy as 
compared to other members of the SADC. However, laws should be enacted to make sure 
that this position is not abused or misused. 
 
Having identified the problems or challenges, it is submitted that the SADC should take 
specific steps to eliminate them. The final solutions rest on the individual member states 
that must enact legislation abolishing duties. Such measures would enhance integration. 
There must also be a way to integrate the different legal systems of the member states. One 
of these ways is harmonisation of these laws. Others could include adopting the United 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
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Nations conventions relating to international trade such as United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 34 as their operating legal system.  
 
Orthodox theorists hold that regional integration among developing countries is 
immaterial. They say this is because the real obstacle to intra-regional trade is not the 
presence of tariff barriers, but structural conditions of these developing countries.35 This 
thesis will argue against this statement and show that regional integration can materialise 
in Southern Africa despite the poor structural conditions in the region.  
 
There is also a question of credibility on the part of financial institutions towards the 
Southern African blocs. In the late 80s the IMF and the World Bank decided to make funds 
available to Eastern Europe bloc states. This shifted the focus from third-world debtors to 
Eastern Europe.36 Critics feared that the IMF was becoming a development agency instead 
of a world central bank. Therefore, it should be asked why the same is not done to the poor 
Southern African region, particularly with the crisis in Zimbabwe and after the devastation 
in Mozambique. In fact Trevor Manuel, South Africa’s former Finance Minister, asked the 
question at the World Economic Summit37 why the foreign investors continued to pour 
their monies into Eastern Europe despite the crises in Kosovo, but always cited Zimbabwe, 
as an obstacle, in regard to Southern Africa.  
 
1.2 Problem statement and objectives 
 
As stated above, the countries of Africa, through the African Union, have decided to 
integrate their economies so that they ultimately achieve the stage of an economic 
community i.e. the African Economic Community (AEC). They have set themselves, 
                                                 
34 UNCTAD was established in 1964 in order to provide a forum where the developing countries could 
discuss the problems relating to their economic development. The primary objective of the UNCTAD is to 
formulate policies relating to all aspects of development including trade, aid, transport, finance and 
technology. The Conference ordinarily meets once in four years. 
35 McCarthy, C.L. “Regional Integration of Developing Countries at Different Levels of Economic 
Development: Problems and Prospects” Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems vol. 4 (1994) 1; 
Mytelka, L.K. “The Salience of Gains in the Third-World Integrative Systems” World Politics vol. 25 
(1973) 236.   
36 Bruce, N. “IMF and World Bank meetings” Financial Mail vol. 133 issue 12, 29 September (1989) 34. 
37 The Summit was held in Durban during the week of 11-15 June 2001.  
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through the Treaty establishing the African Economic Treaty (the Abuja Treaty),38 the 
deadline of 2028 in which to achieve this stage. This stage would be preceded by others in 
the linear process of economic integration: free trade areas (FTAs), customs unions and 
common markets.   
 
The regional economic communities (RECs) have been identified as building blocks 
through which this integration agenda should be achieved.39 The Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) is the identified REC for the Southern African region.  
 
The question, therefore, that this thesis is trying to answer is whether the SADC is able to 
achieve this mandate, as well as whether it can do this within the stipulated timeframes. It 
also looks at how the SADC does, or intends to do, this.   
 
As such the objectives of the study are as follows: 
 It deals with the WTO as the legal basis for regional integration worldwide and how 
it fits and relates to regional trade integration in Southern Africa. 
 It compares and contrasts as well as analyse different regional schemes used in the 
world to see whether they are suitable for Southern Africa. 
 It traces the origin of the Southern African regional institutions and their 
performance with regard to integrating the region’s trade and overall economy. 
 It deals with the applicability of the rules/laws of these institutions (SADC, 
COMESA, SACU and WTO) in the effort to alleviate the trading pedigree of 
Southern African states in particular, if there are any. 
 It looks into the integration agenda of the European Union (EU) and draws some 
lessons from which the SADC could learn.   
                                                 
38 Treaty establishing the African Economic Treaty (the Abuja Treaty) was concluded in Abuja, Nigeria in 
June 1991 and came into force in May 1994. It provides for the African Economic Community to be set up 
through a gradual process, which would be achieved by coordination, harmonisation and progressive 
integration of the activities of existing and future regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa. 
39 Article 5(1)(d) of the Protocol on Relations between the AU and the RECs provides that the regional 
economic communities shall take steps to review their treaties to provide an umbilical link to the 
Community and in particular provide for the eventual absorption, at stage 5 set out in Article 6(2)(e) of the 
Treaty, of the RECs into the African Common Market as a prelude to the Community. 
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 It then gives a verdict as to whether the attempts in integrating the Southern African 
region are bearing fruits or not as well as recommendations therefor.    
 
1.3 Methodology  
 
The methodology adopted by this study is primarily desk and library research. An array of 
mostly recent books, journal articles, case law, treaties and protocols relating to the subject 
of regional trade integration, especially relating to the SADC, is used and analysed.  
 
The study also applies a descriptive analysis in order to provide a detailed foundation and 
framework. In this regard, the various theories underpinning the core elements of the thesis 
are discussed. The comparative method is also used to enrich the discussion as well as the 
conclusion and recommendations. 
 
1.4 Scope and structure of the study 
 
The study deals mainly with the SADC, but also touches on the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) as 
well as with the AEC and AU, in as far as they relate to the SADC. 
 
However, the thesis starts by briefly analysing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
because it is the umbrella body that controls trade globally. Because the WTO allows or 
makes provision for regionalism, it could be concluded that regionalism is a supplement or 
complement to multilateralism, at least through the prism of the WTO. This is the approach 
this thesis follows. Thereafter it measures the regional trade integration in Southern Africa 
(SADC) against particular provisions of the WTO Agreement. 
 
The approach of this thesis, therefore, is that regionalism, as opposed to unilateralism, and 
multilateralism by the WTO, is the way to go for the Southern Africa region. Intra-regional 
trade is thus used as one of the most important empirical indicators of success, or lack of, 
in this regional integration.  
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The Structure of the thesis is as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 looks into how regional integration comes into being. This entails looking 
(briefly) at the origin of the WTO and its perceived role towards regional integration. It 
will also touch on its impact or implications on regional integration in southern Africa.  
 
Chapter 3 will give an overview and comparison of different types or schemes of regional 
integration used throughout the world and state as to which one(s) is (are) best suited for 
southern Africa.  
 
Chapter 4 will look at the SADC, its composition and roles as well as the African Economic 
Community (AEC), the NEPAD and the AU in as far as they deal with trade and integration 
in Africa.  
 
Chapter 5 will deal with achievements and performance of the SADC thus far regarding 
regional integration and tell whether it is a success or failure, or whether it is on the right 
path or not. 
 
Chapter 6 will compare the SADC with the European Union (EU) and state the lessons 
that the SADC can learn from the EU for it to become a success.   
 
Chapter 7 will consist of two parts:  
 
Part A will be my conclusion.  
In part B I will give recommendations of what should be done to develop and integrate 
trade in Southern Africa Region, in particular by the SADC.   
It then ends with concluding remarks. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
HOW REGIONAL TRADE INTEGRATION COMES INTO BEING  
Introduction  
 
Regional integration is the unification of neighbouring states working within a framework 
in order to upgrade cooperation through common institutions and rules. The objective is 
thus to promote free movement of goods, services and factors of production, and to 
coordinate and harmonise the policies of the member states. It can also be defined as a 
process and a means by which a group of countries strive to increase their levels of welfare. 
It involves the recognition that partnership between countries can achieve this goal in a 
more efficient way than unilateral or independent pursuance of policy in each country.40 
 
Regional economic integration as a strategy for achieving greater economic development 
and growth is currently being implemented in many parts of the world. The idea of regional 
integration is reinforced by relatively successful experience of integration among European 
states in the European Union (EU) and other integration schemes such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  
 
The EU is currently a union of twenty-eight independent states based on the European 
communities and founded to enhance political, economic and social co-operation. It has a 
single market as its core as well as a common currency – the Euro. The single market 
basically means that barriers are removed, and people, goods, services and money move 
around Europe as freely as within one country. The people of Europe travel at will across 
EU’s internal frontiers for business and pleasure or, if they choose, they can stay at home 
and enjoy a dazzling array of products from all over the European Union.41  
 
                                                 
40 Mutasa, C. “Regional Integration and Debt in Africa: A Comparative Report of Africa’s Regional 
Groupings” SARPN Paper, March 2003. 
41 The Preamble of the Treaty of Lisbon provides, among others, that the signatories: 
“Resolved to facilitate the free movement of persons, while ensuring the safety and security of their 
peoples, by establishing an area of freedom, security and justice, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”. 
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The EU was formerly known as European Community (EC) or European Economic 
Community (EEC). Its date of foundation is 1st November 1993 through the Treaty of 
Maastricht42 (Treaty Establishing the European Union). Its predecessor is the Treaty of 
Rome43 which created the then EEC in 1958. 
 
The EU’s success owes a lot to the way it works – its unique method of interaction between 
institutions such as the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission, 
supported by a number of agencies and other bodies. Like any government, the Union has 
a legislative and an executive branch and an independent judiciary, though it is a non-state 
body. Three institutions within the Union are responsible for making policy and taking 
decisions. These are: The Council of European Union, the European Commission and the 
European Parliament.44 
 
The NAFTA is an agreement signed by Canada, Mexico, and the United States of America 
(USA), creating a trilateral trade bloc in North America. The agreement came into force on 
1 January 1994 and it eliminated barriers to trade and investment between the U.S.A, 
Canada and Mexico. Since it came into effect, the North Americans have enjoyed an overall 
extended period of strong economic growth and rising prosperity. The NAFTA has helped 
to stimulate economic growth and create higher-paying jobs across North America. It has 
also paved the way for greater market competition and enhanced choice and purchasing 
power for the North American consumers, families, farmers, and businesses.45 
  
Achievements in these integrated schemes have demonstrated that economic cooperation 
can be an important and potentially effective means for facilitating social and economic 
development.46 However, material conditions existing in different member states, like 
                                                 
42 Officially called the Treaty on European Union. It was signed on 7 February 1992 by the members of the 
European Community in Maastricht, Netherlands and came into force on 1 November 1993.  
43 Officially called the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. It was signed on 25 March 
1957 by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the then West Germany, and came into 
force on 1 January 1958. 
44 Article 9(A), (C) & (D) of the Treaty on the European Union. 
45 Abbott, J et al. Uniting North American Business: NAFTA Best Practices (2002) at 13; “What is 
NAFTA” naftanow.org/ (accessed on 10 November 2016).  
46 Lawrence, R. “Competing with regionalism by revitalizing the WTO” in Meléndez-Ortiz, R et al. The 
Future and the WTO: Confronting the Challenges. A Collection of Short Essays, International Centre for 
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varying economic levels, must be taken into account before deciding which type of 
integration to follow.  
 
The NAFTA stopped at trade integration, in part because of a recognition that the economic 
shocks faced by Canada and Mexico are different to those faced by the USA, and the 
smaller economies need currency flexibility, but also because of political concerns.47 
 
However, the first question that must be answered with regard to regional trade integration, 
and regional integration in general, is: “how does it come into being? In other words, “what 
is its legal basis? 
 
The answer to the above question lies in Article 24 (“XXIV”) of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) or General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Treaty. This 
Article sets out the basic conditions for the formation of customs unions and free trade 
areas which are forms of regional schemes or arrangements.48 In addition to customs unions 
and free trade areas, Article XXIV further envisages “interim arrangements” leading to a 
customs union or free trade area.49 
                                                 
Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) Programme on Global Economic Policy and Institutions 
(2012) at 38.  
47 Jefferis, K.R. “The Process of Monetary Integration in the SADC Region” Journal of Southern African 
Studies vol. 33 no. 1 (March 2007) 83 at 93. 
48 See Chapter Three for detailed discussion of customs union and free trade areas. 
49 GATT Article XXIV(5). It provides:  
“Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of contracting 
parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement 
necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area; Provided that:  
(a)        with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a formation of a 
customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of 
any such union or interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting parties not 
parties to such union or agreement shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive 
than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the 
constituent territories prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of such interim 
agreement, as the case may be;  
(b)        with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a 
free-trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the 
constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such free–trade area or the 
adoption of such interim agreement to the trade of contracting parties not included in 
such area or not parties to such agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the 
corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent 
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A key rule of the multilateral trade system is that reductions in trade barriers should be 
applied, on a most-favoured nation (MFN) basis, to all WTO members. This means no 
WTO member should be discriminated against by another member’s trade regime.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
However, regional schemes or arrangements are an important exception to this rule. This 
exception is allowed under Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)50 for trade in goods, in Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS)51 for trade in services and in the Enabling Clause.52 
 
                                                 
territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement as the case 
may be; and  
(c)        any interim agreement referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall include a plan and 
schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within a 
reasonable length of time.” 
50 GATT Article XXIV(1) provides: “The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the metropolitan 
customs territories of the contracting parties and to any other customs territories in respect of which this 
Agreement has been accepted under Article XXVI or is being applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant to 
the Protocol of Provisional Application. Each such customs territory shall, exclusively for the purposes of 
the territorial application of this Agreement, be treated as though it were a contracting party; Provided that 
the provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed to create any rights or obligations as between two or 
more customs territories in respect of which this Agreement has been accepted under Article XXVI or is 
being applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application by a single 
contracting party.” 
51 GATS Article V provides:  
“1.   This Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from being a party to or entering into an 
agreement liberalizing trade in services between or among the parties to such an agreement, provided that 
such an agreement: 
(a)        has substantial sectoral coverage, and  
(b)        provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination, in the sense of 
Article XVII, between or among the parties, in the sectors covered under 
subparagraph (a), through: 
(i)        elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or 
(ii)        prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures, 
either at the entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of a reasonable time-frame, 
except for measures permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIV and XIV bis. 
2. In evaluating whether the conditions under paragraph 1(b) are met, consideration may be given to the 
relationship of the agreement to a wider process of economic integration or trade liberalization among the 
countries concerned.” 
52 GATT Decision (L/4903) of 28 November 1979 (on “treatment of developing nations”).  
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Article XXIV of GATT and Article V of GATS essentially mean that goods and services 
originating in a particular trading bloc or scheme can have different tariffs in states that are 
not member states of the bloc or scheme from which those goods or services originate, even 
if those states are members of the WTO. 
 
The Enabling Clause is officially called the “Decision on Differential and More Favourable 
Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries” and was adopted 
under the GATT in 1979, and enables developed member states to give differential and 
more favourable treatment to developing countries. It is the WTO’s legal basis for the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). Under the GSP, developed countries offer non-
reciprocal preferential treatment (such as zero or low duties on imports) to products 
originating in developing countries. Preference-giving countries unilaterally determine 
which countries and which products are included in their schemes. The Enabling Clause is 
also the legal basis for regional arrangements among developing countries and for the 
Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP), under which a number of developing 
countries exchange trade concessions among themselves.53 
 
The Enabling Clause is designed principally to care for the needs of developing countries, 
as its main objective is to facilitate economic development rather than tariff liberalisation. 
The principal justification for granting preferences under the Enabling Clause is the 
contention that treating equally those states that are unequal would be unfair.54  
 
Regional trade agreements, therefore, must be consistent with the WTO rules governing 
such agreements, which require that parties to a regional trade agreement must have 
established free trade on “substantially all” goods within the regional area within ten 
                                                 
53 Panagariya, A. “Preferential Trade Liberalization: The Traditional Theory and New Developments” 
Journal of Economic Literature vol. 38 no. 2 (June 2000) 287; Bartels, L. “The WTO Enabling Clause and 
Positive Conditionality in the European Community's GSP Program” Journal of International Economic 
Law vol. 6 issue 2 (2003) 507 at 510. 
54 Thomas, R. “The World Trade Organisation and Southern African trade relations” Law Democracy & 
Development vol. 3 issue 1 May – June (1999) 105 at 111; Pangestu, M. “Special and Differential 
Treatment in the Millennium: Special for Whom and How Different?” The World Economy vol. 23 issue 9 
(2000) 1285 at 1287; Islam, R et al. “Preferential Trade Agreements and the Scope of GATT Article XXIV, 
GATS Article V and the enabling clause: an Appraisal of GATT/WTO Jurisprudence” Netherlands 
International Law Review vol. 56 issue 1 (2009) 1 at 5. 
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years,55 and that the parties cannot raise their tariffs against countries outside the 
agreement. Compliance with the WTO rules is important to ensuring that an agreement is 
beneficial to all parties in the multilateral system. 
 
There is no gainsaying that for a regional integration arrangement such as a customs union 
or a free trade area to be sustainable, the attention should be placed on promotion of better 
governance, and on creating or maintaining conditions for sustainable and equitable 
growth. Also there is a need to strengthen governments’ human resource and institutional 
capacities for effective economic management.  
 
This chapter, therefore, deals only with the WTO as the legal basis of regional trade 
integration as well as its impact or implications on regional integration in southern Africa. 
 
2.1 THE OVERVIEW OF THE WTO SYSTEM 
 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) came into existence on 1 January 1995 under the 
Marrakesh Agreement,56 with the aim of improving existing international trade regimes in 
goods and services. It replaces or merges the two regimes that regulated trade in goods and 
services respectively since 1947. These were the GATT57 which regulated trade in goods 
and the GATS58 which regulated trade in services. 
 
The purpose of this new organisation was, and still is, to supervise the international trade 
from a legal standpoint. The formation of the WTO was necessitated by many problems 
encountered in commercial transactions between countries under the GATT law.59 This 
was because the GATT system was provisional, though almost for half a century. This, 
                                                 
55 “Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994” Article 3 provides:  
The “reasonable length of time” referred to in paragraph 5(c) of Article XXIV should exceed 
10 years only in exceptional cases. In cases where Members parties to an interim agreement 
believe that 10 years would be insufficient they shall provide a full explanation to the Council for 
Trade in Goods of the need for a longer period. 
56 It is called Marrakech Agreement as it was signed in Marrakech, Morocco, on 15 April 1994. 
57 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs came into being in 1947 and was renegotiated in 1994.  
58 General Agreement on Trade in Services. 
59 Van den Bossche, P et al. The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (2013) at 40. 
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however, does not mean that the GATT and the GATS no longer exist. One must 
understand that these two are not institutions, but agreements. The WTO, on the other hand, 
is an institution.60 
 
The original intention was to create a third institution to handle the trade side of 
international cooperation, joining the two “Bretton Woods” institutions (the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank). This institution was to be called the 
International Trade Organisation (ITO) and over 50 countries participated in negotiations 
to create it as a specialised agency of the United Nations. However, the draft ITO Charter 
was ambitious: it extended beyond world trade discipline, to include rules on employment, 
commodity agreements, restrictive business practices, international investments, and 
services.61 That is why it could not go far.  
 
In terms of Article XI(1) of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, the contracting parties 
to the GATT 1947 and the European communities which accept the Agreement shall 
become the original members of the WTO. This means membership of the WTO is divided 
into original members and ordinary members.62 However, it is not clear, from this Article 
or the Treaty in general, whether there will be a different treatment for these members or 
not. It looks, therefore, like conferring original membership is just an acknowledgement of 
support, and dedication of these members, to international trade – there is nothing special 
about it. This argument is supported by the WTO’s Appellate Body decision63 that the 
WTO Agreement is a “single treaty instrument which was accepted by the WTO members 
as a ‘single undertaking’ and binding on all members”.  
                                                 
60 Article II of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation provides:  
“(1) The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations 
among its Members in matters related to the agreements and associated legal instruments included 
in the Annexes to this Agreement.”  
Both the GATT and the GATS are listed in Annexes 1A and 1B respectively. 
61 Matsushita, M et al. The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and Policy (2006) at 1; Wolfrum, R 
et al. WTO [World Trade Organization]: Institutions and Dispute Settlement (2006) at 138. 
62 Tams, J et al. Documents in International Economic Law: Trade, Investment, and Finance (2012) at 61; 
Steinberger, E. “The WTO Treaty as a Mixed Agreement: Problems with the EC’s and the EC Member 
states’ Membership of the WTO” European Journal of International Law vol. 17 issue 4 (2006) 837 at 839.  
63 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconuts, WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted on 
20 March 1997, at 12; Steinberger (above) at 837. 
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Duties of the WTO include, inter alia, implementation of a large number of existing 
agreements that bear on international trade in goods, with the GATT occupying centre 
position in the group. It is also charged with overseeing agreements that cover services and 
intellectual property. The WTO’s jurisdiction, therefore, covers the GATT as well as 
various trade agreements concluded under the auspices of the GATT, such as the GATS 
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).64 It 
is also to cooperate with the IMF and the World Bank, with a view to achieving a greater 
coherence in global economic policy-making.65 
 
At the heart of the WTO are the international agreements negotiated and signed by the 
majority of the world’s trading nations which are its members. However, it is important to 
note that the WTO is not just about liberalising trade, because in some circumstances its 
rules support maintaining trade barriers to protect the poor.66 
 
2.1.1 Policy-making of the WTO 
 
The WTO has a Ministerial Conference, General Council and other specialised Councils, 
and Committees as its organs.67 The specialised Councils are: Council for Trade in Goods, 
Council for Trade in Services and a Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
                                                 
64 Gallagher, P. The First Ten Years of the WTO: 1995-2005 (2005) at 1; World Trade Organization. 
Understanding the WTO (September 2003) at 16; Matsushita, M et al. The World Trade Organization: 
Law, Practice and Policy (2006) at 1; Shukla, S.P. “From GATT to WTO and Beyond” The United Nations 
University Working Paper No. 195 (August 2000).    
65 Article III:5 of the WTO Agreement provides: “With a view to achieving greater coherence in global 
economic policy-making, the WTO shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund 
and with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its affiliated agencies.”  
In furtherance of the WTO’s mandate to ‘cooperate, as appropriate’ with the IMF, the Agreement Between 
the IMF and the WTO was concluded on 9 December 1996. The Agreement Between the WTO and the 
World Bank was signed on 28 April 1997; Sally, R. “Whither the world trading system? Trade policy 
reform: the WTO and prospects for the New Round” Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) Occasional Paper 
No 36, January 2003 at 18. 
66 Weiler, J.H.H et al. “International and Regional Trade Law: The Law of the World Trade Organization. 
Unit I: The Syntax and Grammar of International Trade Law” New York University Paper (2011) at 15.  
67 Article IV of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. 
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Property Rights. All these specialised councils operate under the general guidance of the 
General Council.68 
 
The Ministerial Conference is the highest organ and is composed of representatives of all 
member states, and meets at least once every two years. This Conference carries out the 
functions of the WTO and has the authority to take decisions on all matters under any of 
the trade agreements, if so requested by a member.69 
 
The General Council is also composed of representatives of all member states and is in 
session between the meetings of the Ministerial Conference. It also acts as the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) and the Trade Policy Review Body.70 This, however, poses a 
serious challenge of combining the political and judicial powers, i.e. in line with the 
“separation of powers principle”. However, this should be understood within the context 
of method(s) that the DSB follows: that is alternative dispute resolution (ADR) rather than 
“strict court” method.  
 
In essence the General Council is the real engine of the WTO, and has all the powers of the 
Ministerial Conference when that body is not in operation.71 The General Council has the 
following subsidiary bodies which oversee committees in different areas: 
 Council for Trade in Goods 
There are 11 committees72 under the jurisdiction of the Goods Council each with a 
specific task. All members of the WTO participate in the committees. The Textiles 
Monitoring Body is separate from the other committees, but still under the 
                                                 
68 Schott, J. “Decision-Making in the WTO” Policy Brief 2 March 2000.  
69 Ibid; Article IV(1). 
70 Article IV(2). 
71 Bartels, L. “The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism” International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly vol. 53 no. 4 (2004) 861 at 863; “Organisational Structure of the WTO” World 
Trade Organization Open Lab Space, available at labspace.open.ac.uk/mod/oucontent/view.php?id   
(accessed on 15 October 2013). 
72 These are: Committee on Market Access; Committee on Agriculture; Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures; Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices; Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures; Committee on Safeguards; Committee on Import Licensing; Committee on 
Customs Valuation; Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade; Committee on TRIMs; and Information 
and Technology Agreement (ITA) Committee.  
24 
 
jurisdiction of Goods Council. The body has its own chairman and only 10 
members. The body also has several groups relating to textiles.73 
 
 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
It deals with information on intellectual property in the WTO, news and official 
records of the activities of the TRIPS Council, and details of the WTO’s work with 
other international organisations in the field of intellectual property.74 
 
 Council for Trade in Services 
The Council for Trade in Services operates under the guidance of the General 
Council and is responsible for overseeing the functioning of the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS). It is open to all WTO members, and can create 
subsidiary bodies as required.75 
 
 Trade Negotiations Committee 
The Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) is the committee that deals with the 
current trade talks round. Its chairperson is the WTO's Director-General. As of June 
2012, the Committee was tasked with the Doha Development Round.76 
 
 Committee on Trade and Development  
It periodically reviews the special provisions in the multilateral trade agreements in 
favour of the least-developed member countries, and reports to the General Council 
for appropriate action.77  
 
                                                 
73 Wouters, J et al. “The World Trade Organization: a legal and institutional analysis” International Law 
Series vol.1 (2007) 3; World Trade Organization. Whose WTO is it anyway? (2008) 101. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Wouters (above).  
76 The Doha Round is the latest round of trade negotiations among the WTO membership, officially 
launched at the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001. Its aim is to 
achieve major reform of the international trading system through the introduction of lower trade barriers 
and revised trade rules. The Round is also known semi-officially as the “Doha Development Agenda” as a 
fundamental objective is to improve the trading prospects of developing countries. 
77  Wouters (fn 73). 
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The decisions within the WTO are taken through consensus first. In the event that a 
decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, it takes place through voting, in which case 
decisions are arrived at by a two-thirds majority of votes. Each member state has one vote, 
thus voting prowess is not dependant on a member’s contribution to international trade or 
its contribution to the budget of the WTO.78 
 
However, there are instances where even the two-thirds majority vote does not apply. These 
are instances of amendments relating to Article I, (Most-Favoured Nation principle), 
Article IX (decision-making), Article II of the GATT 1994 (Tariff concessions) and Article 
II of the GATS and Article 4 of the TRIPS (both MFN). In these instances decisions can 
only be made through or by the acceptance of all the member states.79 
 
2.1.2 Functions of the WTO 
 
The WTO is an organisation that intends to supervise and liberalise international trade. The 
full list of its functions is contained in Article III of the WTO Agreement,80 but the 
following are regarded by analysts as the most important: 
                                                 
78 Art. IX of the WTO Treaty; Pauwelyn, J. “The Transformation of World Trade” Michigan Law Review 
vol. 104 no. 1 (2005) 1 at 24.  
79 World Trade Organization. Understanding the WTO (September 2003) at 16; Article X(2) of the WTO 
Treaty.   
80 In terms of Article III of the Agreement, the functions of the WTO are: 
1. to facilitate the implementation, administration and operation, and further the objectives, of this 
Agreement and of the multilateral trade agreements, and to provide the framework for the 
implementation, administration and operation of the plurilateral trade agreements. 
2. to provide the reform for negotiations among its members concerning their multilateral trade 
relations in matters dealt with under the agreements in the annexes to the Agreement. The WTO 
may also provide a forum for further negotiations among its members concerning their 
multilateral trade relations, and a framework for the implementation of the results of such 
negotiations, as may be decided by the Ministerial Conference. 
3. to administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(Dispute Settlement Understanding or “DSU”) in the Annex of the Agreement. 
4. to administer the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) provided for in Annex 3 of the 
Agreement. 
5. with a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making, to cooperate with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and with the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) and its affiliated agencies. 
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 It oversees the implementation, administration and operation of the covered 
agreements.81 
 It provides a forum for negotiations and for settling disputes.82 
It can be said that the functions of the WTO are three-pronged: 
1. It is an organisation for liberalising trade.  
2. It is a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements.  
3. It is a place for them to settle trade disputes.83 
 
2.1.3 The Role of the WTO 
 
The WTO agreements are lengthy and complex because they are legal texts covering a 
wide range of activities.84 However, there are a number of simple, fundamental principles 
that are common to all of these agreements. These principles are the foundation of the 
multilateral trading system. They are: trade without discrimination; free trade; encouraging 
development and economic reform; predictability; and fair competition.85 However, only 
the first three are discussed in this thesis as they are the more relevant hereto.   
 
2.1.3.1 Trade without discrimination 
 
i. Most-Favoured-Nation treatment (MFN)86  
                                                 
81 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The Basics of the WTO: Environment and Trade: A 
handbook (2000) at 1.  
82 Deere, C. “Decision-making in the WTO: Medieval or Up-to-Date?” WTO Public Forum 26 September 
2006.  
83 World Trade Organization Understanding the WTO: Trading into the future (2011) at 9; Hoekman, B. 
The WTO: Functions and Basic Principles – A Handbook (2002) at 7; Matsushita, M et al. The World 
Trade Organization: Law, Practice and Policy (2006) at 9. 
84 They deal with agriculture, textile and clothing, banking, telecommunications, government purchases, 
industrial standards and product safety, food sanitation regulations, intellectual property, and much more. 
85 Bagwell, K et al. The Economics of the World Trading System (2004) at 7; Chan et al. “World Trade 
Organization” Paper prepared for Department of International Relations, Zaman University (2014) at 9. 
86 Article I(1) of GATT provides: 
“With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with 
importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or 
exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all 
rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and 
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This sounds like a contradiction because if taken literally it suggests special 
treatment, but in the WTO context it actually means non-discrimination – 
treating virtually everyone equally.87 This means that each member treats all the 
other members equally as “most-favoured” trading partners. If a country 
improves the benefits that it gives to one trading partner, it has to give the same 
“best” treatment to all the other WTO members so that they all remain “most-
favoured”.88  
 
The MFN, together with the National Treatment principle, is one of the two 
fundamental non-discrimination clauses on which the GATT/WTO system 
rests. The MFN treatment has been defined as the “cornerstone” of the WTO 
and the “defining principle” of the GATT.89 However, it is not limited to GATT 
as it is also stipulated in other WTO agreements such as the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services,90 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade91 and 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).92 
In all these agreements the principle is the same: that if a country grants another 
a special favour (such as a lower customs duty rate for one of their products), 
they have to do the same for all other WTO members. 
 
                                                 
with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for 
any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating 
in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.” 
87 According to Caplin, A and Krishna, K [Seoul Journal of Economics vol. 1 no. 3 (1988) 267] the term 
“Most-Favoured Nation” was first used in 1692 in a treaty between Denmark and the Hanse cities.  
88 Gazzini, T. “The Legal Nature of WTO Obligations and the Consequences of their Violation” European 
Journal of International Law vol. 17 issue 4 (2006) 723 at 727; Horn, H et al. “Economic and legal aspects 
of the Most-Favored-Nation clause” European Journal of Political Economy vol. 17 (2001) 233 at 234. 
89 “Most-Favoured Nation Treatment” UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
II, United Nations (2010) at 13; Banifatemi, Y. “The emerging jurisprudence on the most favoured-nation 
treatment in investment arbitration” in Bjorklund, A.K et al. Investment Treaty Law, Current Issues III 
(2008) at 239-272. 
90 Article II. 
91 Article 2(1). 
92 Article 4. 
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There is a debate in legal circles as to whether MFN clauses include only 
substantive rules or also procedural protections, especially in bilateral 
investment treaties. One side of the argument is that MFN clauses should be 
interpreted broadly.93 The underlying rationale for this side of the argument is 
that the term “treatment” in MFN clauses is in itself wide enough to be 
applicable to procedural matters such as dispute settlement. The argument goes 
further to say that as regards “all matters” MFN clauses, such a phrase should 
not be read narrowly as referring to “all similar matters” or “all other matters of 
the same kind” such that it excludes procedural matters.94 
 
The other side of the argument is that MFN clauses relate to the substantial 
protections afforded to investors and investments and that, therefore, their reach 
should not extend to procedural issues such as dispute resolution.95 
 
There is also another argument that says that in fact the MFN treatment should 
not be extended to dispute resolution. One of the judges in the Impregilo96 case 
(the Argentina-Italy BIT), Prof. Stern, views this debate from the “rights and 
conditions” perspective. In his view, an MFN clause can only concern the rights 
that an investor can enjoy – it cannot modify the fundamental conditions for the 
enjoyment of such rights.97 
 
However, there are some exceptions allowed by GATT Article XXIV. For 
example, countries can set up a free trade agreement (FTA) that applies only to 
                                                 
93 Majority decision of ICSID award in Impregilo SpA v Argentina (ICSID Case No ARB/07/17 – 21 June 
2011). 
94 There is a significant volume of case law to support this position. The leading decision is Maffezini v 
Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 – 25 January 2000). Other examples include: Gas Natural v. Argentina 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10 – 17 June 2005); Suez and Vivendi v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 – 
3 August 2006); and Camuzzi International v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/2 – 11 May 2005). 
95 The decisions to support this side of the argument include: Salini v. Jordan (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13 
– November 9, 2004); Plama v. Bulgaria (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24) – 8 February 2005); and Telenor v 
Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15 – 13 September 2006). 
96 Impreglio case (above, fn 93). 
97 Dissenting decision of ICSID award in Impregilo SpA v Argentina (ICSID Case No ARB/07/17 – 21 June 
2011). 
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goods traded within a group – discriminating against goods from outside. Or a 
country can give developing countries special access to their markets. Or a 
country can raise barriers against products that are considered to be traded 
unfairly from specific countries.98 
 
In general, the MFN means that every time a country lowers a trade barrier or 
opens up a market, it has to do so for the same goods or services from all its 
trading partners – whether rich or poor, weak or strong.99 
 
The MFN principle is embodied in Article I of the GATT and the question might 
be asked why this is so. The former Secretary of State for the World Trade 
Division, Jean-Daniel Gerber, is of the view that the order by which the drafters 
of the GATT have integrated the MFN principle and the provision on 
preferential trade agreements into the Agreement is not just the result of pure 
coincidence. He opines that the drafters of the GATT likely wished to convey 
an important message which could read: “Most-Favoured Nation treatment is 
the overall guideline and the fundamental principle of multilateralism. By 
contrast, free trade agreements and customs unions should only be allowed as 
exceptions to this overall principle, under the condition that they fulfil certain 
strict requirements.”100  
 
From a political perspective, trade liberalisation on the MFN basis provides 
protection for countries from the abuse of trade policy for political or non-trade 
purposes by more powerful countries. By contrast, preferential trade 
agreements may have exclusive, and therefore also exclusionary, character.101 
                                                 
98 These are Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) as allowed by Art. XXIV of GATT such as free trade 
agreements (FTA) and customs unions; Moore, M. The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and 
Political Analysis (2005) at 40. 
99 Moore, M. “The WTO’s first decade” World Trade Review vol. 4 no. 3 (2005) 359 at 362. 
100 Gerber, J. “Preferential Trade Agreements and the Most Favoured Nation Principle” presentation at the 
Conference on “Multilateralising Regionalism” Geneva, 11 September 2007. 
101 Weiler, J.H.H et al. “International and Regional Trade Law: The Law of the World Trade Organization. 
Unit II: Globalism v Regionalism” New York University Paper (2011) at 23; Davidson, P.J. “The Legal 
Framework for RTAs/FTAs” APEC Study Center Consortium Conference Paper The Asia-Pacific Region 
(2005). Available at www.apec.org.au/docs/koreapapers2/SX-PD-Paper.pdf (accessed on 14 January 2014). 
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Also the MFN principle is of particularly high value from the perspective of a 
small or medium-sized country. On the one hand, small and medium-sized 
countries often lack the market power necessary to negotiate commitments from 
larger partners. On the other hand, small and medium-sized countries depend 
much more on free trade than their larger counterparts because their firms 
require international markets in order to harvest the gains from specialisation 
and economies of scale.102  
 
By contrast, firms in large markets such as the United States of America (USA) 
may find a sufficiently large customer base already at home. The MFN principle 
has therefore done small and medium-sized economies a great service: it has 
secured a certain level of market access on a global scale and it has made sure 
that the concessions granted by members in the many trade rounds since the 
establishment of the GATT have been applied to all trade partners, regardless 
of their political or economic weight.103 
 
Despite its general acceptance as part of the WTO system, there is a most 
notable and long-standing concern about MFN, which is that it opens the 
possibility of countries “free riding” on the trade negotiations of others. This 
concern stems from the fact that whenever a few WTO members mutually 
exchange trade-barrier reductions, they must extend those reductions to all other 
WTO members under the MFN, even if the latter do not reciprocate. This means 
that, to the extent that non-reciprocating countries benefit from improved 
market access to liberalising countries (the so-called MFN externality), two 
related incentive problems emerge: countries may avoid entering into 
negotiations in the hope of free riding on the liberalisation of others; and 
                                                 
102 Gerber (fn 100).  
103 Gerber. 
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countries that do enter negotiations may reach inefficient agreements, as they 
do not fully internalise the benefits of their liberalisation.104 
 
According to Ludema and Mayda105 the severity of the MFN free rider effect is 
greater for markets in which the country has greater monopoly power in trade. 
This view is supported by Bagwell and Staiger106 who find no evidence of MFN 
free riding in the tariffs of countries recently acceding to the WTO, which are 
mostly developing and least-developed countries. 
 
ii. National treatment 
 
The National Treatment (NT) principle is found under Article III of the GATT, 
Article XVII of GATS and Article 3 of TRIPS and, together with the MFN 
principle, it is regarded as a cornerstone of the WTO trade law.107  This one, 
however, means treating foreigners and locals equally, that is giving others the 
same treatment as one’s own nationals. Imported and locally produced goods 
would thus be treated equally – at least after the foreign goods have entered the 
market.  
 
Unlike the MFN, the NT does not only refer to like products, but has also been 
interpreted to apply in the case of directly competitive or substitutable goods.108 
Its obligation in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is wider 
in scope, but more limited in application than that in the GATT. It is wider in 
                                                 
104 Ludema, R et al. “Do Countries Free Ride on MFN?” Journal of International Economics vol. 77 issue 
2 (2009) 1. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Bagwell, K et al. “What do trade negotiators negotiate about? Empirical evidence from the World Trade 
Organization” Stanford University Paper, July 2009. 
107 Horn, H et al. “Still Hazy after All These Years: The Interpretation of National Treatment in the 
GATT/WTO Case-law on Tax Discrimination” European Journal of International Law vol. 15 issue 1 
(2004) at 39; Gerhart, P et al. “Understanding National Treatment: The Participatory Vision of the WTO” 
Indiana International and Comparative Law Review vol. 14 (2003-2004) 505; Saggi, K et al. “National 
Treatment at the WTO: The Roles of Product and Country Heterogeneity” International Economic Review 
vol. 49 no. 4 (2008) 1365 at 1366. 
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scope because, while national treatment under GATT is concerned with 
measures affecting products per se, the domain of this obligation in the GATS 
includes not only measures affecting services products, but also measures 
affecting service suppliers. It is more limited in application because, while 
national treatment under the GATT applies across the board, under the GATS 
it applies only to scheduled sectors, and there too it may be subject to 
limitations.109 
 
For each WTO member states the national treatment principle covers virtually 
every policy of government, whether it is tax, law, regulation, etc.110 However, 
it only applies once a product, service or item of intellectual property has 
entered the market. Therefore, charging customs on an import is not a violation 
of national treatment even if locally produced products are not charged an 
equivalent tax.111 
 
The NT rule prevents countries from taking discriminatory measures on imports 
on the one hand, and to prevent countries from offsetting the effects of tariffs 
through non-tariff measures on the other. The purpose of the NT rule, therefore, 
is to eliminate “hidden” domestic barriers to trade by the WTO members 
through according imported products treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to products of national origin. The adherence to this principle is 
important to maintain the balance of rights and obligations, and is essential for 
the maintenance of the multilateral trading system.112 
 
                                                 
109 Mattoo, A.  “National Treatment in the GATS: Corner-stone or Pandora's Box?” Staff Working Paper, 
WTO Trade in Services Division (22 January 1997) at 2; Ahnlid, A. “Comparing GATT and GATS: 
Regime Creation under and after Hegemony” Review of International Political Economy vol. 3 (1996) 65.  
110 Horn, H. “National Treatment in GATT” The American Economic Review vol. 96 no. 1 (2006) 394.  
111 Marceau, G. “The WTO in the Emerging Energy Governance Debate” Global Trade and Customs 
Journal vol. 5 issue 3 (2010) 83 at 85. 
112 “National Treatment Principle”, available at www.docstoc.com/docs/.../NATIONAL-TREATMENT-
PRINCIPLE at 267 (accessed on 14 January 2014); Elahi, M. “National Treatment and Efficient Protection 
as adopted in IP treaties” Business, IPR & Global Perspective (2005) at 13.     
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Although national treatment is a basic principle under the GATT, Article III(8) 
provides for certain exceptions such as government procurement, domestic 
subsidies, and infant industries. This was made in order to protect domestic 
production in member states.113 The provisions of GATT Article XX on general 
exceptions, Article XXI on security exceptions, and WTO Article IX on waivers 
also apply to the national treatment rule.114 
 
An important derogation from the principle of non-discrimination in international 
commerce and the MFN treatment rule was the concept of special and differential 
treatment of developing countries, introduced into the GATT law under the “Enabling 
Clause”. Paragraph 2 of the Clause gave at least four examples of trade or tariff schemes 
under which developing countries could be favourably treated without bringing into 
operation the MFN treatment rule for the benefit of other GATT parties.115 
 
The examples included tariff schemes evolved under the GATT; regional or global 
arrangements entered into “among less-developed contracting parties” for the mutual 
reduction, or elimination, of tariffs and non-tariff measures, in accordance with criteria 
and conditions which may be prescribed, in respect of products imported from one 
another; and arrangements providing for the special treatment of the “least-developed 
among the developing countries” in the context of any general or specific measures in 
favour of developing states.116 
 
This list, however, did not cover all special and differential (SD) treatment 
arrangements that should have been covered. The most notable omission was that of 
                                                 
113 Article III(1) provides:  
“The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, 
regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, 
processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to 
imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.” 
114 Hoekman, B. The WTO: Functions and Basic Principles – A Handbook (2002) at 7. 
115 Ng’ong’ola, C. “The reconstitution of the Southern African Development Community: some 
international trade law perspectives” South African Law Journal vol. 50 no.117 (2000) 256 at 261. 
116 Ibid. 
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the Lomé Convention117 between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) states. The implication of this omission was that the legal cover for Lomé 
trade arrangements under the GATT law, unlike Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) schemes specifically mentioned in the Enabling Clause, continued to require 
waivers secured periodically in terms of Article XXV(5) of the GATT.118 
 
Paragraph 3 of the Enabling Clause listed three substantive conditions to be complied 
with by acceptable arrangements. It suggested that they must be designed to facilitate 
and promote the trade of other contracting parties; they must not constitute an 
impediment to tariff and trade liberalisation on MFN basis; and any treatment accorded 
by developed countries must be designed to respond positively to the development, 
financial and trade needs of the developing countries.119 
 
It was, however, uncertain whether “regional or global arrangements entered into 
among less-developed contracting parties” were also to be assessed in terms of the 
problematic external and internal trade facilitation parameters in paragraphs 5 and 8 of 
Article XXIV of the GATT. There was also no indication of the factors to be taken into 
account in the assessment of the position of each country on the development of 
continuum, from least-developed to developed contracting party.120 
 
Article XI(2) of the WTO Agreement, on original membership, clarified some of the 
ambiguities on the identification of the beneficiaries of SD treatment. It indicated that 
only the “least-developed countries, recognised as such by UN”, would be entitled to 
seek exemptions from some of the obligations entailed by the WTO membership on 
                                                 
117 The “Lomé Convention” is a trade and aid agreement between the European Union (EU) and African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, first signed in February 1975 in Lomé, Togo. In June 2000 it was 
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118 Ritter, L et al. European Competition Law: A Practitioner's Guide (2004) at 93 – 96.  
119 Ng’ong’ola (above, fn 115) at 264; Grossman, G et al. “A preference for development: the law and 
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account of their development, financial and trade needs, or their administrative and 
institutional capabilities. This was to wean developing countries off concessionary or 
SD treatment in international law and diplomatically encouraging the participation and 
integration of developing countries within the multilateral trading system.121 
 
The only instrument on trade in goods directly dealing with formation of regional 
trading arrangements is the “Understanding on the interpretation of Article XXIV”.122 
This, with its imperfections, must be the primary instrument to be applied in the 
assessment of arrangements such as the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), which bring together countries placed in different development categories 
under the UN criteria that are now applicable.123  
 
Under the WTO, the SADC countries are involved in tariff reduction and simplification 
of their complicated tariff systems. In particular, as a more developed country, South 
Africa, has honoured significant commitments of trade liberalisation under the WTO. 
These commitments have liberalised the access of the South African market for third 
countries, and so eroded the preferences South Africa extended to the other SADC 
countries in the context of bilateral trade agreements (BTAs), or is about to extend to 
them in the context of the new trade agreements. 124 
 
2.1.3.2 Encouraging development and economic reform 
 
The WTO system contributes to development, and the developing countries need 
flexibility in the time they take to implement the system’s agreements. The agreements 
themselves inherit the earlier provisions of the GATT that allow for special assistance 
                                                 
121 Ng’ong’ola at 269. 
122 This “Understanding”, as agreed to by member states, has been added to the original Article XXIV as an 
update.  
123 Ng’ong’ola at 273. 
124 Ng’ong’ola at 276; Alavi, A et al. “EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs): Institutional 
and Substantive Issues”, Paper for the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen 2007 
at 26 – 28. 
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and trade concessions for developing countries.125 Over three quarters of the WTO 
members are developing countries and countries in transition to market economies. 
Developing countries and transition economies were much more active and influential 
in the Uruguay Round126 negotiations than in any previous round, and they are even 
more so in the current Doha Development Agenda.127 
 
A Ministerial Decision adopted at the end of the Uruguay Round says that developed 
countries should accelerate implementing market access commitments on goods 
exported by the least-developed countries, and it seeks increased technical assistance 
for them. More recently, developed countries have started to allow duty-free and quota-
free imports for almost all products from least-developed countries. The current Doha 
Development Agenda includes developing countries’ concerns about the difficulties 
they face in implementing the Uruguay Round agreements. 128 
 
This principle is more beneficial for less developed countries because it gives them 
more time to adjust, greater flexibility, and special privileges.129 It is also, as with other 
principles, not absolute but subject to exceptions. In terms of the GATT Articles XI 
and XII, a member country may issue quantitative restrictions in respect of export of 
certain goods or the importation of certain agricultural products, or to safeguard their 
external financial positions and balance of payment or other non-tariff barriers.130  
                                                 
125 Weiler, J.H.H et al. “International and Regional Trade Law: The Law of the World Trade Organization. 
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Conference, September 2005. 
129 Steers, R.M et al. Managing in the Global Economy (2005) at 44. 
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Reforms of the multilateral trading system during the Uruguay Round took into account 
the poor record of the GATT mechanisms in the implementation of Article XXIV, and 
the threat posed to the system by the resurgence of regional trading arrangements in the 
1990s. The four substantive requirements remained unchanged, and fairly uncertain, 
except for the clarification that a “reasonable length of time” for the implementation 
arrangements under interim agreements should exceed 10 years only in “exceptional 
cases”, calling for a “full explanation” of the need for a longer period.131 
 
2.1.3.3 Free trade 
 
Free trade implies removing trade barriers gradually through negotiations. The barriers 
concerned include customs duties (or tariffs) and measures such as import bans or 
quotas that restrict quantities selectively. It falls within one of the primary objectives 
of the WTO, which is to identify and neutralise obstacles to “free trade”.132 Opening 
markets can be beneficial, but it also requires adjustment. The WTO agreements 
therefore allow countries to introduce changes gradually, through “progressive 
liberalisation”. However, developing countries are usually given longer to fulfil their 
obligation.133 
 
According to Rose134 free trade does not lead to countries that join the WTO to reduce 
their trade barriers. He states that many countries, it seems, choose to reduce their 
                                                 
131 Saurombe, A. “The Southern African Development Community trade legal instruments compliance with 
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barriers before they join the WTO or even if they have no plans of joining. From this 
one can deduce that countries would be attracted to the WTO by their realisation that 
they meet the requirements of free trade anyway.   
 
The WTO has extended application of free trade to areas such as health, environment, 
sustainable development, etc.135 This is clear in the Appellate Body’s decisions, which 
recognise that it is no longer possible for the WTO to uphold the free trade goals of the 
GATT 1994, such as promoting market access, above all these other concerns and 
goals.136 
 
Trade negotiations have been a sore point of the GATT/WTO system since the GATT’s 
creation.  Eight rounds137 have failed and the ninth round started in 2001 under the 
“Doha Development Agenda” with the WTO as host and is still continuing. It was 
supposed to end in 2006, but this was already doubtful when in August 2004 a special 
session was held in Mauritius to forge ways for implementation of the Doha 
Agreement.138 This was after the developing countries raised some concerns about 
tariffs and subsidies during the 2003 Cancun talks.   
 
From the failure of these trade talks one might ask the question: is the WTO necessary 
for free trade talks? This is relevant because the WTO doesn’t dictate policy, as any 
intergovernmental body. It provides a forum for members to discuss concerns and find 
solutions. It makes decision by consensus and if any of the members dislike an 
agreement the agreement does not get made.  
 
                                                 
135 Ala’I, P. “Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of the WTO Appellate Body’s Shift to a 
More Balanced Approach to Trade Liberalization” American University International Law Review vol. 14 
no. 4 (1999) 1129. 
136 Report of the Appellate Body on United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
April 26, 1996, WTO Doc. No. \T/DS2JAB1R; Report of the Appellate Body on United States-Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, October 12, 1998, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS58AB'R. 
137 See fn 127. 
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During the Cancun and Doha talks an agreement was not reached for exactly the same 
reason. Poor countries felt that rich countries were trying to hold on to their profits. 
However, some commentators feel that this can’t be the reason as rich countries do not 
need the WTO for that, given that many already have bilateral agreements with other 
countries and also belong to other regional blocs. They say countries belong to the 
WTO because they see its advantages towards unifying the trade regime globally.139  
 
However, on 7 December 2013, in a meeting held in Bali, Indonesia, the WTO’s 159 
members reached a major agreement to lower barriers to international trade. The most-
important component of this agreement, known as “trade facilitation”, sets minimum 
standards for customs administration. It aims to reduce the amount of bureaucracy 
involved in clearing customs and limit delays at borders, in ports and in transit. 140  
 
The “Bali Package”, as this Agreement is known, is a legally binding agreement and 
covers three more areas – besides trade facilitation – namely, agriculture, cotton and 
development issues. It entered into operation on 22 February 2017.141 The agreement 
on agriculture focuses on shielding public stockholding programmes for food security 
in developing countries, so that they would not be challenged legally even if a country’s 
agreed limits for trade-distorting domestic support were breached.  
 
The Ministerial Conference also adopted five other decisions on the WTO’s regular 
work:  
(1) In intellectual property, members agreed not to bring “non-violation” cases 
to the WTO dispute settlement process — “non-violation” is shorthand for 
the technical question of whether there can be legal grounds for complaint 
                                                 
139 “Does WTO promote free Trade?” The Daily Iowan Newspaper (online version) of 10 December 2004, 
available at dailyiowan.lib.uiowa.edu/DI/2004/di2004-12-02.pdf (accessed on 16 January 2014).    
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about loss of an expected right under the WTO’s intellectual property 
agreement, even when the agreement has not been violated. 
(2) In electronic commerce, members agreed not to charge import duties on 
electronic transmissions. The Work Programme also encourages continued 
discussions on electronic commerce in relation to commercial issues, 
development and new technology. 
(3) Ministers decided to give special consideration to issues of small 
economies. Ministers instructed the Committee on Trade and Development 
to consider proposals on small economies and make recommendations to 
the General Council.  
(4) Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to Aid for Trade, an initiative that 
assists developing countries, and in particular least-developed countries, to 
trade. They welcomed progress on Aid for Trade since its launch in 2005 
and mandated the Director-General to continue the support of the 
programme. 
(5)  Ministers directed their Geneva delegations to continue examining the link 
between trade and transfer of technology and make possible 
recommendations on steps that might be taken to increase flows of 
technology to developing countries. The mandate was given at the 2001 
Doha declaration.142 
 
The “Bali Package” – though it falls short of the more ambitious global free-trade deal 
championed by the WTO ever since the 2001 Doha Round of talks – brings hope that 
the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) could be achieved. 
 
2.1.4 Legal status and dispute settlement system of the WTO 
 
In terms of Article VIII of the WTO Treaty, the WTO has legal personality and shall be 
accorded by each of its members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise 
                                                 
142 “Protocol Amending the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization” General 
Council Decision of 27 November 2014 (WT/L/940).  
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of its functions. Though not expressly stated, this means the WTO can sue and be sued as 
well as be able to conclude a contract. This much is supported by Article VIII(5) where it 
is stated that the WTO may conclude a headquarters agreement. 
 
The officials of the WTO and the representatives of the member states shall not be 
responsible for actions committed while discharging their official duties for the WTO.143 
These officials and representatives shall also be given the same privileges and immunities 
as those given to officials of other UN specialised agencies, such as the IMF and the World 
Bank.144 
 
The settlement of trade disputes under the GATT was blamed for many weaknesses, 
including the lack of an institutional framework and procedure for the resolution of disputes 
as well as questions of delay, uncertainties, and ineffectiveness. This led to the WTO 
adopting the “Dispute Settlement Understanding” (DSU).145 This new WTO dispute 
settlement procedure presents a crucial step towards a more rule-oriented system and 
represents a significant improvement over the GATT dispute resolution system.146 
 
The “Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes” (the 
Understanding)147 shall apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes between 
members concerning their rights and obligations under the provisions of the “Agreement 
Establishing the WTO”. In terms of these rules the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is 
established to administer these rules and procedures, as well as the consultation and dispute 
settlement provisions of the covered agreement.148 The DSB is empowered to establish 
panels, and adopt Panel and Appellate Body (AB) reports. In terms of Article 2(2) the DSB 
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is to inform the relevant WTO councils and committees of any developments in disputes 
related to provisions of the respective covered agreements. The DSB takes decisions by 
consensus.149 
 
The jurisdiction of the DSB is, however, limited in some important respects. For example, 
it is not empowered to adopt in abstract interpretations of the multilateral trade agreements 
or the Agreement Establishing the WTO. This function is reserved for the exclusive 
authority of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council. Thus, the aim of the 
dispute settlement process is to settle “real” disputes only. The process is not intended to 
clarify the law outside the context of the dispute.150 
 
Article 3(2) of the Understanding gives the members of the WTO assurance that this 
dispute settlement system will not undermine the rights and duties of parties agreed to in 
treaties, and also that it respects and abide by the international law. It states that 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB could not add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements. This shows the independence of the DSB. 
The DSB shall also strife for the speedy or expedient resolution of disputes to avoid 
backlogs and prejudice to members.151 
 
Article 3(7) of the Understanding provides that the aim of the dispute settlement 
mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to 
the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. 
In the absence of this mutual solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement 
mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found 
to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements.  
 
Compensation, as one of the possible awards, will only be resorted to if the immediate 
withdrawal of the measure is impracticable, and as a temporary measure pending the 
                                                 
149 Art. 2(4) of the “Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes”. 
150 Qureshi, A.H et al. International Economic Law (2007) at 350. 
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withdrawal of the measure which is inconsistent with a covered agreement. This provision 
makes sense especially when one looks at the difficulties associated with “enforcement” at 
international law level. This is what led to some commentators to put it thus: “The WTO 
has no jailhouse, no blue helmets, no truncheons or teargas”.152   
 
There are different methods available for conflict resolutions in terms of the 
Understanding. The principal method is adjudication through panel process, subject to an 
appeal procedure. The other methods include consultation procedures, good offices, 
conciliation, mediation, and arbitration. The emphasis in the use of all these methods is on 
ensuring a “consensual” resolution between the members, rather than necessarily a rule-
orientated decision.153 
 
With regard to consultations, the rules provide that all requests for consultations shall be 
notified to the DSB and the relevant councils and committees by the member which 
requests consultations. Such a request for consultation shall be in writing and shall give the 
reasons for the request, including identification of the measures at issue and an 
identification of the legal basis for the complaint.154 
 
Article 4(6) of the Understanding states that the consultations should be confidential and 
without prejudice to the rights of any member in any further proceedings. If the 
consultations fail to settle a dispute within 60 days after the date of receipt of the request 
for consultations, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel. 
However, in cases of urgency, the period of entering into consultations shall be reduced to 
within 10 days. If the consultations have failed to settle the dispute within a period of 20 
days after the date of receipt of the request, the complaining party may request the 
establishment of a panel.155  
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Good offices, conciliation and mediation procedures, as provided for by Article 5 of the 
Understanding, are also confidential and without prejudice. These procedures may be 
requested at any time by any party to a dispute. They may begin at any time and be 
terminated at any time. Once procedures for good offices, conciliation or mediation are 
terminated, a complaining party then proceed with a request for the establishment of a 
panel.  
 
Since these procedures are optional and additional to the consultations, the complaining 
party must allow a period of 60 days after the date of receipt of the request for consultations 
to elapse before requesting the establishment of a panel. The complaining party may 
request the establishment of a panel during the 60-day period if the parties to the dispute 
jointly consider that the good offices, conciliation or mediation process has failed to settle 
the dispute. If the parties to a dispute agree, these procedures may continue while the panel 
process proceeds. 
 
The most important question, though, is: is the 60-day timeframe enough for the settlement 
of these international disputes? Recent case law, however, shows that at the request of 
parties to the dispute the DSB can extend this time frame if exceptional circumstances are 
shown.156  
 
The Panel itself is composed of well-qualified persons, including lawyers and academics. 
There are no nominations by government for members of the Panel, and also no opposition 
to candidates except for compelling reasons. To show fairness, citizens to a country in 
dispute may not serve on the Panel.157 
 
The Panel is to produce a final report within six months of its establishment; and in cases 
which require urgent consideration including cases involving perishable goods, the final 
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report is produced within three months. However, the Panel is to issue an interim report for 
consideration of the parties before a final report is recommended. This final report must 
then be adopted within 60 days of its issuance. However, the final report will not be adopted 
if one of the parties to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its intention to appeal or if 
it is decided by the DSB by consensus not to adopt the report.158 
 
There is also the Standing Appellate Body, appointed by the DSB, to hear appeals from 
panel cases.159 It is composed of seven persons, three of whom serve on any one case. Their 
term of office is four years and each person may be reappointed only once.160 These persons 
shall be experts in law, international trade and the subject-matter of the covered agreements 
generally. They shall be broadly representative of membership in the WTO and shall not 
participate in the considerations of any disputes that would create a direct or indirect 
conflict of interest.161 
 
The appeal to this body can only be noted by parties to the dispute. Third parties may take 
part in the appeal as interested parties by notifying the body of their intention by written 
application. The proceedings of appeal shall not exceed 60 days from the date a party to 
the dispute formally notifies its decision to appeal to the date the Appellate Body circulates 
its report. When this body is of the opinion that it cannot provide its report within 60 days, 
it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of 
the period within which it will submit its report. However, in no case shall the proceedings 
exceed 90 days. That is, if the body has failed to submit its report within 60 days, it would 
only be given another 30 days within which to finish the report.162 
 
An appeal to the Appellate Body shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel 
report and legal interpretations developed by the Panel. The body will then address each of 
the issues raised. The proceedings shall be confidential and the reports shall be drafted 
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without the presence of the parties to the dispute.163 This body may uphold, modify or 
reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the Panel.164 
 
The DSB shall adopt the report of the Appellate Body and the parties to the dispute shall 
unconditionally accept it, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report 
within 30 days following its circulation to the members.165 
 
The decisions or judgments of the Panel and the Appellate Body shall be in the form of 
recommendations. For example, where a Panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a 
measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement it shall recommend that the member 
concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement. To show their justice or 
fairness, a Panel or the Appellate Body cannot add or diminish the rights and obligations 
of the parties provided in the covered agreements when making their findings or 
recommendations.166 
 
The time-frame for the decisions of the DSB shall be within 9 months from the date of the 
establishment of the Panel until the date the DSB considers the Panel or appellate report 
for adoption, unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise. However, where there is an 
appeal against the report the time-frame will be 12 months. That is, an addition of 3 
months.167 
 
As an alternative and expeditious means of dispute settlement, arbitration is also provided 
for. However, this shall only be resorted to if both parties to the dispute agree to the 
arbitration. Agreement to arbitration shall be notified to all members sufficiently in 
advance of the actual commencement of the arbitration process. Other members may 
become party to an arbitration proceeding only upon the agreement of the parties which 
have recourse to arbitration, i.e. main parties. The parties shall agree to abide by the 
                                                 
163 Article 17(9) of the Understanding. 
164 Article 17(13) of the Understanding. 
165 Article 17(14) of the Understanding. 
166 Article 19 of the Understanding. 
167 Article 20 of the Understanding. 
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arbitration award. The awards shall be notified to the DSB and the Council or Committee 
of any relevant agreement where any member may raise any point relating thereto.168 
 
As a measure of compliance, a member must confirm intention to implement the report 
within a reasonable time. This intention must be conveyed to the DSB within days of the 
adoption of the report by the DSB. The arbiter decides the reasonableness on case-by-case 
basis. The DSB then tracks implementation of the Panel’s or Appellate Body’s report.169 
 
For remedies, the DSB favours the general rule that a challenged measure be terminated or 
phased out. There could also be a recommendation to bring matters in conformity with 
agreement in terms of Article 19(1). If a member fails with this recommendation, voluntary 
compensation could be agreed upon as concession – not punitive damages.170 
 
This, however, does not mean that the system is that of “breach and pay”.171 This is so 
because if there is no agreement within 21 days on compensation retaliation could be 
resorted to. However, the retaliation must meet the following requirements: it must be 
under guidance of DSB; it must be proportionate to the impairment; it must be of/within 
same section of economy; and must not be a prohibited action in terms of (international) 
law.172 
 
There could also be a cross retaliation instead of ordinary retaliation. This, however, must 
meet the following requirements: there must be proof that it is not effective to retaliate in 
the same sector or that retaliation in this domain is not practicable; must be subjected to 
review in mini-arbitration to ensure proportionality; that it is temporary and it does not 
distort trade. However, distortion of trade – which is a policy that alters the amount of 
                                                 
168 Article 25 of the Understanding. 
169 Qureshi, A.H et al. International Economic Law (2007) at 357. 
170 World Trade Organization. Understanding the WTO (2010) at 55. 
171 Bello, J.H. “The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More”  American Journal of 
International Law vol. 90 no. 3 (1996) 416.  
172 World Trade Organization. Understanding the WTO (2010) at 55. 
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trade, up or down, from what it would otherwise be – can be allowed in exceptional 
cases.173 Also, in exceptional cases, the DSB can order for specific performance.  
 
Under the WTO system, the dispute can be set in motion under three circumstances: first 
when a party considers that another country has taken a measure that impairs or nullifies 
its benefits under any of the covered agreements through a breach or failure to carry out 
the obligations created (violation claim).174 Second, when, without a violation of any of the 
agreements, a measure taken by another country results in such impairment or nullification 
(a non-violation claim).175 Third, when such nullification or impairment occurs for “any 
other situation” (a situation claim).176 
 
For a violation claim, the general rule is that it is sufficient for the claiming party to allege 
that there is a violation, whereupon the burden of proof shifts to the defending party to 
prove that no such violation has occurred.177  
 
Under the dispute settlement mechanism, the remedy to which a party is entitled depends 
on whether the claim relates to a violation or non-violation measure. Thus, where the 
impairment or nullification is the result of a violation measure, the complaining party 
would be entitled to the whole range of remedies available under the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU). In the case of a non-violation measure, the DSU normally 
recommends that parties agree to a compensatory arrangement or to “a mutually 
satisfactory adjustment as final settlement”.178   
 
No matter how clear this dispute settlement system may seem to be, Qureshi and Ziegler179 
are of the opinion that it offers a number of challenges for developing member states. They 
opine, first, that a number of provisions are hortatory and difficult to enforce in relation to 
                                                 
173 ibid 
174 Article 18(1)(a) of the Understanding. 
175 Article 18(1)(b) of the Understanding. 
176 Article 18(1)(c) of the Understanding. 
177 Article 3 of the Understanding. 
178 Article 26 (1)(b), (d) and (2) of the Understanding. 
179 Qureshi, A.H et al. International Economic Law (2007) at 371. 
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developing countries. Secondly, the consensual character of the process is “power based” 
and developing countries do not have this power. More so the system does not appear to 
allow a third member state to retaliate on behalf of another member. Thirdly, the 
developing members, despite the provision for assistance from the WTO, can have 
problems in having access to relevant expertise in order to engage in litigation. 
 
However, with regard to regional arrangements or bodies there seems to be some clarity. 
With the adoption of the “Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV”180, it is now 
clear that the WTO members can invoke the dispute settlement procedure to challenge the 
RTA formation or any other aspect relating to RTAs under Article XXIV of the GATT. 
Among other things the Understanding sets a “reasonable length of time” of 10 years for 
interim agreements. 
 
In the case “Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkish 
Textiles)”181 the WTO Appellate Body held that Article XXIV of the GATT did not allow 
Turkey to impose trade restrictions which violate other WTO provisions, such as Articles 
XI and XIII, where less restrictive measures could have been introduced to avoid disrupting 
trade in the proposed customs union. The Appellate Body further held that paragraph 4 of 
Article XXIV expresses “purposive” and not “operative” language. 
 
The Turkish Textiles decision shows that RTAs can exist in the WTO regime, but remain 
subject to scrutiny regarding their multilateral trade obligations. With this case it was for 
the first time that the Appellate Body had been called upon to interpret Article XXIV of 
the GATT 1994 and the related “Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of 
the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade 1994”.  
 
                                                 
180 It is officially called “Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs 1994” in order to formalise further details concerning RTA disciplines. 
181 Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, AB-1999-5, WT/DS34/AB/R, (99-
4546), adopted by Dispute Settlement Body, 19 November 1999.  
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The case also shows that notwithstanding the absence of any authoritative pronouncement, 
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is not foreclosed as a possible forum even in cases 
of internal violations of regional trade arrangements.182  
 
There is also another enforcement mechanism, despite the dispute settlement, that the WTO 
uses, called the “Trade Policy Review Mechanism”. This Mechanism embraces conflict 
resolution as opposed to surveillance and supervision techniques embraced by the dispute 
settlement. The responsibility for its administration vests with the Trade Policy Review 
Body (TPRB), which is essentially the General Council acting under a different 
framework.183 The main aim of this body is to regularly examine individual members’ trade 
policies and practices. 
 
2.2. WTO and Regional Trade 
 
2.2.1 Applicability of the WTO Law in RTAs 
 
Having accepted the regional trade agreements (RTAs) as part of the WTO system the 
question that will necessarily follow is: “what role should the WTO law play in the 
decisions taken by panels, in interpreting RTA provisions that either incorporate or 
resemble the WTO language; What could be the theoretical underpinnings that could link 
them? This question is necessary as there will be an interface between the WTO law (treaty 
and dispute settlement mechanisms) and the number of dispute settlement panels that are 
provided for under the RTAs.  
 
At the outset it is apparent that the WTO law does have an impact on interpretation outside 
the WTO. As such, at the very least, the relationship between the WTO law and the RTA 
law will be one of influence and persuasiveness where there is common treaty language. 
                                                 
182 Odour, M. “Resolving Trade Disputes in Africa: Choosing between multilateralism and regionalism: 
The case of COMESA and WTO” Tulane Journal of international and Comparative Law vol. 13 (2005) 
177 at 181. 
183 Articles III and IV of the WTO Agreement. 
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However, since an RTA is an international treaty, it is subject to the textual approach of 
interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”).184 
 
In the Turkey – Textiles case the Panel stated at the outset that panels and the Appellate 
Body should not ignore bilateral and regional trade agreements in the interpretation of the 
WTO agreements. This was in recognition of the fact that RTAs have greatly increased in 
number and importance since the establishment of the GATT in 1947 and today cover a 
significant portion of world trade. Another factor is that the economic and political realities 
that prevailed when Article XXIV of the GATT was drafted have evolved and the scope of 
RTAs is now broader than it was in 1947.  
 
Hsu185 is of the view that where there is a language in the RTA that is similar or identical 
to that of the WTO Treaty, an RTA panel would have to interpret the RTA language in 
accordance with principles of the Vienna Convention (i.e. good faith, etc.), and might 
therefore, in the light of that RTA’s text, context and objective, come to an interpretation 
that differs from what is in a particular WTO case. In terms of the Vienna Convention every 
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith186 and a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its 
failure to perform a treaty187. 
 
In other words, there should not be blind or slavish reference to the WTO interpretations 
since the RTA is a separate treaty, equally subject to rules used in interpreting international 
law. This is more so because, at the very least, the WTO cases may form “judicial 
                                                 
184 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was adopted on 22 May 1969 and entered into force on 
27 January 1980, in accordance with Article 84(1). It can be found in the Official Publication in United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155 at 331. Article 31(1) of the Convention states: “A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. 
185 Locknie Hsu quoted in Bartels. L et al. Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal Systems (2006) 
at 541. Hsu is an Associate Professor and former Associate Dean at the School of Law, Singapore 
Management University. 
186 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
187 Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
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decisions” to be used by an RTA panel as subsidiary source of international law under 
Article 38(1)(d) of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute.188 
 
However, it should be borne in mind that several provisions in the WTO agreements do 
establish a hierarchy between the WTO-covered agreements and regional trade agreements, 
including GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article 5 and Article IX(3) of the WTO Agreement. 
To the extent that these provisions set out the conditions that customs unions, free trade 
areas and other preferential arrangements must meet, in order to be tolerated by the 
multilateral trading system, the WTO regime is superior to those preferential arrangements 
of various natures.189 Simply put, this means that in cases where the two regimes are 
applicable the WTO regime will supersede the RTA regime.    
 
2.2.2 Application of RTAs within the WTO  
 
When one looks at the institutions of the WTO one cannot help, but think that the WTO’s 
institutional framework seems to be hindering the incorporation of regional economic 
agreements into the WTO. This, however, should not be surprising given the fact that the 
WTO is an organisation propagating for multilateralism, as opposed to regionalism.190 But 
as it has been stated above, the WTO does allow regional economic agreements, despite 
the view held by some that they tend to undermine the development of the multilateral trade 
system as well as posing an institutional threat to the WTO.191 
                                                 
188 Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides: “The Court, whose function 
is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply subject to 
the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” 
189 Bartels (fn 185) at 564; Morgan, D. “Dispute Settlement under RTAs: Political or Legal?” in Buckley, R 
et al. Challenges to Multilateral Trade: The Impact of Bilateral, Preferential and Regional Agreements 
(2008) 241-260; Pauwelyn, J. “Legal avenues to ‘multilateralizing regionalism’: beyond Article XXIV” in 
Baldwin, R et al. Multilateralizing Regionalism: Challenges for the Global Trading System (2008) at 389.  
190 Picker, C.B. “Regional Trade Agreements v the WTO: A proposal for reform of Article XXIV to 
counter this threat” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economics vol. 16 (2005) 267 at 
268 – 273.  
191 Chapter 2 of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, World Bank, Global Economic 
Prospects: Trade Regionalism & Development (2005) [hereinafter World Bank, Global Economic 
Prospects]; Picker, C.B. “Regional Trade Agreements v. The WTO: A 
Proposal for Reform of Article XXIV to Counter this Institutional Threat” Journal of International Law 
vol. 26 (2005) 267 at 270. 
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This then means that RTAs and the WTO share the common objective of trade 
liberalisation, with the former being discriminatory and the latter not. The pursuance of 
similar objectives, however, according to different approaches, creates inevitably some 
tension in this relationship. The tension has extensive ramifications and may pose a threat 
to a balanced development of world trade through increased trade and investment 
diversion, particularly if liberalisation on a preferential basis is not accompanied by 
concurrent MFN liberalisation; it also poses a threat to the business community and to the 
global production system on which it operates by raising costs through regulatory 
complexity and shifting production from comparative advantage to competitive 
preferences.192 
 
The regional trade agreements (RTAs) have been seen as both building blocks and 
stumbling blocks to multilateral liberalisation.193 As building blocks, RTAs facilitate the 
further liberalisation of trade through fora such as the WTO; they establish incentives that 
lead governments to oppose protectionism generally at both regional and multilateral 
levels.194 As stumbling blocks, they divert trade and clash with the economic goals of 
multilateral liberalisation.195 However, confronted with the reality of proliferation of the 
RTAs the WTO was forced to go with the lesser of the “two evils”, that is, making the 
exception for the RTAs to exist within its multilateral framework.   
 
Regional agreements have allowed groups of countries to negotiate rules and commitments 
that go beyond what was possible at the time multilaterally. In turn, some of these rules 
have paved the way for agreement in the WTO. Services, intellectual property, 
environmental standards, investment and competition policies are all issues that were raised 
                                                 
192 Fiorentino, R et al. “The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements: 2006 Update” WTO 
Discussion Paper No 12, World Trade Organization (2007) at 26. 
193 Bartels (fn 185) at 24; Fink, C et al. “Services provisions in regional trade agreements: stumbling or 
building blocks for multilateral liberalization?” Paper presented at the Conference on 
Multilateralising Regionalism 10-12 September 2007, Geneva, Switzerland.  
194 Bartels (fn 185) at 24; Baldwin, R. “Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs 
on the Path to Global Free Trade” The World Economy vol. 29 no. 11 (2006) 1451.  
195 Bartels (fn 185) 24; Levy, P. “A Political-Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements” American 
Economic Review vol. 87 no. 4 (1997) 506; Krishna, P. “Regionalism and Multilateralism: A Political 
Economy Approach” Quarterly Journal of Economics vol. 113 no. 1 (1998) 227. 
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in regional negotiations and later developed into agreements or topics of discussion in the 
WTO.196 
 
Normally, setting up a customs union or a free trade area would violate the WTO’s 
principle of equal treatment for all trading partners (“most-favoured-nation”). But the 
GATT’s Article XXIV allows regional trading arrangements to be set up as a special 
exception, provided certain strict criteria are met. These are: 
 Customs unions and free trade areas (FTAs) are exempted from the MFN clause 
only if such an arrangement does not increase existing levels of trade restrictions 
affecting non-member countries;  
 If existing trade barriers are raised to outsiders, compensation may be required;  
 The arrangement must lead to significant liberalisation - in particular, it must cover 
“substantially all” trade between participating countries; and  
 interim arrangements should lead to formation of FTAs or customs unions within a 
reasonable period of time.197 
 
In particular, the arrangements should help trade flow more freely among the countries in 
the group without barriers being raised on trade with the outside world. In other words, 
regional integration should complement the multilateral trading system and not threaten it. 
 
Article XXIV of the GATT states that if a free trade area or a customs union is created, 
duties and other trade barriers should be reduced or removed on substantially all sectors of 
trade in the group. Non-members should not find trade with the members of the group any 
more restrictive than before the group was set up.  
 
                                                 
196 Schott, J.J. The WTO After Seattle (2000) 1; Panagariya, A. “Developing Countries at Doha: A Political 
Economy Analysis” The World Economy vol. 25 issue 11 (2002) 1; World Trade Organization. 
“Understanding the WTO: Cross-Cutting and New Issues: Regionalism - friends or rivals?” Available at 
www.wto.org (accessed on 16 January 2014).  
197 Article 24 (XXIV) of GATT. 
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Similarly, Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provides for 
economic integration agreements in services. It provides as follows: 
 
“1.        This Agreement shall not prevent any of its members from being a party to 
or entering into an agreement liberalising trade in services between or among the 
parties to such an agreement, provided that such an agreement: 
(a)        has substantial sectoral coverage, and  
(b)       provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination, 
in the sense of Article XVII, between or among the parties, in the sectors 
covered under subparagraph (a), through: 
(i)        elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or 
(ii)        prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures, 
either at the entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of a reasonable 
time-frame, except for measures permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIV and 
XIV bis. 
 
2. In evaluating whether the conditions under paragraph 1(b) are met, 
consideration may be given to the relationship of the agreement to a wider 
process of economic integration or trade liberalisation among the countries 
concerned. 
 
3.       (a) Where developing countries are parties to an agreement of the type 
referred to in paragraph 1, flexibility shall be provided for regarding the conditions 
set out in paragraph 1, particularly with reference to subparagraph (b) thereof, in 
accordance with the level of development of the countries concerned, both overall 
and in individual sectors and subsectors. 
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph 6, in the case of an agreement of the type 
referred to in paragraph 1 involving only developing countries, more favourable 
treatment may be granted to juridical persons owned or controlled by natural 
persons of the parties to such an agreement. 
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4. Any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall be designed to facilitate 
trade between the parties to the agreement and shall not in respect of any member 
outside the agreement raise the overall level of barriers to trade in services within 
the respective sectors or subsectors compared to the level applicable prior to such 
an agreement. 
 
3 If, in the conclusion, enlargement or any significant modification of any agreement 
under paragraph 1, a member intends to withdraw or modify a specific commitment 
inconsistently with the terms and conditions set out in its schedule, it shall provide 
at least 90 days advance notice of such modification or withdrawal and the 
procedure set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Article XXI shall apply. 
 
4 A service supplier of any other member that is a juridical person constituted under 
the laws of a party to an agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall be entitled to 
treatment granted under such agreement, provided that it engages in substantive 
business operations in the territory of the parties to such agreement. 
 
5 (a)  Members which are parties to any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 
shall promptly notify any such agreement and any enlargement or any significant 
modification of that agreement to the Council for Trade in Services. They shall also 
make available to the Council such relevant information as may be requested by it. 
The Council may establish a working party to examine such an agreement or 
enlargement or modification of that agreement and to report to the Council on its 
consistency with this Article. 
(b)  Members which are parties to any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 
which is implemented on the basis of a time-frame shall report periodically to 
the Council for Trade in Services on its implementation. The Council may 
establish a working party to examine such reports if it deems such a working 
party necessary. 
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(c) Based on the reports of the working parties referred to in subparagraphs (a) 
and (b), the Council may make recommendations to the parties as it deems 
appropriate. 
 
8.        A member that is a party to any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 
may not seek compensation for trade benefits that may accrue to any other 
member from such agreement.” 
 
Other provisions in the WTO agreements also allow developing countries to enter into 
regional or global agreements that include the reduction or elimination of tariffs and non-
tariff barriers on trade among themselves. For example, Article 24 of Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)198 provides for exception in 
                                                 
198 Article 24: International Negotiations; Exceptions: 
“1.     Members agree to enter into negotiations aimed at increasing the protection of individual 
geographical indications under Article 23. The provisions of paragraphs 4 through 8 below shall not 
be used by a Member to refuse to conduct negotiations or to conclude bilateral or multilateral 
agreements. In the context of such negotiations, Members shall be willing to consider the continued 
applicability of these provisions to individual geographical indications whose use was the subject of 
such negotiations. 
  
2.     The Council for TRIPS shall keep under review the application of the provisions of this 
Section; the first such review shall take place within two years of the entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement. Any matter affecting the compliance with the obligations under these provisions may be 
drawn to the attention of the Council, which, at the request of a Member, shall consult with any 
Member or Members in respect of such matter in respect of which it has not been possible to find a 
satisfactory solution through bilateral or plurilateral consultations between the Members concerned. 
The Council shall take such action as may be agreed to facilitate the operation and further the 
objectives of this Section. 
  
3.     In implementing this Section, a Member shall not diminish the protection of geographical 
indications that existed in that Member immediately prior to the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement. 
  
4.     Nothing in this Section shall require a Member to prevent continued and similar use of a 
particular geographical indication of another Member identifying wines or spirits in connection with 
goods or services by any of its nationals or domiciliaries who have used that geographical indication 
in a continuous manner with regard to the same or related goods or services in the territory of that 
Member either (a) for at least 10 years preceding 15 April 1994 or (b) in good faith preceding that 
date. 
  
5.     Where a trademark has been applied for or registered in good faith, or where rights to a 
trademark have been acquired through use in good faith either: 
  
(a)     before the date of application of these provisions in that Member as defined in Part VI; 
or 
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international negotiations, and a notable exception is the one contained in Article 66199 for 
least developed countries. Article 4 of Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMS)200 also provides for similar special conditions for developing countries with 
regard to investment agreements. 
                                                 
(b)     before the geographical indication is protected in its country of origin; 
  
measures adopted to implement this Section shall not prejudice eligibility for or the validity of the 
registration of a trademark, or the right to use a trademark, on the basis that such a trademark is 
identical with, or similar to, a geographical indication. 
  
6.     Nothing in this Section shall require a Member to apply its provisions in respect of a 
geographical indication of any other Member with respect to goods or services for which the 
relevant indication is identical with the term customary in common language as the common name 
for such goods or services in the territory of that Member. Nothing in this Section shall require a 
Member to apply its provisions in respect of a geographical indication of any other Member with 
respect to products of the vine for which the relevant indication is identical with the customary 
name of a grape variety existing in the territory of that Member as of the date of entry into force of 
the WTO Agreement. 
  
7.     A Member may provide that any request made under this Section in connection with the use or 
registration of a trademark must be presented within five years after the adverse use of the protected 
indication has become generally known in that Member or after the date of registration of the 
trademark in that Member provided that the trademark has been published by that date, if such date 
is earlier than the date on which the adverse use became generally known in that Member, provided 
that the geographical indication is not used or registered in bad faith. 
  
8.     The provisions of this Section shall in no way prejudice the right of any person to use, in the 
course of trade, that person’s name or the name of that person’s predecessor in business, except 
where such name is used in such a manner as to mislead the public. 
  
9.     There shall be no obligation under this Agreement to protect geographical indications which 
are not or cease to be protected in their country of origin, or which have fallen into disuse in that 
country.” 
 
199 Article 66: Least-Developed Country Members: 
“1.     In view of the special needs and requirements of least-developed country Members, their 
economic, financial and administrative constraints, and their need for flexibility to create a viable 
technological base, such Members shall not be required to apply the provisions of this Agreement, 
other than Articles 3, 4 and 5, for a period of 10 years from the date of application as defined under 
paragraph 1 of Article 65. The Council for TRIPS shall, upon duly motivated request by a least-
developed country Member, accord extensions of this period. 
  
2.     Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their 
territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed 
country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.” 
 
200 Article 4: Developing Country Members: 
“A developing country Member shall be free to deviate temporarily from the provisions of Article 2 
to the extent and in such a manner as Article XVIII of GATT 1994, the Understanding on the 
Balance-of-Payments Provisions of GATT 1994, and the Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for 
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As indicated in Chapter 1 compliance with the WTO rules is important to ensuring that an 
agreement is beneficial to all parties in the multilateral system. As such the WTO created 
the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), following the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations to ensure the consistency of RTAs with the WTO rules.201 This was in 
recognition of the fact that regional trade agreements can play an important role in 
promoting trade liberalisation and in fostering economic development.  
 
The CRTA plays an important role in ensuring that regional agreements do not undermine 
the multilateral system. It has the following terms of reference: 
 To carry out examinations of bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements 
and report on them;  
 To consider how the required reporting on the operation of regional agreements 
should be carried out;  
 To develop procedures to facilitate and improve the examination process;  
 To consider the systemic implications of regional agreements for the multilateral 
trading system.202  
 
The WTO members are required to notify regional trade agreements to the CRTA to ensure 
that the agreements meet the WTO requirements. Once an agreement has been notified it 
is carefully examined and scrutinised by other WTO members for the WTO compliance.  
 
However, these rules are not 100% and the WTO itself accepts that some of the existing 
rules governing RTAs need clarification. To address this situation, at their meeting in Doha 
in 2001, the WTO Ministers agreed to “negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving 
                                                 
Balance-of-Payments Purposes adopted on 28 November 1979 (BISD 26S/205–209) permit the 
Member to deviate from the provisions of Articles III and XI of GATT 1994.” 
201 WTO General Council Decision WT/L/127 of February 1996. 
202 Ibid. 
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disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provisions applying to regional trade 
agreements.”203 
 
In late 2004, an independent report prepared for the WTO, entitled “The Future of the 
WTO: Addressing institutional challenges in the new millennium” (the Sutherland Report), 
underlined these concerns and recommended, inter alia,  that FTAs, and RTAs in general, 
be subjected to meaningful review and effective disciplines in the WTO.204 The Report is 
yet to be agreed to.  
 
The current negotiations on the RTAs have been conducted on two tracks: transparency 
issues and systemic issues. First priority has been given to transparency issues which are, 
by nature, less contentious than the systemic ones. The resumption of Doha negotiations in 
2004 has furthered the work on transparency and they have enlarged the scope of the 
negotiations to include systemic issues.205  
 
In June 2006, the WTO “Negotiating Group on Rules” approved a new WTO transparency 
mechanism, called “Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements”, for all 
regional trade agreements (RTAs). This transparency mechanism provides for early 
announcement of any RTA and notification to the WTO.206 Commenting on this new 
development, the then Director-General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, had this to say: “This 
decision will help break the current logjam in the WTO on regional trade agreements. This 
is an important step towards ensuring that regional trade agreements become building 
blocks, not stumbling blocks to world trade.”207 
 
                                                 
203 Fiorentino, R et al. “The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements: 2006 Update” WTO 
Discussion Paper No 12, World Trade Organization (2007) at 26. Available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/wto_agreements.html  (accessed on 14 January 2014).  
204 The Conclusions and Recommendations of the Report by the Consultative Board to the former Director-
General, Supachai Panitchpakdi, commonly called the “Sutherland Report,” are on pages 79 - 83 of the 
Report. 
205 Crawford, J et al. “The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements” WTO Discussion Paper 
No. 8 (2005) at 19. 
206 WTO General Council Decision WT/L/671 of 14 December 2006.  
207 “Lamy welcomes WTO agreement on regional trade agreements”. Available at 
http://www.wto.org.org/english/news_july06 (accessed on 12 March 2014).  
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In terms of this Mechanism, the CRTA and Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) 
are instrumental for its implementation.  The CRTA will conduct the review of RTAs 
falling under Article XXIV of the GATT and Article V of the GATS. The Committee on 
Trade and Development (CTD) will, on the other hand, conduct the review of RTAs falling 
under the Enabling Clause.208 
 
The transparency mechanism is to be implemented on a provisional basis.209 Members are 
to review, and if necessary modify, the decision and replace it by a permanent mechanism 
adopted as part of the overall results of the Doha Round.210  
 
2.2.3 The WTO July (2004) Framework Agreement 
 
Progress on the Doha Development Round or Agenda (DDA) was halted by the failure of 
the Trade Ministers to agree on the four Singapore issues211. However, prospects on 
progress of the DDA emerged with the WTO General Council Decision of 31 July 2004 – 
referred to as the WTO July (2004) Framework Agreement. This is simply a framework 
agreement and actual modalities for negotiations are still to be negotiated.212  
 
The Framework is an attempt at devising partial modalities that would guide future 
commitments under the Doha Round and included, among other things, an agreement on a 
“tiered formula” for tariff reduction (in which tariffs are categorised according to their 
height and with deeper cuts made to higher tariffs), confirmation that tariff reduction will 
be made from bound (and not applied) rates, recognition of the concept of “sensitive 
products” (which would not be subject to formula cuts but for which additional access 
would be given through tariff quota expansion), recognition of the concept of “special 
products” to address development concerns of developing countries, and which would be 
                                                 
208 Clause 18 of the Mechanism entitled “Bodies Entrusted with the Implementation of the Mechanism”. 
209 Clause 22 of the Mechanism. 
210 Clause 23 of the Mechanism. 
211 These issues relate to investment, competition, transparency in government procurement and trade 
facilitation, and were agreed to at the WTO Ministerial meeting in Singapore in 1996 – hence they are 
called “Singapore issues”.  
212 WTO General Council Decision WT/L/579 of 2 August 2004. 
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accorded “more flexible treatment”; and agreement that developing countries will have 
access to a new Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM).213 
 
“Trade facilitation” is the only Singapore issue214 that remained part of the Framework 
Agreement. This is not surprising given its complexities. It basically means the 
simplification, harmonisation, standardisation and modernization of trade procedures, and 
is aimed at reducing all the transactions costs associated with the enforcement, regulation 
and administration of trade policies.215 
 
Due to “trade facilitation” remaining a sore issue it was not surprising that the Mini-
Ministerial negotiations were held in July 2008 in Geneva, Switzerland on modalities 
focused on trade. In various briefings during the July 2008 talks, the WTO Director-
General had listed issues that had been most divisive and which were on the agenda of the 
Mini-Ministerial negotiations.216 In agriculture, these were six: trade-distorting domestic 
support measures; cotton; tariff cuts for developed countries; sensitive products; Special 
Products (SPs); and the SSM. Two other outstanding issues that were also prominent were: 
tropical products and preference erosion; and trade-related aspects of intellectual property 
rights (TRIPS).  
 
At the end of the negotiations the following were agreed upon:217 
 In domestic support, it has been agreed to group countries in three tiers according 
to the level of trade-distorting support level in the base period. The latest position 
as of December 2008 was to reduce the overall trade-distorting domestic support 
(OTDS) by 80% for the Members with the highest level of support in the base 
period, and in the range of 70% and 55% respectively for the other two tiers. 
                                                 
213 Clauses 27 – 44 of the WTO July (2004) Framework Agreement.  
214 See fn 211.  
215 Grainger, A. “Customs and Trade Facilitation: from concepts to implementation” World Customs 
Journal vol. 2 no. 1 (2008) 17.  
216 “Multilateral Negotiations in the WTO: Current Position and Implications” available at 
www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/G77/COAG-CCDP/CCP_09-7.doc (accessed on 12 March 2014). 
217 Ibid. 
63 
 
 In the July 2004 Framework Agreement, Members had agreed that sensitive 
products would not go through the full tariff cuts, but this would have to be offset 
substantially through provision of additional import quota. However, there were 
two main issues still to be settled: one was the number of sensitive products, and 
the second issue was the size of the additional quota. In early 2008, considerable 
technical progress was made by a group of WTO Members in establishing a method 
for determining additional quota at the level of tariff line. 
 With regard to special products, there were three divisive issues: i) total number of 
special products (SPs); ii) the number of SPs tariff lines requiring no tariff cut; and 
iii) tariff reduction rate for the rest of the SPs. The G-33218 countries had proposed 
15% of tariff lines for the total number of SPs, of which 5% of lines would have no 
tariff cut while the overall average cut would be 9% for the rest of the SPs. SPs 
became a divisive issue because negotiators from the two sides saw the instrument 
very differently. The proponents viewed SPs as a key development instrument for 
ensuring food security, rural development and livelihood security. The other side – 
mainly the developed and developing agricultural exporting countries – argued that 
SPs could potentially block a significant share of their exports and that the key 
parameters should reflect this. 
 With regard to Special Safeguard Mechanism, there were sharp differences in views 
on all three components that make up the SSM: i) threshold level for triggering 
volume-based SSM; ii) level of remedy; and iii) number and frequency of use. On 
the first point, the positions ranged from a 40% threshold to 10 - 15%. Proponents 
of the 40% trigger argued that below that level, market access would be seriously 
compromised. The other side stressed that small farmers and agriculture in general, 
in developing countries, are highly vulnerable to shocks for which they lacked 
alternative risk mitigating instruments, and so only a low threshold of 10 to 15% 
could safeguard farming and livelihoods from import surges. On the remedy, the 
differences were about whether the total duty should exceed pre-Doha bound tariff 
                                                 
218 This is a group of developing countries that coordinate on trade and economic issues in order to help a 
group of countries that were all facing similar problems. It is still called G-33 (the original number) even 
though it has grown to 45 members.  
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levels. One side argued that exceeding these levels would undo what had been 
negotiated in the past. The other side held that SSM is a safeguard, and like other 
WTO safeguards, the level of the remedy should be linked to the problem at hand 
and so the issue of exceeding the bound tariff is not a relevant consideration. 
 
From these negotiations it is clear that in the area of trade facilitation, it is important to 
conduct a capacity-needs assessment in order to effectively benefit from available technical 
assistance and capacity-building provisions. This may also be important in informing 
negotiating positions on special and differential treatment for developing and least 
developed countries in trade facilitation. Developing countries should seek to benefit 
effectively from trade facilitation provisions while avoiding making commitments that may 
become unsustainably costly and administratively burdensome. Trade facilitation matters 
for competitive growth remain key determinants for effective integration into global 
economy.219 
 
The development dimension of the Doha Round of negotiations, through special and 
differential treatment still needs to be clearly spelled out and made operationally effective. 
This simply means that in all key issues for negotiations, the developing countries will need 
to make sure that the final outcomes are supportive of their development objectives.220 
 
As stated above (at page 39), the WTO members concluded negotiations on the Framework 
Agreement and adopted the Trade Facilitation Agreement at the Bali Ministerial 
Conference, the so-called “Bali Package” in December 2013.221 Since then, WTO members 
have undertaken a legal review of the text. Under the decision adopted in Bali, WTO 
members must draft a Protocol of Amendment to insert the new Agreement into Annex 1A 
                                                 
219 Kalenga, P. “The WTO July (2004) Framework Agreement: Some observations” Tralac Trade Brief, 
October 2004 at 4 – 5; Finger, J.M et al. “Implementing a WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation: What 
Makes Sense?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3971, 1 August 2006.   
220 “Report on Doha Negotiations” delivered by Egypt, at the African Group Coordinator on WTO Issues 
EPA coordination meeting 22 – 23, July 2009, Gaborone, Botswana.  
221 “Bali Ministerial Declaration - WT/MIN(13)/DEC”, Ministerial Conference  Ninth Session,  Bali, 3 – 6 
December 2013. 
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of the WTO Agreement. As stated above, the Agreement entered into force on 22 February 
2017.222 
 
The Trade Facilitation Agreement contains provisions for expediting the movement, 
release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit. It also sets out measures for 
effective cooperation between customs and other appropriate authorities on trade 
facilitation and customs compliance issues. It further contains provisions for technical 
assistance and capacity building in this area.223  
 
2.3 The WTO and Southern Africa 
 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) provides a range of technical assistance and training 
activities in support of African countries in the area of trade. While a key objective is to 
maintain a geographical balance in the delivery of activities, particular attention is given to 
Africa, which benefits from over one third of activities. In 2005, 45% of its national and 
34% of its regional trade-related technical assistance was directed at African countries.224 
 
The WTO Secretariat Technical Assistance (TA) Plans continue to accord priority to the 
delivery of technical assistance to least-developed countries (LDCs), the majority of which 
are in Africa. It is estimated that roughly one third (i.e. an estimated CHF10-12 million) of 
all funds available for Trade-Related Technical Assistance (TRTA) in the WTO, including 
regular and extra-budgetary (i.e. through the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust 
Fund (GTF)) have been put to use for Africa.225 
 
While many African countries accepted the WTO obligations in full, several agreements 
afforded special concessions to developing countries, such as those in Africa. For example, 
                                                 
222 “WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement enters into force” WTO: 2017 News Items of 22 February 2017. 
Available at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/fac_31jan17_e.htm (accessed on 28 September 
2017); Batibonak, P. “Africa and implementation of Trade facilitation agreement” Bridges Africa vol. 6 no. 
3, 17 May 2017 at 8. 
223 The WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation WT/L/931.  
224 World Trade Organization Report: Support to NEPAD 2005- 2006. 
225 Ibid. 
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some agreements included special provisions allowing developing countries extra time to 
fulfil the WTO commitments, providing greater market access for developing countries, 
and mandating members to safeguard developing nation’s interests. These are agreements 
such as TRIPS, TRIMS, Marrakesh Agreement, etc.226 These concessions, however, still 
exist alongside trade barriers, including domestic production supports and the use of export 
subsidies for agricultural products.   
 
The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) calls for “substantial reductions in trade-distorting 
domestic support” in agriculture.227 However, Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) will not 
be required to undertake reduction commitments.228 This is in recognition of their “weak” 
economies and/or inadequate infrastructure, and will come handy for Southern Africa as 
most of the states in the region are classified as LDCs.  
 
Cuts in tariffs are critical in enabling countries, not only in southern Africa, but the entire 
developing world, to compete on an equal footing in the global economy. At the WTO 
Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong in December 2005, member countries set 30 April 2006 
as the deadline for reaching an agreement on how to reduce farm subsidies and cut tariffs 
on manufactured goods. However, by the beginning of April 2006, there was growing 
concern that WTO member countries were unlikely to meet the 30 April 2006 deadline for 
a broad agreement on agricultural and trade tariff cuts.  A round of talks between the 
African Union and the WTO in Kenya in April 2006 also did not make much progress on 
this issue of agriculture.229  
 
This concern became a reality when the former Director-General of the WTO, Pascal 
Lamy, announced that plans to hold this key ministerial meeting in Geneva at the end of 
April 2006 would be abandoned. Trade diplomats agreed that it would be pointless to 
convene a ministerial meeting since differences between WTO members remained so wide 
                                                 
226 Scott, F. “Too much of a good thing: Reassessing the proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements” 
Suffolk Transnational Law Review vol. 30 (2006 – 2007) 407 at 416. 
227 The Agriculture Framework (Annex A of the 31 July 2004 Decision)  
228 Clause 45 of the WTO General Council Decision WT/L/579 of 2 August 2004. 
229http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=52910&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=
SOUTHERN_AFRICA (accessed on 6 November 2014). 
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that there was no realistic chance of reaching agreement, particularly on modalities in 
agriculture and industrial tariffs.230  
 
This conduct by/of the WTO raises questions such as what can be gained by developing 
countries from the Doha Round, and the WTO in general, and what are the implications for 
regional trade arrangements? Do developing countries have an alternative if the 
negotiations within the WTO keep on failing them? 
 
However, on 8 July 2013, the WTO and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to enhance trade-related technical 
assistance and capacity-building for African countries. The two parties underscored the 
importance of leveraging their comparative advantage in implementing the joint 
agreement. They agreed to jointly manage a Trade Related Technical Assistance (TRTA) 
programme for selected participants from African countries on a cost-sharing basis. They 
also agreed that the technical assistance to be provided to the RECs shall be determined 
jointly by the parties in consultation with relevant individual RECs, taking account of the 
priority needs of countries in specific regions of Africa, the Doha Development Agenda 
and its expected outcomes.231  
 
Conclusion 
 
With the stalling of multilateral trade negotiations, regional trade agreements have “kept 
the fires of international trade burning”. Multilateral trade has shown that countries, when 
grouped together through regional trade agreements (read arrangements), can do business 
more effectively and can attract interest from other countries outside the group; given that 
when consolidated they are more attractive both as markets and investment destinations. 
For example, in July 2013 the European Investment Bank (EIB) announced that it will 
invest 9 billion Euros in the countries of the ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) region 
                                                 
230 This was announced by Tralac on 9 May 2006. Available at 
http://www.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?id=4823  (accessed on 6 November 2014).  
231 “ECA and WTO strengthen cooperation to enhance Africa’s participation in multilateral trade” at 
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/igo_06jul13_e.htm (accessed on 6 November 2014).  
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by 2020, in partnership with the Investment Facility ACP. According to the EIB the 
objective is to support infrastructure investments that are critical to private sector 
development and improving regional integration.232 
 
In addition, RTAs offer a platform for LDCs to consolidate their interests and take 
advantage of strength in numbers during multilateral negotiations. As such, on the one 
hand, there is the undeniable fact that rapid development in regional trade cooperation has 
at least partly undermined the WTO members’ mutual trust and belief in the multilateral 
trading system (MTS); on the other, fast-moving RTAs, as the prerequisite and basis for 
the MTS, can serve as a major driving force for the progress of the MTS. Thus, the two are 
not necessarily mutually incompatible or exclusive.233  
 
The creation of the (WTO), and other international institutions, gives credence to the view 
held by some people that for international business to succeed, it must be done through 
formalised structure(s). Formal structure, in turn, means the organisation must have rules 
and regulations and other legal prescripts such as a constitution. 
 
Compared to the IMF/World Bank agreements the WTO rules are stricter and more legal-
oriented. The IMF/World Bank rules are mostly bilateral and the agreements are in the 
form of loan agreements. This difference is more visible in the dispute-settling mechanisms 
of these three institutions. The WTO has a dispute settling mechanism, which is quasi-
judicial in nature, entrenched in the articles and seeks to secure compliance with the 
agreements.234 The articles of agreements of both the IMF and World Bank do not provide 
for internal organs to settle disputes. Instead they rely on courts of member countries for 
judicial processes.235 
                                                 
232  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_BEI-13-107_en.htm (accessed on 6 November 2014).  
233 Taifeng, C. “Regional Trade Agreement vs. Multilateral Trading System: A Study of Chinese Interests 
and Policy Options” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Working Paper 762 (2009) at 7. Available 
at www.nupi.no/content/download/10219/.../5/.../WP-762-Taifeng.pdf (accessed on 6 November 2014).  
234 Article VIII of the WTO Treaty, “Dispute Settling Understanding” and “Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes”. 
235 Article VII(3) of the Article of Agreement of World Bank provides: 
“Actions may be brought against the Bank only in a court of competent jurisdiction in the 
territories of a member in which the Bank has an office, has appointed an agent for the purpose of 
accepting service or notice of process, or has issued or guaranteed securities. No actions shall, 
69 
 
 
The dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO means the WTO has competences and 
powers that were previously the monopoly of states (i.e. through courts). What counts, 
therefore, is whether the balance between some loss of policy space at the national level 
and the advantages of cooperation and the rule of law at the multilateral level is positive or 
negative.  
 
However, all three institutions use arbitration as a form of dispute resolution. But with 
regard to the IMF and the World Bank arbitration is a “must” when there is a dispute, 
whereas with regard to the WTO it is an “alternative” to other measures.  
 
In terms of the “Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes” of the WTO, the parties will have to follow the procedure of consultation, 
conciliation or mediation first. If this does not work a complaints panel composed of trade 
experts is convened. If neither party wishes to appeal, the process of adjudication is 
complete. However, if an appeal is noted, this is taken to a body of legal experts who pass 
judgment on legal issues within a prescribed period.236  
 
In a nutshell, the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO takes two approaches: the 
conciliation system (good offices, consultation, conciliation or mediation) and the 
adjudication system (panels and Appellate Body).  The panels operate as “courts” and if 
the parties are not satisfied with decisions of these panels, they are free to appeal to the 
Appellate Body. 
 
                                                 
however, be brought by members or persons acting for or deriving claims from members. The 
property and assets of the Bank shall, wheresoever located and by whomsoever held, be immune 
from all forms of seizure, attachment or execution before the delivery of final judgment against the 
Bank.” 
Article IX (3) of the IMF Articles of Agreement provides: 
“The Fund, its property and its assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy 
immunity from every form of judicial process except to the extent that it expressly waives its 
immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.” 
236 Articles 11 – 15 of the “Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes” 
of the WTO; 
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At face value the WTO dispute settling mechanism looks simple and ordinary, but 
Trachtman237 holds a different opinion. He says the WTO law is mandatory law with 
compensation or trade retaliation being merely temporary solutions. Other jurists are also 
of the opinion that the WTO rules, as interpreted in WTO dispute settlement reports, 
constitute firmly binding legal obligations.238 
 
The Doha Declaration mandated negotiations to improve the WTO rules that govern the 
development of regional trade agreements (RTAs).  This was because some WTO members 
have interpreted the rules broadly, resulting in RTAs that are not comprehensive or truly 
liberalising.  These RTAs undermine the multilateral trading system through limited and 
selective liberalisation and giving comfort to protectionist interests.  Concerns about such 
RTAs were highlighted in the WTO report ‘The Future of the WTO: Addressing 
Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium’ (the Sutherland Report).239 
 
These different interpretations are partly to blame for frequent failures of talks that hamper 
progress on trade. However, the “July (2004) package”240 seems to carry some hopes, 
although lot still needs to be done as the Mini-Ministerial negotiations (July 2008 – 
December 2013) have shown how complicated the modalities to this framework can be. 
The “July (2004) package” has brought back hope among developing countries that they 
can still use the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in furtherance of their 
development objectives. 
 
With the signing and coming into operation of existing RTAs one has to ask: Does the 
proliferation of preferential trade agreements and the decreasing role of MFN treatment 
                                                 
237 Trachtman, P. “The WTO Cathedral” Stanford Journal of International Law vol. 43 (2007) 127 at 130. 
238 Zimmermann, C. “Toleration of Temporary Non-Compliance: The Systemic Safety Valve of WTO 
Dispute Settlement Revisited” Trade, Law and Development vol. 3, no. 2 (2011) 382; Schwartz, W et al. 
“The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization” 
Journal of Legal Studies vol. 31 (2002) 179; Jackson, J. “The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: 
Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation” American Journal of International Law vol. 91 no. 1 
(1997) 60.  
239 This was the Report by the Consultative Board to the former Director-General, Supachai Panitchpakdi, 
marking the 10th anniversary of the WTO, released in January 2005. It, inter alia, calls for “addressing 
institutional challenges in the new millennium”. 
240 WTO General Council’s Post Cancun Decision WT/L/579 of July 2004.  
71 
 
mean that the MFN principle has lost its value for policy-makers? What exactly is the value 
of the MFN principle today? 
 
Other subsequent questions would be: How can we reconcile the normative principle of 
MFN treatment with today’s reality of proliferating preferential agreements? How can we 
avoid preferential trade agreements from rendering the MFN principle meaningless? How 
can we make sure that both concepts coexist in a way that is mutually supportive and that 
helps countries to reap benefits from both concepts?  
 
The WTO has to support regional integration and lay to rest the fear that regionalism would 
replace multilateralism. As the discussion above has shown regionalism can be a powerful 
force, but it does not have to substitute multilateralism. In fact, the two can co-exist as the 
WTO bears testimony to this.  
 
Today there is almost no country among the WTO’s member countries that has not signed 
at least one regional trade agreement, and this makes countries more open to trade and more 
competitive. Also there is no strong leadership for advancing the new round of multilateral 
negotiations and this has justified the deepening of regional integration processes as a 
fundamental tool for development. 
 
Having accepted the regional integration as a “necessary evil” within the multilateral trade 
landscape, the WTO must do more to support the regional integration schemes. Yes, the 
WTO rules do provide for existence of such schemes and tools such as the MoU for 
technical assistance are appreciated, but there is still a need for this to be put into practice. 
Practical assistance will empower and strengthen the RECs and stronger RECs will 
eventually benefit the WTO regime in the long run, not the opposite.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL TRADE INTEGRATION SCHEMES IN 
SOUTHERN AFRICA 
 
Introduction 
 
Africa is not alone in aspiring for regional integration. With increasing globalisation and 
the advent of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), other parts of the world have embraced 
the ideal of regional integration. Among others, these include:  
 The European Union (EU), in which some members have opted for a single 
currency, a central bank and free movement of factors of production for all 
members;241 
 North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) which brings together the US, Canada 
and Mexico; 
 Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM); and 
 Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU) in the Middle East. 
 
This has made regional economic integration to be a strategy for achieving greater 
economic development and growth. According to the Institute for International Economics 
this is because “regionalism is in fashion”.242 Others may argue that successes of regional 
bodies, such as the European Union (EU), also reinforce the idea of regional integration.243 
Such successes demonstrate that economic cooperation can be an important and potentially 
effective means for facilitating social and economic development. 
 
The success of an integration project seems, firstly, to depend on the economic well-being 
of a region. Secondly, competence of an organisation to enact supranational legislation 
                                                 
241 This is in line with Articles 45, 56 and 119 of the Maastricht Treaty (formally called the Treaty on 
European Union). 
242 Frankel, J.A. Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System (1997) at 1.   
243 One of the EU’s greatest success stories was rounded off in 1993 with the full entry into force of the 
internal market (free movement of people, goods, services and capital). 
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does not guarantee the success of an integration project as such. For example, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has this supranational legislation, but it 
does not lead to successful integration.244 Thirdly, the member states in a regional 
integration scheme must be clear of what they want to achieve and also make proper 
projections. This is so because the new regional frameworks encompass not only trade and 
economic developments, but also environmental and social policies, and security 
cooperation.245 
 
Regional trade integration is driven through different types or schemes that are utilised 
throughout the world. These are free trade areas (FTAs), customs unions, common markets 
and economic communities or unions. However, despite it having been embraced globally, 
critics argue that regardless of what type of integration is followed, it benefits only the 
developed economies.246 This chapter will try to look into the correctness or credibility of 
this sentiment.  
 
The regional economic communities (RECs) – which are the drivers of regional integration 
– have become pivotal tools in the promotion of international trade, investment and trade 
liberalisation. In the Southern Africa region, there are a number of these bodies, used for 
economic integration and cooperation, such as the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); and the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). They take different forms of 
integration such as a customs union, a common market, a free trade area (FTA) and an 
economic community or union. These are typical forms of integration, but other authors 
                                                 
244 Lehmann, J. “Regional Economic Integration and Dispute Settlement outside Europe” International Law 
Forum vol. 7 no.1 - 4 (2005) 54 at 60. 
245 Onzivu, W. “Globalism, Regionalism, or both: Health Policy and Regional Economic Integration in 
Developing Countries, an Evolution of a Legal Regime?” Minnesota Journal of International Law vol. 15 
(2006) 111; Bishop, M.L. “Caribbean Regional Integration” – A Report by the University of West Indies 
(UWI) Institute of International Relations (IIR), April 2011; EUROSTAT, January 2013 (available at 
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics).  
246 Mathis, J.H. “World Trade Report 2011. The WTO and the Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-
existence to Coherence” World Trade Review vol. no.1 (2012) 1 at 2; Bruce, A. “The Pros and Cons of 
Pursuing Free-Trade Agreements” Almanac of Policy Issues (31 July 2003). Retrieved 
from: http://www.policyalmanac.org/economic/archive/free_trade_agreements.shtml (accessed 23 
September 2015); Nye, J.S. “Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement” International 
Organization vol. 22 no. 4 (Autumn 1968) 885. 
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include in this linear process of regional integration a preferential trade agreement (PTA), 
at the beginning, and end it with a political union.247  
 
Trade integration, as part of economic integration, provides the region with a degree of 
policy credibility if the integration agenda is adhered to. This in turn attracts foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to the region, a phenomenon which developing countries are so reliant 
upon. 248  The FDIs have sparked increased debate as to their relevance and efficacy in the 
efforts to attain meaningful development in Africa, particularly, in the wake of the 
phenomenon of globalisation and the increased marginalisation of Africa in world trade.249 
However, this will not be discussed here.  
 
3.1  THE THEORY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
In the context of this thesis by “theory” it is meant a theory from a philosophical point of 
view. This means a theory is viewed as a model, which is a logical framework intended to 
represent reality. This context is important because there is always a debate whether 
regional integration is a theory or a practice. This is as a result of Aristotle’s definitions, 
where theory is always contrasted to practice. 250  
 
Another debate, which ensued when early theories of integration were developed, was on 
how to define the concept of integration. It was for instance discussed whether integration 
refers to a process or to an end product. Of course the two can be combined. Integration 
could then be defined as a process that leads to a certain state of affairs.251 
                                                 
247 Wu J.P. “Measuring and Explaining Levels of Regional integration” Centre for European Integration 
working Paper No. B12 (2004) at 5: Choi, Y.J et al. Handbook of International Relations (2002) at 483; 
Choo, M.H. “Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of Regional Economic Arrangements and Their Effects on 
the WTO” Temple International and Comparative Law Journal vol. 13 (1999) 253 at 255. 
248 Hansohm, D et al. “Introduction: Monitoring the Process of Regional Integration in Southern Africa in 
2004-2005” Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook vol. 5 (2005) 1. 
249 Ibid. 
250 Söderbaum, F. “Comparative Regional Integration and Regionalism” The Sage Handbook of 
Comparative Politics (2008) at 2;  Laursen, F. “Theory and Practice of Regional Integration”, Paper 
prepared for presentation at the European Union Centre, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, 25 
February 2008. 
251 Laursen, F. “Theory and Practice of Regional Integration”, Paper prepared for presentation at the 
European Union Centre, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, 25 February 2008.   
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This philosophical point of view takes care of one aspect of “regional integration” (i.e. 
integration). However, to fully understand the meaning of regional integration the other 
aspect – regionalism – must also be understood. Regionalism is a term in international 
relations that refers to the expression of a common sense of identity and purpose, combined 
with the creation and implementation of institutions that express a particular identity, and 
shape collective action within a geographical region.252 The idea that lies behind this 
increased regional identity is that as a region becomes more economically integrated, it will 
necessarily become politically integrated as well.253 
  
As such regional integration can be defined as a process and a means by which a group of 
countries strive to increase their levels of welfare, be it politically, economically or 
otherwise. It can also be defined as the unification of neighbouring states working within 
a framework to promote free movement of goods, services and factors of production, and 
to coordinate and harmonise their policies. It involves the recognition that partnership 
between countries can achieve this goal in a more efficient way than unilateral or 
independent pursuance of policy in each country.254 
 
Choo255 argues that the main objective of regional integration is the acquisition of 
hegemonic status for general purpose. He says if this were not the case, the European Union 
(EU) would not need to be an amalgamated community with a formally institutionalised 
and rule-based dispute settlement. That is why, he says, the EU’s objective is to create 
“Fortress Europe” with regard to power distribution of world politics, including general 
foreign policies.  
 
                                                 
252 Definition of “regionalism” at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regionalism_(international relations) 
(accessed on 10 February 2015).  
253 Ibid. 
254 Haas, B. “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing” 
International Organization vol. 24 no. 4 (1970) 607; Schiff, M.W et al. Regional Integration and 
Development (2003) at 1; Choi, Y.J et al. Handbook of International Relations (2002) at 481. 
255 Choo, M.H. “Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of Regional Economic Arrangements and Their Effects 
on the WTO” Temple International and Comparative Law Journal vol. 13 (1999) 253 at 276. 
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Regional integration can be either economic, political, social or all three. Economic 
integration is the unification of economic policies between different states through the 
partial or full abolition of tariff and non-tariff restrictions on trade taking place among them 
prior to their integration. This is meant in turn to lead to lower prices for distributors and 
consumers with the goal of increasing the combined economic productivity of the states.256 
 
Political integration involves the strengthening of a political system, in particular the scope 
and capacity of its decision-making process. Besides this institutional aspect of integration, 
there is as well the normative dimension of creating a political community.257 
 
Social integration - in the sense of regional integration258 - is the blending and unifying of 
social groups, most commonly seen in the desegregation of races. It is about making 
societies more equitable.259 The United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs defines it as “a dynamic and principled process where all members participate in 
dialogue to achieve and maintain peaceful social relations.”260 
 
Economic integration may include institutional integration, which is the policy decision(s) 
taken by two or more governments of countries belonging to the same geographic area in 
order to promote economic co-operation in terms of deepening and/or widening the spheres 
of co-ordination under the terms of an agreed pact. So, economic integration has some 
aspects of political integration, as decisions will have to be taken at political level.261 
 
                                                 
256 Balassa, B. The Theory of Economic Integration (Routledge Revivals) (2013) at 1; Schiff, M et al. 
“Regional Integration as Diplomacy” World Bank Economic Review vol. 12 issue 2 (1998) 12 at 14.   
257 Collins Cobuild English Dictionary for Advanced Learners 4th edition (2003) (online version).  
258 This is to distinguish this definition from the general and broad definition in a sociological sense, which 
basically refers to “embeddedness”.  
259 Ferguson, C. “Promoting Social Integration”, Report commissioned by the United Nations Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) for the Expert Group Meeting on Promoting Social Integration, 
Helsinki, Finland, 8-10 July 2008, at 5. 
260 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. “Definition of Social integration”. 
Available at  http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/sib/peacedialogue/soc_integration.htm (accessed 11 February 
2015). 
261 Odour, M. “Resolving Trade Disputes in Africa: Choosing between multilateralism and regionalism: 
The case of COMESA and WTO” Tulane Journal of international and Comparative Law vol. 13 (2005) 
177 at 187. 
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Economic integration, also, may be characterised as negative or positive integration. 
Negative integration denotes the removal of discrimination in national economic rules and 
policies under joint and authoritative surveillance. It involves limiting national economic 
power and decision-making. It is prevalent in free trade areas (FTAs), customs unions and 
common markets. Positive integration, on the other hand, involves the transfer of public 
market-rule-making and policy-making powers from the participating states to the union 
level. It is at this level where unification of monetary and fiscal policies happens.262  
 
It is within the context of economic integration that trade integration should be understood: 
it (trade integration) being a condition (or process) wherein separate national economies 
maintain lower barriers to mutual trade, while sustaining relatively higher barriers to third 
parties.263  
 
An alternate approach to understanding forms of integration would encompass: trade or 
goods market integration – concerning free flow of goods; labour market integration – 
concerning free movement of labour; capital market integration – concerning equalisation 
of real interest rates across countries; monetary integration – relating to common currency; 
and integration of movement activity and regulation.  The advantage of this approach is 
that integration is not seen as sequential or linear, rather the approach is dynamic and allows 
for various types of integration to occur either together or separately.264  
 
Trade integration can be divided into trade creation and trade diversion.265 Both are 
possible consequences of the formation of regional arrangements. In other words, they can 
occur regardless of whether a preferential trade agreement, a free trade area or a customs 
union is formed. 
                                                 
262 Oppong, R.F. “Observing the legal systems of the Community: The relationship between Community 
and national legal systems under African Economic Community” Tulane Journal of International and 
Comparative Law vol. 15 (2006 – 2007) 41.  
263 Carim, X. “Multilateral trading, regional integration and the Southern African Development 
Community” South African Journal of Economics vol. 65 no. 3 (1997) 334.  
264 Ibid. 
265 The concepts of “trade creation” and “trade diversion” were introduced in 1950 by an economist Jacob 
Viner (May 3, 1892 - September 12, 1970). Viner was a noted opponent of John Maynard Keynes during 
the Great Depression. While he agreed with the policies of government spending that Keynes pushed for, 
Viner argued that Keynes's analysis was flawed and would not stand in the long run.   
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3.1.1 Trade creation and Trade diversion  
 
Trade creation relates to a situation where once a regional bloc is created, members agree 
to eliminate tariffs between themselves. That is, the integration creates trade that would not 
have existed otherwise. The effect of this is that, facing lower priced and zero-tariff imports 
from members, consumers increase their demand for these goods, and new trade will be 
created – trade creation.266 
 
After the formation of an economic bloc, the cost of the goods considered is decreased, 
leading to an increase of efficiency of economic integration. Hence, trade creation’s 
essence is in elimination of customs tariffs on inner border of unifying states (usually 
already trading with each other), causing further decrease of price of the goods, while there 
may be a case of new trade flow creation of the goods between the states decided to 
economically integrate.267 
  
The results will be that the production of a popular good in one country, which does not 
possess a comparative advantage in that sector, is replaced by cheaper supplies from a 
producer within the region which does. This then leads to the increase in intra-regional 
trade due to the relative decrease in price as a result of lower tariffs, thereby complementing 
– or extending – comparative advantage within the regional context.268 
 
Trade diversion, on the other hand, in its simplest form, means any trade diverted away 
from efficient global producers as a result of the creation of a trading bloc. It occurs when 
a country turns from lower cost suppliers in an extra-regional (third) country to higher cost 
regional suppliers that enjoy an advantage only as a result of the preferential tariff 
arrangement. It does not change the total volume of the individual country imports nor does 
it displace regional production. Rather, it changes the geographic composition of imports, 
as importers substitute imports from a foreign supplier whose price is unchanged, to 
                                                 
266 Suranovic, S.M. International Trade Theory and Policy (1998) - Chapter 10 at 2.  
267 Ibid. 
268 Rosson, C.P. “Preferential Trading Arrangements: Gainers and Losers from Regional Trading Blocs” 
available at www.ces.ncsu.edu/depts/agecon/trade/eight.html (accessed on 11 February 2015). 
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imports from a regional supplier whose relative price has fallen as a result of the lowering 
of tariffs.269 
 
According to Jacob Viner,270 the welfare impact of preferential trade agreements is 
ambiguous, because preferential trade liberalisation can either result in the replacement of 
inefficient domestic production with low-cost imports from member countries (trade 
creation) or in the substitution of efficient, low-cost imports from non-member countries 
with less efficient imports from member countries (trade diversion).271 
 
Regional economic integration is seen to be economically beneficial in situations where 
trade creation outweighs trade diversion. According to conventional theory, trade creation 
is more likely to outweigh trade diversion when trade among co-operating partners is 
currently or potentially a large proportion of their overall trade; or there is a high level of 
complementarity in production structures. When the establishment of a regional 
arrangement leads to a trade diversion, a misallocation of resources is a possible outcome. 
It is therefore expected that trade diversion will lead to a decline in imports and an 
expansion of domestic production, but at relatively higher costs.272 
 
Although existing theory on trade is unable to determine whether regional arrangements 
increase or reduce international trade distortion, regional arrangements are more likely to 
enhance world efficiency if their primary effect is to create new investment and trade rather 
than divert existing investment and trade flows.273 The prospects for this depend on existing 
                                                 
269 Suranovic (above, fn 266). 
270 Viner, J. The Customs Union Issue (1950) – as referred to by Sidzingre, A in “Trade structure as a 
constraint to multilateral and regional arrangements in sub-Saharan Africa: WTO and African Union” 
Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR) 10th Anniversary Conference Paper. 
University of Warwick, 17 – 19 September (2007) at 22. 
271 Sindzingre, A. “Trade structure as a constraint to multilateral and regional arrangements in sub-Saharan 
Africa: WTO and African Union” Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR) 10 th 
Anniversary Conference Paper. University of Warwick, 17 – 19 September (2007) at 22. 
272 Siah, K.L et al. “AFTA and the Intra-trade patterns among ASEAN-5 Economies: Trade-Enhancing or 
trade-inhibiting?” International Journal of Economics and Finance vol. 1 no. 1 February (2009) 117.  
273 Carim, X. “Multilateral trading, regional integration and the Southern African Development 
Community” The South African Journal of Economics vol. 65 no. 3 (1997) 334 at 339.  
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trade patterns among would-be regional partners and the manner in which their agreement 
is structured.  
 
In a large free trade area or a large customs union, consumer welfare may increase if such 
regional arrangements are able to shift the terms of trade in their favour through the 
reduction of imports and the expansion of regional production. While large regional 
arrangements will generate greater influences on the pattern of world trade, investment, 
etc, others are likely to have negligible effects.274  
 
South-South trade agreements275 – a situation in the Southern African region – are likely 
to lead to trade diversion as opposed to trade creation because developing countries trade 
little with each other, and tend to have a comparative advantage in the same sectors.276 This 
is why some authors state that values like “trade creation” or “trade diversion” cannot be 
used as measurements for judging the “quality” of integration in third world countries. 
They argue that what matters are the positive effects of cooperation on the single 
developing country. 277 
 
Several studies show that the SADC countries retained their openness and outward 
orientation despite signing the Trade Protocol278 for enhancing intra-SADC trade. As a 
result of this outward orientation, there is an increasing trend of extra-SADC trade 
commodities such as agriculture and light manufacturing sectors, and thus creating a 
negative trade diversion effect.279 However, the studies also show that intra-SADC trade is 
growing in the fuel and minerals and the heavy manufacturing sectors. 
                                                 
274 Ibid. 
275 “South–South Cooperation” is a term historically used by policymakers and academics to describe the 
exchange of resources, technology, and knowledge between developing countries.  
276 Sindzingre, A. “The European Union Economic Partnership Agreements with Sub-Saharan Africa”, 
United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS) Working 
Papers W-2008/5, 2008 at 30. 
277 Sundkvist, D. “The Southern African Development Community – A successful regional organisation?” 
Paper for Växjӧ University, Germany, 2009 at 9; Muuka, G.N et al. “Impediments to Economic Integration 
in Africa: The Case of COMESA” Journal of Business in Developing Nations vol. 2 (1998).  
278 This Protocol was concluded in Maseru, Lesotho on 24 August 1996, but its implementation phase 
began on 1 September 2000. It is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
279 Chauvin, S et al. “Regional trade integration in Southern Africa” Centre d'Études Prospectives and 
d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) Working Paper no. 2002-12 (2002); Bun, M. J et al. “The 
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3.2  APPROACHES TOWARDS INTEGRATION 
 
When attempting to explain the rationale for integration of economies, one must look both 
at the economic and the political motivations that lie behind such a move. This is because 
economic and political factors often closely interact in integration schemes.280 Also, 
membership of a regional integration arrangement is a political choice of any one country, 
whether based on political, social, geographic and/or economic considerations. 
 
Consideration of both economic and political aspects in integration led to development of 
economic and political theories. Economic theories include the market integration, 
development integration, functional and neo-functional integration, etc. Political theories, 
on the other hand, have to do with consideration of political factors such as reducing the 
chances of war, achieving regional security, promoting market-oriented democracies, or 
avoiding marginalisation in relation to other countries. 281 
 
In this chapter only economic theories are dealt with, as they are the ones relevant to this 
thesis.   
 
3.2.1 Economic Theories of Integration  
 
i. Market integration theory282 
 
                                                 
Importance of dynamics in panel gravity models of trade” (Discussion Paper: 2002/18) Department of 
Quantitative Economics, Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, University of van Amsterdam, 
Roetersstraat (2002) 11; Yayo, M et al. “International Trade Effects of Regional Economic Integration in 
Africa: The Case of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)” International Journal of 
African Development vol. 3 no. 2 (Spring 2016). 
280 Ng’ ong’ola, C. “The drive towards regionalisation in Southern Africa: fictional reality” African Journal 
of International and Comparative Law vol. 9 (1997) 639 at 640; “Chapter 2: Economic Aspects of 
Regional Integration” Regional integration and food security in developing countries FAO Corporate 
Document Repository (online version), available at www.fao.org/3/a-y4793e/y4793e05.htm (accessed on 
24 September 2015). 
281 Scott, F. “Too much of a good thing: Reassessing the proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements” 
Suffolk Transnational Law Review vol. 30 (2006 – 2007) 407 at 414. 
282 Ng’ ong’ola (fn 270). 
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The market integration theory is premised upon a group of member states that creates a 
common external tariff and remove internal tariff, hence it is sometimes called “customs 
union” theory. However, Lee283 argues that this theory is applicable in other forms of 
integration as well, including free trade areas, common markets, economic union and total 
economic integration.  
 
Market regional integration promotes regional interdependence, but does so by 
progressively removing the barriers to economic activity between states in the region: “the 
integrating force of the market is released through the removal of restrictions and barriers 
to regional trade, rather than through positive government interventions”.284 
This typically starts by reducing barriers to intra-regional trade such as tariffs, but later can 
include dismantling barriers to other factors of production, such as the movement of people.  
 
In theory, the process follows in linear succession, from preferential trade area (PTA), to a 
free trade area (FTA), customs union (CU), common market (CM), economic and monetary 
union (EMU)285, and finally complete economic integration. The important difference 
between the developmental approach (discussed below) and the market approach to 
regional economic integration is that with the latter the market, rather than the state, is the 
engine for closer economic integration.286 
 
However, the fundamental flaw of the market integration theory is that it is premised on 
the idea that all member states are developed economies and that trade is competitive. It is 
therefore open to discussion how useful market integration can be in the Southern Africa 
region, where almost half the gross domestic product (GNP) of the entire region originates 
in only five countries – South Africa, Angola, Mauritius, Botswana and Namibia.287  
                                                 
283 Lee, M. The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa (2003) at 15. 
284 Hentz, J.J. “South Africa and the political economy of regional cooperation in Southern Africa” Journal 
of Modern African Studies vol. 43 no 1 (2005) 25. 
285 See details discussion of different schemes of integration below. 
286 Matlli, W. The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond (1999) at 31; Hentz, J.J. South Africa 
and the Logic of Regional Cooperation (2005) at 6. 
287 World Bank. Global Economic Prospects (January 2015) at 6 – 9; Oluwu, D. “Regional integration, 
Development and the AU Agenda: Challenges, Gaps and Opportunities” Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems vol. 13 (2003) 212 at 241. 
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ii. Development integration theory288 
 
This theory developed in response to the criticisms of the market integration theory’s 
failure to account for the problems of less developed countries. Such problems are: 
different economic sizes, different political systems, and different levels of 
industrialisation. Rather than focusing on maximising the efficiency of existing trade, this 
theory looks at how to stimulate the countries’ productive capacities.289 It is characterised 
by an intentional effort on the part of regional partners to promote cooperation and 
interdependence, and this call for cooperation and co-ordination leads to a higher degree 
of state intervention than in the market integration model. This cooperation takes the form 
of regional industrial planning, in which implementation of development plans occur at a 
regional, rather than national, level.290  
 
The development integration theory requires a great degree of state participation in 
controlling economic activity as well as regional institutions playing a substantial role. In 
short, development integration theory is very much a state-led process. The other element 
of integration in this theory is the priority given to an equitable distribution of benefits 
derived from regional integration. This redistribution may come in the form of a transfer 
tax that allows poorer member states to impose limited tariffs on imports from a partner 
state.291 
 
The development integration theory would seem to have greater economic application 
among less developed countries than would the market integration theory. The political 
requirement of intensive cooperation among member states’ governments and strong 
regional institutions make it difficult to implement this model. Additionally, the fall of 
                                                 
288 Ng’ ong’ola, C. “The drive towards regionalisation in Southern Africa: fictional reality” African Journal 
of International and Comparative Law vol. 9 (1997) 639at 640. 
289 Lee, M. “Regionalism in Africa - A Part of Problem or a Part of Solution” Polis / R.C.S.P. / C.P.S.R. 
vol. 9 special number (2002) at 4. 
290 Hentz, J.J. “South Africa and the political economy of regional cooperation in Southern Africa” Journal 
of Modern African Studies vol. 43 no 1 (2005) 25. 
291 Hentz, J.J. South Africa and the Logic of Regional Cooperation (2005) at 5; Mittelman, J. The 
Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance (2000) at 21.  
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Soviet Union and worldwide shift to market-oriented economies has led to many 
questioning the theory’s practical application.292 
 
In Southern Africa this theory is applicable to both the SADC and the COMESA, especially 
the COMESA as it is still developing from a common market to an economic community. 
Article 177 of the COMESA Treaty makes provision for gradual development into an 
economic union, which led to a four-stage programme towards the establishment of a 
monetary union by the year 2025 being approved by the Authority of Heads of State and 
Government of the COMESA in 1992.293 The stages are the following: 
 stage one 1992 - 1996: consolidation of existing instruments of Monetary Co-
operation and implementation of policy measures aimed at achieving 
macroeconomic convergence; 
 stage two 1997 - 2000: introduction of limited currency convertibility and informal 
exchange rate union; 
 stage three 2000 - 2024: formal exchange rate union and co-ordination of economic 
policies by a common monetary institution; 
 stage four 2025: full monetary union involving the use of one common currency 
issued by a common central bank.294 
 
For the SADC Article 21 of the SADC Treaty calls for cooperation in areas such as trade, 
science and technology. Nowhere in the Treaty does a demand for a common external tariff 
appear, although the signing of the Trade Protocol indicates a shift. Article 11 of the SADC 
Trade Protocol adheres to national treatment principle while Article 12 provides for 
“Community treatment” of originating goods. Article 26A makes a provision for 
establishment of the Regional Development Fund in which shall be accounted receipts and 
expenditure of the SADC relating to the development of the SADC. 
 
                                                 
292Hentz, J.J. “South Africa and the political economy of regional cooperation in Southern Africa” Journal 
of Modern African Studies vol. 43 no 1 (2005) 25. 
293 Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). “Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA III): 
Towards Monetary and Financial Integration in Africa” (2008) at 198.  
294 Ibid; “COMESA Strategy” at about.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view… (accessed on 5 
February 2015).  
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The SACU Treaty is a mix of both market integration and development integration theories. 
It has established a common external tariff for South Africa and the Botswana-Lesotho-
Namibia-Swaziland (BLNS) states. Coupled with this is a development integration element 
in which the Treaty allows for a monetary transfer based on duties collected flowing from 
South Africa to the BLNS countries.295  
 
However, there are problems to the SACU Treaty, which are two-fold. First, because of its 
market integration approach, the benefits from a common external tariff have not been 
shared among the BLNS countries. Secondly, market forces tend to benefit the larger 
countries in such an arrangement. With this, the BLNS countries have been unable to attract 
industrial development, and they face the prospect of trade diversion as an industrial state 
such as South Africa is able to exploit the common tariff to develop markets in the BLNS 
countries for its exports. Even with the compensatory customs arrangement, industrial 
investments both from within the Customs Union and outside still flow to South Africa. 
This continues the cycle of further industrialisation for South Africa and minimal growth 
for the other member states.296 
 
iii. Functional and Neo-functional integration theories (or Post-neo-functionalism)  
 
Functional theory is based on the functional model of integration as advanced by David 
Mitrany297 after the World War II. Mitrany felt that integration was necessary to solve 
security problems, rather than creating a massive supranational structure. He argued that 
integration could proceed by linking particular activities and interests, one at a time, 
according to need and acceptability, giving each a joint authority and policy limited to that 
activity alone. This, he said, can be done through a series of shared projects across borders, 
                                                 
295 Ng’ ong’ola, C. “The drive towards regionalisation in Southern Africa: fictional reality” African Journal 
of International and Comparative Law vol. 9 (1997) 639 at 644. 
296 Ibid. 
297 (1898 – 1975) He was the mastermind behind the ‘Reconstruction of Europe’ after World War II. He 
was an intellect of Romanian origin. One of his seminal proposals was to ‘contain in a dialectical sense the 
old nations states, to entangle and de-substantiate them in a web of transnational economic and 
administrative functions thus creating a “working peace system” beyond the old conflict laden European 
power system’. With publication of this vision he became the intellectual godfather of many subsequent 
European developments in real politics and in academic analysis. 
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which create habits of cooperation and reveal the advantages of pooling efforts.298 
Therefore, according to this theory the functional way for regional integration has to do 
with sharing the load or burden among regional members in such a way that each nation is 
responsible for a specific task and, therefore, plays a role in integrating and catering for the 
region. 
 
This theory is as such limited to the formation of non-political institutions and entails less 
sacrifice of sovereignty than with market integration, but does see intra-regional economic 
interactions creating a “functional need” for a regional institution.299 Unlike in the prior 
models, an increase in trade or the establishment of a customs union is considered a by-
product of the political goal of diminishing the likelihood of regional aggression in this 
model.300 
 
The neo-functional theory developed as a result of the complaint or concern that Mitrany 
had separated economics from politics. Like the functionalists, neo-functionalists believe 
that international cooperation should begin in narrow technical areas. Yet they differ in that 
neo-functionalists believe success in one sector will lead to pressures for integration in 
other areas. As these sectors merge at the regional level, the need for political institutions 
will arise. Ultimately, groups within the region will look to supranational structures as a 
way of reaching their aims.301 Another difference is that neo-functionalism describes or 
explains the process of regional integration based on empirical data. Its focus on 
supranationalism is on regional integration or regional supranationalism, and not on global 
integration or global supranationalism, which is a primary concern of functionalism 
theory.302  
                                                 
298 Mitrany, D. “Functional Approach to World Organization” International Affairs vol. 24 no. 3 (1948) 
350.  
299 Hentz, J.J. “South Africa and the political economy of regional cooperation in Southern Africa” Journal 
of Modern African Studies vol. 43 no 1 (2005) 25 at 26. 
300 Maffei, D et al. “Crisis and Integration: The Effect of Crisis on the Pace of European Integration”, Paper 
presented at European Union Studies Association Conference Baltimore, Maryland (May 2013) at 1. 
301 Akwara, A et al. “The Role of Regional Economic and Political Groups in the Globalization Process: A 
Case Study of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (1982-2002)” Canadian 
Social Science vol. 9 no. 6 (2013) 67 at 68. 
302 Burchill,S et al. Theories of International Relations (2005) at 10 – 27;  Echezona, N. International 
Politics in Post Cold War Era (1998) at 76 – 80.  
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Haas303 is generally regarded as the “father” of neo-functionalism and his theory arose out 
of the European integration experiences in the early post-war years. He noted that certain 
kinds of organisational tasks most intimately related to group and national aspirations can 
be expected to result in integration even though the actors responsible for this development 
may not deliberately work towards such an end.304 
 
According to the theory, initial cooperation on the creation of common institutions in non-
political (and hence non-controversial) policy areas is, over time, not only deepened, but 
also widened to include the realm of other connected policy areas. The deliberate design of 
institutions is seen as the most effective means for solving common problems, and these, 
in turn, are instrumental to the creation of functional as well as “political spill-over” and 
ultimately to a redefinition of group identity around the regional unit.305 
 
Neo-functionalists therefore believe that economic integration would lead to political 
integration - the so-called “spill-over” - according to which integration would deepen from 
economic to political and the result would be an integrated union of states.306  
 
The idea of spill-over, particularly the fact that economic integration would lead to political 
integration, was challenged by various critics.307 They say the neo-functionalists – that is, 
proponents of “spill-over” – did not make a distinction between high and low politics. Low 
politics would be the more technocratic issues which did not involve too much sovereignty 
transfer from the Member State and therefore in such a case integration would be possible. 
                                                 
303 Ernst Bernard Haas (1924 – 6 March 2003) was a leading authority on international relations theory and 
published numerous books, monographs and articles. He also acted as a consultant to many national and 
international organisations.  
304 Stephan, H et al. “New regionalism in southern Africa: functional developmentalism and the Southern 
African Power Pool” Politeia vol. 27 issue 3 (2008) 54 at 56.  
305 Fawcett, L et al. Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order (1995) 
at 59. 
306 Pollack, M. A. “International Relations Theory and European Integration” Journal of Common Market 
Studies vol. 39 (2) (2001) 221- 244. 
307 Ujupan, A. “Reconciling theories of regional integration: a third way approach”, University of Ulster 
Paper (2005) at 3; Sandholtz, W et al. “Neo-functionalism and Supranational Governance” Oxford 
Handbook of the European Union (2012) at 17; Gehring, T. “Integrating Integration Theory: Neo-
functionalism and International Regimes” Global Society vol. 10 no. 3 (1996) 225 at 229. 
88 
 
High politics would be a different issue – this concept refers to key policies of member 
states such as defence, taxation, macroeconomic strategies, etc.308   
 
There are three major principles of neo-functionalism:  
(i) The principle of positive spill-over effects which states that integration 
between states in one sector, that is economic sector, will eventually ramify 
into integration or cooperation in other sectors, such as political, socio-
cultural, security, etc;  
(ii) The mechanism of a transfer in domestic allegiance which assumes that as 
the process of integration gathers momentum in an increasingly pluralistic 
domestic society of each state, interest groups and other associations will 
transfer their allegiance or loyalty away from national institutions towards 
the supranational institution(s) when they begin to realise that their material 
interests or wellbeing can be better pursued through supranational 
institution(s) than the pre-existing national institutions; and  
(iii) The principle of technocratic automaticity which states that as integration 
hastens, the supranational institution(s) will take the lead in fostering further 
integration as they become more and more autonomous of the member 
states.309  
 
Both the functional and neo-functional approaches could be found in the SADC and 
COMESA, especially the SADC, which as the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC), started as a loose security co-operation arrangement 
which spilled over into co-operation in the economic sphere. The majority of institutions 
of these two bodies are headed by politicians and even their policies have huge political 
overtones as it is states that are parties to these treaties. This is despite some authors 
maintaining that neo-functionalism, in particular, is Eurocentric and not appropriate for 
                                                 
308 Ujupan (above). 
309 Aniche, E. “Problematizing Neo-functionalism in the Search for a New Theory of African Integration: 
The Case of the Proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) in Africa” Developing Country Studies vol.4 
no.20 (2014) 128 at 136.  
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Africa. They maintain that Africa needs to look for a theory, which transcends neo-
functionalism, a post-neo-functional theory.310 
 
The proponents of post-neo-functional theory maintain that neo-functionalism has many 
defects. One defect is that while assuming that regional integration is a gradual process, its 
conception of integration as a linear process makes explanation of setbacks or shortcomings 
impossible. Another of its defects is that neo-functionalism assumes that integration of 
states is an integration of interdependence, and therefore, not adequate for explaining the 
incidence of dependence of African economies to Western economies and integration of 
dependence of the one African state to another.311 
 
Consequently, according to these proponents, there is a need for a paradigm shift in Africa, 
that is, a theory that will be appropriate or adequate in explaining the African predicament: 
a theory which will enable Africans to tell their own stories by themselves, a post-neo-
functional theory.312  
 
iv. Ad hoc integration theory 
 
Ad hoc regional economic integration relies heavily on bilateral agreements between 
regional states. It is considered ad hoc because it is not part of a larger plan to induce 
regional interdependence, or even part of a regional scheme. However, some authors do 
not regard this as a theory of integration for the mere reason that “ad hoc” itself denotes 
                                                 
310 Aniche, E. “Problematizing Neofunctionalism in the Search for a New Theory of African Integration: 
The Case of the Proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) in Africa” Developing Country Studies vol. 
4 no. 20 (2014) 128 at 129; Okeke V.O.S et al. “Economic Regionalism and Dependency in Africa: A 
Study of African Economic Community (AEC)” Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review 
vol.1 no.1 (June 2012) 1 at 6; Aniche, E et al. “Regional Economic Integration in Africa: A Comparative 
Study of ECOWAS and SADC” International Journal of Africa Culture, Politics and Development vol. 4 
no. 2 (2009) 82 - 101. 
311 Aniche, E. “Problematizing Neo-functionalism in the Search for a New Theory of African Integration: 
The Case of the Proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) in Africa” Developing Country Studies vol.4 
no.20 (2014) 128 at 136. 
312 Aniche, E. A Modern Introduction to Political Science (2009) at 404.  
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something temporary whereas “integration” denotes something permanent.313 However, by 
connecting countries, albeit in an ad hoc manner, it does create a more integrated region. 
 
Both the ad hoc and functional integration focus on infrastructural development, but the ad 
hoc approach explicitly rejects the promotion of regional interdependence and advocates a 
much less progressive role for the state.314 
 
v. The Neo-liberal economic theory 
 
As the concept itself suggests, neo-liberalism is a revival of liberalism. It is thus thought 
of as the return and spread of economic liberalism, which is, basically, the belief that states 
ought to abstain from intervening in the economy, and instead leave that, as much as 
possible, up to individuals participating in free and self-regulating markets.315 
 
This theory is, in the main, a variant of the market integration approach to regionalism as, 
and to some less degree, political theory of integration. That is why Harvey316 defines it as 
“a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and 
free trade.”  
 
According to Gibb,317 this approach prioritises “open regionalism . . . as a mechanism to 
enhance multilateral liberalisation and promote integration in the world economy.” It is 
underpinned by the principle of comparative advantage, which says that countries should 
specialise in producing what they are specially endowed to produce. 
                                                 
313 Biswaro, J.M. The Quest for Regional Integration in the Twenty First Century: Rhetoric versus Reality – 
A comparative study (2012) at 13; Schiff, M et al. Regional Integration and Development (2003) at 187. 
314Ng’ ong’ola, C. “The drive towards regionalisation in Southern Africa: fictional reality” African Journal 
of International and Comparative Law vol. 9 (1997) 639 at 640.  
315 Thorsen, D.E et al. “What is Neoliberalism?” Paper written for the Department of Political Science, 
University of Oslo (2008) at 2.   
316 Harvey, D. A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005) at 2.  
317 Gibb, R. “Regional Integration and Development Trajectory: Meta-theories, expectations and reality” 
Third World Quarterly vol. 30 no. 4 (2009) 701 at 708. 
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In agreeing with Gibb, Gamble and Payne318 argue that the neo-liberal theoretical 
framework of analysing integration is open regionalism, which tend to reinforce the 
detrimental effects of economic globalisation and global capitalism. They also see the 
contemporary form of regionalism as a manifestation of economic globalisation and 
prevailing form of hegemony. 
 
Having dealt with the theories and approaches of regional integration as well as its 
relationship with the WTO, it is now pertinent to look into different integration schemes 
that are applied by various regions globally, but use those in Southern Africa as examples. 
 
3.3  REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION SCHEMES IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
 
Regional economic integration arrangements or schemes are not new phenomena. One of 
the first recorded regional integration initiatives was the customs union established by 
Prussia with Hesse-Darmstadt. This was followed by the Bavaria Württemberg Customs 
Union, the German Zollverein, the North German Tax Union and the German Reich.319 
This wave of integration is what influenced the creation of the European Steel and Coal 
Community (ECSC) in 1952 by Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg. In 1957 the West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg and the 
Netherlands signed the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Community, which is 
the precursor of the present-day European Union (EU).320  
   
In Southern Africa, the then Union of South Africa and the High Commission Territories 
of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland concluded the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) in 1910. With the advent of independence for these territories, the 
                                                 
318 Gamble, A et al. “The World Order Approach” in Soderbaum, F et al. Theories of New Regionalism: A 
Palgrave Reader (2004) at 30. 
319 Matlli, W. The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond (1999) at 2.  
320 Ibid. 
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agreement was updated on 11 December 1969 and entered into force on 1 March 1970. 
Namibia joined the Customs Union in 1990 after gaining its independence.321 
 
Regional integration schemes differ in terms of depth and kind, moving from most limited 
to deepest integration. They include the following: 
 
1.  Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA): customs duties on trade among members are 
reduced compared to those on trade with non-member countries. That is where 
“preferential treatment” comes in; 
2. Free Trade Area (FTA): tariffs and quotas on trade between members are totally 
removed, but members retain control over their own restrictions on trade with non-
member countries. The different rules applying to external trade make a system of 
rules of origin necessary; 
3. Customs Union: in addition to free internal trade (as in FTA) member countries 
apply a common external tariff (CET) on trade with non-member countries. Rules 
of origin are no longer required; 
4. Common Market: in addition to a customs union there is a free movement of factors 
of production. Common restrictions apply to the movement of factors of production 
with non-member countries; and 
5.  Economic Union: in addition to a common market major economic policies (e.g. 
fiscal and monetary policy) are coordinated.322 
 
Because there is currently no PTA in existence in Southern Africa the thesis will deal  
only with the other four applicable schemes, i.e. FTA, customs union, common market  
and economic union.   
 
 
 
                                                 
321 “About SACU” at www.sacu.int/ (accessed on 6 March 2015). In-depth discussion on SACU is made 
below under 3.3.2.  
322 Balassa, B. The Theory of Economic Integration (1961) 1; Nye, J.S. “Comparative Regional Integration: 
Concept and Measurement” International Organization vol. 22 no. 4 (1968) 855 at 860.  
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3.3.1 Free Trade Area 
 
A free trade area (FTA) can be considered the second stage of economic integration – that 
is, after the PTA – and it involves removal of tariff and quantitative restrictions on trade 
between member states. If people are also free to move between the countries, in addition 
to the FTA, it would also be considered an open border. Normally countries would choose 
this kind of economic integration if their economic structures are complementary. If their 
economic structures are competitive, it is likely there will be no incentive for an FTA, or 
only selected areas of goods and services will be covered to fulfil the economic interests 
between the two signatories of an FTA.323 An FTA is a result of a free-trade agreement (a 
form of trade pact) between two or more countries.  
  
As such free trade area can be defined as an area formed by reciprocal multilateral 
agreements whereby two or more nations agree to limit or eliminate all import tariffs and 
duties between them.324 However, the process of such economic integration must not result 
in higher external trade barriers for non-members, as per the GATT Article XXIV(5).325  
                                                 
323 Komolanavij, S et al. “The Formation of Industrial Clusters in Asia and regional integration” – Midterm 
Report (2008) at 63. 
324 Sullivan, A et al. Economic: Principles in Action (2003) at 453; Schulze, H.C.A.W. “The legal 
implications of the establishment of free trade zones in South Africa” Comparative and International Law 
Journal of Southern Africa (CILSA) vol. XXXI (1998) 1 at 2; De Melo, J et al. New Dimensions in 
Regional Integration (1995) at 160.  
325 Article XXIV(5) Provides: 
Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of 
contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an 
interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area; Provided 
that: 
  
(a)     with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a formation of a 
customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of 
any such union or interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting parties not parties 
to such union or agreement shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the 
general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent 
territories prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of such interim agreement, as 
the case may be; 
  
(b)     with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a 
free trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the 
constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such free-trade area or the adoption 
of such interim agreement to the trade of contracting parties not included in such area or not 
parties to such agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding 
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Unlike in a customs union (the third stage of economic integration), members of a free-
trade area do not have a common external tariff, which means they have different quotas 
and customs, as well as other policies with respect to non-members. To avoid tariff evasion 
(through re-exportation) the countries use the system of certification of origin - commonly 
called “rules of origin” - where there is a requirement for the minimum extent of local 
material inputs and local transformations adding value to the goods. Only goods that meet 
these minimum requirements are entitled to the special treatment envisioned by the free 
trade area provisions.326 
 
FTAs have both advantages and disadvantages. The principal advantage of an FTA is trade 
liberalisation. A practical advantage of FTAs is that they are quicker and easier to negotiate 
than other multilateral agreements because fewer parties are at the table. As such parties 
can secure advantages that are harder to win in bigger forums.327 
 
The disadvantages are twofold. If FTAs are not set up within the right framework of 
policies, they can diminish rather than enhance economic welfare. The second 
disadvantage is that they are not good vehicles for liberalising trade in sectors on which 
parties outside the agreement have a major influence. In addition to these two there is a 
traditional debate that FTAs have a danger of diverting rather than creating trade.328 
                                                 
duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior to 
the formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement as the case may be; and 
  
(c)     any interim agreement referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall include a plan and 
schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within a 
reasonable length of time. 
 
326 Komolanavij, S et al. “The Formation of Industrial Clusters in Asia and regional integration” – Midterm 
Report (2008) at; www.princeton.edu/freetrade/html (accessed 31 March 2015). 
327 “Chapter 3 FTAs — advantages and disadvantages, An Australia–USA Free Trade Agreement: Issues 
and Implications”, Report by Monash University's APEC Study Centre, August 2001; Cooper, W. “Free 
Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy”, Congressional Research 
Service (CRC) Report, February 2014 at 3.  
328 Baldwin, R et al. “are Free Trade Agreements Contagious” Journal of International Economics vol. 88 
(2012) 1 at 7; Baldwin, R et al. “A Test of Endogenous Trade Bloc Formation Theory on EU Data” Journal 
of International Economic Studies vol. 11 no. 2 (2007) 77 at 80; Baier, S.L et al. “Economic Determinants 
of Free Trade Area” Journal of International Economic vol. 64 issue 1 (2004) 29 at 55; “Chapter 3 FTAs 
— advantages and disadvantages, An Australia–USA Free Trade Agreement: Issues and Implications”, 
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3.3.1.1 COMESA 
 
The classic example of a free trade area in Southern Africa is the Common Market of 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), formerly the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (PTA). It should be remembered that a common market encompasses 
both the customs union and a free trade area. The PTA was the brainchild of the United 
Nations Economic Commissions for Africa (ECA). Its founding Treaty was signed on 21 
December 1981 and it entered into force on 30 September 1982.329  
 
The COMESA formally succeeded the PTA on 8 December 1994 when it came into force. 
This is the largest regional economic community in Africa with membership of 20 states.330  
 
The COMESA strives for economic integration in all fields of economic activity, not only 
trade. It sees integration as involving a gradual process – the establishment of a free trade 
area to be followed by a common market and eventually an economic community. This 
was stated in the Preamble to the PTA Treaty which stated that the PTA is a “first step 
towards . . . a common market and eventually an Economic Community of Eastern and 
Southern African States”.331  
 
Article 12 of the PTA Treaty provided for “the establishment of a common market within 
which customs duties or other charges . . . shall be progressively eliminated . . . and a 
common customs tariff . . . established and maintained.” This first step was realised by 
                                                 
Report by Monash University's APEC Study Centre, August 2001; Grossman, G.M et al. “The Politics of 
Free trade Agreements” American Economic Review vol. 85 no. 4 (September 1995) 667 at 672 – 673.  
329 Schechter, M.G. International Organizations (2010) at 13.  
330 These are: Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.   
331 This is reiterated in the Preamble to the COMESA Treaty, which reads: 
 “Bearing in mind the establishment among their respective States of the Preferential Trade Area 
for Eastern and Southern African States as a first step towards the creation of a Common Market 
and eventually of an Economic Community for Eastern and Southern Africa.  
 
Recalling the provisions of Article 29 of PTA Treaty to the effect that steps should be taken to 
develop the Preferential Trade Area established by that Treaty into a Common Market and 
eventually into an Economic Community.” 
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transforming the PTA into the COMESA, which then means it (COMESA) will have to 
realise the eventual step of establishing the economic community. 
 
The COMESA Free Trade Area (FTA) was launched on 31 October 2000,332 marking the 
first ever free trade area within the African continent. The FTA started with nine countries, 
namely: Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Membership in the FTA is now sixteen,333 with the DRC being the latest 
member to join in 2016. All other fifteen member states trade on a full duty free and quota 
free basis, except for the DRC.  Having joined the FTA recently, the DRC’s accession to 
the FTA would be done through a three-year phase down approach starting in 2016 with a 
40% reduction on duty, followed by a 30% reduction in 2017 and another 30% in 2018.334 
 
Eritrea and Ethiopia are still undergoing legislative process to pass the necessary legal 
instruments for accession to the COMESA FTA,335 whilst Swaziland is trading under an 
indefinite derogation which allows the country not to reciprocate tariff preference on 
imports originating from other member states of COMESA as provided for by the 
COMESA Treaty.336 
 
Article 48 of the COMESA Treaty provides the “Rules of Origin” for protection and  
                                                 
332 Lombaerde, P. Multilateralism, Regionalism and Bilateralism in Trade and Investment (2006) at 131; 
Tralac. “COMESA Legal Texts and Policy Documents” available at www.tralac.org/resources (accessed on 
31 March 2015).  
333 The 16 participating countries are Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, 
Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
334 “16 countries now in COMESA Free Trade Area” Tralac, 3 May 2016 (online). Available at 
https://www.tralac.org/news/article/9574-16-countries-now-in-comesa-free-trade-area.html (accessed on 4 
October 2017).  
335 Communiqué of the nineteenth Summit of the COMESA Authority of Heads of State and Government, 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 18 – 19 October 2016. 
336 “Free Trade and Preferential Agreements Relevant to Swaziland” available at 
http://www.sra.org.sz/customs/free-trade-and-preferential-agreements.php (accessed on 4 October 2017); 
Mchavi, K. “Country Spotlight: Kingdom of Swaziland” Political Economy Southern Africa (PESA) 
Regional Integration Monitor (September 2016) at 8. 
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checks-and-balances of the FTA.337 The COMESA is also a legal person that can sue and 
be sued.338 The institutions of the COMESA are: the Authority of Heads of State and 
Government, Council of Ministers, the Court of Justice and the Committee of Governors of 
Central Banks. These four have the power to take decisions on behalf of the COMESA. In 
addition there are other organs: the Intergovernmental Committee, the Technical 
Committees, the Secretariat and the Consultative Committee.339 
 
The Authority is the supreme policy organ of the COMESA and is responsible for the 
general policy, direction and control of the performance of the executive functions of the 
Common Market and the achievement of its aims and objectives. The decisions and 
directives of the Authority are by consensus and are binding on all subordinate institutions, 
other than the Court of Justice.340 
 
                                                 
337 Article 48 states: 
“1.  For the purposes of this Treaty, goods shall be accepted as eligible for Common Market tariff 
treatment if they originate in the member states.  
 
2. The definition of products originating in the member states shall be as provided for in a Protocol on 
the Rules of Origin to be concluded by the member states. 
 
3. The Intergovernmental Committee shall, from time to time, examine the rules referred to in 
paragraph 2 of this Article and propose amendments thereto to the Council.” 
 
338 Article 186 provides: 
“1. The Common Market shall enjoy international legal personality. 
  
2. It shall have in the territory of each Member State: 
(a) the legal capacity required for the performance of its functions under this Treaty; and 
(b) power to acquire or dispose of movable and immovable property in accordance with the laws 
and regulations in force in each member state. 
 
3. The Common Market shall, in the exercise of its legal personality, be represented by the Secretary-
General. 
 
4. Subject to the provisions of the Charters establishing the institutions of the Common Market which 
provide that the institutions, as the case may be, shall be capable of being sued, the Agreement shall 
be extended to the institutions of the Common Market: 
 
Provided that the Secretary-General shall make arrangements by which the administrative costs related to 
implementation of the provisions of the Agreement are equitably shared with the institutions of the 
Common Market.” 
339 Article 7(1) of the COMESA Treaty. 
340 Article 8. 
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The Council of Ministers is the second highest policy organ of the COMESA. It is 
composed of ministers designated by the member states. It takes policy decisions on the 
programmes and activities of the COMESA, including the monitoring and reviewing of its 
financial and administrative management. The Council decisions are made by consensus, 
failing which, by two-thirds majority of the members of the Council.341 
 
The Court of Justice is the judicial organ of the COMESA, having jurisdiction to adjudicate 
upon all matters that may be referred to it pursuant to the COMESA Treaty.342 It ensures 
the proper interpretation and application of the provisions of the Treaty and adjudicates 
any disputes that may arise among the member states regarding the interpretation and 
application of the provisions of the Treaty. The decisions of the Court are binding and final. 
When acting within its jurisdiction, it is independent of the Authority and the Council.  
 
The Committee of Governors of Central Banks is empowered under the Treaty to, inter 
alia, determine the maximum debt and credit limits to the COMESA Clearing House. It 
also monitors, and ensures the proper implementation of the Monetary and Financial 
Cooperation programmes.343 
 
The Inter-governmental Committee is a multi-disciplinary body composed of permanent 
secretaries from member states in the fields of trade and customs, administrative and 
budgetary matters, transport and industry, legal affairs, etc. Decisions of the Committee are 
taken by simple majority. Its main functions include: 
 the development of programmes and action plans in all the sectors of co-operation, 
except in the finance and monetary sector; 
 the monitoring and keeping under constant review and ensuring proper functioning 
and development of the Common Market;  
 overseeing the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and, for that purpose, 
requesting a technical committee to investigate any particular matter; and 
                                                 
341 Article 9. 
342 Article 23. 
343 Article 13. 
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 submission from time to time of the reports and recommendations to the Council.344 
 
There are twelve (12) Technical Committees345 on, inter alia, Administrative and 
Budgetary Matters, Legal Affairs, Trade and Customs and Transport and Communications. 
The Technical Committees are responsible for the preparation of comprehensive 
implementation programmes and monitoring their implementation and then making 
recommendations to the Council.346 
 
There is also the Consultative Committee that consists of representatives of business 
community and other interest groups from member states. It is responsible for providing a 
link and facilitating dialogue between the business community and other interest groups, 
and other organs of the COMESA.347 
 
The Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General, who is appointed by the Authority for a 
term of five years and eligible for re-appointment for a further term of five years. The basic 
function of the Secretariat is to provide technical support and advisory services to the 
member states in the implementation of the Treaty. It undertakes research and studies as a 
basis for implementing the decisions adopted by the policy organs. The various activities 
of the Secretariat encompass, inter alia: Trade and Customs, Monetary Co-operation and 
Administration. The Office of the Secretary-General includes the Legal Office.348 
 
Several institutions have been created to promote sub-regional co-operation and 
development. These include: 
 the COMESA Trade and Development Bank in Nairobi, Kenya; 
 the COMESA Clearing House in Harare, Zimbabwe; 
 the COMESA Association of Commercial Banks in Harare; 
                                                 
344 Article 14. 
345 Article 15. 
346 Article 16. 
347 Article 18. 
348 Article 17. 
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 Federation of National Associations of Women in Business in Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (FEMCOM) in Harare; 
 the COMESA Leather and Leather Products Institute (LLPI) in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia; and 
 the COMESA Re-Insurance Company in Nairobi.349 
 
3.3.1.2 SADC 
 
The two founding documents, the Declaration350 and Treaty,351 establishing the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) were signed at the Summit of Heads of State 
or Government on 17th of July 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia. The SADC replaced the 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which had been in 
existence since 1980.352 The main aim of the SADCC was to reduce the economic 
dependence of the region on apartheid South Africa, but with the political change looming 
in South Africa – which eventually happened in 1994 – it was clear that this objective 
would soon be obsolete. The SADC is currently composed of 15 member states.353 
 
The SADC also has its own FTA, which entered into force in January 2008 and was 
officially launched during the SADC Summit held in Sandton, South Africa, in August 
2008. The SADC FTA was launched as a result of attainment of minimum conditions for 
the FTA – 85% of intraregional trade among member states attaining zero duty. According 
                                                 
349 “About COMESA” at about.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view (accessed 31 March 
2015). 
Some of these institutions, together with others listed in Article 174, were established under the PTA Treaty 
and shall be recognised by COMESA. 
350 The Declaration was entitled “Towards a Southern African Development Community: - Declaration 
made by Heads of State or Governments of Southern Africa, Windhoek, August, 1992”. 
351 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (Windhoek) August, 1992. 
352 SADCC was created by the so-called Front Line States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe). 
353 Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe; Kalenga, 
P. “Regional integration in SADC: retreating or forging ahead?” Tralac Working Paper D12WP08/2012 
(September 2012) at 3. 
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to the SADC maximum tariff liberalisation was only attained by January 2012, when the 
tariff phase-down process for sensitive products was completed.354 
 
However, Sandrey355 argues that the maximum tariff liberalisation was never attained since 
for Mozambique the process was only due to be completed in 2015 in the case of imports 
from South Africa. Also Angola and the DRC still remain outside the agreement. In 
addition, Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe had derogations that include allowances for a 
25% import duty on sugar and paper products until 2015 in order for the industries to take 
measures to adjust. 
 
The existence of the FTAs in both the COMESA and the SADC presents some challenges 
with regards to the rules of origin. But the flipside of this can be seen as advantageous as 
member states have an option to choose which rules of origin they can apply to their trade 
transaction.  
 
The SADC rules of origin are substantially different from those applied by the COMESA. 
Whilst the COMESA rules of origin are only of general conditions, the SADC rules of 
origin include both general conditions and specific rules for all chapters of the harmonised 
system (HS) classification.356 They therefore vary widely across product chapters, headings 
and subheadings.357 
 
Another FTA, The Tripartite FTA between the SADC, COMESA and East African 
Community (EAC), has just been established on 10 June 2015.358 This FTA was envisaged 
in 2005 when a Task Force was formed in 2005 to coordinate the trade-related programmes 
                                                 
354 Southern African Development Community – Towards a common future. Available at 
www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/free-trade-area/ (accessed on 8 April 2015).  
355 Sandrey, R. “An Analysis of the SADC Free Trade Area” Tralac Working Paper (2013) at 2.  
356 Shayanowako, P. “Towards a COMESA, EAC and SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area” Trade and 
Development Studies Issue No. 40 (January 2011) at 14; Kalaba, M. “Exploring the COMESA-EAC-SADC 
Trilateral Free Trade Area: An Approach to Rules of Origin” Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies 
Working Paper, December 2009 at 7; Kalenga, P. “Rules of Origin and Regional Integration in Southern 
Africa” Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook vol. 5 (2005) 25 at 34. 
357 Appendix I of Annex I of the SADC Trade Protocol.  
358 Communiqué of the Third COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit, adopted on 10 June 2015 at Sharm 
El Sheikh, Egypt. 
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of the three RECs and eliminate any duplication of efforts. Afterwards the RECs’ Heads 
of State and Government met in October 2008 in Kampala, Uganda and agreed to: 
 
 Form an enlarged FTA encompassing SADC, EAC and COMESA leading to an 
enlarged customs union; 
 Develop a roadmap for establishing the enlarged FTA; and 
 Directed the chairpersons for the three RECs to accelerate the development of joint 
programmes that enhance cooperation and coordination in industrial and 
competition policies.359 
 
The Kampala Summit took far-reaching decisions, including the merger of the three 
RECs.360 During the Second COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit that took place on 
12 June 2011 in Sandton, South Africa, the three RECs agreed on the negotiating 
principles, processes, scope and institutional framework for negotiating the Tripartite 
FTA.  A roadmap and timelines for establishing the FTA were also agreed upon.361 
 
The first (preparatory) phase of negotiations was aimed at addressing tariff liberalisation, 
rules of origin, customs cooperation and customs-related matters, non-tariff 
barriers, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, trade remedies 
and dispute settlement. 362 During this phase, countries exchanged information, adopted the 
terms of reference and rules of procedure, as well as the schedule of negotiations, 
established a monitoring and evaluation mechanism and prepared national negotiating 
positions for core FTA items. Facilitating movement of business persons within the region 
                                                 
359 http://www.comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite.org/about/background (accessed on 10 June 2015); 
Shayanowako, P. “Towards a COMESA, EAC and SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area” Trade and 
Development Studies issue no. 40 (January 2011) at 7.   
360 “Final Communiqué of the joint COMESA-EAC-SADC Heads of State and Government Summit, 
Vision: Towards a Single Market, Theme: Deepening COMESA-EAC-SADC Integration, 20 October 
2008, Kampala, Uganda”.  
361 “Communiqué of the Second COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit, Vision: Towards a Single 
Market, Theme: Deepening COMESA-EAC-SADC Integration, 12 June 2011, Sandton Convention Centre, 
Johannesburg, South Africa”. 
362 Ibid. 
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was negotiated in parallel with this phase. A timeline of 36 months was set for completion 
of the first phase and it ran from December 2011 to November 2012.363  
 
However, the November 2012 deadline was not met and the completion of the first phase 
was done in October 2014 during the Tripartite Sectoral Committee of Ministers meeting 
in Bujumbura, Burundi where the majority of the Tripartite Member/Partner States made 
ambitious tariff offers and agreed on rules of origin to be applied in the interim whilst 
further work continued on product specific rules of origin.364 
 
The second phase, which is the last stage, focuses on negotiating trade in services and trade-
related issues, including intellectual property rights, competition policy and trade 
development and competitiveness. This would start after the adoption of the “Declaration 
launching Phase II of the negotiations for the TFTA and the Roadmap”, which was done 
on 10 June 2015 by the 3rd Summit of the Tripartite Heads of State and Governments in 
Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt. The Summit also launched the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite 
Free Trade Area (Tripartite FTA).365 
 
3.3.2 Customs Union 
 
Characteristics of a customs union ordinarily involve the following: 
 the removal of trade restrictions, such as import quotas and customs tariffs, among 
member states of the union; 
 the adoption of a common external tariffs and common customs regulations against 
non-member states; and 
 a division of customs revenue among union members.366 
 
                                                 
363 “Towards a Tripartite Free Trade Area” www.comesa.int/index.php?option...id...tripartite (accessed 
on12 June 2015). 
364 Tralac. “Largest Free Trade Area set for launch” at www.tralac.org/.../7483-largest-free-trade-area-
set-for-launch.html (accessed on 12 June 2015). 
365 Communiqué of the Third COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit, adopted on 10 June 2015 at Sharm 
El Sheikh, Egypt. 
366 Kemp, M. et al. “An Elementary Proposition Concerning the Formation of Customs Unions” Journal of 
International Economics vol. 6 (1976) 95; Viner, J. The Customs Union Issue (2014) at 4.  
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As such a customs union may be defined as a merger of two or more customs territories 
into a single customs territory, in which customs duties and other measures that restrict 
trade are eliminated for substantially all trade between the merged territories.367 Those 
territories, in turn, apply the same duties and measures in their trade with third parties, that 
is, territories not included in the customs union.  
 
A customs union allows for free movements of goods – by removing tariff barriers – but it 
does not allow free movement for factors of production such as capital, labour, technology, 
etc.368 The WTO principles of most-favoured nation (MFN) and national treatment would 
thus not apply because a customs union creates a common trade barrier for members in 
regard to third-party states.369 Sometimes, not necessarily all the time, signatory nations 
also share a common currency unit.  
 
A customs union provides three advantages to members of the union: 
 First, custom unions promote trade among members by the elimination or severe 
reduction of tariffs. The reduction makes exporting more profitable and easier to 
accomplish because it makes the cost of the goods more competitive with domestic 
products.  
 Second, it provides protection for the domestic industries of members conducting 
business in protected trade area from non-members. Protection is available because 
all members create a common trade policy, including such matters as quotas and 
tariffs, which protect member industries from outsiders.  
 Third and finally, the members agree to revenue sharing regarding funds generated 
from common tariffs imposed upon outsiders. This may provide additional income 
                                                 
367 Johnson, H.G. “The Economic Theory of Customs Union” in Jovanović, M.N et al. International 
Economic Integration: Theory and measurement (1998) at 198; Balassa, B. The Theory of Economic 
Integration (2013) at 21; “About Comesa” at 
http://about.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=75&Itemid=106  (accessed on 
23 April 2015).    
368 Mikić, M. “Preferential trading agreements: adding spices and noodles to a spaghetti bowl” Cahiers De 
Commerce International No 3 (2002) 1 at 8. 
369 Centre for Economic Policy Research, London. “Trade and Investment Competence Review -  
 A study for the Department for Business Innovation and Skills” November 2013 at 14 – 17. 
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to a country that might not otherwise generate such income because of low trade 
activity.370 
 
A customs union is, however, not without some disadvantages for its members. Some of 
these disadvantages include the following: 
 Member countries give up some degree of sovereignty (the power to control their 
own actions) upon entering a customs union. For example, members have to give 
up some control over fiscal policy - spending and taxing - such as unilateral 
decisions on tariffs, duties and sales taxes.  
 Secondly, while custom unions can protect domestic industries, they will not 
always protect domestic member industries, because their member neighbours can 
compete against them uninhibited by normal trade barriers such as tariffs.  
 Finally, the “big kids” on the block get more out of the deal. Larger member 
countries often take advantage of economies of scale - cost efficiencies due to the 
fact that costs per unit will decline as volume of production increases - that give 
them an advantage. Smaller member countries may get access to cheaper imports 
from members, but they also risk their own industries eroding because they cannot 
compete with the larger members.371 
 
So before a country joins a customs union its political leadership must compare the 
advantages with disadvantages of a customs union in deciding whether the idea is worth 
pursuing or not.  
 
3.3.2.1 SACU 
 
The classic example of a customs union in Southern Africa is the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU). The SACU provides for duty-free movements of goods and 
services, and a common external tariff (CET) against the rest of the world. In recent years, 
                                                 
370 “Customs Union: Definition, Theory & Quiz” at education-portal.com/.../customs-union-definition-
theory-quiz.html (accessed on 23 April 2015). 
371 Ibid. 
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the SACU tariffs against the rest of the world have been progressively reduced, partly in 
response to membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).372  
 
The SACU Agreement came into force on 1 March 1970 between South Africa, Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland. This was in fact a re-negotiation of a 1910 Customs Union between 
the then Union of South Africa and the High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland, 
Basutoland and Swaziland,373 making it the oldest customs union in the world. The re-
negotiation was due to the Territories having achieved independence, and thus under new 
governments. Namibia became a member of the SACU in 1990 after gaining independence 
from South Africa. This was in pursuance of Article 23 of the SACU Agreement374 which 
provided that any state may, on application, be admitted as a contracting party by 
unanimous decision of the current contracting parties.  
 
The SACU embodies the essential characteristics of a customs union as outlined above. It 
abolishes quantitative restrictions and duties on the importation (from within the common 
customs area) of goods grown, produced or manufactured in the common customs area or 
imported from outside the area, that is, free movement of domestic products.  The abolition 
of transport rate discrimination and discrimination in respect of tariffs for the conveyance 
of goods by public road and rail is also provided for. There is also the removal of 
discrimination in respect of freedom of transit, and a common external customs tariff exists, 
as does a formula for the division of the common customs revenue.375  
 
The SACU is designed to ensure the continued economic development of the customs 
union area as a whole, to encourage the development of the less advanced members of the 
customs union and the diversification of their economies and afford to all parties equitable 
                                                 
372 Edwards, L et al. “SACU Tariff Policies: Where Should They Go From Here?” Center for International 
Development (CID) Working Paper No. 169, Harvard University, May 2008 at 4. 
373 “An Overview of SACU” at www.tralac.org/resources/by-region/sacu.html (accessed on 23 April 
2015); Gibb, R. “The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement: Dependence with Democracy” 
Journal of Southern African Studies vol. 32 no. 3 (2006) 583. 
374 This was the situation as provided for under the 1969 Agreement which is now obsolete. It was replaced 
by the 2002 Agreement (Final Agreement). The admission of new members is dealt with in Article 6 of 
SACU Final Act. 
375 These are provided in the SACU Final Agreement, Articles 18, 19, 20, 23, 24 and 32. 
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benefits arising from trade among themselves and with other countries.376 In pursuance of 
these ideals, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) had the right, subject to 
prior consultation, to levy additional duties on goods imported into their areas to enable 
new industries to face competition from other producers or manufacturers in the common 
customs area.377 However, the SACU Final Agreement tends to treat members equally by 
applying identical rebates, refunds, etc.378 
 
Customs duties on foreign goods that compete with goods from any industry specified by 
any of the BLNS states as being of major importance to their economies, may not without 
consent, be cancelled or decreased for a specified period. South Africa, which determines 
the common customs tariff, had to sympathetically consider proposals by the BLNS states 
to increase the customs duty on such foreign goods or to decrease customs duty on 
materials used in the production or manufacturing process of such goods in order to 
promote these industries.379  
 
The financial benefits in the SACU Agreement are commonly regarded as constituting the 
most important advantage for the BLNS states of continued membership of the SACU, as 
they compensate them for the detrimental effects of customs union membership, such as 
                                                 
376 The Preamble to the 1969 Agreement. This was modified in the Preamble of the Final Agreement to 
align SACU with the current developments in international trade relations. 
377 Edwards, L et al. “SACU Tariff Policies: Where Should They Go From Here?” Center for International 
Development (CID) Working Paper No. 169, Harvard University, May 2008 at 5. 
378 Article 21(2) of the SACU Final Act. It provides:  
“1. The Ministers responsible for Finance in all Member states shall meet and agree on the rates of specific 
excise and ad valorem excise duties and specific customs and ad valorem customs duties to be applied to 
goods grown, produced or manufactured in or imported into the Common Customs Area.  
2. Member states shall apply identical rebates, refunds or drawbacks of specific excise and ad valorem 
excise duties and of specific customs and ad valorem customs duties on imported goods in respect of such 
goods. Such rebates, refunds or drawbacks of specific excise and ad valorem excise duties and specific 
customs and ad valorem customs duties shall be determined by the Ministers responsible for Finance in the 
Member states through consultation.” 
379 Grynberg, R et al. “SACU Revenue Sharing Formula: The History of an Equation” South African 
Foreign Policy Initiative Working Paper, 2010 at 23; Edwards, L et al. “SACU Tariff Policies: Where 
Should They Go From Here?” Center for International Development (CID) Working Paper No. 169, 
Harvard University, May 2008 at 6; Alden, C et al. “South Africa's Economic Relations with Africa: 
Hegemony and Its Discontents” The Journal of Modern African Studies vol. 43 no. 3 (September 2005) 367 
at 371.  
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industrial polarisation, price-raising as a result of protective tariffs, and loss of tariff 
revenues.380 
 
The SACU is administered by the Council of Ministers, Customs Union Commission, the 
Secretariat, Tariff Board, ad hoc Tribunal and Technical Liaison Committees.381 
 
The Council consists of one minister from each Member State and is the supreme decision-
making organ of the SACU. The Customs Union Commission is responsible for the 
implementation of the Agreement and the decision of the Council. It also manages the 
Common Revenue Pool into which all revenues collected are paid. The Secretariat is 
responsible for the day-to-day administration of the SACU. The Tariff Board is an 
independent institution consisting of experts drawn from member states. Its main function 
is to make recommendations to the Council on any changes that the SACU must do. 
  
There are four Technical Liaison Committees that assist and advise the Commission in its 
work: Agriculture Liaison Committee, the Customs Technical Liaison Committee, the 
Trade and Industry Liaison Committee and the Communications and Transport Liaison 
Committee. These committees are not supranational authorities with legislative or 
adjudicative functions, because the Council has the authority to determine and alter their 
terms of reference.382  
 
The Tribunal shall be composed of three members and will deal with any dispute apropos 
the Agreement on an ad hoc basis. The Tribunal shall decide by majority vote and its 
                                                 
380 Gibb, R et al. “From Colonial Administration to Development Funding: Characterisations of SACU as a 
Governance Mechanism” Journal of Southern African Studies vol. 40 no. 4 (2014) 819 at 828; Edwards, L 
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decision shall be final and binding. It shall also provide the Council with advisory opinion 
if so requested.383 
 
In addition, the member states shall establish specialised, independent and dedicated 
national bodies or designate institutions which shall be entrusted with receiving requests 
for tariff changes and other related SACU issues. These bodies will carry out preliminary 
investigations and recommend any tariff changes necessary to the Tariff Board. The SACU 
will assist member states with the establishment of common procedures and technical 
capacity to ensure effective, efficient and transparent functioning of these national 
bodies.384 
 
One disadvantage for the BLNS states, in line with the disadvantages alluded to above, is 
that they have surrendered their sovereign capacity to influence their domestic trade 
practices by determining customs tariffs. This surrender has been, not to a supranational 
authority as is usual in a customs union, but to South Africa, the dominant Member State.385  
However, the Final Agreement is geared towards correcting this by providing protection of 
infant industries of the BLNS countries in Article 26.386 
 
The Final Agreement seeks to safeguard the interests of smaller member states, and 
provides for joint exercise of responsibility over decisions affecting tariff setting, revenue 
                                                 
383 Article 13. 
384 Article 14. 
385 McCarthy, C. “South African Trade and Industrial Policy in a Regional Context” in Petersson, L. Post-
Apartheid Southern Africa: Economic Challenges and Policies for the Future (2013) at 76; McCarthy, C. 
“The Southern African Customs Union in Transition” African Affairs vol. 102 (2003) 605 at 624; 
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African Studies vol. 16 issue 1 (January 1998) 1. 
386 Article 26 of Final SACU Agreement provides:   
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pooling and overall direction of the organisation. It also provides for deeper economic 
integration through the development of common policies on industry, investment, 
agriculture and competition, as well as the harmonisation of policies on unfair trade 
practice.387 
 
The SACU is a legal person with capacity and power to enter into contracts, acquire, own 
or dispose of movable or immovable property, and to sue and be sued.388 Its Headquarters 
are in Windhoek, Namibia. However, the Common Revenue Pool is in South Africa (within 
the South African Reserve Bank), as it has been managed by South Africa for a “transitional 
period of two years” from entry into force of the Agreement.389 All member states of the 
SACU are also members of the SADC. 
 
Except for Botswana, the other member states of the SACU (Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland) have their national currencies pegged at par to the South African currency, the 
Rand, through the common monetary area (CMA).390 
 
Compared to the SACU, the COMESA also has its own customs union which was launched 
in June 2010 and allows the application of a single tariff, the common external tariff (CET) 
in all the COMESA member states for an interim period of three years. A programme for 
eliminating non-tariff barriers has been implemented through organisational structures at 
the national and regional level. By 2025, the COMESA expects to remove all tariff 
barriers.391 
 
The BLNS States (of SACU) have a special status within the COMESA. Because the 
SACU membership prevents them from granting tariff preferences, they are not obliged to 
                                                 
387 “South African Trade with Africa” 
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reciprocate the preferential tariffs granted for their exports to the COMESA states. This is 
one problem that is likely to persist because of dual membership of the SACU and the 
COMESA. This is so because from a technical and legal viewpoint, a country cannot apply 
two different external tariffs and therefore cannot be a member of more than one customs 
union. 
 
The SADC, on the other hand, missed its deadline of establishing a customs union by 2010. 
This was despite the Report by the Ministerial Task Team that this was at an advanced 
stage.392  In terms of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP),393 the 
aim is to establish the customs union by 2010, common market by 2015 and monetary 
union by 2016. The SADC now seems to have abandoned these targets in favour of the 
Tripartite Free Trade Area with the COMESA and East African Community (EAC).394 
Another reason might be that the SADC has come to the realisation that it may be 
unrealistic to introduce the customs union before the FTA is fully operational.395 
 
The main challenge with the establishment of a customs union in the SADC is the 
overlapping membership of member states with other RECs. Almost all the SADC member 
states, with the exception of Angola and Mozambique, belong to existing customs unions. 
This overlapping membership is called the “spaghetti bowl effect”. Bhagwati coined the 
                                                 
392 The Ministerial Task Force reported to the SADC Council of Ministers at the February/March 2012 
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term in 1995396 to explain how the proliferation of regional agreements makes trade 
procedures more complicated by increasing the number of tariffs and rules of origin. 
 
Since its first use, the “spaghetti bowl phenomenon” has been defined in various ways. 
Baldwin,397 for example, uses the term to describe the complete global trend of regionalism. 
Schiff and Winters398 use it to explain that multiple membership may generate duty-free 
market access and zero-tariffs on imports with many trading partners and can hence be an 
appealing alternative to national policy makers as a substitute to free trade. Tavares and 
Tang399 use it to show how the complexities created by overlapping memberships risk 
slowing down trade liberalisation within the integration area and hampering the effect on 
integration.  
 
The establishment of a SADC Customs Union, if it were still to be pursued, would have to 
be carefully considered as the implications for the Customs Union are that the SADC 
member states may then have to choose which customs union they want to belong to 
between the COMESA Customs Union and the SADC Customs Union. This is so because, 
as stated above, technically, a member state cannot belong to more than one customs union 
because of the common external tariff (CET).400 This will also have implications for the 
SACU: it will have to stop existing by either absorption into the SADC Customs Union or 
by dissolution.  
 
Another challenge is that if the SACU were to widen to include more SADC members like 
Mozambique, it would necessarily have to include them in the distribution of revenues 
from the SACU Revenue Pool, something that the BLNS states seem not to be in favour 
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of. This is so because, though the SACU may be able to fudge the common external tariff, 
it can’t fudge the distribution of the revenues. There can only be one formula.401   
 
However, the SADC Secretariat undertook two preliminary studies to prepare for 
negotiations for the SADC Customs Union. The first related to the customs union model, 
while the second concerned the compatibility of trade policies. From the resulting 
consultations and discussions, the SADC Council of Ministers approved the establishment 
of technical working groups to begin to make progress on customs union issues such as a 
common external tariff; revenue collection; a distribution and sharing mechanism 
(including the development fund); legal and institutional arrangements; and coordinating 
industrial, agricultural, infrastructure, competition and other sectoral policies.402 
 
The intended SADC Customs Union is not expected to create irresolvable complications 
within the SACU as all member states of the SACU are also members of the SADC i.e. the 
SACU is a “sub-regional association” of the SADC. However, there are expected 
complications with regard to the COMESA in view of the fact that some SADC member 
states also belong to the COMESA, which launched its own customs union in June 2010.  
 
It is an accepted argument that multiple memberships are a hindrance to regional 
integration since, among other things, they introduce duplication of effort. So the SADC 
and COMESA will have similar problem, given their convergence to both sectoral 
cooperation and trade integration in Southern Africa.403  
 
Member states of these RECs will thus face enormous tests when the two customs unions 
are fully operational. As alluded to above technically, given the requirement for a common 
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external tariff (CET), a country cannot belong to more than one customs union. The 
implication, therefore, is that the SADC member states would have to choose which 
customs union they want to belong to between the COMESA Customs Union and SADC 
Customs Union. However, of utmost importance is to ascertain whether or not this situation 
is contrary to the WTO rules.404 
 
These challenges seem to be the main reason that persuaded the SADC leadership to lean 
towards the creation of the Tripartite Free Trade Area with the COMESA and the EAC. 
Also the BLNS states seem to be against the SADC customs union because that would 
mean they lose the revenue that they currently get in terms of the revenue-sharing formula 
in the SACU. If the SADC custom union comes to fruition, there would be one external 
tariff and the revenue would be shared with all member states.405   
 
3.3.3 Common Market 
 
A common market provides not only for the free movement of goods across national 
boundaries (as in an FTA and customs union), but also allows a free flow of other 
production aspects like labour, services and capital.406 This means physical (borders), 
technical (standards) and fiscal (taxes) barriers among the member states are removed to 
the maximum extent possible. It also institutionalises a system that prevents distortion 
through competition and strives for approximation of laws. Like a customs union, a 
common market requires all imports entering such an area to meet the requirements at their 
initial point of entry. A common market encompasses both the customs union and free trade 
area.407  
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The advantages of a common market are in the main the following:  
 With full freedom of movement for all the factors of production between the 
member countries, the factors of production become more efficiently allocated, 
further increasing productivity. 
 Consumers have lower prices, more choices, and opportunities for work throughout 
the common market. 
 Businesses have more consumers and are able to exploit economies of scale. 
 Competitive environment brings cheaper products, more efficient providers of 
products and increased choice of products to consumers. 
 Efficient firms can benefit from economies of scale, increased competitiveness and 
lower costs, as well as expect profitability to be a result.  
 The common regulatory regime and frameworks ensure that best practice within 
the regional framework is not only in place, but adhered to. 
 By being in common market and practising common policies and regulations, 
countries in the trading bloc become their “brothers’ keepers” and therefore they 
create a system of surveillance upon one another based on “best endeavours” and, 
at times, backed by legal systems.408 
 
The disadvantages include the following:  
 In reality worker mobility does not happen as hoped and thus render the common 
market a misnomer. 
  Many businesses still see or experience barriers. 
 Enhanced competition leads to removal of less efficient forms and industries, and 
therefore unemployment.  
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Concepts, Advantages, Disadvantages and Lessons of Experience” Paper for the World Bank, May 2005, at 
8; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Integration across Borders: Transition Report 2012 
at 64.  
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 Monopolies may be formed – these are an example of market failure.409  
 
The classic example of a common market in Southern Africa is still the COMESA. Of the 
twelve Technical Committees of the COMESA there are the Committee on Finance and 
Monetary Affairs; Committee on Labour, Human Resources and Social and Cultural 
Affairs; Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Matters; Committee on Trade and 
Customs; and Committee on Transport and Communications.410 
 
Each Technical Committee shall: 
(a) be responsible for the preparation of a comprehensive implementation programme 
and a time-table prioritising the programmes with respect to its sector; 
(b) monitor and keep under constant review the implementation of co-operation 
programmes with respect to its sector; and 
(c) except for the Committee on Finance and Monetary Affairs, which submits its 
report and recommendations to the Committee of Governors of Central Banks, 
submit from time to time reports and recommendations to the Intergovernmental 
Committee, either on its own initiative or upon the request of the Council, 
concerning the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.411 
 
                                                 
409 “Advantages and Disadvantages of a single market” at http://www.revisionworld.com/a2-level-level-
revision/economics/working-economist/case-study-european-union (accessed on 19 June 2015); Weihrich, 
H. “Analyzing the competitive advantages and disadvantages of Germany with the TOWS Matrix ‐ an 
alternative to Porter’s Model” European Business Review vol. 99 issue 1 (1999) 9 at 13. 
410 Article 15(1) of the COMESA Treaty provides: 
“The Technical Committees of the Common Market shall be the following:  
(a) the Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Matters;  
(b) the Committee on Agriculture;  
(c) the Committee on Comprehensive Information Systems;  
(d) the Committee on Energy;  
(e) the Committee on Finance and Monetary Affairs;  
(f) the Committee on Industry;  
(g) the Committee on Labour, Human Resources and Social and Cultural Affairs;  
(h) the Committee on Legal Affairs;  
(i) the Committee on Natural Resources and Environment;  
(j) the Committee on Tourism and Wildlife;  
(k) the Committee on Trade and Customs; and  
(l) the Committee on Transport and Communications.” 
411 Article 16 of the COMESA Treaty. 
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Various articles of the COMESA Treaty lay foundation for meeting or complying with the 
requirements of a common market: 
 
Article 55412 of the COMESA Treaty deals with the requirement of preventing 
distortion through competition. Through Article 72 the member states also 
undertake to co-operate in monetary and financial matters in accordance with the 
monetary harmonisation programme in order to establish monetary stability within 
the common market, aimed at facilitating economic integration efforts and the 
attainment of sustainable economic development of the common market. This they 
would do by taking measures that would facilitate trade and capital movement 
within the common market.413  
 
In Article 81 the COMESA Treaty provides: 
 
“The Member states shall, permit the free movement of capital within the Common 
Market and integrate their financial structures. In this regard, the Member states 
shall: 
                                                 
412 Article 55 provides:  
1. The Member states agree that any practice which negates the objective of free and 
liberalised trade shall be prohibited. To this end, the Member states agree to prohibit any 
agreement between undertakings or concerted practice which has as its objective or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market. 
 
2. The Council may declare the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article inapplicable in the 
case of: 
(a) any agreement or category thereof between undertakings; 
(b) any decision by association of undertakings; 
(c) any concerted practice thereof; 
 
which improves production or distribution of goods or promotes technical or economic progress 
and has the effect of enabling consumers a fair share of the benefits: 
 
Provided that the agreement, decision or practice does not impose on the undertaking 
restrictions inconsistent with the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty or has the effect of 
eliminating competition. 
 
3.  The Council shall make regulations to regulate competition within the Member states. 
413 Article 72(b). 
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(a) ensure the unimpeded flow of capital within the Common Market through 
the removal of controls on the transfer of capital among the Member states 
in accordance with a timetable to be determined by the Council; 
(b) ensure that the citizens of and persons resident in the Member states are 
allowed to acquire stocks, shares and other securities or to invest in 
enterprises in the territories of the other Member states; and 
(c) encourage cross border trade in government securities such as treasury bills, 
development and loan stocks within the Common Market.” 
 
Article 164 states: 
 
1. The Member states agree to adopt, individually, at bilateral or regional 
levels the necessary measures in order to achieve progressively the free 
movement of persons, labour and services and to ensure the enjoyment of 
the right of establishment and residence by their citizens within the 
Common Market. 
2. The Member states agree to conclude a Protocol on the Free Movement of 
Persons, Labour, Services, Right of Establishment and Right of residence. 
3. The Member states agree that the Protocol on the Gradual Relaxation and 
Eventual Elimination of Visa requirements within the PTA adopted under 
the PTA Treaty shall remain in force until such time that a Protocol on the 
Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Service, Right of Establishment and 
Residence enters into force. 
 
Articles 81 and 164 clearly show that the COMESA also meets the requirement of free 
movement of labour and services – a characteristic of a common market. Read with Article 
55, one can safely conclude that the COMESA meets all the requirements of a Common 
Market as per its Treaty. However, the proof of these lies in the implementation of the 
particular articles of the Treaty.   
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To meet the requirement of free flow of other means of production, the member states 
adopted the COMESA Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, and 
Rights of Establishment and Residence in 2001, but this was ratified only by Burundi. In 
2012 the COMESA began consultations with member states towards implementation of 
this Protocol. 414 On the other hand, the COMESA Protocol on the Gradual Relaxation and 
Eventual Elimination of Visas was adopted in 1984 and ratified by all member states, and 
entered into force in phases through workshops, meetings, direct contact with member 
states and using mass media.415 
 
In October and November 2013 the COMESA Secretariat carried out consultative visits to 
the eight select member states of Djibouti, Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, Seychelles, Comoros, 
Swaziland and Malawi. From its findings, the Secretariat observed that the level of 
awareness on the COMESA legal instruments has not been effectively cascaded to the 
general public. However, the member states have now undertaken to set up structures 
aimed at implementing the COMESA legal instruments.416 
 
The SADC Common Market that was targeted to be achieved in 2015, in terms of the 
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) timelines or targets, seems not 
to be achievable, at least not in the near future. This is mainly due to the immaterialisation 
of the SADC Customs Union, which is the preceding step for the common market.417 Also 
the focus, as alluded to above, has shifted to the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite FTA. 
 
In 2009 the Chirundu One Stop Border Post (OSBP) at the Zambia/Zimbabwe Border, the 
first of its kind in Africa, was launched under the auspices of the COMESA-EAC-SADC 
Tripartite Arrangement within the broader programme of the North-South Corridor 
Initiative. It is aimed at addressing the challenge of duplication of processes (customs, 
                                                 
414 “Consultations Underway on Free Movement of Persons” at www.comesa.int/index.php?...id...free-
movement (accessed on 15 June 2015). 
415 Oucho, J.O. “Cross-border migration and regional initiatives in managing migration in Southern Africa” 
in Oucho, J.O et al. Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and Determinants (2006) at 66. 
416 “Fresh commitment towards free movement of persons in the region” at 
www.comesa.int/index.php?...id...free-movement (accessed on 15 June 2015). 
417 The RISDP states that “negotiations on establishment of SADC Common Market should commence 
soon after establishing a customs union.” (RISDP, at 66).  
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immigration, health, agriculture, security, etc.) on both sides of the border by merging 
entry/exit processes, and potentially cutting down costs and delays by 50%. This is to be 
replicated in other border posts on the North-South Corridor and the rest of the corridors 
in the COMESA, EAC and SADC.418 
 
However, this arrangement is not without challenges. One of the most significant 
challenges currently facing operations at Chirundu is the lack of information and 
communications technology (ICT) connectivity between the Zambian and Zimbabwean 
sides of the border. This has resulted in certain clearance procedures having to be 
duplicated as the Zimbabwean Revenue Authority officers on the Zambian side of the 
border are unable to connect to the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) for 
computerised customs administration used on the Zimbabwean side. To overcome this 
problem, procedures are being completed manually on the Zambian side and then inputted 
on the computer system on the Zimbabwean side. Zambian border agents based on the 
Zimbabwean side also face a similar problem in not being able to access the electronic 
systems used in Zambia. The lack of connectivity between the two sides of the border has 
also prevented the designated “fast track” lane from becoming fully functional.419 
 
3.3.4 Economic Community or Union 
  
The words “community” and “unity” presuppose group cohesiveness and this applies 
similarly to the group of states that are part of the economic community or union as a form 
of regional integration. For this group of states to be regarded as “economic community or 
union” it must have reached a stage where there is free movement of products and factors 
of production between the countries, and some degree of harmonisation of national 
economic policies to remove discrimination that was due to disparities in these policies.420   
                                                 
418 “Transformation-Ready: The strategic application of information and communication technologies in 
Africa”. Regional Trade and Integration Sector Study Annexes - Report for the African Development Bank, 
the World Bank and the African Union, October 2011 at 60. 
419 Woolfrey, S et al. “Challenges at Chirundu One-Stop Border Post” at www.tralac.org/.../5338-
challenges-at-chirundu-one-stop-border-post.html (accessed on 15 June 2015).  
420 Balassa, B. The Theory of Economic Integration (1961) at 2; Pinder, J. “Positive integration and 
negative integration: some problems of economic union in the EEC” The World Today vol. 24 no. 3 (March 
1968) 88 at 88 – 89. 
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An economic community or union is essentially a type of trade bloc which is composed of 
a common market with a customs union. It adds to the common market harmonised fiscal, 
monetary and labour market policies. Because labour market policies affect migration 
patterns and production costs, these will have to be streamlined among members and the 
process involves harmonisation of basic national economic policies.421 
 
To achieve such a union, it is necessary to form supranational institutions that legislate the 
rules of commerce for the entire area, leaving the administration to national bodies, but with 
recourse to supranational administrative tribunals to ensure uniform application of these rules. 
In an economic union, supranational commercial law replaces national law.422 
 
In addition to the advantages that accrue in the common market the following are potential 
benefits associated with the economic union: 
 Harmonised and improved rules and regulations that facilitate foreign direct 
investment in the region. 
 Contribute to development of financial markets, cross-border issuances of 
securities, etc.  
 Open borders allow easier travel. 
 Louder international voice for member states as a bloc.423  
 
The disadvantages include the following: 
 Inequalities of member states in the community mean the stronger members benefit 
more than the weaker members. 
 The economic demands of the membership are strenuous for weaker or not-so-
wealthy members.  
                                                 
421 Mirus, R et al.  “Economic Integration: Free Trade Areas vs. Customs Unions” Paper by Western Centre 
for Economic Research, University of Alberta, Edmonton, August 2011 at 4; Dinan, D. Ever Closer Union: 
An Introduction to European Integration (2005) at 97; El-Agraa, A. The European Union: Economics and 
Policies (2011) at 1.  
422 Mirus, R et al.  “Economic Integration: Free Trade Areas vs. Customs Unions” Paper by Western Centre 
for Economic Research, University of Alberta, Edmonton, August 2011 at 4. 
423 “How the E.U works” available at: http://europa.eu/about-eu/index_en.htm (accessed on 16 June 2015).  
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 Net migration into wealthier or more developed member states.  
 Different political opinions, which may cause red tape and disagreements.424  
  
Both the COMESA and SADC have the characteristics of an economic community. In the 
Preamble to its Treaty, the COMESA states that eventually it will become an economic 
community. This means that COMESA is not yet an economic community, though its aim 
is to become one. This is more evident in Article 177 of the COMESA Treaty, which 
provides for gradual establishment of an Economic Community for Eastern and Southern 
Africa.425 The proposed date for this is 2025.426  
 
The SADC on the other hand is already a “community”, albeit a development community, 
and aims to achieve a monetary union with a single currency by 2018.427 The objectives of 
the SADC also point to this direction, some of which are: 
(a) to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic 
development that will ensure poverty alleviation with the ultimate objective of its 
eradication, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of  Southern 
Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration;428 
(b) to promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and 
the interdependence of member states;429 and  
                                                 
424 Perry, M et al. Sources of European History: Since 1900 (2010) at 459; “Disadvantages of EU 
Membership at www.economicshelp.org/europe/disadvantages-eu/ (accessed on 16 June 2015). 
425 Article 177 of COMESA Treaty provides: 
“1. At a date to be determined by the Authority after the entry into force of this Treaty, the Council shall 
propose to the Authority for its approval, measures which in addition to the provisions of this Treaty would 
be required to be implemented in order to assist in the eventual development and establishment of an 
Economic Community for Eastern and Southern Africa. 
 2. The functioning and development of the Common Market shall be reviewed in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty in order to establish an Economic Community for Eastern and Southern Africa. 
 3. The transition from the Common Market into an Economic Community for Eastern and Southern Africa 
shall be conditional upon a finding that the objectives of the Common Market have been substantially 
attained and that the obligations upon the Member states have been fulfilled.”  
426 This is in terms of a four-stage programme towards the establishment of a Monetary Union by the year 
2025, as approved by the Authority of Heads of State and Government in 1992; “COMESA Strategy” at 
about.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view…  (Accessed on 16 June 2015).  
427 This is in terms of the Regional Indicative Strategy Development Plan (RISDP) timelines (RISDP at 67).   
428 Article 5(1)(a) of SADC Treaty. 
429 Article 5(1)(d) of the SADC Treaty. 
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(c) to achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and 
programmes.430  
 
The undertakings by the SADC to achieve these objectives point clearly to an economic 
community. These include: “SADC shall: 
(a) harmonise political and socio-economic policies and plans of Member states; 
(b) encourage the people of the region and their institutions to take initiatives to 
develop economic, social and cultural ties across the region, and to participate fully 
in the implementation of the programmes and projects of SADC; 
(c) create appropriate institutions and mechanisms for the mobilisation of requisite 
resources for the implementation of programmes and operations of SADC and its 
institutions; 
(d) improve economic management and performance through regional co-operation; 
(e) promote the coordination and harmonisation of the international relations of 
Member states; and  
(f) secure international understanding, co-operation and support, and mobilise the 
inflow of public and private resources into the Region.”431 
 
Article 22 of the SADC Treaty provides:  
“(1). Member states shall conclude such Protocols as may be necessary in each area 
of co-operation, which shall spell out the objectives and scope of, and institutional 
mechanisms for, co-operation and integration.”  
 
One such protocol is the SADC Protocol on Trade, which provides for harmonisation of 
laws – a phenomenon that is lacking in the SADC Treaty. These are contained in Annex 
II, Articles 2 – 5. Article 3 of this Annex deals with “Harmonisation of Customs Tariff 
Nomenclatures and Statistical Nomenclatures”, Article 4 deals with “Harmonisation of 
                                                 
430 Article 5(1)(e) of the SADC Treaty. 
431 Article 5(2)(a), (b), (c), (d), (g), (h) and (i). 
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Valuation Laws and Practice” and Article 5 deals with “Simplification and Harmonisation 
of Customs Procedures”.432 
 
Another protocol dealing with fiscal and monetary issues in the SADC is the Finance and 
Investment Protocol, concluded and approved in 2006. It seeks to foster harmonisation of 
finance and investment policies of member states in order to make them consistent with 
the objectives of the SADC and ensure that any changes to the financial and investment 
policies in one member State do not necessitate undesirable adjustments in other member 
states.433 This Protocol came into operation on 16 April 2006.  
 
The SADC has also adopted a Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP),434 
which is a strategic plan/document that “outlines the necessary conditions that should be 
realised towards the attainment of the SADC’s regional integration and development 
goals”. The RISDP recommends that the SADC should establish a customs union by 2010, 
a common market by 2015, monetary union by 2016 and an economic union with a single 
currency by 2018. 
 
The RISDP seeks, among other things, to address several key challenges related to labour 
market in Southern Africa by: 
 Removing structural distortions in the economies of member states and 
combating of high-levels of unemployment and under-employment, 
especially among women and youth; 
 Addressing gender inequalities in the labour markets and inadequate 
mainstreaming of gender concerns in the policy formulation and programme 
implementation; 
 Inadequate integration of employment and labour issues in overall economic 
and social development; 
                                                 
432 The details of these provisions are dealt with in Chapter 5.  
433 Article 2(1). 
434 The RISDP is also dealt with in detail in Chapter 5.  
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 Weak institutional and human capacity for the collection, analysis, 
harmonisation, utilisation and dissemination of labour market information 
and data; 
 Lack of a policy framework for promoting social dialogue and social 
protection; 
 Lack of a comprehensive framework to facilitate smooth movement of labour 
as a factor of production; 
 Lack of a comprehensive regulatory mechanisms to promote the informal 
sector; 
 The impact of HIV and AIDS on the most productive segment of the labour 
force; and 
 Lack of positive cultural attitudes towards productivity, entrepreneurship and 
innovation. 
 
The SADC has already developed appropriate policies and legal frameworks in some of 
these areas through the adoption of protocols. These include the protocols on Education 
and Training435, on Health436, on Tourism437, and on Mining438.  
 
In addition to these the SADC has also made progress in accelerating the free movement 
of goods, services and capital by taking the following actions: 
 Creating initiatives to coordinate customs procedures and instruments (including 
electronically exchanging customs data); 
 Developing a single customs administrative document (SADC CD) to harmonise 
customs declarations in the SADC; 
 Passing a law on a SADC customs model to facilitate the coordination of customs 
in national legislations; 
 Adopting a nomenclature of common tariffs; 
 Proposing and developing a regional transit framework; 
                                                 
435 It entered into force on 31 July 2000. 
436 It entered into force on 14 August 2004. 
437 It entered into force on 26 November 2002. 
438 It entered into force on 10 February 2000.  
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 Initiating a review of rules of origin in 2007; 
 Creating a software on trade facilitation: for example, the promotion of a single 
counter at border posts and to implement the SADC Transit Chain Bond Guarantee 
regulations; 
 Updating non-tariff obstacles to inform, monitor and eliminate non-tariff obstacles 
in 2007; 
 Developing a regional qualifications framework for coordinating education systems 
in the region to facilitate the free movement of people and manpower;439 and 
 Adopting Regional Labour Migration Policy Framework to promote sound 
management of intra-regional labour migration for the benefit of both the sending 
and receiving countries as well as the migrant workers.440 
 
Conclusion  
 
Names given to most African regional groupings have tended to reflect the goal rather than 
the stage of integration that has actually been reached. For example, the SADC use the 
name “Community” whereas it has not yet reached that stage. Complicating this name-
thing further is the fact that in terms of the RISDP, reaching a “community stage” is not a 
target for the SADC. The targets in terms of the RISDP are: a customs union by 2010, a 
common market by 2015, monetary union by 2016 and a single currency by 2018. One can 
then ask: why call SADC a “community”, and not a “union”?  
 
In contrast to the SADC is the COMESA. It is called a “common market” even though its 
target is to eventually become an economic community, by 2025. Here too one can ask: 
will COMESA change its name to, for example, Economic Community of Eastern and 
Southern Africa once it reaches the “community” stage? In fact, this is what is suggested 
by Article 177(1) of COMESA Treaty that provides: 
                                                 
439 Kitimbo, A. “Is it time for open borders in Southern Africa? The Case for Free Labour Movement in 
SADC” The Brenthurst Foundation Discussion Paper 4/2014 at 6; Economic Commission for Africa. “The 
Status of regional integration in Africa”, Towards an African Continental Free Trade Area: Assessing 
Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA V) – UNECA Report (2012) Chapter 2 at 18. 
440 SADC Labour Migration Policy Framework, 2013.  
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“At a date to be determined by the Authority after the entry into force of this Treaty, 
the Council shall propose to the Authority for its approval, measures which in 
addition to the provisions of this Treaty would be required to be implemented in 
order to assist in the eventual development and establishment of an Economic 
Community for Eastern and Southern Africa.” 
 
Perhaps this confusion in the names of the RECs is something that is deep-rooted in the 
integration stages themselves. For example, the choice between a free trade agreement 
(FTA) and a customs union remains a matter of debate. Customs unions are supposed to be 
more efficient than FTAs and to foster greater market integration, but they also require 
more coordination and entail tighter constraints on member policies and sovereignty.441  
 
FTA negotiations react to one another, and as FTAs disadvantage non-members, every time 
one is signed there is pressure from non-member exporters to engage in integration.442 Also 
in an FTA no duties are applied to goods from other members, but each member determines 
its own tariff policy in relation to goods imported from outside the area. 
 
A customs union is only viable in a situation where member states are few – perhaps four 
or five – and governs trade with non-members by a common external tariff (CET), and this 
would lead to multiple organisations in the same region. It is as such good for members, 
but not necessarily good for those outside it.443 
 
The economic community or union also has its fair share of disadvantages. However, these 
are overwhelmed by advantages, especially where the community is also a monetary union. 
The European Union (EU) is the leading model of this kind of integration. It has delivered 
half a century of peace, stability and prosperity; helped raise living standards; launched a 
                                                 
441 Sindzingre, A. “The European Union Economic Partnership Agreements with Sub-Saharan Africa”, 
UNU-CRIS Working Papers W-2008/5 (2008) at 11; Schiff, M et al. Regional Integration and 
Development (2003) at 78.  
442 Sindzingre (above); Baldwin, R. “Big-Think Regionalism: a Critical Survey” Cambridge MA, NBER 
Working Paper 14056 (2008) at 1. 
443 Facchini, G. “The customs union issue: Why do we observe so few of them?” Journal of International 
Economics vol. 90 issue 1 (2013) at 136.  
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single European currency; and is progressively building a single Europe-wide market in 
which people, goods, services and capital move among member states as freely as within 
one country.444 
 
The EU has the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the purpose of which is 
to redress imbalances in development across the EU through the distribution of funds to 
stimulate economic development in the most deprived areas.445 The importance of the Fund 
was shown during the so-called “Euro financial crisis”, where several eurozone member 
states (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Cyprus) were unable to repay or refinance 
their government debt or to bail out over-indebted banks under their national supervision. 
The Fund was used to bail out these countries in the form of loans, bonds, etc.446 
 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO), although it frowns upon regional economic 
schemes, does allow for their existence as an exception. Its main reason for this frowning 
is that these arrangements do not advance the goal of global free trade. In a background 
briefing ahead of a Seminar on Regional Trade Agreements in November 2003 the WTO 
stated:  
 
“Regional trade agreements can potentially hinder the objectives of a coherent and 
transparent multilateral trading system by discriminating against third parties, 
distorting trade flows and by detracting limited resources from multilateral to 
regional and bilateral trade negotiations.”447 
 
This argument makes sense, especially with regard to free trade areas and customs unions 
because these two arrangements tend to discriminate against non-members. However, 
                                                 
444 Perry, M et al. Sources of European History: Since 1900 (2010) at 450.    
445 Gibb, R et al. “From Colonial Administration to Development Funding: Characterisations of SACU as a 
Governance Mechanism” Journal of Southern African Studies vol. 40 no. 4 (2014) 819 at 823.  
446 Karanikolos, M et al. “Financial crisis, austerity, and health in Europe” Health in Europe 7 Magazine of 
27 March 2013 at 5: Mody, A et al. “The Eurozone Crisis: How Banks and Sovereigns Came to be Joined 
at the Hip” IMF Working Paper WP/11/269, November 2011 at 16. 
447 World Trade Organization. “Seminar on Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO” Report, 14 
November 2003; SOWETAN Newspaper of Monday 16 February 2004 at 15; Dev, B.J. “Regionalism and 
multilateralism: conflicts and needs” The Daily Star (online) of 13 October 2006. 
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because the WTO allows for their existence it also realises the importance of cooperating 
with them. During the same briefing, ahead of the November 2003 Seminar the WTO 
stated:  
 
“As the number of RTAs and scope expand to include complex regulatory trade 
provisions, trade in services and investment-based activity, the importance of 
improving the formal and substantive links between regional trade agreements and 
the multilateral trading system is becoming apparent. 
 
Even more so as no effective multilateral surveillance mechanism is in place to 
address those cases where regional trade agreements may not be in line with the 
spirit of WTO fundamental principles. This may result in unbalances between the 
liberalisation efforts being pursued regionally and multilaterally and increasingly 
generate tensions.”448 
 
From this statement it is clear that the WTO, despite catering for the regional integration 
arrangements (RIAs), is still, in principle against them. Statements like this may make 
cooperation between the RIAs or RECs and the WTO difficult.   
 
Having looked into all these regional integration schemes one can therefore conclude that 
the type of regional arrangement scheme the WTO would favour would be the common 
market and economic community, as they move beyond intra-regional trade liberalisation 
among members. Based on this conclusion it would leave the SADC and COMESA as 
appropriate forms of economic communities to be followed in Southern Africa. However, 
the parallel existence of these organisations in Southern Africa creates a problem of 
overlapping membership.   
 
All fourteen countries of the SADC are members of at least two organisations. Not only is 
there overlap in terms of membership, but there is also overlap regarding areas of claimed 
                                                 
448 World Trade Organization “Seminar on Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO” Report, 14 
November 2003; SOWETAN Newspaper, of Monday 16 February 2004 at 15.  
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responsibility. Both the SADC and COMESA claim to take responsibility for enhancing 
integration in the areas of science, technology, industry, free movement of labour and 
goods, peace and security, to name a few. Given these types of overlap, the need for 
rationalisation of these two organisations seems clear. As it is obvious, the region’s 
economy is extremely weak, and to have duplicative efforts towards similar goals would 
waste what little resources are available.  
 
An attempt to solve this problem was made in January 1997 meeting between the 
COMESA and the SADC to discuss the issue of integration.449 However, despite calls for 
a merger, each group seems to be racing away from the other on separate courses. But even 
if these two do not merge, they can still co-operate in terms of Article 24 of the SADC 
Treaty450 and Articles 178 - 181 of the COMESA Treaty.451 However, the bottom line 
                                                 
449 At the meeting of the COMESA Council of Ministers held in January 1997 it was agreed that COMESA 
and SADC should co-exist and cooperate. On 2 November 2001 there was a meeting in Gaborone, 
Botswana, where a joint task force looked at the harmonisation of rules of origin, customs procedures and 
the Economic Partnership agreements.  
450 Article 24 of SADC Treaty provides: “1. Subject to the provisions of Article 6(1), Member states and 
SADC shall maintain good working relations and other forms of co-operation, and may enter into 
agreements with other . . . regional and international organisations, whose objectives are compatible with 
the objectives of SADC and the provisions of this Treaty. 
2. Conferences and other meetings may be held between Member states and other Governments and 
organisations associated with the development efforts of SADC to review policies and strategies, and 
evaluate the performance of SADC in the implementation of its programmes and projects, identify and 
agree on future plans of co-operation.” 
451 It provides:  
Article 178: “1. . . the Member states shall: (a) negotiate, together with other regional economic 
communities, the Protocol on Relations between the African Economic Community and the Regional 
Economic Communities.” 
 
Article179: “1. In the context of realising its regional integration objectives, the Common Market may enter 
into co-operation agreements with other regional communities. 
 2. The co-operation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be subject to prior approval by the 
Council.” 
 
Article 180: “1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, the Member states may be members of other 
regional or sub-regional organisations with other Member states or third countries for the purpose of 
strengthening co-operation among themselves. 
2. The Secretary-General shall endeavour to co-ordinate the activities of the Common Market with those of 
the organisations referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.” 
 
Article 181: “1. The Common Market shall establish such continuous and close working relations with 
relevant African organisations . . . and other intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations in 
Eastern and Southern Africa with a view to strengthening the institutional capacity of the Common Market 
and assisting it in the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty. 
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remains that there must not be an overlap of membership between the two. This will augur 
well with the rationalisation by AU/AEC of the COMESA as an REC for Eastern Africa 
Region and the SADC for Southern Africa Region.452 
 
Since joining the SADC, South Africa has also voiced its support for such a rationalisation 
programme. To this point, South Africa has refused to join the COMESA. This has added 
to the already existing friction between the two RECs. Because of their continuing co-
existence, questions about motives will continue to arise.    
 
The leaders of these RECs should realise that it is not a particular trade scheme, whether 
the COMESA or SADC, that is a key to a successful trade bloc, but the regional trade itself. 
After a decade of trying to increase intra-regional trade, plus-minus five percent of trade is 
conducted by one state with other states in Southern Africa region, excluding South 
Africa.453 And there is no doubt that regional integration has a potential to change all this. 
 
In the light of the above, and having compared the different integration schemes, one would 
lean towards the economic community or union as the model that the Southern African 
region has to follow. This is because economic community encompasses all other schemes 
of integration and is viable where the member states in the scheme are many. 
 
                                                 
 2. The Common Market shall accord special importance to co-operation with United Nations systems, 
other international organisations and bi-lateral and multi-lateral donor agencies whose policies and 
programmes are compatible with the policies, programmes and activities of the Common Market. 
 3. The Secretary-General shall initiate and maintain dialogue with the organisations and agencies referred 
to in paragraph 2 of this Article and with any other organisation whose policies and programmes are 
compatible with those of the Common Market in order to facilitate closer co-operation with such 
organisations, agencies and multi-lateral and bilateral donor agencies. 
 4. Meetings may be held between the member states and governmental and Non-governmental 
organisations and bilateral donor agencies on the Common Market policies and strategies including the 
implementation thereof, with a view to enhancing the participation of these organisations and agencies in 
the implementation and development of the Common Market.” 
452 This, together with discussion of AU and AEC in general, is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
453 Yabu, B. “Intra-SADC Trade in Goods and Services (Including Assessing the Condition for the 
Dynamism of Intra-regional Trade)” Report for the Bank of Tanzania, August 2014 at 26; Flatters, F. 
Technical Report: “SADC Trade Audit: Rules of Origin” - USAID/Southern Africa Gaborone, Botswana 
May 2012.  
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As such the SADC seems poised to emerge as the leading REC in the Southern African 
region. All countries in the SADC are members of the WTO, and South Africa, as the most 
significant trading nation in the region and on the African continent, plays an increasing 
role in the SADC.454 This role would probably continue even in the newly-established 
COMESA-EAC-SADC Free Trade Area.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
454 Saurombe, A. “The role of South Africa in SADC regional integration: the making or braking of the 
organization” Journal of international Commercial Law and Technology vol. 5 issue 3 (2010) 124 at 128.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE REGIONAL INTEGRATION BODIES OF SADC, AEC AND AU IN 
SOUTHERN AFRICA  
 
Introduction 
 
As stated in chapters 2 and 3, regional integration is permitted through Article XXIV of 
the WTO (GATT) Agreement. Apropos the conditions set in Article XXIV the following 
question may be asked: are the regional arrangement schemes in Southern Africa Article 
XXIV-compliant?  If not, what course of action should be taken (i.e. can this situation be 
remedied)? This is one of the questions this Chapter will seek to answer.  
 
There has been increased debate as to the relevance and efficacy of regional integration in 
the efforts to attain meaningful development in Africa, particularly in the wake of the 
phenomenon of globalisation and the increased marginalisation of Africa in world trade.455  
This Chapter will also deal with these efforts of regional integration efforts in Southern 
Africa, within the context of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
 
Although the Southern African region has various integration bodies, such as the Common 
Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as touched upon in 
Chapter 3, this Chapter will focus on the SADC. However, the SADC, together with other 
regional bodies for integration in Africa, does not exist in a vacuum. There are bodies, such 
as the African Economic Community (AEC) and African Union (AU), which serve as the 
umbrella bodies within which these regional bodies fall. Both these bodies (AEC and AU) 
                                                 
455 Ndulo, M. “African integration schemes: a case study of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC)” African Yearbook of International Law vol. 7 no. 7 (1999 – 2001) at 3; Schiff M. W et al. 
Regional Integration and Development (2003) at 1; Crawford, J. et al. “The Changing Landscape of 
Regional Trade Agreements” WTO Discussion Paper No.8, World Trade Organization, Geneva (2005). 
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use regional economic communities (RECs), like the SADC, as building blocks for 
economic integration of the whole continent.456 
 
This implies that all the integration schemes in Africa must relate to these bodies (AEC 
and AU), as they also have a role to play in the ultimate aim of integrating the whole 
continent. Oppong457 is of the opinion that these relational issues are crucial and that 
Africa’s economic integration processes fail because they do not pay necessary attention 
to these relational issues. These relational issues are not only horizontal, i.e. between 
AEC/AU and the RECs, but are also between the RECs themselves. And they take various 
forms such as laws, mechanisms, institutions, etc. 
 
This Chapter will thus also briefly touch on the relationship between the three bodies 
(SADC, AEC and AU) as well as the roles of the AEC and AU in the entire scheme of 
integration on the continent. It starts with the SADC as it is the main focus of this Chapter 
and was also established before both the AEC and AU, which came into being in 1994 and 
2002 respectively. The AEC is also still in formation and its development is largely 
contingent on the constituent RECs like the SADC.  
 
4.1 SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) 
 
The Declaration458 and Treaty459 establishing the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) were signed at the Summit of Heads of State or Government on 17 
                                                 
456 Article 3(2)(a) of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty) provides: 
“In order to promote the attainment of the objectives of the Community as set out in paragraph I of this 
Article, and in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty, the Community shall, by stages, 
ensure the strengthening of existing regional economic communities and the establishment of other 
communities where they do not exist.” 
Article 3(l) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union Provides: 
“The objectives of the Union shall be to coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and 
future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union.” 
457 Oppong, R.F. Legal Aspects of Economic Integration in Africa (2011) at 5 and 12. 
458 The Declaration was entitled “Towards a Southern African Development Community: - Declaration 
made by Heads of State or Governments of Southern Africa, Windhoek, August, 1992”. 
459 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (Windhoek) August, 1992. 
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July 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia by the ten founding member states,460 and the SADC 
Treaty entered into force on 30 September 1993. The other five member states joined later, 
with South Africa joining in August 1994, followed by Mauritius, then the DRC, 
Madagascar461 and Seychelles.462 The Comoros is the latest member of the SADC after it 
was admitted in August 2017.463 The admission of any state to the membership is effected 
by a unanimous decision of all the SADC member states at a summit. One of the 
requirements for admission is that an aspiring Member State should be democratic.464 
 
The SADC is established as an international organisation with legal personality. It has the 
capacity and power to enter into contracts, acquire, own or dispose of movable or 
immovable property, and to sue and be sued. In addition it has such legal capacity as is 
necessary for the proper exercise of its functions in the territory of each Member State.465  
It currently consists of 16 member states: Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
The SADC replaced the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC), which had been in existence since 1980.466 The main aim of the SADCC was to 
reduce the economic dependence of the region on apartheid South Africa. With the political 
change looming in South Africa (which eventually happened in 1994) it was clear that this 
objective would soon be obsolete.  
                                                 
460 These were: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe 
461 Madagascar was fully admitted into SADC in August 2005 after it was given candidate membership 
status in August 2004. It was suspended in 2009 after President Ravalomanana was forced to resign in a 
military coup, but the suspension was lifted in February 2014 after the 20 December 2013 Presidential and 
Parliamentary elections. 
462 Seychelles pulled out in 2004 and re-joined in August 2008. 
463 Communiqué of the 37th Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Southern African 
Development Community, Pretoria, Republic of South Africa, 18 - 20 August 2017. 
464 However, the DRC was admitted into SADC despite it having not held democratic elections. It may be 
that member states were expecting this (democratic elections) after Laurent Kabila toppled the oppressive 
military regime of General Mobutu Sese Seko.  
465 Article 3 of the SADC Treaty. 
466 The SADCC was created by the so-called Front Line States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe); Ndlovu, J.M.L. “The AU–SADC interface on peace and security: challenges and 
opportunities” in van Nieuwkerk, A et al. Southern African Security Review (2013) at 59. 
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The coming into force of the SADC Treaty changed the name of the organisation from the 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and also its mission from that of reducing 
dependence on South Africa to one of creating an economic community in Southern 
Africa.467  
 
The integration agenda for the SADC, as outlined in the Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan (RISDP)468, is as follows:   
 transformation to a Free Trade Area (FTA) in 2008;  
 Customs Union in 2010;  
 Common Market in 2015;  
 Monetary Union in 2016; and  
 Regional currency in 2018.  
 
As indicated in Chapter 3, the SADC FTA has already been achieved whilst the set date of 
2010 for the Customs Union was missed. However, this should be viewed in the context of 
the COMESA-SADC-EAC Tripartite FTA that is currently the pre-occupation of the three 
RECs.469  
 
4.1.1 Structure and institutions of SADC 
 
The SADC Treaty, as amended, establishes eight institutions: the Summit of the Heads of 
State or Government; the Council of Ministers; Organ on politics, Defence and Security 
Co-operation; Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committees; Standing Committee of 
Officials; the Secretariat; SADC National Committees and the Tribunal.470 
                                                 
467 Article 5 of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC Treaty). 
468 The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) is a comprehensive development and 
implementation framework guiding the regional integration agenda of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) over a period of fifteen years (2005-2020). It is fully discussed in Chapter 5.  
469 The EAC-COMESA-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area (Tripartite FTA) was launched on 10 June 2015, 
as discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
470 Article 9. 
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4.1.1.1 The Summit of the Heads of State or Government (the Summit)  
 
The Summit consists of Heads of State or Government of member states. These are 
presidents or prime ministers, or king, in the case of Swaziland. It is the supreme 
policy-making body, and is responsible for overall policy direction and control of 
the functions of the SADC. It adopts the legal instruments for the implementation 
of the provisions of the SADC Treaty and its decisions are by consensus, and are 
binding.471  
 
This requirement of “consensus” essentially means giving the member in violation 
of its obligations a veto over any sanctions and this is a major flaw in the system.472 
This weakness played itself in the Zimbabwe saga473 that led to the de facto 
suspension of the SADC Tribunal.  
 
4.1.1.2 The Council of Ministers (The Council) 
 
The Council shall consist of one Minister from each Member State, preferably a 
Minister responsible for Foreign or External Affairs. It reports, and is responsible, 
to the Summit.474 It meets at least four times a year and its decisions are taken by 
                                                 
471 Article 10. 
472 Erasmus, G. “Is the SADC trade regime a rules-based system?” SADC Law Journal vol. 1 (2011) 17 at 
30; Scholtz, W. “Review of the role, functions and terms of reference of the SADC Tribunal” SADC Law 
Journal vol. 1 (2011) 197; Tino, E. “The Role of Regional Judiciaries in Eastern and Southern Africa” 
Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook (2012) 140.   
473 In 2007 and 2008 the SADC Tribunal gave judgments against the Zimbabwean Government regarding 
its land policy in the Mike Campbell and Gondo cases respectively (see footnote 475 below for full 
citations). The Zimbabwean Government to comply with the SADC Tribunal’s rulings and the Summit was 
not prepared to act against Zimbabwe; instead, it decided to appoint a consultant to investigate the 
jurisdiction and terms of reference of the Tribunal. 
474 Article 11(2) provides that the Council shall be responsible to:  
a. oversee the functioning and development of SADC;  
b. oversee the implementation of the policies of SADC and the proper execution of its programmes;  
c. advise the Summit on matters of overall policy and efficient and harmonious functioning and 
development of SADC;  
d. approve policies, strategies and work programmes of SADC;  
e. direct, coordinate and supervise the operations of the institutions of SADC subordinate to it;  
f. recommend, for approval to the Summit, the establishment of directorates, committees, other institutions 
and organs;  
g. create its own committees as necessary;  
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consensus. It also considers and recommends to the Summit any application for 
membership to the SADC.475 
 
4.1.1.3 The Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committees  
 
The Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committees consist of ministers from each 
SADC Member State. These committees are directly responsible for overseeing the 
activities of the core areas of integration, monitoring and controlling the 
implementation of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)476 
in their area of competence, as well as providing policy advice to the Council of 
Ministers. They replace the erstwhile Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM),477 
which consisted of one minister from each Member State.  
 
4.1.1.4 The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (the Organ)  
 
The Organ was established in terms of the amendment to the original SADC Treaty 
(Article 10A). It is selected by the Summit and its Chairperson and Deputy 
Chairperson are selected from the members of the Summit. It reports to the Summit 
and the Chairperson of the Summit cannot simultaneously be the chairperson of the 
Organ.478 There is also the Ministerial Committee of the Organ, consisting of 
ministers of foreign affairs; defence; public security or state security.479 This Organ 
                                                 
h. recommend to the Summit persons for appointment to the posts of Executive Secretary and Deputy 
Executive Secretary;  
i. determine the Terms and Conditions of Service of the staff of the institutions of SADC;  
j. develop and implement the SADC Common Agenda and strategic priorities;  
k. convene conferences and other meetings as appropriate, for purposes of promoting the objectives and 
programmes of SADC; and  
l. perform such other duties as may be assigned to it by the Summit or this Treaty. 
475 Article 11(7).  
476 Article 12. 
477 The ICM was abolished in November 2007 after the observation that it was not able to provide the 
policy guidance as expected due to its wide range of representatives, thus not contributing to the SADC 
regional integration agenda. It, inter alia, oversaw the functions and development of the SADC and the 
implementation of the SADC policies and programs. It also advised the Summit on matters of overall 
policy and the development of the SADC, and approves policies, strategies and work programs of the 
SADC. Its decisions are also by consensus. 
478 Article 10A(1). 
479 Article 10A(4). 
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had to conclude a protocol that would outline its functions and powers,480 and as a 
result the “Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation” was 
concluded, and it entered into force on 2 March 2004. 
 
4.1.1.5 The SADC National Committee  
 
This is another institution introduced by the amendment to the original SADC 
Treaty, in terms of Article 16A. This body shall be created in each Member State 
and shall be responsible to: 
(a) provide input at the national level in the formulation of the SADC 
policies, strategies and programmes of action; 
(b) co-ordinate and oversee, at the national level, implementation of 
the SADC programmes of action; and 
(c) create a national steering committee, sub-committees and 
technical committees. 
 
Each national steering committee shall consist of the Chairperson of the SADC 
National Committee and the Chairpersons of sub-committees. A national steering 
committee is responsible for ensuring rapid implementation of programmes that 
would otherwise wait for a formal meeting of the SADC National Committee. 
Stakeholders here include government, private sector, civil society, non-
governmental organisations and workers and employers’ organisations.  
 
4.1.1.6 The Standing Committees of Officials 
 
The Standing Committees of Officials are the real functioning units of the SADC. 
They consist of one permanent secretary or an official of equivalent rank from each 
Member State, preferably from a ministry responsible for economic planning or 
                                                 
480 Article 10A(5) provides: 
“The structure, functions, powers and procedures of the Organ and other related matters shall be prescribed 
in a Protocol.” 
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finance. They make recommendations to the Council as its technical advisory 
committee. Their decisions are also by consensus.481 
 
4.1.1.7 The Secretariat 
 
The Secretariat is the principal executive institution of the SADC and is responsible 
for the implementation of the decisions of both the Summit and the Council. It is 
also the chief administration body of the SADC, which includes financial 
management and promotion of the SADC.482 It is headed by the Executive 
Secretary who is the accounting officer of the SADC. The Executive Secretary is 
also the public relations officer as well as the custodian of the property of the 
SADC.483 
 
The Executive secretary is assisted by one or more Deputy Executive Secretaries 
as decided by the Summit from time to time.484 Currently there are two Deputy 
Executive Secretaries responsible for Regional Integration and for Finance and 
Administration respectively.485 
 
4.1.1.8 The Tribunal 
 
The Tribunal is constituted to ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of 
the provisions of the SADC Treaty and to adjudicate upon disputes referred to it. 
Its composition, functions, powers and procedures are to be prescribed by a protocol 
                                                 
481 Article 13 provides: 
“1. The Standing Committee shall consist of one permanent secretary or an official of equivalent rank from 
each Member State, from the Ministry that is the SADC National Contact Point.  
2. The Standing Committee shall be a technical advisory committee to the Council.  
3. The Standing Committee shall process documentation from the Integrated Committee of Ministers to the 
Council.  
4. The Standing Committee shall report and be responsible to the Council.” 
482 Article 14. 
483 Article 15. 
484 Article 14(2).  
485 Report of the 2008 SADC Summit for Heads of State and Government, Sandton, South Africa, 16 - 17 
August 2008 (Decision 5).  
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adopted by the Summit.486 It shall also give advisory opinions on such matters as 
the Summit or the Council may refer to it487 and its decisions are final and 
binding.488 
 
This means that the purpose of the Tribunal is twofold: it is an “advisory body” to 
the Summit and/or Council as well as the “court” of the SADC. It will give advisory 
opinions of legal nature to the Summit or Council if and when so requested. These 
will be in the form of recommendations. However, when it adjudicates upon a 
dispute it will assume a “court status” and its decisions will be final and binding. 
The Protocol establishing the Tribunal entered into force on the 14 August 2001 
and the Tribunal was inaugurated in November 2005.489 
 
It should be mentioned that the Protocol establishing the Tribunal entered into force 
upon the adoption of the “Agreement Amending the Treaty of SADC” at the 
Blantyre Summit of August 2001, thus without going through the normal 
ratification process.490 This would later on prove to be a bad call as evidenced by 
the challenges that the Tribunal faced, leading to its suspension in 2010. The 
challenges were mainly with regard to non-compliance with its judgments, by the 
Government of Zimbabwe in particular.491 The main argument by the Zimbabwean 
government against the Tribunal was that the Tribunal was not legally constituted 
because its protocol had not been ratified by two-thirds of the member states.492  
                                                 
486 Article 16. 
487 Article 16(4). 
488 Article 16(5). 
489 Ebobrah, S et al. Compendium of African sub-regional human rights documents (2010) at 375; Rupel, 
O.C et al. “The SADC Tribunal: A legal analysis of its mandate and role in regional integration” 
Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook vol. 8 (2008) 179. 
490 SADC Heads of State and Government Summit Communiqué, Blantyre, Malawi, August 2001; Peters, 
W. The Quest for an African Economic Community: Regional Integration and its role in achieving African 
unity (2010) at 187.  
491 In the two cases involving the Zimbabwean Government (Mike Campbell (PVT) Limited and Another v 
Republic of Zimbabwe (2/07) [2007] SADC (T) 1 (13 December 2007) and Gondo and Others v Republic of 
Zimbabwe 05/2008 (T) (9 December 2010) the Tribunal gave judgments against Zimbabwe, which refused 
to honour them arguing lack of jurisdiction by the Tribunal. This led to the suspension of the operations of 
the Tribunal by the SADC Heads of State or Government Extraordinary Summit of May 2011, in 
Windhoek, Namibia. 
492 Nathan, L. “Solidarity Triumphs Over Democracy - The Dissolution of the SADC Tribunal” 
Development Dialogue (December 2011) 124 at 127; Matyszak, D. “The Dissolution of the SADC 
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However, the role and functions of the Tribunal are set to change. This was after 
the SADC Summit493 resolved that a new Tribunal should be negotiated and that its 
mandate should be confined to interpretation of the SADC 
Treaty and protocols relating to disputes between member states. The new Tribunal 
Protocol was adopted by the 34th SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government, 
held in August 2014 in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, but is yet to come into 
operation.494  
 
According to Phooko, the limitation of the Tribunal’s mandate to interpretation of 
the SADC Treaty and protocols relating to disputes between member states would 
not mean that it would not have other powers. He argues that where the instrument 
is silent about certain powers of the Tribunal, the Tribunal may decide to resort to 
an implied mandate in order to adjudicate over a legal issue before it. This it can do 
by considering whether the exercise of such power would be necessary to achieve 
its object and purpose as contained in the constituent document.495 However, with 
the way the SADC conducts its affairs, it is difficult to see it, especially the Summit 
of Heads of state and Government, following or agreeing with this argument.  
 
                                                 
Tribunal” Paper for the Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU) available at 
http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/system/files/The%20Dissolution%20of%20the%20SADC%20Tribunal.
pdf (accessed on 10 June 2016); Sasa, M. “Zim Pulls out of SADC Tribunal” The Herald Newspaper of 2 
September 2009. Available at www.zimbabwesituation.com/sep3_2009.html  (accessed on 10 June 2016). 
493 Decision of the SADC Heads of State and Government Summit of 17 August 2012, Maputo, 
Mozambique.  
494 Communiqué of The 34th Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, 
17-18 August 2014. This decision is not immune to challenges though. In South Africa the Law Society of 
South Africa (LSSA) has taken the Government to court insisting that it (Government) must ensure public 
participation prior to voting in favour of the new protocol. This is in line with the promise made in the 
Preamble of the SADC Treaty – “to be mindful of the need to involve the people of the region in the 
process of development and integration, particularly through the guarantee of democratic rights, observance 
of human rights and the rule of law.” Also Sections 59 and 72 of the Constitution of South Africa oblige 
Parliament to facilitate public participation in its legislative processes; Manyathi-Jele, N. “SADC 
stakeholders form coalition to lobby for restoration of a SADC Tribunal” De Rebus (October 2014) 5; 
Erasmus, G. “The New Protocol for the SADC Tribunal: Jurisdictional Changes and Implications for 
SADC Community Law” Tralac Working Paper No. US15WP01/2015, January 2015 at 1.  
495 Phooko, M.R. “No Longer in Suspense: Clarifying the Human Rights Jurisdiction of the SADC 
Tribunal” Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad (PER) vol. 18 no.3 (2015 533 at 534. 
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Notably the new Protocol on the Tribunal clearly states that the Protocol shall enter 
into force thirty days after the deposit of instruments of ratification by two-thirds 
of the member states.496 Member states seem to have learned a hard lesson from the 
Zimbabwe saga, hence the adherence to the international norm of ratification. This 
clearly shows that the SADC wants to close every loophole that may allow the 
Tribunal to have any powers beyond those stipulated in the Protocol.  
 
This new Protocol is, however, subject to legal challenges. The Law Society of 
South Africa (LSSA) has launched the application in the High Court: North 
Gauteng Division on 19 March 2015 to declare the actions of the President as well 
as the Ministers of Justice and International Relations and Cooperation in voting 
for, signing and planning to ratify the SADC Summit Protocol in 2014 as it relates 
to the SADC Tribunal, to be unconstitutional. It argues that the jurisdictional limit 
of the SADC Tribunal to disputes only between member states – and no longer 
between individual citizens and states – in the SADC region infringes the right of 
South African citizens to access justice in terms of the Bill of Rights contained in 
the South African Constitution.497 
 
Other law societies and Bar councils in the SADC region have or are in the process 
of launching similar actions in their courts to challenge the ratification of the SADC 
Protocol in their countries. This resolution was taken by member societies at the 
SADC Lawyers Association annual general meeting held at Victoria Falls 
immediately after the SADC Summit in 2014.498 
 
Recent publications on the Tribunal are also critical of this limited mandate. They 
argue that this effectively sets up a new judicial organ with the different role from 
the erstwhile Tribunal, which interpreted its role as protecting the rights and the 
                                                 
496 Article 53 of the new Protocol on the SADC Tribunal. 
497 The matter is set down for hearing in the High Court: Gauteng Division, Pretoria on 5 to 7 February 
2018 and will be heard by a full Bench (Notice of Set Down dated: 7 August 2017). 
498 Manyathi-Jele, N. “SADC stakeholders form coalition to lobby for restoration of a SADC Tribunal” De 
Rebus (October 2014) 5.  
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interests of the SADC citizens. This, they argue, would be inadequate to meet the 
needs of a regional organisation, like the SADC, that is committed to economic 
development and integration, to democracy and to peace and security.499 
 
4.1.2 Goals and Objectives of SADC 
 
Article 5(1) of the SADC Treaty states the objectives as: 
a. promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic 
development that will ensure poverty alleviation with the ultimate objective 
of its eradication, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of 
Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional 
integration; 
b. promote common political values, systems and other shared values which 
are transmitted through institutions which are democratic, legitimate and 
effective; 
c. consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability; 
d. promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, 
and the interdependence of member states; 
e. achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and 
programmes; 
f. promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources 
of the Region; 
g. achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection 
of the environment; 
                                                 
499 Phooko, M.R. “The SADC Tribunal: Its Jurisdiction, Enforcement of Its Judgments and the Sovereignty 
of its Member States” Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Laws at the University of South Africa, February 2016; Naldi, G.J et al. “The New SADC Tribunal: Or the 
Emasculation of an International Tribunal” Netherlands International Law Review vol. 62 issue 2 (July 
2016) 133; Tino, E. “The Denial of Access to Justice for Individuals Within the SADC: Some 
Considerations on the New Protocol on the Tribunal” Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale vol. 2 (May 
2017) 477. 
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h. strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural 
affinities and links among the people of the Region; 
i. combat HIV/AIDS or other deadly and communicable diseases; 
j. ensure that poverty eradication is addressed in all SADC activities and 
programmes; and 
k. mainstream gender in the process of community building. 
 
These objectives are interrelated and straddle the economic, social and political spectrum. 
Through these objectives the SADC realises that integration into the world economy will 
help it to achieve the economic growth needed to realise its main goal of poverty 
eradication.500  
 
The achievement of the key objectives of the Community requires that member states 
perform certain obligations over and above the measures they intend to take in terms of the 
SADC Treaty. Naturally, the first obligation of member states is to adopt adequate 
measures for the achievement of the key objectives of the SADC and the uniform 
application of the Treaty. The corollary of this obligation is the duty to refrain from taking 
any measure likely to jeopardise the achievement of the SADC’s key objectives or the 
implementation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty.501 The question therefore is: are the 
member states doing enough to implement the SADC Treaty and therefore achieve these 
objectives?  
 
In order to achieve these goals, there are strategies outlining what is to be done by the 
SADC. These are: 
 
a. harmonise political and socio-economic policies and plans of member states; 
                                                 
500 Ng’ong’ola, C. “Regional integration and trade liberalisation in the Southern African Development 
Community” Journal of International Economic Law vol. 14 (2000) 485 at 489; Kaime, T. “SADC and 
Human Security: fitting human rights into the trade matrix” African Security Review vol. 13 no. 1 (2004) 
109 at 110.  
501 Zongwe, D. “An Introduction to the Law of the Southern African Development Community” GlobaLex 
(online) February 2011.   
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b. encourage the people of the region and their institutions to take initiatives to 
develop economic, social and cultural ties across the region, and to participate fully 
in the implementation of the programmes and objectives of the SADC; 
c. create appropriate institutions and mechanisms for the mobilisation of requisite 
resources for the implementation of programmes and operations of the SADC and 
its institutions; 
d. develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the free 
movement of capital and labour, goods and services and of peoples of the region 
generally among member states; 
e. promote the development of human resources; 
f. promote development, transfer and mastery of technology; 
g. improve economic management and performance through regional cooperation; 
h. promote the coordination and harmonisation of international relations of member 
states; 
i. secure international understanding, co-operation and support, and mobilise the 
inflow of public and private resources into the region; and 
j. develop such other activities as member states may decide in furtherance of the 
objectives of this treaty.502  
 
Also, to give the Treaty a practical effect, provision is made for states to negotiate a series 
of protocols which spell out the objectives and scope of, and institutional mechanisms for, 
cooperation and integration in designated areas. These protocols are not necessarily limited 
to members inter se. On approval by the Summit, the protocols become an integral part of 
the SADC Treaty. 503 
 
Member states undertake to adopt adequate measures to promote the achievement of the 
objectives of the SADC, and agree to refrain from taking any measures likely to jeopardise 
the substance of its principles, the achievement of its objectives and the implementation of 
the provisions of the SADC Treaty. They are also required to take all steps necessary to 
                                                 
502 These are set out in Article 5(2) of the SADC Treaty. 
503 Article 22 of the SADC Treaty. 
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ensure the uniform application of the Treaty and to accord the Treaty the force of national 
law.504 
 
To achieve these undertakings, the member states would have to pass implementing 
legislation for positive results. However, the situation in states where national constitutions 
make treaties, once entered into by the state, applicable in domestic jurisdiction, might be 
different. In South Africa this provision is entrenched in the Constitution.505  
 
The freedom of establishment and the freedom to supply services are an important aspect 
of economic integration. The right to provide services extends to citizens of member states 
who are established in a country other than that of the individual for whom the services are 
intended. The SADC Treaty recognises the importance of this right to economic integration 
by categorically prohibiting discrimination between nationals of member states and asking 
member states to take measures that abolish all restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment.506 
 
The freedom of movement of capital is complementary to that of movement of goods, 
persons and services, but it has a special connection with the right of establishment. This 
is so because it would be useless if a person could only have the right to set up an economic 
activity in a member country, but denied the right to transfer capital to that country to 
enable that person to acquire the necessary premises and operational facilities required for 
the activity. 
 
It can be seen, from the areas of cooperation outlined in the Treaty,507 that the SADC is not 
simply a trading organisation or a mechanism restricted to the promotion of cooperation in 
                                                 
504 Article 6 of the SADC Treaty. 
505 Section 231(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides: 
“Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by national 
legislation; but self-executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the 
Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.” 
506 Articles 5(2)(c) and 6(3). 
507 Article 21 provides: 
3. In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, Member states agree to co-operate in the areas 
of:  
a. food security, land and agriculture; 
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trade and production based on the creation of a common market. In addition to the 
integration of national markets and cooperation in production, states joining the 
Community undertake to cooperate with each other in certain functional areas as well.508  
 
It is also important to note that the SADC states have many traditional links:  
 the countries in the region all emerged from colonial oppression, most of them after 
bitter and protracted liberation wars;  
 they assisted each other in the liberation wars509; and  
 the indigenous ethnic groups in many of the SADC states overlap or have common 
historical origins.510  
 
That is why non-economic matters are also included in the areas of cooperation. The SADC 
strategy of encompassing non-economic matters among its areas of cooperation is a 
realisation that successful integration invariably has to be anchored on the twin foundations 
of economic and political integration.511 
 
4.1.3. SADC Protocol on Trade 
 
There is no doubt that trade is one of the most important tools for sustainable economic 
development and deeper regional integration and cooperation, and that it fosters growth. 
                                                 
b. infrastructure and services; 
c. trade, industry, finance, investment and mining; 
d. social and human development and special programmes; 
e. science and technology. 
f. natural resources and environment; 
g. social welfare, information and culture; and 
h. politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security. 
4. Additional areas of co-operation may be decided upon by the Council. 
508 Article 5(1)(a), (b), (h) and 5(2)(b). 
509 The ANC and its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), had their headquarters in Lusaka (Zambia) 
and also had camps in Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.    
510 There are Batswana in South Africa as well as in Botswana, Swazis in South Africa as well as in 
Swaziland Shangaans in South Africa as well as in Mozambique and Ndebeles in South Africa as well as in 
Zimbabwe. 
511 Ndulo, M. “African integration schemes: a case study of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC)” African Yearbook of International law vol. 7 no. 7 (1999 – 2001) at 15; Kaime, T. “SADC and 
Human Security: fitting human rights into the trade matrix” African Security Review vol. 13 no. 1 (2004) 
109 at 110. 
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Because the main aim of the SADC is to integrate the economies of its member states, it 
concluded the Protocol on Trade as one of the main tools to achieve its objectives.  
 
This Protocol was concluded in Maseru, Lesotho on 24 August 1996, but its 
implementation phase began on 1 September 2000.512 It provides for trade liberalisation 
and co-operation in the SADC and the timing thereof enabled the framing of the Protocol 
to take into account the results of the Uruguay Round and the changes to the multilateral 
trading system arising out of the establishment of the WTO in 1995.513 It entered into force 
on 25 January 2000 after ratification by two-thirds of the SADC member states,514 but the 
three member states of Angola, the DRC and Seychelles remained outside.515 Seychelles 
eventually acceded to the Protocol in September 2015.516 The Protocol commits member 
states to provide duty-free treatment for 100% of trade by 2015.517 
 
Its objectives are:  
1. To further liberalise intra-regional trade in goods and services on the basis of 
fair, mutually equitable and beneficial trade arrangements, complemented by 
protocols in other areas. 
2. To ensure efficient production within the SADC reflecting the current and 
dynamic comparative advantages of its members. 
3. To contribute towards the improvement of the climate for domestic, cross-
border and foreign investment. 
                                                 
512 The Preamble to the amendment protocol on trade signed in August 2000; Bohanes, J. “A Few 
Reflections on Annex VI to the SADC Trade Protocol” Tralac Working Paper No. 3/2005, June 2005 at 1. 
513 Ng’ong’ola, C. “Regional integration and trade liberalization in the Southern African Development 
Community” Journal of International Economic Law vol. 3 no. 3 (2000) 485 at 488. 
514 Grynberg, R et al. Multilateral and Regional Trade Issues for Developing Countries (2003) at 184; 
www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/Protocol_on_Trade1996.pdf (accessed on 9 November 
2015). 
515  Kalenga, P. “Regional integration in SADC: retreating or forging ahead?” Tralac Working Paper 
D12WP08/2012 (September 2012) at 7. Sandrey, R. “An analysis of the SADC Free Trade Area” Tralac 
Paper No. D13TB01/2013, June 2013 at 1. 
516 This was announced by the South African Revenue Services (SARS) on 18 September 2015. Available 
at www.engineeringnews.co.za/.../seychelles-accedes-to-sadc-protocol (accessed on 9 November 2015).  
517 This is the date on which Mozambique would finalise its tariff phase-down on goods from South Africa. 
The SACU countries completed their tariff liberalisation commitments in 2008 and the others committed 
themselves to accomplish this by 2012, with the exception of Mozambique regarding South Africa.  
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4. To enhance the economic development, diversification and industrialisation 
of the Region. 
5. To establish a Free Trade Area in the SADC Region.518 
 
The Protocol envisages the elimination of tariffs within eight years of its entry into force.519 
The processes and modalities for the elimination of the tariffs are to be determined by a 
Committee of Ministers responsible for trade (CMT).520 Member states who consider that 
they may be or have been adversely affected by the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
to trade, may upon application to the Committee of Ministers of Trade, be granted a grace 
period to afford them additional time for the elimination of tariffs. 
 
It also envisages the existence of different common tariffs for different products and as 
such provides for derogations from the applicable obligations in Article 3.521 This is in 
recognition of the economic inequalities among the member states and as such goods had 
to be categorised into different classes for the purposes of tariff reduction. Category A 
requires immediate reduction of duty to zero at the beginning of the implementation period, 
                                                 
518 Article 2. 
519 Article 3(1)(b); “2011 Audit of the Implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade”, Technical Report 
by AECOM International Development, August 2011. 
520 This is one of the special institutions established in terms of Article 31 of the Protocol, to be responsible 
for trade matters including the supervision of the implementation of this Protocol. Others are:  the Committee 
of Senior Officials responsible for trade matters, the Trade Negotiation Forum (TNF), and the Sector Co-
ordinating Unit. 
521 Article 3 provides:  
“1. The process and modalities for the phased elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers shall be 
determined by the Committee of Ministers responsible for trade matters (CMT) having due regard 
to the following: 
(a)  The existing preferential trade arrangements between and among the Member states. 
(b)  That the elimination of barriers to trade shall be achieved within a time frame of eight (8) 
years from entry into force of this Protocol. 
(c)  That Member states which consider they may be or have been adversely affected, by 
removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade may, upon application to CMT, 
be granted a grace period to afford them additional time for the elimination of tariffs and 
(NTBs). CMT shall elaborate appropriate criteria for the consideration of such 
applications. 
(d)  That different tariff lines may be applied within the agreed time frame for different 
products, in the process of eliminating tariffs and NTBs. 
(e)  The process and the method of eliminating barriers to intra-SADC trade, and the criteria 
of listing products for special consideration, shall be negotiated in the context of the 
Trade Negotiating forum (TNF).  
2. The agreed process and modalities for eliminating barriers to intra-SADC trade shall upon adoption, be 
deemed to form an integral part of this Protocol.” 
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by year 2000. These were the commodities that already attracted low or zero tariffs. The 
second category B deals with goods that constitute significant sources of customs revenue 
and whose tariffs are to be removed over 8 years, by 2008. Categories A and B should 
account for 85% of intra-SADC trade so that by 2008 SADC could be regarded as a free 
trade area in compliance with Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). This required that “substantially all trade” should be duty free.  
 
Category C deals with sensitive products (imports sensitive to domestic industrial and 
agricultural activities) whose tariffs were to be eliminated between 2008 and 2012. 
Category C is limited to a maximum of 15% of each member’s intra-SADC merchandise 
trade. Category E is for goods that can be exempted from preferential treatment under 
Articles 9 and 10 of the Trade Protocol such as firearms and munitions, comprising of a 
small fraction of intra-SADC trade.522 
 
This provision is critical for the functioning of the SADC Free Trade Area (FTA), in which 
substantially all trade must be liberalised within a reasonable period after the launching 
date. The process and the method of eliminating barriers to intra-SADC trade, and the 
criteria of listing products for special consideration have to be negotiated in the Trade 
Negotiating Forum (TNF). Once adopted, the process and modalities for eliminating intra-
SADC trade barriers would form an integral part of the Trade Protocol and, therefore, of 
the SADC law. The same applies to the application for derogations. However, this is yet to 
be done.523 
 
Erasmus524 is of the opinion that this state of affairs undermines legal certainty. According 
to him, this also results in the imperfect functioning of the SADC FTA, where exceptions 
                                                 
522 SADC Trade Protocol Project, 2001. “Customs Revenue Implications of the SADC Trade Protocol”; 
Kalenga, P. “Implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol: Some Reflections” Trade Briefs (2004); 
Ng’ong’ola, C. “Regional integration and trade liberalization in the Southern African Development 
Community” Journal of International Economic Law vol. 3 no. 3 (2000) 485 at 487. 
523 Erasmus, G. “Why Article 3 of the SADC Trade Protocol needs to be fixed” Tralac Paper of 19 June 
2013, available at http://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/5323-why-article-3-of-the-sadc-trade-protocol-
needs-to-be-fixed.html  (accessed on 9 November 2015); Muntschick, J. “Regional Economic Integration in 
Southern Africa: SADC’s Protocol on Trade and South Africa’s big Fingerprint” Paper for the University 
of Bamberg Workshop on “Regional Integration”, 19 – 20 June 2009.  
524 Erasmus (above). 
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to the tariff and related trade rules should be based on those provisions allowing particular 
exceptions such as safeguards, trade remedies, security or general exceptions. This is so 
because member states do not follow those routes and therefore objective criteria for 
justifying them are never invoked. Instead, the ad hoc and politically motivated derogations 
of Article 3 are employed. 
 
The Protocol also provides for the phased reduction and eventual elimination of import 
duties on goods originating from member states.525 The key to qualifying for preferential 
treatment under the Protocol are the rules of origin526 and these are primarily used to 
determine from which country a product originates. Their purpose, therefore, is 
authentication in order to ensure that countries that are not signatories of the FTA do not 
enjoy the preferences offered by the agreement. These rules of origin are a complex set of 
trade rules and take into account the fact that virtually all manufactured products available 
in markets today are produced in more than one country.527 The SADC member states 
approved the rules of origin for most products that are exported within the region in July 
2003.528 The approval means that products identified would gain entry from the country of 
origin into another country duty-free. 
 
The Protocol is divided into nine Parts, and covers trade in goods (Part 2); customs 
procedures (Part 3); trade laws (Part 4); trade related investment measures (Part 5); trade 
in services, intellectual property rights, and competition policy (Part 6); and trade 
development (Part 7). Apart from these substantive issues, the Protocol also covers trade 
                                                 
525 Article 4. 
526 There are two common types of rules of origin (RoO) depending on application: the preferential and 
non-preferential rules of origin. Preferential RoO are part of a free trade area or preferential trade 
arrangement which includes tariff concessions. These trade arrangements might be unilateral, bilateral or 
regional (also sometimes called multilateral) trade arrangements. Non-preferential RoO, on the other hand, 
are used to determine the country of origin for certain purposes. These purposes may be for quotas, anti-
dumping, anti-circumvention, statistics or origin labelling. 
527 Maiketso, J.T et al. “Countrywise Review of the Implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol” 
Proceedings of the 2006 Formative Process Research on Integration in Southern Africa (FOPRISA) Annual 
Conference, Report 3, at 217. 
528  Muchinguri, W. “Southern Africa: SADC Approves Rules of Origin” allAfrica.com (online), 17 July 
2013; “SADC Rules of Origin Exporters Guide Manual”, approved at 7th Meeting of the Sub Committee on 
Customs Cooperation, November 2003; Brenton, P et al. “Rules of Origin and SADC: The Case for 
Change in the Mid Term Review of the Trade Protocol” Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 83, June 
2005. 
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relations among member states and with non-member states (Part 8) as well as institutional 
arrangements and dispute resolution (Part 9). 
 
This wide coverage is criticised as leading to its minimum implementation. It also leads to 
the Protocol lacking focus, as evidenced by its lack of rules and disciplines that are region-
specific.529 By having this wide coverage it enters the terrain of the WTO rules, which are 
defined taking into account the international trading scenario, not looking to the 
specificities of regions such as Southern Africa, where heterogeneity or diversity is the 
main characteristic. This might lead to a conflict between the two.530  
 
These nine parts are supported by nine Annexes elaborating on implementation of the 
Protocol. They deal with issues such as rules of origin (Annex I), customs co-operation 
(Annex II), simplification and harmonisation of trade documentation and procedures 
(Annex III), transit trade and facilities (Annex IV), trade development (Annex V), 
concerning the settlement of disputes between the (Annex VI), concerning trade in sugar 
(Annex VII), concerning sanitary and phytosanitary measures (Annex VIII) and concerning 
technical barriers to trade (Annex IX). 
 
The parts of the Protocol dealing with “trade-related issues” and “investment matters” 
simply call upon the member states to “adopt policies and implement measures” in 
accordance with their obligations in terms of the GATS and the TRIPS agreements of the 
WTO. This is in view to liberalising their services sector within the SADC.531 Member 
states are also called upon to adopt policies and to implement measures to promote an open 
cross-border investment regime thereby enhancing economic development, diversification 
and industrialisation,532 and to prohibit unfair business practices and promote 
competition.533  
                                                 
529 Machava, A. “An Overview of the SADC Protocol on Trade in Services” Regional Integration Observer 
vol. 2 no. 2 (October 2014) 8.  
530 Ibid; Ng’ong’ola, C. “Regional integration and trade liberalization in the Southern African Development 
Community” Journal of International Economic Law vol. 3 no. 3 (2000) 485 at 496. 
531 Article 23(2). 
532 Article 22. 
533 Article 25. 
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Article 32 of the Trade Protocol, elaborated through Annex VI,534 describes the procedures 
and arrangements for settling disputes arising from the interpretation and implementation 
of the Protocol. The first step is through negotiations between member states involved in 
the dispute through co-operation and consultation, the second is taking recourse to a panel 
of experts and the third is in accordance with Article 32 of the SADC Treaty i.e. the dispute 
shall be referred to the SADC Tribunal. It is worth noting that the first two steps are the 
replica of the WTO process.535  
 
This replication is also done with regard to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
mechanisms. Article 5 of the WTO “Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes” provides for good offices, conciliation and mediation 
procedures, which are confidential, as alternative to the adjudication process. Annex VI of 
the SADC Trade Protocol provides the same.536 
 
However, there are some differences between the two systems: first, under the SADC there 
is no clear indication of the linkages between the three levels of dispute settlement, i.e. 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration, which is the case with the WTO system. Secondly, 
in the WTO system these procedures are optional and additional to the consultations, 
whereas in the SADC system this is not so. 
 
                                                 
534 Annex VI ‘Concerning the Settlement of Disputes Between the Member states of SADC’, which was 
brought about by the Amendment Protocol on Trade adopted by the SADC member states at their Summit 
meeting in Windhoek, Namibia in September 2000. 
535 Article 4 of the WTO “Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes” 
provides for settlement of disputes first by negotiations between the parties through cooperation and 
consultations. If the consultations fail to settle a dispute within 60 days after the date of receipt of the 
request for consultations, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel.  
536 Article 4 of Annex VI to the SADC Trade Protocol provides: 
“1. Good offices, conciliation and mediation are procedures that are undertaken voluntarily if the 
disputing Member states so agree. 
2. Procedures involving good offices, conciliation and mediation shall be confidential, and may be 
requested at any time by a disputing Member State.  These procedures may begin at any time and 
be terminated at any time.  
3. The Chairperson of the CMT, or any other Member of the CMT designated by the Chairperson 
who is not a national of a disputing Member State, may offer good offices, conciliation or 
mediation with a view to assisting the disputing Member states.” 
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Thirdly, when it comes to remedies the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) makes 
provision for measures such as retaliation and cross-retaliation where recommendations 
of the DSB are not complied with.537 The SADC system, on the other hand, does not make 
this provision. Annex VI only empowers the Panel, as part of its terms of reference, to 
make findings as and when appropriate on the degree of adverse trade effects on any 
Member State of any measure found not to conform to the provisions of the Protocol, or to 
have caused nullification or impairment of the complaining Member State as well as to 
recommend that the Member State complained against brings a measure into conformity 
with the Protocol where such a measure is found to be inconsistent with this Protocol.538 
 
This lack of regulation at the post-adjudication stage is striking, particularly because the 
agreement (SADC Trade Protocol) envisages the settlement of disputes through a legalistic 
procedure. In other words, although the SADC provides a complainant Member State with 
a right of access to an adjudicatory process, which is not conditioned on the consent of the 
respondent, it does not specify the means by which the result of that process might be 
enforced. It might be argued that this absence of regulation with regard to remedies for 
non-compliance leaves open the possibility that an RTA member could have recourse to 
countermeasures under customary international law with a view to inducing compliance 
with the ruling of an ad hoc panel.539 
 
Annex VI is likely to become one of the crucial documents for the SADC integration 
efforts. This is so because experience at the global level (WTO) as well as the regional 
level (for instance, the European communities) teaches that a rules-based dispute resolution 
system – rather than a “soft” negotiation approach to solving trade disputes between 
members of an institution of economic integration – is an essential means of ensuring the 
                                                 
537Sykes, A.O. “The Disputes Settling Mechanism: Ensuring Compliance?” in Narlikar, M et al. Oxford 
Handbook on the World Trade Organization (2012) at 560; World Trade Organization. Understanding the 
WTO 5th ed. (2010) at 55; Spadano, L. ‘Cross-Agreement Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System: An Important Enforcement Mechanism for Developing Countries?” World Trade Review vol. 7 no. 
3 (2008) 511. 
538 Article 9 (c) & (d) of Annex VI of the SADC Trade Protocol. 
539 Chase, C et al. “Mapping of dispute settlement mechanisms in regional trade agreements: Innovative or 
variations on a theme?” WTO Staff Working Paper, No. ERSD-2013-07 (2013) at 38; Van den Bossche, P 
et al. “What to Do When Disagreement Strikes? The Complexity of Dispute Settlement under Trade 
Agreements” in Frankel, S et al. Trade Agreements at the Crossroads (2014). 
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functioning, establishing and maintaining the credibility of such an institution, both in the 
eyes of the governments as well as of the business community.540 
 
So far, however, the implementation of Annex VI by the SADC member states has been 
slow to get off the ground. No disputes have been filed yet.541 This state of affairs is most 
likely a result of the limited internal resources and experience of the SADC member states 
in this respect, and also due to the still very politicised climate prevalent within the SADC, 
where the vast majority of countries feel that a trade dispute is not simply a by-product of 
increased beneficial trading relations, but an unfriendly act – an attitude which is 
characteristic of a young and inexperienced regional organisation.542  
 
This absence of disputes, however, does not point to a lack of interest of the SADC member 
states in the dispute settlement mechanism.543 Also the effectiveness of a dispute settlement 
mechanism cannot be discounted merely because it is not active. A dispute settlement 
mechanism that shows little or no activity may be effectively deterring parties from 
violating their obligations.544 
 
4.1.4 SADC and WTO 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, regional integration schemes are recognised in terms of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) law – Article 24 (XXIV) of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) or General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)545 for trade in 
                                                 
540 Bohanes, J. “A Few Reflections on Annex VI to the SADC Trade Protocol” Tralac Working Paper no. 3 
June 2005 at 1; Erasmus, G. “Is the SADC trade regime a rules-based system?” SADC Law Journal Vol. 1 
(2011) 17; Ndlovu, L. “The EC-Asbestos dispute and its implications for a transforming SADC: Is the dust 
refusing to settle?” South African Public Law (SAPR/PL) vol. 21 (2006) 246 at 260. 
541 Ng’ong’ola, C. “Replication of WTO dispute settlement processes in SADC” SADC Law Journal Vol. 1 
(2011) 35 at 36; “The Settlement of Disputes in the SADC Free Trade Area”, Submission by Trade Law 
Centre (Tralac) for the SADC August 2014 Summit at 3. 
542 Ng’ong’ola (above).  
543 Saurombe, A. “Regional Integration Agenda for SADC “Caught in the winds of change” Problems and 
Prospects” Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology Vol. 4 Issue 2 (2009) 100 at 103. 
544 Chase (fn 539) at 47. 
545 GATT Article XXIV(1) provides: “The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the metropolitan 
customs territories of the contracting parties and to any other customs territories in respect of which this 
Agreement has been accepted under Article XXVI or is being applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant to 
the Protocol of Provisional Application. Each such customs territory shall, exclusively for the purposes of 
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goods, Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)546 for trade in 
services and in the “Enabling Clause”.547 The Enabling Clause was essentially created in 
1979 for preferential trade arrangements on goods between developing-country members. 
These arrangements are not subject to examination by the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements, but they are notified to the Committee on Trade and Development. 
                                                 
the territorial application of this Agreement, be treated as though it were a contracting party; Provided that 
the provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed to create any rights or obligations as between two or 
more customs territories in respect of which this Agreement has been accepted under Article XXVI or is 
being applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application by a single 
contracting party.” 
546 GATS Article V provides:  
“1. This Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from being a party to or entering into an 
agreement liberalizing trade in services between or among the parties to such an agreement, provided that 
such an agreement: 
(a)        has substantial sectoral coverage, and  
(b)        provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination, in the sense of 
Article XVII, between or among the parties, in the sectors covered under 
subparagraph (a), through: 
(i)        elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or 
(ii)        prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures, 
either at the entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of a reasonable time-frame, 
except for measures permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIV and XIV bis. 
2. In evaluating whether the conditions under paragraph 1(b) are met, consideration may be given to the 
relationship of the agreement to a wider process of economic integration or trade liberalization among the 
countries concerned.” 
547 The Enabling Clause is officially called the “Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries”. This was in terms of GATT Decision 
(L/4903) of 28 November 1979 (on “treatment of developing nations”). 
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Notification to the WTO can, therefore, be made under the provisions of Article XXIV of 
GATT548 and under the “Enabling Clause”.549 
 
According to the WTO law or rules, and reinforced by the “Understanding on the 
interpretation of Article XXIV”,550 which was reached during the Uruguay Round, regional 
groups must inform the WTO of their arrangements as soon as they are agreed to and 
submit to an examination.551  
                                                 
548 Paragraph 7 of GATT Article XXIV provides:      
“(a)     Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade area, or an interim 
agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, shall promptly notify the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make available to them such information regarding the 
proposed union or area as will enable them to make such reports and recommendations to 
contracting parties as they may deem appropriate. 
  
     (b)     If, after having studied the plan and schedule included in an interim agreement referred to 
in paragraph 5 in consultation with the parties to that agreement and taking due account of the 
information made available in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (a), the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES find that such agreement is not likely to result in the formation of a 
customs union or of a free-trade area within the period contemplated by the parties to the agreement 
or that such period is not a reasonable one, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall make 
recommendations to the parties to the agreement. The parties shall not maintain or put into force, as 
the case may be, such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these 
recommendations. 
  
     (c)     Any substantial change in the plan or schedule referred to in paragraph 5(c) shall be 
communicated to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, which may request the contracting parties 
concerned to consult with them if the change seems likely to jeopardize or delay unduly the 
formation of the customs union or of the free-trade area.” 
549 Paragraph 4 of “Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903)” – The Enabling Clause – provides:          
“Any contracting party taking action to introduce an arrangement pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above 
or subsequently taking action to introduce modification or withdrawal of the differential and more 
favourable treatment so provided shall: 
a)         notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and furnish them with all the information they may 
deem appropriate relating to such action; 
  
b)         afford adequate opportunity for prompt consultations at the request of any interested 
contracting party with respect to any difficulty or matter that may arise. The CONTRACTING 
PARTIES shall, if requested to do so by such contracting party, consult with all contracting parties 
concerned with respect to the matter with a view to reaching solutions satisfactory to all such 
contracting parties.” 
550 The “Understanding on the interpretation of Article XXIV” sheds some light on certain issues (of a 
rather procedural nature). 
551 In November 2001 the WTO adopted a Declaration (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1), which inter alia provides: 
“Notification 
 
3.     The required notification of an RTA by Members that are party to it shall take place as early as 
possible. As a rule, it will occur no later than directly following the parties’ ratification of the RTA 
or any party’s decision on application of the relevant parts of an agreement, and before the 
application of preferential treatment between the parties.” 
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All the SADC member states are members of the WTO thereby necessitating adherence to 
the WTO legal obligations with respect to the formation of regional groupings. This means 
that the SADC member states had a choice:  they could opt for the more onerous Article 
XXIV notification or the notification under the “Enabling Clause”.552 The SADC chose the 
Article XXIV notification when it notified the Protocol on Trade in the Southern African 
Development Community and the Amending Agreement to the Protocol to the WTO on 2 
August 2004, as aiming at establishing a free trade area.553 It would have also qualified to 
notify under Paragraph 4 (b) of the Enabling Clause since the SADC involves developing 
countries, but it did not go this route. The terms of reference for the examination of the 
Protocol were adopted by the Council for Trade in Goods on 1 October 2004.554 
 
Because the SADC chose the Article XXIV notification, which is onerous, it should be 
tested whether it fully complies with this Article.  
 
4.1.4.1 Is SADC Article XXIV-compliant? 
 
The WTO was notified of the SADC FTA under the Article XXIV of the GATT. This 
means for a SADC FTA to be WTO-compatible it must meet the following requirements: 
 
(a) GATT Art. XXIV: 5 (b) - No higher duties or restrictions; 
(b) GATT Art. XXIV: 7 (a) - Notification at the WTO 
(c) GATT Art. XXIV: 5 (c) -The reasonable time requirement; 
(d) GATT Art. XXIV: 8 - The substantial coverage requirement; 
 
                                                 
552 Nhara, A. “What is SADC? Towards Implementation of the Trade Protocol” SADC User’s Guide, Trade 
& Development Studies Centre Harare, Zimbabwe July 2003 at 2; Saurombe, A. “The Southern African 
development community trade legal instruments compliance with certain criteria of GATT Article XXIV” 
Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad vol. 14 no.4 (2011) 286 at 294. 
553 Protocol on Trade in the Southern African Development Community. World Trade Organization 
Document WT/REG/176/3. Geneva: WTO; Mutai, H.B. “Regional trade integration strategies under SADC 
and the EAC: A comparative analysis” SADC Law Journal vol. 1 (2011) 81 at 84. 
554 “Terms of Reference of the Examination: Protocol on Trade in the Southern African Development 
Community”, World Trade Organization WT/REG176/3 22, December 2004 (04-5637) Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements. 
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(a) No higher duties or restrictions 
 
According to GATT Article XXIV(5)(b),  the provisions of this Agreement shall 
not prevent the formation of a free-trade area, provided that  the duties and other 
regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constituent territories and 
applicable at the formation of such free-trade area to the trade of contracting parties 
not included in such area or non-parties to such agreement, shall not be higher or 
more restrictive than the corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce 
existing in the same constituent territories prior to the formation of the free-trade 
area. And this prohibition applies to all trade, except where specifically permitted, 
as per the definition of a free-trade area.555  
 
In terms of Articles 3 – 6 of the SADC Trade Protocol member states have 
committed themselves to the elimination of all tariffs and non-tariff barriers to 
trade, which includes the elimination of import duties, export duties, quantitative 
import restrictions and export restrictions. Article 3 deals with the elimination of 
barriers to intra-SADC trade, the responsibility of which falls on the Committee of 
Ministers responsible for Trade Matters (CMT).556 The CMT must agree to the 
                                                 
555 GATT Article XXIV(8)(b) defines a free-trade area as a group of two or more customs territories in 
which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted 
under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the 
constituent territories in products originating in such territories. 
556 Article 3 of the SADC Protocol provides:  
“1. The process and modalities for the phased elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers shall be 
determined by the Committee of Ministers responsible for trade matters (CMT) having due regard 
to the following: 
 
a) The existing preferential trade arrangements between and among the Member states. 
b) That the elimination of barriers to trade shall be achieved within a time frame of eight (8) 
years from entry into force of this Protocol.  
c) That Member states which consider they may be or have been adversely affected, by 
removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade may, upon application to CMT, 
be granted a grace period to afford them additional time for the elimination of tariffs and 
(NTBs).  CMT shall elaborate appropriate criteria for the consideration of such 
applications. 
d) That different tariff lines may be applied within the agreed time frame for different 
products, in the process of eliminating tariffs and NTBs. 
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process and modalities for eliminating these intra-SADC barriers and adopt them, 
so that they form part of the Protocol.557  
 
Articles 7 and 8 of the SADC Trade Protocol prohibit all the SADC member states 
from applying quantitative restrictions on import and exports, except if permitted 
in terms of the Protocol.  
 
Not only have member states undertaken not to raise import duties beyond those 
which existed prior to the entry into force of the Trade Protocol, but they have also 
undertaken to grant no less favourable treatment to third states than they give to 
member states in circumstances where export duties and quantitative export 
restrictions are applied. These undertakings ensure that trade with third party states 
are not subject to protectionism.558 
 
This means that Articles 3 – 8 of the SADC Trade Protocol are compliant with the 
definition and with GATT Article XXIV(5(b) with regard to restrictive measures. 
 
(b) Notification at the WTO 
 
Notification is a requirement that has to be made to all contracting parties and has 
to be fulfilled “as early as possible . . . no later than directly following the parties” 
ratification of the RTA or any party’s decision on application of the relevant parts 
of an agreement, and “before” the application of preferential treatment between the 
parties.559  
                                                 
e) The process and the method of eliminating barriers to intra-SADC trade, and the criteria 
of listing products for special consideration, shall be negotiated in the context of the 
Trade Negotiating Forum (TNF).” 
557 Article 3(2) provides: “The agreed process and modalities for eliminating barriers to intra-SADC trade 
shall upon adoption, be deemed to form an integral part of this Protocol.” 
558 Article 27 – 30 of the Trade Protocol. 
559 GATT Article XXIV: 7 provides: 
“(a) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade area, or an interim 
agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, shall promptly notify the Contracting Parties 
and shall make available to them such information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them 
to make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem appropriate. 
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In practice this means that the WTO members have to be informed before the 
implementation of the RTA, so that those who have questions or reservations can 
raise them.560 In the case of the SADC Protocol on Trade, this was not done and 
therefore the question arises as to whether the SADC violated the notification 
requirement.  
 
The answer to such a question would logically be in the positive, but one can argue 
that the 2004 notification was with regard to the SADC FTA, and not the 
Community itself, which was launched in January 2008. In this regard it would 
mean that the notification was in fact four years early and thus a “prior notification”, 
as required by the WTO. 
 
The authority that must determine whether there was compliance or not is the 
Council on Trade in Goods, which is made up of representatives from all the WTO 
member countries. This is in terms of Paragraph 7 of the Understanding on Article 
XXIV which states:  
 
“All notifications made under paragraph 7(a) of Article XXIV shall be 
examined by a working party561 in the light of the relevant provisions of 
                                                 
(b) If, after having studied the plan and schedule included in an interim agreement referred to in paragraph 
5 in consultation with the parties to that agreement and taking due account of the information made 
available in accordance with the provisions of sub-paragraph (a), the Contracting Parties find that such 
agreement is not likely to result in the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area within the period 
contemplated by the parties to the agreement or that such period is not a reasonable one, the Contracting 
Parties shall make recommendations to the parties to the agreement. The parties shall not maintain or put 
into force, as the case may be, such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these 
recommendations. 
 
(c) Any substantial change in the plan or schedule referred to in paragraph 5 (c) shall be communicated to 
the Contracting Parties, which may request the contracting parties concerned to consult with them if the 
change seems likely to jeopardize or delay unduly the formation of the customs union or of the free-trade 
area.” 
560 Schaefer, M. “Ensuring that Regional Trade Agreements Complement the WTO System: US 
Unilateralism a Supplement to WTO Initiatives?” Journal of International Economic Law vol. 10 issue 3 
(2007) 585 at 594. 
561 This work is now done by the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), which was created 
on 6 February 1996, as a result of the Singapore Ministerial Conference (Decision WT/L/ 127 of 6 
February 1996). 
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GATT 1994 and of paragraph 1 of this Understanding. The working party 
shall submit a report to the Council for Trade in Goods on its findings in 
this regard. The Council for Trade in Goods may make such 
recommendations to Members as it deems appropriate.” 
 
However, there is no obligation to accept these recommendations. If a member is 
not satisfied with the decision or recommendations of the Council for Trade in 
Goods, such a member would have recourse to dispute settlement proceedings on 
the question of the overall legality of the agreement.562 
 
(c) Reasonable time requirement 
 
This requirement is linked to the “notification requirement” because notification 
must take place within reasonable time. This was interpreted by the WTO to mean 
that any free trade agreement be implemented no more than ten years except for 
“exceptional cases”.563 However, there is no clear consensus on what is meant by 
“exceptional cases”.564 
 
The SADC Trade Protocol entered into force in the year 2000, and according to 
Saurombe565 this means, as the SADC was notified to the WTO in 2004, that the 
notification requirement was not strictly complied with, as it was four years late or 
after the fact.  
  
                                                 
562 WTO Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Textiles, WT/DS34/AB/R, adopted on 19 November 1999, 
paragraphs 360 and 369; Bartels, L. “Interim Agreements under Article XXIV GATT” World Trade Review 
vol. 8 no.2 (2009) 339 at 341. 
563 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement Tariffs and Trade 1994 
provides: “The ‘reasonable length of time’ referred to in paragraph 5(c) of Article XXIV should exceed 10 
years only in exceptional cases.” 
564 “The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium” World Trade 
Report 2007 at 310; Taylor, C.O. “Regionalism: the second-best option?” Saint Louis University Public 
Law Review Vol. XXVIII:155 (2008) 155 at 177. 
565 Saurombe, A. “The Southern African development community trade legal instruments compliance with 
certain criteria of GATT Article XXIV” Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad vol. 14 no.4 (2011) 286 at 
294. 
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This means, in practical terms, that the SADC is in violation of the notification 
requirement because four years had passed before notification was made. However, 
the obligation for notification has not been complied with in a systematic manner 
by WTO member states and Crawford566 notes that: 
 
“While the wording of GATT Article XXIV suggests that an RTA should 
be notified before the entry into force of the RTA, notifications are generally 
received after entry into force, in some cases months or even years after.” 
 
In terms of the Understanding on the interpretation of Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, where member parties to an agreement 
believe that ten years would be insufficient, they shall provide a full explanation to 
the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) of the need for a longer period.567 Article 
3(1)(b) of the Trade Protocol provides that elimination of the trade barriers shall be 
achieved within eight years. The question that now arises is whether the eight-year 
provision of the Trade Protocol is in contravention of the ten-year timeframe as per 
the “Understanding”. 
 
Taken at face-value the answer would be in the affirmative, but the answer to the 
above question should be NO because of the following reasons:  
 
 Shortening the achievement of the elimination of trade barriers by two years 
shows how positive the SADC is about achieving integration. The fact that 
member states have chosen to implement this within eight years should not 
pose any problems. This in fact puts them in good stead because they can 
always seek an extension of two years should they fail to achieve this within 
the eight years they set themselves. The extension would only become 
                                                 
566 Crawford, J. “A New Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements” Singapore Year Book 
of International Law and Contributors (2007) 133 at 136. 
567 Paragraph 3 of the “Understanding”.  
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problematic where the SADC member states seek a period of more than ten 
years in total.568 
 
 Also the ten-year period itself is not rigid as member states can always 
provide a full explanation to the Council for Trade in Goods of the need for 
a longer period, as provided by Paragraph 3 of the Understanding. 
 
So even with the SADC Customs Union, which was supposed to happen in 2010, 
the SADC would not necessarily be in violation of the GATT Article XXIV 
requirement of “reasonable time”, provided it furnishes the Council for Trade in 
Goods with a convincing argument.  
 
(d) Substantial coverage requirement 
 
The requirement of “substantial coverage” is a key notion in terms of Article 
XXIV(8) of the GATT.569 Of relevance to the SADC is the second part of the 
paragraph (i.e. Article XXIV(8)b) as it relates to FTAs, bearing in mind that the 
SADC was notified to the WTO as an FTA. Articles 7 and 8 prohibit member states 
                                                 
568 Saurombe, A. “The Southern African development community trade legal instruments compliance with 
certain criteria of GATT Article XXIV” Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad vol. 14 no.4 (2011) 286 at 
294; Nhara, A. “What is SADC? Towards Implementation of the Trade Protocol” SADC User’s Guide 
(July 2003) at 2. 
569 Article XXIV(8) provides: 
(a)     A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs territory for two or 
more customs territories, so that 
  
(i)     duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those 
permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to 
substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories, and 
  
(ii)     subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and other regulations 
of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of territories not 
included in the union; 
  
(b)     A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories in which the 
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted 
under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the 
constituent territories in products originating in such territories.” 
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from applying any quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, respectively, 
that originate in member states.570 Article 7 goes further to require member states 
to phase out the existing restrictions on the import of goods originating in member 
states, except where otherwise provided for in this Protocol.571 These phase-out 
exceptions are listed in Article 9, with a proviso that the measures do not arbitrarily 
or unjustifiably discriminate between member states or are not disguised 
restrictions on intra-SADC trade.572  
 
                                                 
570 Article 7 provides: 
1. Member states shall not apply any new quantitative restrictions and shall in accordance with 
Article 3, phase out the existing restrictions on the import of goods originating in Member states, 
except where otherwise provided for in this Protocol. 
 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, Member states may apply a quota 
system provided that the tariff rate under such a quota system is more favourable than the rate 
applied under this Protocol. 
 
Article 8 provides: 
 
1. Member states shall not apply any quantitative restrictions on exports to any other Member State, 
except where otherwise provided for in this Protocol. 
 
2. Member states may take such measures as are necessary to prevent erosion of any prohibitions or 
restrictions which apply to exports outside the Community, provided that no less favourable 
treatment is granted to Member states than to third countries. 
571 Article 7(1). 
572 Article 9 provides: 
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Member states, or a disguised restriction on intra-SADC 
trade, nothing in Article 7 and 8 of this Protocol shall be construed as to prevent the adoption or enforcement 
of any measures by a Member State: 
 
a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order; 
b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
c) necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations which are consistent with the 
provisions of the WTO; 
d) necessary to protect intellectual property rights, or to prevent deceptive trade practices; 
e) relating to transfer of gold, silver, precious and semi-precious stones, including precious 
and strategic metals; 
f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological 
value; 
g) necessary to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs in any exporting Member 
State; 
h) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources and the environment; or 
i) necessary to ensure compliance with existing obligations under international agreements; 
j) necessary to prohibit or control the importation or exportation of second-hand goods into 
or from its territory under this Protocol.” 
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Grimett argues that, although the general exceptions clause contains a proviso 
which aims to prevent protectionism between contracting Members States, the fact 
that it provides for the application of these quantitative restrictions between 
member states, could be interpreted as an infringement of Article XXIV(8)(b).573 
Gathii,574 however, argues that Grimett’s claim is unfounded as it is based on 
textual comparisons as, firstly, no conduct pursuant to the Protocol that is in 
violation of any GATT provision is available. Secondly, the Enabling Clause 
provides independent justification for least developed countries’ RTAs outside of 
Article XXIV.  
 
The SADC Protocol on Trade has also been crafted in such a way as to comply with 
the WTO requirement that intra-regional trade should cover “substantially all 
trade”. The Protocol covers trade in goods575, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures576, trade in services577, intellectual property rights578, competition 
policy579, trade with third countries580, etc. 
 
One area that could cause some concern is the one provided for by Article 4(5) of 
the Trade Protocol. This paragraph is an exception to the provision of Article 4(4) 
that prohibits raising of import duties beyond those which existed when the Trade 
Protocol came into force.581 This in effect means that member states can impose 
across-the-board internal charges. This would, in turn, be in contrast with the aim 
                                                 
573 Grimett, L.A. “Protectionism and Compliance with the GATT Article XXIV in selected regional trade 
arrangements” (Dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the Degree of Master of Laws, 
January 1999) at 221.  
574  Gathii, J.T. African Regional Trade Agreements as Legal Regimes (2011) at 215.  
575 Articles 3 – 15. 
576 Article 16. 
577 Article 23. 
578 Article 24. 
579 Article 25. 
580 Articles 27 – 30. 
581 Article 4(4) provides: 
“ . . . Member states shall not raise import duties beyond those in existence at the time of entry into force of 
this Protocol.”  
Article 4(5) states: “Nothing in paragraph 4 of this Article shall be construed as preventing the imposition 
across-the-board internal charges.” 
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of a free-trade area, which is to liberalise trade within the common area. Levying 
of internal charges violates ex facie Article XXIV(8)(b).582 
 
The above discussion therefore shows that the SADC complies with the GATT Article 
XXIV and is as such compliant with the WTO requirements for regional integration 
schemes. 
 
4.2 AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
 
Having dealt with the various integration schemes that exist in the Southern Africa region 
(in Chapter 3), it is important to touch on the African Economic Community (AEC) since 
it is the over-arching body that will have to integrate the efforts of integration at regional 
and sub-regional levels in Africa.583 The focus, however, will be on how it relates to the 
SADC.  
 
The AEC is actually a cooperation and integration plan of the erstwhile Organisation for 
African Unity (OAU).  In 1963 the African leaders, when establishing the OAU, stated 
their commitment, individually and collectively, to promote the economic integration of 
Africa, in order to facilitate and reinforce social and economic intercourse. They also 
committed themselves to promote the economic and social development and integration of 
their economies and, to that end, to establish national, regional and sub-regional institutions 
leading to a dynamic and interdependent African economy, thus paving the way for the 
                                                 
582 Grimett (fn 573) at 223. 
583 The African Economic Community Treaty (more popularly known as the Abuja Treaty) was concluded 
in Abuja, Nigeria in June 1991 and came into force in May 1994. It provides for the African Economic 
Community to be set up through a gradual process, which would be achieved by coordination, 
harmonisation and progressive integration of the activities of existing and future regional economic 
communities (RECs) in Africa. 
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eventual establishment of the African Economic Community. In this way they were making 
a break with the market approach to integration.584 
 
These commitments were translated into concrete form, in Abuja, Nigeria, in June 1991 
when the OAU Heads of State and Government signed the Treaty establishing the African 
Economic Community. The AEC Treaty has been in operation since May 1994 when the 
required number of instruments of ratification for its coming into force was deposited with 
the Secretary General of the OAU/AEC.585 
 
The main objective of the AEC is to foster the economic, social and cultural integration of 
the African Continent.586 This was after the realisation that “no African state is 
economically large enough to construct a modern economy alone. Africa as a whole has 
the resources for industrialisation, but it is split among more than fifty African territories. 
The only way to achieve the economic reconstruction and development essential to fulfil 
the aspirations, needs and demands of the peoples of Africa is through a sustained shift to 
continental planning, so as to unite increasingly the resources, markets and capital of Africa 
in a single substantial economic unit.”587 
 
The above means that the AEC will lead to the unification of the economies of Africa, 
which will in turn permit economies of scale. However, the nature of integration remains 
contested. While some have advocated regionalism, others have emphasised the need for 
                                                 
584 Gibb, R. “Regional Integration and Africa's Development Trajectory: meta-theories, expectations and 
reality” Third World Quarterly vol.30 no.4 (2009) 701 at 708; Fakir, E et al. “Modernity, Globalisation, 
and Complexity: The Legacy and Future of the New Partnership for Africa’s development (NEPAD)” in 
Ingiriis, M.H. The Africana World: From Fragmentation to Unity and Renaissance (2012) at 145; “The 
African Economic Community” at http://www.panafricanperspective.com/aec.htm  (accessed on 19 
November 2015); “African Economic Community” by Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation at www.dirco.gov.za (accessed on 19 November 2015).  
585 “The African Economic Community” at http://www.panafricanperspective.com/aec.htm  (accessed on 
19 November 2015); Gekonge, C.O.  Emerging Business Opportunities in Africa: Market Entry, 
Competitive Strategy and the Promotion of Foreign Direct Investments (2013) at 93.  
586 Preamble of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty), 1991. 
587 Green, R et al. Unity or Poverty: The Economics of Pan Africanism (1968) at 22. 
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continent-wide integration. This led to the adoption of a compromise to use the RECs as 
building blocks for this envisaged continent-wide community.588 
 
4.2.1 AEC and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 
 
The AEC has established direct working relations with the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) in the West African region; the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS), the Common Market for East and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the East 
African Community in the Eastern region; the Economic Community of Sahel-Saharan 
States (CEN-SAD) in the Northern region and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and the COMESA in the Southern region.589  
 
However, despite this relationship between the AEC and the RECs, it should be borne in 
mind that, as non-partisan to the AEC Treaty, the RECs are in principle not bound by its 
provisions. In order to formalise their relationship, these parties signed the Protocol on 
Relations between the AEC and the RECs,590 which entered into force on 25 February 1998.  
 
                                                 
588 Oppong, R.F. “Observing the legal systems of the Community: The relationship between Community 
and national legal systems under African Economic Community” Tulane Journal of International and 
Comparative Law vol. 15 (2006 – 2007) 41 at 45; Danso, K. “African Economic Community: Problems 
and Prospects” Africa Today vol. 42 no. 4 (4th Quarter, 1995) 31 at 37. 
589 Oppong (above); Saurombe, A. “An analysis of economic integration in Africa with specific reference to 
the African Union and the African Economic Community” Southern African Public Law vol. 27 issue 1 
(2012) 292 at 297. 
590 Article 5 provided the Specific Undertakings as follows: 
 
“1. The Regional Economic Communities shall take steps to review their treaties to provide an umbilical 
link to the Community and in particular provide:  
a) in the treaties as their final objective, the establishment of the Community;  
b) legal links to this Protocol, the Treaty and the treaties of the Regional Economic Communities; and  
c) for the eventual absorption, at stage 5 set-out in paragraph 2 (f) of Article 6 of the Treaty, of the 
Regional Economic Communities into the African Common Market as a prelude to the Community.  
 
2. The Community undertakes to discharge fully, and as the first priority, its responsibility of strengthening 
the existing Regional Economic Communities and establishing new ones where none exist, within the time 
framework set-out in Article 6 of the Treaty as well as of coordinating and harmonizing the activities of the 
regional economic communities.” 
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The Protocol on Relations between the AEC and the RECs was adopted upon signature by 
the COMESA, SADC, IGAD and ECOWAS. The ECCAS signed the Protocol in October 
1999 and the UMA had yet to sign, though it had been designated, together with the other 
RECs, a pillar of the AEC.591 The Protocol would serve as an effective instrument and 
framework for close cooperation, programme harmonisation and coordination as well as 
integration among the RECs on the one hand, and between the AEC and RECs on the 
other.592 
 
Following the establishment of the AU in 2002, the AEC became an integral part of its 
constitutional structure and this necessitated for the Protocol on Relations between the AEC 
and the RECs being replaced with the Protocol on Relations between the African Union 
(AU) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), which came into force in July 
2007.593 This new Protocol designates eight RECs,594 across the five regions of Africa, as 
the pillars or building blocks of the AEC. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA), in the 
Northern region, has no relations with the AEC and has not yet signed this new Protocol 
either. This is so despite it being originally designated a pillar of the AEC and still being 
recognised by the AU as one of its eight RECs.595 
 
                                                 
591 Dundas, C.W. The Lag of 21st Century Democratic Elections: In the African Union Member states 
(2011) at 212.    
592 The Preamble of the Protocol states, inter alia, that parties are “CONVINCED of the need to establish an 
institutional framework that shall govern relations between the African Economic Community and the 
regional economic communities, the harmonization and coordination of policies, measures, programmes 
and activities of the latter, implementation of the provisions of paragraph 2 (a) through (d) of Article 6 of 
the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community and cooperation among the regional economic 
communities.”; Udombana, N.J. “A harmony or a cacophony?: the music of integration in the African 
Union Treaty and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development” Indianapolis International and 
Comparative Law review vol. 13 (2002 – 2003) 185 at 197; Marinov, E. “The History of African 
Integration: A Gradual Shift from Political to Economic Goals” Journal of Global Economics vol. 3 issue 1 
(2015) 74 at 82. 
593 Article 34 of the Protocol on Relations between the African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) provides: “The operation of the Protocol on Relations between the African Economic 
Community and the RECs, which entered into force on 25 February 1998 shall terminate upon entry into 
force of this Protocol.” 
594 These are: AMU, CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC, as per the AU 
Decision AU/Dec.112 (VII) of 2 July 2006; Ebobrah, S et al. Compendium of African sub-regional human 
rights documents (2010) at vi.  
595 Institute for Security Studies. “Profile: Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)” available at 
www.issafrica.org/profile-arab-maghreb-union-amu (accessed on 20 November 2015).  
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The major characteristic of the AEC is the modalities that it has set up for establishing the 
AEC. They consist of six stages of variable duration over a transition period not exceeding 
thirty-four years, from the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Each of the stages consists 
of specific activities to be implemented concurrently.596 These are basically the linear 
stages of integration (free trade area, customs union, common market and economic 
community) and are activities to be performed by the regional economic communities 
(RECs), thus making the AEC different from other integration organisations.597 In fact the 
Abuja Treaty, as the AEC Treaty is sometimes called, makes it clear that the establishment 
of the AEC is the final objective towards which the activities of all the RECs (existing and 
future) shall be geared.598  
 
Article 6(4) of the Treaty provides that the transition from one stage to another shall be 
determined when the specific objectives set in the Treaty or pronounced by the Assembly 
for a particular stage, are implemented and all commitments fulfilled. The Assembly599 is 
then tasked, on the recommendation of the Council,600 to confirm the attainment of the 
objectives to a particular stage and then approve the transition to the next stage. 
However, this deadline of thirty-four years is not rigid as it can be extended, but such an 
extension cannot exceed forty years.601  
                                                 
596 Article 6(1) and (2) of AEC Treaty. 
597 Article 6 of the AEC Treaty provides: 
“1. The Community shall be established gradually in six (6) stages of variable duration over a transitional 
period not exceeding thirty-four (34) years.  
2. At each such stage, specific activities shall be assigned and implemented concurrently . . .” 
598 Article 88 provides: 
“1. The Community shall be established mainly through the co-ordination, harmonisation and progressive 
integration of the activities of regional economic communities. 
2. Member states undertake to promote the co-ordination and harmonisation of the integration activities of 
regional economic communities of which they are members with the activities of the Community, it being 
understood that the establishment of the latter is the final objective towards which the activities of existing 
and future regional economic communities shall be geared. 
3. To this end, the Community shall be entrusted with the co-ordination, harmonisation and evaluation of 
the activities of existing and future regional economic communities. 
4. Member states undertake, through their respective regional economic communities, to coordinate and 
harmonize the activities of their sub-regional organisations, with a view to rationalising the integration 
process at the level of each region.” 
599 This means the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union. 
600 This means the Council of Ministers of the AU (i.e. Ministers responsible for foreign affairs or 
international relations). 
601 Article 6(5) of the AEC Treaty. 
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(a) First Stage (five years)  
 
This stage is about strengthening of existing RECs and establishing new ones in the 
regions where they do not exist. The five years are calculated from the date of entry 
into force, which means this was to be completed in May 1999.602 As such it is in 
principle complete, with only the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA) members and 
Saharawi Republic/Western Sahara not participating.603 The UMA is currently 
dormant due to deep political and economic disagreements between Morocco and 
Algeria regarding, among others, the issue of occupation of Western Sahara by 
Morocco.604 
 
By recognising only eight RECs, this means that the AU, through its decision of 
the 2006 7th Summit605 and the Protocol on Relations between the AU and the 
RECs, considers this stage as completed.   
 
(b) Second Stage (eight years)  
 
This stage is all about strengthening of intra-REC integrations and inter-REC 
harmonisation including the following: 
 
(i) at the level of each REC, establishing tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
customs duties and internal taxes at the May 1994 level, and determination 
of the time table for the gradual liberalisation of regional and intra-
                                                 
602 Article 6(1)(a) of the AEC Treaty. 
603 Zank, W. “A Region of Crises: North Africa under the Influence of Arab, African and European 
Integration Processes” in Fiaramonti, L. Regions and Crises: New Challenges for Contemporary 
Regionalisms (2012) at 87; Willis, J. Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco 
from Independence to the Arab spring (2014) at 265.  
604 Morocco withdrew from the AU’s predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1984 after 
the OAU recognised the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, which Morocco invaded and occupied in 
1976. The AU recognised the existence of Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic when it came into being in 
2004 and it has been its member state since then.  
605 During this Summit the AU adopted the “Moratorium on the establishment and recognition of more 
RECs”. 
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community trade, and for the harmonisation of customs duties vis-à-vis 
third states;  
 
(ii) strengthening of sectoral integration, particularly in the fields of trade, 
agriculture, money and finance, transport and communications, industry and 
energy; and  
 
(iii) coordination and harmonisation of the activities of RECs.606 
 
In terms of the timelines, this stage was to be completed in 2007, that is eight years 
from 1999, and as such should in principle also be complete. The SADC has signed 
various protocols that promote integration in various fields,607 with the Trade 
Protocol that entered into force in 2000 and establishing the FTA being the most 
significant. In terms of the SADC Trade Protocol, member states have committed 
themselves to the elimination of all tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade. 
 
The ECCAS has launched its free trade area in 2004 and the Protocol on Non-Tariff 
Trade Barriers is an appendix to the ECCAS Treaty. ECOWAS has put in place 
National Committees to deal with problems of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and 
complaint desks at the borders.608 The EAC is the most advanced community which 
launched its common market in 2010 and the member states have implemented the 
following tariff structure:  
 0% on raw materials;  
 10% on intermediate goods; and  
 25% on finished products.609 
 
                                                 
606 Article 6(2)(b) of the AEC Treaty.  
607 Other SADC protocols include Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology that entered 
into force on 6 July 1998; Protocol on Energy that entered into force on 17 April 1998; Finance and 
Investment Protocol that came into operation on 16 April 2006; etc.   
608 “Status of Integration in Africa (SIA IV) – 2013” – African Union Commission Report at 9.  
609 SIA IV at 28.  
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The UMA member states adopted a Trade and Tariff Convention on 10 March 1991 
in Ras Lanouf, Libya. This Convention provides for:  
 the establishment of free trade area in conformity with WTO provisions;  
 the free trade will be implemented after a transition period that may last 
twelve years from the date of entry into force of the Agreement;  
 tariffs will be phased out during the transition period.  
 
Unfortunately, this agreement in the UMA was not implemented like many others 
because of the political problems between the community member states.610 
 
With regard to the third element (coordination and harmonisation of the activities 
of the RECs) a Protocol on Relations between the AEC and the RECs was 
concluded and signed in February 1998. This Protocol served as an efficient 
instrument and framework for close cooperation, programme harmonisation and 
coordination, as well as integration among the RECs on the one hand (horizontal) 
and between the AEC and the RECs on the other (vertical).611 It was replaced by 
the Protocol on Relations between the African Union (AU) and the Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs), which came into force in July 2007. Through this 
Protocol the parties (RECs) undertake to coordinate their policies and programmes 
with those of the AU.612 
 
To enhance cooperation among the RECs, the Protocol makes provisions for 
mandating or advocating entering into cooperation arrangements613 and 
participation in each other’s meetings.614 The Protocol also establishes the 
Committee on Coordination and the Committee of Secretariat Officials as the 
                                                 
610 SIA IV at 30. 
611 Oppong, R.F. “The African Union, African Economic Community and Africa’s Regional Economic 
Communities: Untangling a Complex Web” African Journal of International and Comparative Law vol. 18 
issue 1 (2010) 92 at 94. 
612 Article 4(a) of Protocol on Relations between the African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs). 
613 Article 15(1). 
614 Article 16(1). 
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institutions responsible for ensuring the coordination of policies and activities of 
the RECs and the implementation of the Protocol.615  
 
Inter-REC activities entail collaboration by the RECs with one another. It is in line 
with this notion that the EAC, COMESA and SADC held a Tripartite Summit in 
October 2008, during which it was institutionalised to steer the process of 
integrating the three RECs, starting by establishing a free trade area. The Tripartite 
Free Trade Area was eventually established on 10 June 2015.616 
 
Member states of the Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA), the COMESA-EAC-
SADC FTA, are in addition to their individual commitments, implementing a 
comprehensive programme for the elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in 
order to minimise their impacts on intra-regional trade.617 The COMESA-EAC-
SADC Programme on Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) was agreed to by 
the COMESA-SADC-EAC Committee of Ministers of Trade (CMT) at their 
meeting of February 2011 and came into operation when the Declaration on 
COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area was signed by the Assembly on 
12 June 2011.618 
 
In the North and the West Africa regions, there has not been much collaboration 
between the two regions nor intra-regionally in the North Africa region. In West 
Africa, there has been a reported growing rapport between ECOWAS and UEMOA, 
which yielded the sub-region’s Common External Tariff (CET) that became 
effective on 1 January 2015.619 
 
                                                 
615 Articles 6 – 10; Oppong, R.F. “Redefining the relations between the African Union and regional 
economic communities in Africa” in Bösl, A et al. Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa 
Yearbook (2009) at 8. 
616 Communiqué of the Third COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit, adopted on 10 June 2015 at Sharm 
El Sheikh, Egypt. 
617 Ibid. 
618 Declaration Launching the Negotiations for the Establishment of the Tripartite Free Trade Area, 12 June 
2011. 
619 “ECOWAS, UEMOA and the World Bank Group Conclude 2nd Tripartite Meeting,” 11 February 2015, 
available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/02/11/  (accessed on 22 January 2016).  
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It could thus be said that, though its timeframe of eight years has lapsed, this stage 
is not fully completed because progress by regional blocs and the countries within 
them has been uneven. The question that must then be asked is whether transition 
into the stage three of the AEC can take. This question is necessary because Article 
6(4) of the AEC Treaty provides: 
 
“The transition from one stage to another shall be determined when the 
specific objectives set in this Treaty or pronounced by the Assembly for a 
particular stage, are implemented and all commitments fulfilled. The 
Assembly, on the recommendation of the Council, shall confirm that the 
objectives to a particular stage have been attained and shall approve the 
transition to the next stage.” (Emphasis added).  
 
Although there has never been a decision to this effect, the third stage is being 
proceeded with. This augurs with the sentiments by Davies,620 who maintains that 
some of the stages will be skipped.  
 
(c) Third Stage (ten years)  
 
This is the stage where the AEC implementation is at currently. It is about the 
establishment of a free trade area (FTA) and a customs union at the level of each 
REC. This means each REC must have adopted a common external tariff (CET) 
vis-à-vis third parries by the end of the stage. This goal is to be completed in 
2017.621  
 
The SADC FTA entered into force in January 2008 whilst the COMESA launched 
its FTA on 31 October 2000. The COMESA Customs Union was launched in June 
2010 whilst the SADC missed its 2010 deadline of establishing a customs union. 
                                                 
620 Davies, R (Minister of Trade and Industry: South Africa).   University of Western Cape Lecture, 7 April 
2011. 
621 Article 6(2)(c); Mbenge, M et al. “The African Economic Community” in Yusuf, A.A et al. The African 
Union: Legal and Institutional Framework: A Manual on the Pan-African Organization (2012) at 197.  
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This was despite its report that the process of establishing the SADC customs union 
was at an advanced stage.622 The SADC now seems to have abandoned this target 
in favour of the Tripartite Free Trade Area with the COMESA and the East African 
Community (EAC), which was established in June 2015. However, it should not be 
forgotten that the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) already exist 
consisting of five member states of the SADC – Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, 
South Africa and Swaziland.   
 
As stated above the ECCAS launched its free trade area in 2004 and common 
market in 2010. The ECOWAS free trade area, called the ECOWAS Trade 
Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS), was launched in 1990 and led to the proclamation 
of the sub-region as a free trade area (FTA) in 2000. 1 January 2001 was set as a 
date for transformation of this FTA into a customs union, but this is still to 
materialise.623 
 
The UMA’s objectives of establishing a free trade area by 1992 and common 
market by 2000 is still to be realised. However, it should be noted that the League 
of Arab States – which includes Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia – established 
the Greater Arab Free Trade Area in 1998.624 
 
However, it seems like not every member state is convinced that this is the way to 
go. Davies argues   that   a   trajectory   that imitates the   EU   integration   is 
unrealistic,  that 
is   the   formal   deepening   of   economic   integration,   following   orthodox 
economic   theory of   the   1950s.625     Thus in 2009 the   AU adopted 
                                                 
622 The Ministerial Task Force reported to the SADC Council of Ministers at the February/March 2012 
Meeting in Luanda, Angola, outlining the strategic direction towards the SADC Customs Union, 
identifying, in particular the Parameters of the Future Customs Union, Benchmarks or Milestones and 
elements for a Model SADC Customs Union. 
623 Ukaoha, K et al. “The ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme: Genesis, Conditions and Appraisal” 
ECOWAS Vanguard vol. 2 issue 3 (January 2013) at 2.  
624 Hufbauer, G.G et al. Maghreb Regional and Global Integration: A Dream to be Fulfilled (2008) at 50; 
“Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA)” at www.mit.gov.jo (accessed on 20 November 2015). 
625 Davies, R.   University of Western Cape Lecture, 7 April 2011. 
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the   Minimum   Integration   Programme (MIP),626 which   saw   the   first   major  
revision   of   the   Abuja Treaty by permitting the RECs to progress at different 
pace in the process of integration. To this end, the RECs will continue to implement 
their respective programmes (considered as priority programmes) and at the same 
time attempt to carry out the activities contained in the MIP, the contents of which 
were identified by the RECs themselves in close collaboration with the African 
Union Commission (AUC).627 
 
Since the adoption of the MIP the current approach seems to be to 
broaden   economic integration by creating and merging free trade areas 
before deepening each into customs unions and then common markets. This is in 
line with the Sirte Declaration,628 which undertook to speed up the process of 
rationalisation and shorten the period set forth in Article 6 of the AEC Treaty. 
 
This approach was followed during the African Union (AU) Summit held in 
January 2011, where a decision was taken to endorse the recommendation of the 6th 
Ordinary Session of the AU Conference of Ministers of Trade, held in Kigali, 
Rwanda, from 29 October to 2 November 2010, to fast-track the establishment of a 
Pan-African/Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). It was emphasised that 2017 
was an indicative date for the CFTA and Africa’s political leaders agreed to 
undertake further reflections on the establishment of the CFTA. The CFTA, if 
achieved, would be a major milestone and a stepping stone towards achieving the 
Continental Customs Union by 2019.629 
                                                 
626 This is thee consensual framework between member states, RECs and African Union Commission 
(AUC), which serves as a connecting link or common denominator for African continental integration 
players. It aims to fast-track the integration in two phases: phase 1, from 2009 to 2012, is the development 
basis and phase two, from 2013 – 2016, is the implementation of various activities including the adoption 
of a continental common external tariff.   
627 African Union Minimum Integration Programme (MIP) 2009, at 7 and 22. 
628 Declaration of the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 8 – 
9 September 1999 Sirte, Libya (EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev.1). 
629 Report of the Meeting of the Committee of Experts of the 5th Joint Annual Meetings of the AU 
Conference of Ministers of Economy and Finance and ECA Conference of African Ministers of Finance, 
Planning and Economic Development, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 22–25 March 2012 – titled “Overview of 
Developments in Regional Integration in Africa”; Gottschalk, K. “The African Union and its sub-regional 
Structures” Journal of African Union Studies vol.  1 issue 1 (2012) at 16 – 17.  
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The   MIP   commends   this   as   a   model,   urging   that   ECOWAS,   ECCAS, 
CEN-SAD   and   AMU   should   follow this example and form their own 
grouping.630  Davies   anticipates 
that   a   continental   free  trade   area   will   precede  further  attempts  to 
broaden  existing  customs  unions,  or  forming  common  markets.631  
 
The decision to establish a Continental Free Trade Area by 2017 was re-affirmed 
at the African Union (AU) Summit of Heads of State and Government in January 
2012, which focused on the theme of “Boosting Intra-Africa Trade”. However, this 
was taken with the option to review the target date according to progress made. 
This was obviously in recognition of the challenges that member states still have 
regarding achievement of this target.632  
 
What is more striking, though, is the determination to continue even though the 
requirements of the stage are not fully met, just as it happened with the second 
stage. The question that would necessarily follow is: is the AU violating its own 
law or self-contradicting? 
 
Hartzenberg states that the January 2012 Summit also agreed that the COMESA-
EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) and the ECOWAS FTA would 
serve as the building blocks of the CFTA.633 Though this is not clear from the 
documents of the Summit (Decision and Declaration),634 it must be stated that if 
this were the case this would de facto change the terms of the Protocol on Relations 
                                                 
630 MIP (fn 627) at 30, paragraphs 86 and 99. 
631 Davies (fn 625). 
632 18th African Union Summit of the Heads of States and Government “Decision on Boosting Intra-African 
Trade and Fast Tracking the Continental Free Trade Area” (Assembly/AU/Dec.394(XVIII)); “Declaration on 
Boosting Intra-African Trade and the Establishment of a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA)” 
(Assembly/AU/Decl.1(XVIII)). 
633  Hartzenberg, T. “The Tripartite Free Trade Area: from the 2008 Kampala vision to . . .” in Hartzenberg, 
T et al. Cape to Cairo: Exploring the Tripartite FTA Agenda (2013) at 3.  
634 Decision Document “Assembly/AU/Dec 394(XVIII)” and Declaration Document 
“Assembly/AU/Decl.1(XVIII)”.  
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between the African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities, which 
designates eight RECs as the building blocks.  
 
The Summit also adopted the roadmap for integration, which for this stage, includes 
“consolidation of the regional FTA processes into the CFTA by 2015-2016.” Once 
this consolidation is done then the CFTA would be established in the following year 
(2017).635 
 
(d) Fourth Stage (two years)  
 
This stage is about the coordination and harmonisation of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers among various RECs with a view to establishing a continental customs 
union. This goal is to be completed in 2019.  
 
This will be a very interesting stage and it will have to be seen how the AEC 
navigates it. This is in light of the fact of the multiple memberships of the RECs 
and the fact that technically a state cannot maintain membership of two customs 
unions – i.e. apply two different external tariffs. This essentially means that 
countries would have to belong to one REC so that they can have a common 
external tariff.  Moreover, each African country is allowed to exclude a certain 
number of products by the World Customs Organisation (WCO).636 
 
Another challenge is the fact that RECs like the SADC still do not have a customs 
union. It is still has to be seen how the AU will convince the SADC to establish its 
                                                 
635 Soininen, I. “The Continental Free Trade Area: What’s going on?” Bridges Africa vol. 3, issue 9 
(November 2014) 4 at 5; 18th African Union Summit of the Heads of States and Government “Decision on 
Boosting Intra-African Trade and Fast Tracking the Continental Free Trade Area” 
(Assembly/AU/Dec.394(XVIII).  
636 WCO allows for 2% to 5% of tariff lines defined at the Harmonized System 6-digit level (HS6) to be 
defined as sensitive products by each African country (2% corresponds to 102 product lines, while 5% is 
equal to 255 products lines). See http://www.wcoomd.org/home_wco_topics_hsoverviewboxes.htm 
(accessed on 31 November 2015); Mevel, S et al.  “Deepening Regional Integration in Africa: A 
Computable General Equilibrium Assessment of the Establishment of a Continental Free Trade Area 
followed by a Continental Customs Union”, Paper presented at the 7th African Economic Conference 
Kigali, Rwanda, 30 October - 2 November, 2012 at 22. 
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customs union so that it complies with the other leg or element of the third stage, 
that is establishing a customs union at the level of each REC.  
 
The Minimum   Integration   Programme (MIP), on the other hand, has established 
the guidelines in the medium and long term for the RECs in order to achieve the 
continental integration. In terms of this the RECs have agreed on issues such as, 
inter alia, the adoption of a continental common external tariff by 2016.637  
 
Mbenge638 is of the view that, in practice, the achievement of this stage is unrealistic 
and the AU leaders seem to have been too optimistic. He continues that 
coordination and harmonisation of different laws, which are based on different legal 
systems, are definitely difficult tasks. By the end of 2016 the envisaged adoption 
of a continental external tariff had not materialised.  
 
However, there is no doubt that if a continental customs union (CCU) is established, 
the reduction of average tariffs imposed by African countries on their imports of 
intermediate goods from the rest of the world would make imports of inputs, to be 
used in the production process of African economies, cheaper. Thus, production 
costs would be lowered leading to an increase in production. African economies 
would become more competitive on the world market and would be able to exploit 
new market opportunities outside the continent.639  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
637 African Union Millennium Integration Programme (MIP), at 56.  
638 Mbenge, M et al. “The African Economic Community” in Yusuf, AA et al. The African Union: Legal 
and Institutional Framework: A Manual on the Pan-African Organization (2012) at 198.  
639 Mevel, S et al.  “Deepening Regional Integration in Africa: A Computable General Equilibrium 
Assessment of the Establishment of a Continental Free Trade Area followed by a Continental Customs 
Union”, Paper presented at the 7th African Economic Conference Kigali, Rwanda, 30 October - 2 
November, 2012 at 25 – 26.  
183 
 
(e) Fifth Stage (four years)  
 
This stage concerns the establishment of an African Common Market (ACM) and 
is to be completed in 2023. In this regard four major activities would be carried out 
during this stage: 
(i) the adoption of a common policy in several areas such as agriculture, 
transport and communications, industry, energy and scientific 
research;  
(ii) the harmonisation of monetary, financial and fiscal policies;  
(iii) the application of the principle of free movement of persons as well 
as the provisions herein regarding the rights of residence and 
establishment; and  
(iv) constituting the proper resources of the Community as provided for 
in Paragraph 2 of Article 82 of the Treaty.640 
 
(f) Sixth Stage (five years)  
 
This is the final stage of the continental integration process and is about the 
consolidation and strengthening of the structures of the ACM, including the free 
movement of peoples of Africa and factors of production; creation of a single 
domestic market and Pan-African Economic and Monetary Union, African Central 
Bank and single African Currency, and establishment of a Pan-African 
Parliament.641 This stage is to be completed in 2028. 
 
It is interesting to note that the AEC does not expect or wish the RECs to achieve the full 
lengths of integration, as per market or linear integration, in their regions before the 
absorption into the African Economic Community. This is so because after the RECs 
                                                 
640 Article 6(2)(e).  
641 The Pan-African Parliament came into being in 2004 after ratification of the Protocol to the Treaty 
Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament. This was after the 
AU Heads of State and Government Summit in Maputo in July 2003 resolves to bring forward its date of 
establishment.  
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establish customs unions, as per stage three, then the preparations continue for the African 
Customs Union, as per stage four, and not the common market in the RECs, as it would 
normally be the case in a linear or market approach of integration.  
 
This might pose a challenge for many of the RECs which aim to reach the next stages of 
common markets and economic unions. It is worth noting that the Protocol on the Relations 
between the AU and the RECs does not deal with this situation, which has the potential to 
derail this integration process as envisaged through the AEC. 
 
Also, five of the eight recognised RECs were established before the AEC Treaty was 
concluded and provided for integration processes that end with either a common market or 
an economic community.642 So many of these RECs might not easily abandon their 
integration agenda in favour of the AEC integration. 
 
However, the six stages are not inflexible; the process can be expedited or extended with 
regular verification of completion of the stages.643 In other words, a particular stage may 
be extended beyond the period specified by Article 6(2), provided that the entire six 
transitional periods do not exceed a period of forty years.644 One therefore wishes, or rather 
expects, the AU to see this defect and allow the RECs to reach their full integration before 
being absorbed into the AEC. This will be easier to manage as compared to the currently 
                                                 
642 AMU Treaty came into operation in February 1989; ECCAS Treaty in January 1985; ECOWAS Treaty 
in May 1975; IGAD Treaty in January 1986 and SADC Treaty in August 1992. Only the CEN-SAD 
(1998), COMESA (1994) and EAC (2001) were established after the AEC Treaty came into operation. 
643 Article 6 provides, inter alia: 
“(3). All measures envisaged under this Treaty for the promotion of a harmonious and balanced 
development among Member states, particularly, those relating to the formulation of multi-national projects 
and programmes, shall be implemented concurrently within the time period specified for the attainment of 
the objectives of the various stages outlined in paragraph 2 of this Article.  
 
(4). The transition from one stage to another shall be determined when the specific objectives set in this 
Treaty or pronounced by the Assembly for a particular stage, are implemented and all commitments 
fulfilled. The Assembly, on the recommendation of the Council, shall confirm that the objectives to a 
particular stage have been attained and shall approve the transition to the next stage.  
 
(5). Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the cumulative transitional period shall not 
exceed forty (40) years from the date of entry into force of this Treaty.” 
644 Saurombe, A. “An analysis of economic integration in Africa with specific reference to the African 
Union and the African Economic Community” South African Public Law vol. 27 (2012) 292 at 300. 
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proposed route. This will of course necessitate a new agreement, either in the form of a 
revision of the Protocol on Relations between the AU and the RECs or the stages of the 
AEC or both.  
   
To achieve the integration, one of the strategies suggested by the AEC Treaty is a 
rationalisation by absorption, with the reduction of the fourteen, or eight in terms of the 
AU, recognised African RECs to only five. This means that the eight recognised RECs will 
change, in both form and name. The five RECs that have been proposed are as follows: 
 
1. The North Africa Economic Community (NAEC), which would include Algeria, 
Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. The secretariats of the Arab 
Maghreb Union and the Regional Group of Sahel and Saharan States would unite 
to form a new secretariat to serve this community. 
 
2. The West Africa Economic Community (WAEC) which would include Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The 
secretariats of the ECOWAS, Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africain 
(UEMOA), and the Mano River Union would unite to form a new secretariat to 
serve this community. 
 
3. The East Africa Economic Community (EAEC) which would include Burundi, 
Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. The secretariats of 
the COMESA, the EAC, and the Inter- Governmental Authority for Development 
(IGAD) would unite to form a new secretariat to serve this community. 
 
4. The Central African Economic Community (CAEC) which would include 
Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and 
Principe. The secretariats of the ECCAS, Communauté Economique et Monétaire 
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de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) and Communauté Economique des Pays de 
Grands Lacs (CEPGL) would unite to form a new secretariat to serve this 
community. 
 
5. The Southern Africa Economic Community (SAEC) would include Botswana, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
The secretariats of the SADC, the SACU and the Indian Ocean Commission would 
unite to form a new secretariat to serve this community.645 
 
According to the AEC Treaty, geographical proximity, economic interdependence, 
commonality of language and culture, history of co-operation, and shared resources should 
define the REC membership. However, despite the advantages offered by the merging 
solution (notably the reduction of the number of RECs, and the solution to the problems of 
multiple memberships and their consequences), many countries do not seem keen to adopt 
this scenario. This would be a challenge for the AEC because leaving other RECs could 
prove difficult for political, economic and historical reasons.646  
 
4.2.2 Relationship between the AEC and the African Union    
 
The AEC (Abuja) Treaty came into force in May 1994 and this meant that since 1994, the 
OAU was operating on the basis of two legal instruments – the OAU Charter and the Abuja 
Treaty. Since then it was clear that there was a need to integrate the political activities, as 
enshrined in the OAU Charter, with the economic and developmental issues laid out in the 
Abuja Treaty. The OAU and AEC had to interchange and brief each other on many issues 
affecting the continent. This resulted in an unnecessary waste of time and resources.647 As 
                                                 
645 Nene, M. “Political and Economic Drivers of Regional Integration in Africa: A Case Study of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo” South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) Occasional Paper 
No. 106, January 2012.  
646 Ibid. 
647 Kösler, A. “The EU as a Role Model for African Integration?” in Kösler, A et al. Global Voices on 
Regional Integration (2007) at 17; Danso, K. “The African Economic Community: problems and 
prospects” Africa Today vol. 42 issue. 4 (1995) 31 – 55; Ndulo, M. “Harmonisation of trade laws in the 
African Economic Community” International and Comparative Law Quarterly vol. 42 (1993) 101 – 118. 
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such it was inevitable that these two had to be merged, and the foundation for this merger 
was laid in September 1999 during the OAU Extraordinary Summit in Sirte, Libya.648  
 
The central theme of this OAU Extraordinary Summit was the commitment to accelerate 
the process envisaged by the AEC Treaty, in particular: shortening the implementation 
periods of the Treaty; and the speedy establishment of all the institutions provided for in 
the Abuja Treaty, such as the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Union, the 
African Court of Justice, and the Pan-African Parliament. This led to the adoption of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) by the OAU/AEC Summit of July 2000 in 
Lomé, Togo, which essentially merged the two. The AU was inaugurated in July 2002.   
 
In programmatic terms, the AU is premised on pursuing the objectives of the OAU Charter 
and Abuja Treaty.649 This becomes clear from the Preamble of the AU Constitutive Act, 
which states that the Union is also premised on the accelerated implementation of the Abuja 
Treaty in order to promote the socio-economic development of Africa, and to face more 
effectively the challenges posed by globalisation. 
 
In terms of its legal status, Article 98(1) of the AEC Treaty states that it, together with its 
envisaged protocols, forms an integral part of the OAU Charter. Article 99 goes on to 
declare that the Treaty and protocols adopted under it shall form an integral part of the 
OAU Charter. However, what is meant by “integral part” is not defined. The immediate 
effect of these provisions was that the institutions or organs of the OAU were co-opted to 
perform the functions of the institutions established by the AEC Treaty without careful 
consideration as to whether, as then structured, the OAU institutions suited the needs of 
economic integration.650 
                                                 
648 The purpose of the Extraordinary Summit was to amend the OAU Charter to increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the OAU. This Summit concluded with the Sirte Declaration and decided to establish the 
African Union to replace the OAU. 
649 Kösler (fn 647); “The Role of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as the Building Blocks of 
the African Union” at http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2003/au0815.htm (accessed on 8 December 2015).  
650 Oppong, R.F. “The African Union, African Economic Community and Africa’s Regional Economic 
Communities: Untangling a Complex Web” African Journal of International and Comparative Law vol. 18 
issue 1 (2010) 92 at 97 – 98; Mutai, H.K. Compliance with international trade obligations: The common 
market for eastern and southern Africa (2007) at 48. 
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Article 33(1) of the AU Constitutive Act, on the other hand, stipulates that the Act will 
replace the OAU Charter, while Article 33(2) stipulates that provisions of the Act will take 
precedence over and supersede any inconsistent or contrary provisions of the AEC Treaty. 
However, the relationship between the two bodies is not clearly defined in either of the two 
founding documents or anywhere else. Member states also have to ratify both the AU 
Constitutive Act and the AEC Treaty separately. As a result of this, the membership of the 
AU does not correspond with the membership of the AEC: of the fifty-five AU member 
states, forty-nine have ratified the AEC Treaty. In other words, the AU has fifty-five 
member states and the AEC forty-nine.651 
 
Even though the AU came into effect after the AEC, its organs are still not structured in a 
way that they are suited for the needs of economic integration. This means that the AU, 
just like the OAU, still operates on the basis of two legal instruments with regards to 
economic integration, though in a hierarchical or vertical form.652  
 
It is worth noting that the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which shall have 
jurisdiction over all cases and legal disputes that relate to “the interpretation and application 
of the Constitutive Act, Union treaties 
and all subsidiary legal instruments, the African Charter and any question of international 
law” is still to be established.653 The jurisdiction of this court is wide enough to cover 
integration issues as per the AEC Treaty.  
 
                                                 
651 Djibouti, Eritrea, Madagascar, Morocco, Somalia and South Sudan have not ratified the AEC Treaty; 
“Status of OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols and Charters (as of 30 November 2017)” available at 
https://au.int/en/treaties (accessed on 6 December 2017); Oppong R.F. Legal Aspects of Economic 
Integration in Africa (2011) at 22. 
652 Oppong (above) at 69; Asante, S.K.B et al. Towards an African Economic Community (2001) at 16. 
653 In June 2014, the Assembly adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Assembly/AU/Dec.529(XXIII)). The new Court 
will begin after 15 member states have ratified the 2008 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights. This Protocol merges the African Court of Justice is provided for by the AU 
Constitutive Act, the Court of Justice of the AEC as provided for in the AEC Treaty and African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, which is the currently operational court in terms of the 2003 Protocol on the 
African Court of Justice that entered into force in February 2009. See more at: 
http://au.int/en/organs/cj#sthash.DzX1Lk5e.dpuf (accessed on 4 December 2015); Jalloh, C. C et al. 
Shielding Humanity: Essays in International Law in Honour of Judge Abdul G Koroma (2015) at 558. 
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4.2.3 African Union and Regional Integration 
 
The final OAU Summit of 9 - 11 July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia reaffirmed the status of the 
RECs as building blocks of the African Union and the need for their close involvement in 
the formulation and implementation of all programmes of the Union.654 When the AU came 
into being in 2002, it had as one of its objectives “to coordinate and harmonise the policies 
between the existing and future RECs for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the 
Union.”655  
 
In November 2003 the AU Commission and the RECs agreed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
that the relationship between the African Union and the RECs needs a stable legal 
framework in order to foster cooperation between the two parties. Consequently, all efforts 
were to be exerted to prepare a new protocol on their relations using, among other elements, 
the Protocol between the AEC and the RECs.656 
 
The parties further agreed that to fulfil the vision and mission of both the African Union 
and the RECs, a mechanism for the harmonisation and coordination of their various 
programmes and actions couldn’t be avoided. This task has to be performed on a regular 
basis and in a proactive manner.657  
 
In March 2005 a project of a protocol on relations between the AU and the RECs was 
adopted by the legal experts and Permanent Representatives’ Committee (PRC) joint 
meeting, offering a good basis to rely on. The Protocol on Relations between the African 
Union and the Regional Economic Communities was then adopted at the July 2007 Accra 
Summit of the AU Assembly. This Protocol, as stated above, primarily set out the 
institutional and procedural framework for the AU’s cooperation with the RECs. One of its 
                                                 
654 “Decisions and Declarations of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government”, Thirty-seventh 
Ordinary Session/Fifth Ordinary Session of the AEC 9 – 11 July, 2001 Lusaka, Zambia (AHG/Dec.1 
(XXXVII)). 
655 Article 3(l) of the African Union Constitutive Act.  
656 This was in a “Brainstorming Session between AU Commission and Regional Economic Communities” 
of 21 –23 November 2003, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
657 Ibid. 
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objectives was to accelerate the integration process by shortening the periods as provided 
for by the AEC Treaty.658  
 
The UMA was the only recognised REC that did not sign this Protocol. Among the reasons 
was its dormancy, due to political differences among the members, chief of which is 
Morocco’s annexation of the Western Sahara, which has paralysed the North Africa 
Region.659  
 
Now the AU classifies Africa into five main regions, namely, North Africa, West Africa, 
Central Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa, but the configuration of none of the RECs 
tallies with the “regions” as defined by the AEC Treaty.660 Some RECs cut across these 
regions.661   
 
This regional cross-cutting led to the AU, in July 2006, at the close of its 7th Summit of the 
Assembly, saying that it would suspend recognition of new RECs on the continent, a move 
believed to be beneficial for enhancing the efficiency in the continent’s integration process 
and economic development.662 This decision was formalised with the adoption of a 
“Moratorium on the establishment and recognition of more RECs”. This led to eight RECs 
being recognised by the AU, which has, in turn, led to the growing calls that the number of 
RECs be reduced from eight to five, to correspond with the regions as defined by the AU 
Treaty.  
                                                 
658 Article 3(d) of the Protocol on Relations between the African Union and the Regional Economic 
Communities; Mossner, L.E. “The Multilayered System of Regional Economic Integration in West Africa” 
in Herrmann, C et al. European Yearbook of International Economic Law (2014) at 334.  
659 Ndomo at “Regional Economic Communities in Africa: A Progress overview”, A study commissioned 
by GTZ, Nairobi, May 2009 at 25; Yaya, B.H. “Inter-regionalism as a Mechanism for the Harmonization of 
Africa’s Regional Integration Projects”, Paper for the Council for the Development of Social Science 
Research, April 2015 at 7. 
660 Article 1(d) of the AEC Treaty provides:  
“Region” shall mean an OAU region as defined by Resolution CM/Res.464 QCXVI) of the OAU Council 
of Ministers concerning the Division of Africa into five (5) regions namely North Africa, West Africa, 
Central Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa. 
661 Ndomo (fn 659) at 8; Centre for Citizen’s Participation on the African Union (CCP-AU). “AU organs 
and institutions, challenges and opportunities”, Civil Society Briefing Notes: 001, January 2012 at 2. 
662 “AU Assembly 7th Ordinary Summit Decision on the Report on the Status of the 
OAU/AU” (Doc.EX.CL/252 (IX) 1); “AU to suspend recognition of new regional economic communities” 
http://english.people.com.cn/200607/03/eng20060703_279456.html  (accessed on 8 December 2015). 
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Apropos this Summit, the AU Assembly urged the eight recognised RECs to coordinate 
and harmonise their policies among themselves and with the AU Commission with a view 
to accelerating Africa’s integration process while requesting member states, RECs and the 
United Nations System, as well as development partners, to collaborate closely with the 
AU Commission in the rationalisation process.663 
 
In order to make progress on the integration of Africa, the African Union Commission 
(AUC), in collaboration with the RECs, took steps to elaborate a Minimum Integration 
Programme (MIP). This followed decisions taken by various AU Conferences of African 
Ministers in Charge of Integration (COMAIs), which identified the urgent need to 
rationalise and harmonise REC activities and programmes, if the AEC were to become 
realised as it was conceived in the AEC Treaty and the AU Constitutive Act. The various 
AU COMAIs recommended the following: 
 
 the AUC, in collaboration with the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (UNECA), African Development Bank (AfDB) and the RECs, should 
review the stages of the Abuja Treaty, taking into account the recent AU decisions, 
including the Sirte Declaration; 
 the MIP should be adopted and implemented as a dynamic strategic and continental 
framework for the integration process; 
 the AUC should elaborate the MIP for RECs, bearing in mind that they implement 
their activities and programmes independently; 
 the AUC should coordinate REC activities and harmonise their policies and 
programmes, as recommended in the AU decision taken in the Gambia; and 
 the free movement of persons, goods, capital and services among and across all 
RECs should be encouraged and promoted to accelerate continental integration.664 
                                                 
663 “Decisions of the AU 7th Summit of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government, Banjul, Gambia, 
1 -2 July 2006 (Assembly/AU/Dec.111 – 132 (VII)); High Level Panel Report on the “Audit of the African 
Union, 18 December 2007 at 138.   
664 “Follow-up Report on the Implementation of Recommendations for the Fourth Conference of African 
ministers in charge of Integration (COMAI IV)”, African Union Department of Economic Affairs - July 
2011, at 7. 
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In implementing these recommendations, the AUC undertook a study, the “Rationalization 
of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs): Review of the Abuja Treaty and Adoption 
of the Minimum Integration Programme”, which was completed in April 2007. However, 
the different AEC stages were never revised. Since then the AUC has been consulting with 
the RECs and other stakeholders, exchanging views on how to elaborate MIPs for RECs to 
advance Africa’s integration.665 
 
The results of the study were presented to the Second Conference of Ministers in Charge 
of Integration in Rwanda, in July 2007. According to the AU July 2011 Report,666 all the 
eight RECs are implementing these recommendations, though to varying degrees as there 
are financial constraints. 
 
After the adoption of the Minimum Implementation Plan (MIP) in 2009, the first draft plan 
for its implementation was adopted in January 2012 during the Eighteenth Ordinary 
Summit of the AU Assembly.667 With regard to trade, the draft plan prioritises the 
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers; rules of origin; customs and free movement of 
people, capital, goods and services.668 
  
It was at this Summit that the Heads of States and Government also agreed to establish the 
Continental FTA (CFTA) by 2017, with the EAC-COMESA-SADC Tripartite FTA (T-
FTA) and the second pole of integration made of ECOWAS, ECCAS, CEN-SAD and 
AMU as the building blocks.669 It must be said that the tone of the 2012 Summit implied 
an ambitious AU agenda of promoting and coordinating African integration and its 
accompanying benefits more quickly than before.  
 
                                                 
665 “The Status of regional integration in Africa: Assessing Regional integration in Africa (ARIA IV)” 
(2010) Chapter 2 at 8 – 9.  
666 Ndomo (fn 659) at 18 et seq. 
667 AU Eighteenth Ordinary Summit “Decision On African Integration” (Assembly/AU/Dec.392(XVIII)). 
668 First Action Plan for the Implementation of the Minimum Integration Programme (MIP) at 8. 
669 “Declaration on Boosting Intra-African Trade and the Establishment of a Continental Free Trade Area 
(CFTA)” (Assembly/AU/Decl.1(XVIII)); Hartzenberg, T. “The Tripartite Free Trade Area: from the 2008 
Kampala vision to . . .” in Cape to Cairo: Exploring the Tripartite FTA Agenda (2013) at 3.  
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In pursuance of the aforementioned decision, the African Union Commission (AUC) has 
held several consultations with the four RECs of ECOWAS, ECCAS, CEN-SAD and AMU 
and the “Concept note on the modalities for the creation of the second bloc of RECs” has 
been developed. The Concept Note proposes the conclusion of a memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) among the RECs that will be the legal framework, with timeframes, 
of establishing the second bloc. However, the AMU is still not participating due to the 
persisting conflict in some of its member states.670 
 
4.2.4 Relationship between AEC/AU and SADC 
 
Article 5(1) of the Protocol on Relations between the AU and the RECs provides that the 
regional economic communities shall take steps to review their treaties to provide an 
umbilical link to the Community and in particular provide:  
(a) strengthening of their relations with the Union; 
(b) alignment of their programmes, polices and strategies with those of the AU; 
(c) providing for the effective implementation of this Protocol; and 
(d) providing for the eventual absorption, at stage 5 set out in Article 6(2)(e) of the 
Treaty, of the RECs into the African Common Market as a prelude to the 
Community. 
 
In line with this, the revised ECOWAS Treaty now provides that integration of the West 
Africa region shall constitute an essential component of the integration of the African 
Continent. Member states undertake to facilitate the co-ordination and harmonisation of 
the policies and programmes of the Community with those of the African Economic 
Community.671 
 
The East African Community (EAC) Treaty provides that the partner states reiterate their 
desire for a wider unity of Africa and regard the Community as a step towards the 
                                                 
670 African Union. “Modalities for the Creation of a Second Bloc of RECs – Concept Note”, November 
2013; Soininen, I. “The Continental Free Trade Area: What’s going on?” Bridges Africa vol. 3, issue 9 
(November 2014) 4 at 5.  
671 Article 78 of the ECOWAS Treaty. 
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achievement of the objectives of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic 
Community.672 
 
The COMESA Treaty has, as one of its main objectives, “to contribute towards the 
establishment, progress and the realisation of the objectives of the African Economic 
Community.”673 It also envisages the conversion of the COMESA into an organic entity of 
the African Economic Community.674 This is interesting because it talks of “conversion” 
and not “absorption”, which is the phrase used by the AEC Treaty. This appears to suggest 
that the COMESA does not envisage the formation of the African Economic Community 
as its demise.675  
 
However, unlike the COMESA Treaty neither the ECOWAS Treaty676 nor the EAC 
Treaty677 contains any provision directly relevant to their status after the formation of the 
African Economic Community. Neither does the ECCAS Treaty.678  
 
The SADC Treaty, on the other hand, contains very little with regard to its relationship 
with the AEC or AU in that it only states, in the Preamble, “taking into account the AEC 
Treaty and the AU Constitutive Act  . . .”.679 This seems to be one of the reasons for the 
dysfunctional SADC-AU interface, which often leads to the SADC member states taking 
different decisions when they participate in or with the AU.680  
                                                 
672 Article 130(2) of the EAC Treaty. 
673 Article 3(f) of the COMESA Treaty. 
674 Article 178(1)(c). 
675 Oppong, R.F. “The African Union, African Economic Community and Africa’s Regional Economic 
Communities: Untangling a Complex Web” African Journal of International and Comparative Law vol. 18 
issue 1 (2010) 92 at 94. 
676 Article 2(1) of the ECOWAS Treaty provides that the member states have decided that ECOWAS shall 
ultimately be the sole economic community in the region for the purpose of economic integration and the 
realization of the objectives of the African Economic Community. 
677 In its Preamble, the EAC Treaty states that the member states affirm their desire for a wider unity of 
Africa and regarded the Community as a step towards the achievement of the objectives of the AEC Treaty. 
678 The ECCAS Treaty only makes reference, in its Preamble, to the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act 
of Lagos (April 1980) as the bases for the African economic community. 
679 Preamble to the SADC Treaty; Oppong, R.F. Legal Aspects of Economic Integration in Africa (2011) at 
68.  
680 When the coup d’état happened in Madagascar in 2009, the SADC reacted to the crisis by convening an 
extraordinary summit at the request of the chairperson of the Organ, King Swati III. While SADC was still 
discussing the best way to address the crisis, the AU and UN deployed a mission to try to resolve the crisis. 
When the SADC mission arrived in Antananarivo, the issue of its mandate arose. The AU’s PSC had 
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However, Article 24 of the SADC Treaty reflects a clear desire on the part of the SADC to 
forge a working relationship with other international, albeit supranational, organisations 
such as the AEC or the AU.681 According to this Article the SADC may hold meetings with 
organisations like the AEC or the AU to review policies and strategies, and to evaluate the 
performance of the SADC in the implementation of its programmes and projects as well as 
to identify and agree on future plans of cooperation.682 
 
It could, therefore, be argued that lack of express provision in the SADC Treaty regarding 
its relationship with the AEC or AU, should not be viewed to mean that the SADC does 
not take its relationship with the AEC or AU seriously, compared to other RECs on the 
continent. One of the reasons might be that the SADC Treaty came into being before the 
Protocol on Relations between the AU and the RECs, and the SADC deemed it unnecessary 
to amend its Treaty as Article 24 already caters for that relationship.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Having analysed the objectives, role and structures of the SADC one can only conclude 
that the aim of the SADC is to create a community providing for regional peace and 
security, and an integrated regional economy. As a regional institution it has laid the basis 
on which regional planning and development in Southern Africa could be pursued. It also 
provides the desired instrument by means of which member states should move along 
towards eventual economic integration.  
                                                 
decided on the mission without consulting SADC, but had consulted the UN. SADC’s reaction was based 
on its internal policies, since Madagascar was a member. The new regime exploited this lack of 
coordination, which complicated the prospects for a resolution of the conflict. 
 
In the case of the DRC, in the stand-off between the Government and the Rebels called the M-23, The 
SADC deployed its stand-by forces and designated President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda as the mediator. 
However, the AU also entered the fray, which raised the issue of mandate as well as issues around funding.  
681 Article 24(1) of the SADC treaty provides: 
“Subject to the provisions of Article 6(1), Member states and SADC shall maintain good working relations 
and other forms of co-operation, and may enter into agreements with other states, regional and international 
organisations, whose objectives are compatible with the objectives of SADC and the provisions of this 
Treaty.” 
682 Article 24(2). 
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Initially, the SADC was composed of countries with different economic orientations and 
political ideologies which would have made cooperation difficult. However, with the 
demise of the “cold war” all the SADC member states embrace the free market system and 
welcome the role of private investment in the development of their economies, which will 
make economic cooperation run smooth. This is apparent in almost all the protocols of the 
SADC, including the Protocol on Trade.683 
 
The signature of the SADC Protocol on Trade in August 1996 confirmed the commitment 
of Southern Africa - as a regional bloc - to establish a Free Trade Area (FTA) in the region. 
The Trade Protocol was ratified by more than two thirds of the SADC member states and 
it started operating on the 1st of September 2000. The SADC also moved swiftly to adopt 
the “Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure Thereof” and other protocols in order 
to regulate trade integration in the region. This shows that the SADC is not only “talking 
the talk”, but also “walking the talk”.  
 
The SADC is also on the right track when one looks at the compliance of the Trade Protocol 
with Article XXIV of the GATT. However, the member states must still finalise details on 
the elimination of tariffs and non-tariffs barriers within the SADC region, especially with 
the confusion brought about by the exception in Article 4(5) of the Trade Protocol. Perhaps 
this would become clear in the programme of action (SADC Programme of action is dealt 
with fully in Chapter 5). Already the deadline of 2012 for a hundred percent 
implementation of the Trade Protocol could not be achieved.     
 
One aspect that the SADC must be applauded on, with regard to integration, is its desire to 
involve the people of the region. Reference to this is made at least in three areas of the 
                                                 
683 Other protocols relating to trade integration are dealt with in Chapter 5.  
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Treaty, namely, the Preamble,684 Article 5 (Objectives)685 and Article 23 (Stakeholders).686 
This is so because logically integration is for the people and thus has to be by the people, 
at least from a democracy point of view.  
 
The SADC is also one of the building blocks of the African Economic Community (AEC). 
The AEC is an important body regarding integration and trade in the Southern Africa region 
since the RECs, which are primarily trade blocs, are the “Pillars of the Community”. 
However, it is still too early to state whether it would succeed in achieving its ultimate goal 
of an African economic community. The core stages for economic integration in its 
timeframes are still forthcoming and there is not much to report on the progress now.  
 
The issue of multiple membership seems to be the Achilles heel for the realisation of the 
AEC. This is so because technically stage three of the AEC, the establishment of a customs 
union at the level of each REC, which is the stage that the AEC has now reached, cannot 
be completed with these multiple memberships. Again, member states seem to be oblivious 
to the fact that in fact their multiple membership of RECs contravenes the AEC. In Article 
5(1) of the AEC Treaty, member states undertook to “create favourable conditions for the 
development of the Community and the attainment of its objectives, particularly by 
harmonising their strategies and policies”, and to “refrain from any unilateral action that 
may hinder the attainment of the said objectives”. The unilateral decision of AEC member 
                                                 
684 The Preamble provides, among others: 
“MINDFUL of the need to involve the people of the Region centrally in the process of development and 
integration, particularly through the guarantee of democratic rights, observance of human rights and the 
rule of law.” 
685 Article 5(2)(b) provides: 
“In order to achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 1 of this Article, SADC shall encourage the people 
of the Region and their institutions to take initiatives to develop economic, social and cultural ties across 
the Region, and to participate fully in the implementation of the programmes and projects of SADC.” 
686 Article 23 provides: 
1. In pursuance of the objectives of this Treaty, SADC shall seek to involve fully, the people of the 
Region and key stakeholders in the process of regional integration.  
2. SADC shall co-operate with, and support the initiatives of the peoples of the Region and key 
stakeholders, contributing to the objectives of this Treaty in the areas of co-operation in order to 
foster closer relations among the communities, associations and people of the Region.  
3. For the purposes of this article, key stakeholders include: 
a. private sector;  
b. civil society; 
c. non -governmental organisations; and  
d. workers and employers organisations.” 
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states to be members of multiple RECs creates unfavourable conditions for the 
development of the AEC.687 
 
The Protocol on the Relations between the AU and the RECs has brought two new 
innovations that might help in this whole integration process: firstly, the AU is vested with 
the authority to sanction the RECs or member states who do not comply with its 
directives.688 Secondly, it provides a mechanism for resolution of disputes.689 Hopefully 
these innovations will invigorate the RECs to do more in improving their relations with the 
AEC, thus accelerating the achievement of the African Economic Community.  
 
Success will depend on the will and determination of each stakeholder to play its efficient 
role in the realisation of the African Economic Community through implementing the 
Abuja Treaty. And the AU should lead the integration process while the member states 
support the process. 
 
What is needed, therefore, is more interaction between the AEC\AU and its building blocks 
RECs, to sort out these obstacles to integration such as multiple membership. At least there 
is a political will to this end, as attested to by the AU’s decision to establish the Continental 
Free Trade Area (CFTA) by 2017. If this could be achieved the problem of multiple 
membership would be solved. This will then lay a perfect ground to move to the next stage 
of the continental customs union.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
687 Oppong, R.F. “The African Union, African Economic Community and Africa’s Regional Economic 
Communities: Untangling a Complex Web” African Journal of International and Comparative Law vol. 18 
issue 1 (2010) 92 at 96. 
688 Article 22. 
689 Article 32. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ACHIEVEMENTS BY THE SADC TOWARDS INTEGRATION IN 
SOUTHERN AFRICA   
 
Introduction 
 
The Southern Africa region is viewed as the one region with the greatest potential for 
spearheading the African Renaissance. This is because the SADC is arguably Africa’s 
fastest growing region in Africa, but conflicts, in particular, are spoiling the potential 
harmony.690 This political instability can divert attention away from economic integration 
initiatives that the region has embarked upon.  
 
Apart from the political challenges, the region also faces some economic challenges such 
as: to become competitive by attracting foreign investment; applying new technology; and 
producing goods and services that can compete effectively with other international role-
players and penetrate industrial markets. However, not all is doom and gloom. The SADC 
has made some achievements, especially in the area of regional economic integration, 
which remains a viable development strategy for Africa, as advocated by the African 
Economic Community (AEC) Treaty.691  
 
The SADC integration agenda was conceptualised under the Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan (RISDP) in 2003, which articulates the roadmap for SADC integration 
through the establishment of a free trade area (FTA) by 2008, a customs union in 2010, a 
common market in 2015, a monetary union in 2016, and an economic union with a single 
currency in 2018. However, institutional challenges remained as the SADC was still rooted 
                                                 
690 Angola, DRC and Mozambique have had a share of civil war, with the one in DRC not totally stopped. 
Zimbabwe had the so-called “operation clean-up” (Murambatsvina) in 2005, which led to massive internal 
displacement of citizens as well as the controversial land policy that ended up at the SADC Tribunal. 
Madagascar had a coup which toppled the government of elected President, Marc Ravalomanana in 2009. 
South Africa has a recurring problem of homophobia against the emigrants from Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique in particular. The recent conflict erupted in Lesotho, which led to the killing of the defence 
force chief and the dissolution of parliament in 2014.  
691 The AEC is discussed in details in Chapter 4, part 2 (above).  
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in the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) framework 
instead of the rules-based mechanism. Its Secretariat was still not adequately transformed 
to suite the new approach.692 There was as such a need to transform the SADC Secretariat.  
 
In order to show its commitment to the issue of integration, the SADC Council approved 
the new structure of the Secretariat on 28 February 2008 in Lusaka, Zambia. The new 
structure created the posts of two Deputy Executive Secretaries: one for Regional 
Integration and the other for Finance and Administration. The Deputy Executive Secretary: 
Regional Integration is responsible for five directorates693 that address SADC’s regional 
integration themes.  
 
This commitment is also fortified by the SADC law, which is geared towards integration. 
For instance, Article 22 of the SADC Treaty requires member states to conclude and ratify 
protocols spelling out the goals, scope and manner of co-operation and integration in seven 
sectors, which cover “politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security”. Out 
of the 27 protocols, 24 have come into force so far after being ratified by two-thirds of the 
signatory member states.694 
 
Though the SADC member states have ratified most of these protocols, there are some 
instances wherein they have been found wanting. So in this section reference is made only 
to protocols that are in operation. The majority of these are protocols that are within the 
realm of economic integration, but others that fall within other areas such as social 
integration have been added because of their link to the subject.  
  
This Chapter will thus be focused on SADC’s achievements on various aspects relevant to 
integration, especially its blueprint for integration and economic development, the 
                                                 
692 Saurombe, A. “Regional Integration Agenda for SADC ‘Caught in the winds of change’: Problems and 
Prospects” Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology vol. 4 issue 2 (2009) 100 at 101. 
693 The Directorates are: Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment; Infrastructure and Services; Food, 
Agriculture and natural Resources; Social & Human development and Special Programmes; and Policy 
Planning and Resource Mobilisation.  
694 “Foreword” by the SADC General Secretary, Dr Stergomena Lawrence Tax, in SADC @35- Success 
Stories vol. 1 (2015). 
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Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), as well as its achievements in 
terms of various relevant protocols.   
 
5.1 Institutional Framework 
 
The institutions of every regional body are important vehicles to carry the obligations and 
objectives of that body. It is important that those institutions or organs are well equipped 
and empowered to fulfil the mandate they are tasked with. The transformation from the 
SADCC into the SADC was not accompanied by an appropriate institutional framework 
for integration. Hence there was a need for strong institutions in the SADC that are 
accountable not only to individual member states, but also to a central authority.695 
 
Thus in August 1999 the SADC of Heads of State or Government Summit696 held in 
Maputo, Mozambique, instructed that a review be conducted of the institutions of the 
SADC as well as its operations. This directive was based on the fact that under the sector-
based approach, which was inherited from the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC), the organisation was being hamstrung in its 
endeavours to achieve regional integration by devising and implementing regional policies 
and strategies in a co-ordinated and harmonised manner.697 
 
In 2001 the SADC Heads of State and Government convened an Extra-Ordinary Summit 
on 9 March 2001, in Windhoek, Namibia,698 at which they approved a Report on the 
Restructuring of SADC Institutions, which spelled out enhanced objectives and common 
                                                 
695 Saurombe, A. “Regional Integration Agenda for SADC ‘Caught in the winds of change’: Problems and 
Prospects” Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology vol. 4 issue 2 (2009) 100 at 101. 
696 The Summit is the ultimate policy-making institution of SADC and is responsible for the overall policy 
direction and control of functions of the Community (Article 10 of the SADC Treaty). 
697 “Southern African Development Community (SADC): History and Present Status”, available at 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/sadc.htm (accessed on 29 January 2016); Saurombe, A. 
“The Role of SADC Institutions in Implementing SADC Treaty Provisions dealing with Regional 
Integration” Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad vol. 15 no.2 (2012) 454 at 460. 
698 “Communiqué from the SADC Heads of State and Government Extra-Ordinary Summit in Windhoek, 
Namibia, 9 March 2001”; “SADC: Ready for 21st century?” Southern African Political and Economic 
Monthly vol. 9 no.11 (1996) 2; Southern African Development Community. SADC Major Challenges and 
Achievements Handbook (2005) at 10; International Business Publications, USA. Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) Business Law Handbook (2011) at 216. 
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agenda for the SADC based on the objectives as outlined in Article 5 of the 1992 SADC 
Treaty. They scrapped the country-based coordination of sectoral activities and 
programmes, and replaced it with a more centralised approach through which the twenty-
one Coordinating Units have been grouped together into four clusters, namely:  
 
 Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment;  
 Infrastructure and Services;  
 Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources; and  
 Social and Human Development and special programmes.699   
 
The 2001 Extra-ordinary Summit also agreed on the current procedure, including a new 
formula for calculating monetary contributions made by member states. This was in 
recognition of unequal levels of the economies of member states.700  
 
The review of the institutions led to the amendment of the Treaty establishing the SADC 
(SADC Treaty) to introduce the new institutions or organs. Article 9A(1) of the SADC 
Treaty introduced the Troika with respect to the following institutions: the Summit; the 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation; the Council; the Integrated 
Committee of Ministers (ICM);701 and the Standing Committee of Officials. The Troika 
system comprises the current chairperson, the incoming chairperson (the deputy at the 
time), and the immediate previous chairperson. 
 
The Troika of each institution shall function as a steering committee of the institution and 
shall, in between the meetings of the institution, be responsible for: 
(a) decision-making; 
(b) facilitating the implementation of decisions; and 
                                                 
699 “SADC: Corporate Profile”. Sourced from 
http://www.sadcreview.com/sadc%20intro2003/Sadc%20Corporate%20Profile.htm (accessed on 29 
January 2016) at 2. 
700 Scott, F. “Too much of a good thing: Reassessing the proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements” 
Suffolk Transnational Law Review vol. 30 (2006 – 2007) 407 at 416. 
701 The ICM was replaced by the Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committees in 2008. 
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(c) providing policy directions.702 
 
The Troika of each institution shall have the power to create committees on an ad hoc basis. 
It shall also determine its own rules of procedure and may co-opt other members as and 
when required.703 
 
The other organ established in terms of the amendment to the original Treaty is the Organ 
on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. It is selected by the Summit and its 
Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson are selected from the members of the Summit. The 
Chairperson of the Summit, however, cannot simultaneously be the Chairperson of the 
Organ. There is also the Ministerial Committee of the Organ, consisting of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs; Defence; Public Security or State Security.704  
 
The Organ had to conclude a protocol which would outline its functions and powers. This 
protocol had to be approved by the Summit and ratified by two-thirds of the SADC member 
states. The Summit approved the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-
operation705 at its meeting in August 2001 and appointed President Chissano (as he then 
was) of Mozambique as the inaugural Chairperson of the Organ. The Summit also 
consolidated a far-reaching plan to restructure the SADC by centralising its operations in 
the Secretariat.706  
 
Another institution introduced by the amendment is the SADC National Committees. These 
Committees shall be created in each Member State and shall be responsible to: 
(d) provide input at the national level in the formulation of the SADC 
policies, strategies and programmes of action; 
(e) co-ordinate and oversee, at the national level, implementation of 
the SADC programmes of action; and 
                                                 
702 Article 9A(6) of the SADC Treaty. 
703 Article 9A(7) – (9). 
704 Article 10A.  
705 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation entered into force on 2 March 2004. 
706 Nathan, L. “SADC’s uncommon approach to common security, 1992 – 2003” Journal of Southern 
African Studies vol. 32 no. 3 (September 2006) 607 at 610. 
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(f) create a national steering committee, sub-committees and 
technical committees. 
 
Each national steering committee shall consist of the Chairperson of the SADC National 
Committee and the Chairpersons of sub-committees. A national steering committee is 
responsible for ensuring rapid implementation of programmes that would otherwise wait 
for a formal meeting of the SADC National Committee. It shall work with stakeholders 
that include government, private sector, civil society, non-governmental organisations and 
workers’ and employers’ organisations.707 
 
Between 2006 and 2007, the SADC commissioned three studies that also recommended 
further consolidation process of the SADC institutional restructuring: 
1. the “Job Evaluation study” by KPMG with focus on aligning the SADC governing 
and Secretariat organisational structure, grading system, remuneration structure as 
well as performance management and appraisal system; 
2. the “European Commission Assessment” through Ernst & Young, with focus on 
improving SADC Secretariat operating policies and procedures; and 
3. the “Assessment of Institutional Capacity Development Needs of the SADC 
Secretariat”, supported by the German Government through Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), with focus on strengthening staff 
competences, organisational cohesion and capacities.708 
 
Apropos these studies, a special attention was given to the role of the Integrated Committee 
of Ministers (ICM), which was another institution that was introduced by the amendment 
to the SADC Treaty (Article 12). It consisted of at least two ministers from each Member 
State and was responsible to, inter alia, oversee the activities of the core areas of integration 
which include trade, industry, finance and investment. This body, in a nutshell, replaced 
the erstwhile SADC Commission. 
                                                 
707 Article 16A of the SADC Treaty. 
708 Giuffrida, L et al. “Chapter 6: Strengthening SADC institutional structures – capacity development is 
the key to the SADC Secretariat’s effectiveness” Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa 
Yearbook vol. 8 (2008) at 5. 
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One major observation by these studies was that the ICM was not able to provide the policy 
guidance as expected due to its wide range of representatives. As such some of the former 
sectoral committees were re-established in some key areas such as energy and trade. 
Consequently, it was recommended that the Sectoral Committees of Ministers, in line with 
SADC regional integration priorities, be restored because these institutions were actually 
in a better position to provide policy guidance.709 
 
In November 2007, the Council, after wide consultations, abolished the ICM and 
established six ministerial clusters, namely: 
 Cluster for Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment (former Ministerial Task 
Force on Regional Integration); 
 Cluster of Infrastructure and Services in Support of Regional Integration; 
 Cluster of Food, Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment; 
 Cluster of Social, Human Development and Special Programmes; 
 Cluster of the Organ of Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation; 
 Cluster on cross-cutting issues related to Science and Technology and Gender.710 
 
The next step in the institutional restructuring process was the alignment of the SADC 
Secretariat’s functions to the integration agenda. The position of Chief Director was 
abolished and a second Deputy Executive Secretary position introduced. Thus, the two 
Deputy Executive Secretaries are to be responsible for Regional Integration and for 
Finance and Administration respectively.711 
 
The Deputy Executive Secretary for Regional Integration is, through delegation by the 
Executive Secretary, responsible for overseeing the programmes of regional integration of 
the technical directorates as well as the work of the directorate for policy planning and 
                                                 
709 Ibid. 
710 Peters, W. The Quest for an African Economic Community: Regional Integration and Its Role in 
achieving African Unity – The Case of SADC (2010) at 137; Odhiambo, M et al. The Civil Society Guide to 
Regional Economic Communities in Africa (2016) at 109. 
711 Report of the 2008 SADC Summit for Heads of State and Government, Sandton, South Africa 16 - 17 
August 2008 (Decision 5).  
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resource mobilisation.712 The latter is of great importance because it shall provide strategic 
direction to the Secretariat, recommend regional policies and coordinate with other regional 
economic blocs.713 
 
As a result of this institutional restructuring some achievements have been made: 
 the SADC has a more focused governing and decision-making structure; 
 the SADC has a prioritised integration agenda and key regional integration 
programmes to be centrally coordinated and managed by the SADC Secretariat; 
 Clusters were established to guide and accelerate the deeper regional integration 
process; 
 Secretariat vision, mission and values have been developed and the core functions 
of the Secretariat as a “think tank”, a principal regional coordinator of policies, a 
provider of support services, and a professional programme manager have been 
clarified; 
 a new and more functional organisational structure consistent with the Secretariat’s 
mandate and in line with the SADC integration priorities has been approved; 
 the Secretariat presently implements the Council decision to align the SADC 
Secretariat’s financial and human resources with priority areas and programmes of 
regional integration; 
 a comprehensive SADC Secretariat Capacity Development Framework has been 
approved, and an institutional set-up to drive the implementation process of the 
Institutional Capacity Developmental Programme (ICDP) proposed; 
 selected capacity development interventions such as the institutionalisation of the 
Performance Management and Appraisal System have been successfully started; 
 a joint SADC-International Cooperating Partners (ICP) Partnership Facility for 
Capacity Development is proposed, and various ICPs have indicated their 
                                                 
712 “SADC Policy for Strategy Development, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation” (February 2012) at 24; 
Muller, M et al. “Water and Regional Integration: The role of water as a driver of regional economic 
integration in Southern Africa”, Report to the Water Research Commission, March 2015 at 87. 
713 Giuffrida (fn 708) at 14.  
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willingness to financially and technically support the implementation of the 
ICDP.714 
 
These achievements augur well with the African Economic Community (AEC) Treaty 
plans for the African Economic Community. However, some authors like Gibb715 are 
doubtful and only see this as a representation of an ambitious attempt to achieve greater 
integration in monetary and fiscal policies, as well as exchange and trade regimes. 
 
This doubt is backed by the findings of the 2016 Study716 that found that to date most 
directorates of the SADC Secretariat still struggle with human resource deployment and 
coordination between directorates. The Study states that authority to act exists on paper, 
but the Summit remains the only political authority, with a Secretariat that can only act 
with the full cooperation of the member states. It further states that even when summits 
agree – for example on the need for a well-resourced and funded Secretariat – there is little 
change. This is so because the budget for the Secretariat and the programmes and policies 
that it implements are largely donor-funded. 
 
5.2 Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)   
 
The RISDP is one of the key outcomes of the implementation of the “Report on the Review 
of the Operations of SADC institutions”, which was adopted on 9 March 2001 at an Extra-
Ordinary Summit in Windhoek, Namibia. The development of the Plan was an arduous, 
yet necessary and fulfilling task. It was a team-work involving the SADC governments, 
key stakeholders such as the private sector, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
                                                 
714 Giuffrida (fn 708) at 20; Tjønneland, E.N. “Making SADC Work? Revisiting Institutional Reform” 
Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook vol. 5 (2005); Buzdugan, S. “A Critical 
Analysis of Regionalism as a Development Strategy in southern Africa: beyond Institutional Explanations 
of Failure of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)” Paper for the British International 
Studies Association Annual Conference, University of Cambridge, 17-19 December 2007 at 18. 
715 Gibb, R. “Southern Africa in transition: prospects and problems facing regional integration” Journal of 
Modern African Studies vol. 36 no 2 (1998) 287 at 303; Peters, C. “Is SADC losing track?” in Bösl, A et al. 
Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook (2010) 143 at 165. 
716 Vanheukelom, J et al. “The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa: The Southern African 
Development Community (SADC)”, January 2016 Report at 8. 
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civil societies as well as their cooperating partners.717 It was adopted by the Dar es Salaam 
Summit in August 2003 as the SADC’s blueprint for regional integration and development 
and it saw globalisation as providing major new opportunities for Southern Africa’s 
economic revival.718 
 
The RISDP is a 15-year strategic roadmap set by member states and its effective 
implementation began in 2005 and will run until 2020. After the launch of the RISDP the 
SADC started with the process of unbundling the Plan, an exercise which is continuing.719 
In this exercise the SADC is allocating clear and specific roles to key players with 
quantified deliverables. This is to meet the targets set within the given time frame, such as 
the free trade area (FTA), which was launched in August 2008, followed by the customs 
union and the common market. 
 
The intention of the RISDP is to provide a clear direction for the SADC region’s policies, 
programmes and activities over the long term. Everything that the SADC has done is 
founded on clear sense of what the common interests of the SADC states are, and how to 
advance them jointly, in practical ways. And the RISDP makes this point clear: the creation 
of a stable, secure and prosperous region is an overriding ambition for the SADC.720  
 
                                                 
717 Peters-Berries, C. Regional Integration in Southern Africa – A Guidebook (2010) at 82; Trade Law 
Centre (Tralac). “The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan: SADC’s trade-led integration 
agenda – how is it doing?” Tralac Trade Brief (April 2012) at 1. 
718 Communique of the SADC Summit of the Heads of Assembly and Government, 25 – 26 August 2003, 
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (paragraph 37); Mulaudzi, C. “Politics of regionalism in Southern Africa” 
Institute for Global Dialogue, Occasional Paper no. 51, April 2006. 
719 In August 2010 the SADC Secretariat conducted a Desk Assessment Review of the Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan. The assessment tracks the status of the implementation of the programmes and 
activities of the plan by the key actors and high lights the key achievements, challenges and lessons learned 
over the five-year period (2005-2010). This was followed by an Independent Review of the RISDP by the 
Zimbabwe-based Trade and Development Studies Centre (TRADES Centre), which began in 2012 and 
finalised in 2013. These and other consultations over recent years have emanated into a revised RISDP 
document, which was adopted by the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of SADC 
on 29 April 2015. This revised document will guide implementation of SADC programmes in the 
remaining period i.e. 2015 to 2020. 
720 This is a view expressed by Benjamin Mkapa, ex-President of Tanzania, at the launch of SADC RISDP 
in Arusha, Tanzania on 12 March 2004. Available at 
http://www.sadc.int/printer.php?lang=english&path=newscenter/speeches&page  (accessed on 4 April 
2016). 
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The RISDP also affirms that the private sector is a strategic vehicle through which the 
SADC region will achieve its objectives, including deeper integration and poverty 
alleviation. Even though the governments must continue to invest in things like 
infrastructure, both economic and social, as well as address other side constraints, the 
engine of growth can only be private sector investment.721 
  
As such a two-pronged approach is needed. On the one hand, governments need to mobilise 
national and regional savings and resources for productive investment. On the other hand, 
governments and private sectors need to work harder to attract foreign direct investments 
(FDIs). It is not a question of choice between national and regional investment on the one 
hand, and the FDI on the other. The search has to be for both, and in finding synergies that 
would give momentum to regional trade and investment initiatives.722 
 
The RISDP can also be viewed in regional and global contexts. This is more so if one looks 
at the priorities of the initial RISDP, which were: 
a. Trade, economic liberalisation and development; 
b. Infrastructure in support of regional integration; 
c. Peace and security cooperation; and 
d. Special programmes with a regional dimension. 
 
Even after the revised RISDP was adopted in 2015, the re-prioritised areas remained 
regional integration dimensional, the only change being under “priority A”, with focus now 
being on industrial development within the market integration agenda. The revised 
priorities are now as follows: 
a. Industrial development and market integration; 
b. Infrastructure in support of regional integration; 
c. Peace and security cooperation; and 
                                                 
721 Ibid. 
722 Ibid. 
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d. Special programmes with a regional dimension.723 
 
The regional dimension or outlook means the RISDP has to encompass and embrace the 
objectives of organisations such as the African Union (AU) and its programme, the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). This is so because the SADC, as one of 
the regional economic communities (RECs) on the African continent, is expected to act as 
a building block in the implementation of the African Agenda under the frameworks of the 
AU and NEPAD.724 
 
The RISDP must also have a global outlook. This is so because the SADC, as an REC 
registered with the World Trade Organisation (WTO), is a global player. At the global level 
economic challenges facing the SADC include the process and effects of globalisation, 
which encompass, among others, financial, trade and technological forces. The agenda of 
the WTO, the Cotonou Agreement between the European Union (EU) and the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states,725 as well as the United States of America’s Africa 
Opportunity Act (AGOA)726 are all key challenges and opportunities for the SADC. This 
is so because the SADC and its member states are individually and collectively signatories 
to these agreements. The RISDP must thus also deal with them. However, it is important 
                                                 
723 Mwanza, W. “The Revised SADC RISDP and plans for market integration and industrial development 
going forward” Tralac Paper available at www.tralac.org/.../7530-the-revised-sadc-risdp (accessed on 4 
April 2016); “2015 – Towards Regional Integration and Industrialization” Southern Africa Today vol. 18 
no. 1 (December 2015) 1 – 2. 
724 “Halala SADC Halala!” DFA Now vol. 1 no. 3 (September 2005) 7; Saurombe, A. “An Analysis of 
Economic Integration in Africa with Specific Reference to the African Union and the African Economic 
Community” South African Journal of Public Law vol. 27 (2012) 292; Weltz, M. 2014. “A Culture of 
Conservatism: How and Why African Union Member States Obstruct the Deepening of Integration” 
Strategic Review for Southern Africa vol. 36 issue 1 (2014) 4. 
725 The Partnership Agreement 2000/483/EC between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member states, of the other part, 
signed in Cotonou, Benin, on 23 June 2000. It is aimed at the reduction and eventual eradication 
of poverty while contributing to sustainable development and to the gradual integration of ACP countries 
into the world economy. 
726 The purpose of this legislation is to assist the economies of sub-Saharan Africa and to improve 
economic relations between the United States and the region. It does this by eliminating import levies on 
more than 7 000 products ranging from textiles to manufactured items and benefits. In late 2015 and early 
2016 South Africa was threatened with exclusion from AGOA after failing to meet some of the 
requirements relating to duty-free treatment of the US poultry products. This was, however, resolved in 
March 2016 when South Africa met the requirements by the US Government.  
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to note that the RISDP is not a legally binding instrument, hence it can be adapted to 
respond to changing circumstances.727 
 
5.2.1 RISDP Priority Intervention Areas  
 
The original RISDP identifies challenges and priorities, including the twelve priority 
intervention areas to drive the region’s integration and development agenda until 2015. 
These were of both cross-sectoral and sectoral nature and were identified as decisive for 
the realisation of the SADC’s objectives, in particular in promoting deeper regional 
integration, integrating the SADC into the world economy, promoting balanced and 
equitable development, eradicating poverty, and promoting gender equality.728 
 
For each of these intervention areas the RISDP listed general and comprehensive strategies 
and activities. Therefore, some more, unpublished and restricted documents were worked 
out such as the 2004 RISDP Implementation Framework, which provides a rather detailed 
15-year long-term plan, but with a five-year medium-term plan (2015 – 2020) and a one-
year (2005-2006) implementation plan as well as a list of priorities and projects.729 
 
                                                 
727 Hartzenberg, T. “The Review of the SADC RISDP Matters” Tralac Policy Brief (August 2014) 2; 
Hartzenberg, T et al. “Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Key issues and challenges” in Volz, U. 
Regional Integration, Economic Development and Global Governance (2011) at 65. 
728 The Areas are as follows:  
1. Cross-Sectoral Intervention Areas:  
* Poverty eradication;  
* Combating of the HIV and AIDS pandemic;  
* Gender equality and development;  
* Science and Technology;  
* Information and Communication Technologies;  
* Environment and Sustainable Development;  
* Private Sector 
* Statistics  
 
2. Sectoral cooperation and integration Intervention Areas: 
* Trade/economic liberalization and development;  
* Infrastructure support for regional integration and poverty eradication;  
* Sustainable food security; and  
* Human and social development. 
729 “SADC Secretariat: Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). Executive Summary, 
point no. 6”, available at http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/risdp/summary.php?media=print    
(accessed on 1 April 2016). 
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Hereunder reference is made to one of these intervention areas, namely, “trade, economic 
liberalisation and development”, which later changed into “industrial development and 
market integration” – as it is the focus of this thesis – to show how it has developed. 
 
5.2.1.1 Industrial development and market integration 
 
As indicated above, this intervention area was originally called “Trade, Economic 
Liberalisation and Development” and its overall goal was to facilitate trade and financial 
liberalisation, competitive and diversified industrial development and increased investment 
for deeper regional integration and poverty eradication through the establishment of a 
SADC Common Market.730 
 
The areas of focus included: 
 market integration through the establishment of the SADC Free Trade Area, the 
SADC Customs Union and the SADC Common Market; 
 attainment of macroeconomic convergence; 
 development and strengthening of financial and capital markets; 
 attainment of deeper monetary cooperation; 
 increasing levels of investment in the SADC including FDI; and 
 enhancing the SADC competitiveness in industrial and other productive activities 
for effective participation in the global economy.731   
 
The strategies included: 
 fast tracking the implementation of the Protocol on Trade to achieve the FTA, 
which should be informed by, and take into account the recommendations of the 
mid-term review of the SADC Protocol on Trade; 
 negotiations on the establishment of a SADC customs union would commence in 
2005 having fulfilled some prerequisites such as ensuring that the FTA is 
                                                 
730 Southern African Development Community Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), 
August 2003 at 65. 
731 RISDP at 66. 
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established, carrying out studies on impact of a customs union and then commence 
negotiations for a common external tariff; 
 preparations for the establishment of a monetary union; 
 negotiations on the establishment of the SADC common market should commence 
soon after establishing a customs union; 
 harmonisation of policies, legal and regulatory frameworks that address the 
business environment and the free movement of all factors of production; 
 promotion of the SADC as an attractive investment destination based on the 
observance and implementation of the Investment Memorandum of Understanding 
and subsequently the Protocol on Finance and Investment; and 
 entrepreneurship development with particular emphasis on small and medium scale 
enterprises.732 
 
The envisaged economic integration in the SADC would proceed along a linear path. The 
targets733 thereof were set as follows: 
Target 1: Free Trade Area – 2008;  
Target 2: Completion of negotiations of the SADC Customs Union – 2010; 
Target 3: Completion of negotiations of the SADC Common Market – 2015; 
Target 4: Diversification of industrial structure and exports with more emphasis on value 
addition across all economic sectors – 2015, taking into account the following indicators: 
 diversify and sustain exports growth rate of at least 5% annually; 
 Increase in intra-regional trade to at least 35% by 2008; and 
 Increment in manufacturing as a percentage of GDP to 25% by 2015. 
 
Target 5: Macroeconomic convergence on: 
 Inflation rate at a single digit by 2008, 5% by 2012 and 3% by 2018; 
 Ratio of budget deficit to GDP not exceeding 5% by 2008 and 3% as an anchor 
within a band of 1% by 2012 and be maintained at the 2012 level up to 2018; and 
                                                 
732 Ibid. 
733 Ibid. 
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 Nominal Value of public and publicly guaranteed debt should be less than 60% of 
GDP by 2008, and this be maintained throughout the plan period (2018).  
 
Target 6: Other Financial indicators; 
 Increase the level of savings to at least 25% of GDP by 2008 and to 30% by 2012; 
 Increase domestic investment levels to at least 30% of GDP by 2008; 
 Gradual interconnection of payments and clearing system in the SADC by 2008; 
 Achieve currency convertibility by 2008; and  
 Finalise legal and regulatory framework for dual and cross listing on the regional 
stock exchanges by 2008. 
 
Target 7: The establishment of a SADC monetary union by 2016; 
 Finalise preparation of institutional, administrative and legal framework for setting 
up a SADC Central Bank by 2016; 
 Launch a regional currency for the SADC Monetary Union by 2018. 
 
Target 1, in terms of this intervention area, has been achieved as the SADC has been 
implementing the Trade Protocol since September 2000, which led to a free trade area 
(FTA) in 2008. However, only 13 out of 15 member states are currently participating in the 
FTA. Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are still to implement the 
Protocol.734  
 
Target 2, the establishment of a customs union by 2010, has been missed, mainly due to 
the focus being shifted to the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) with the Common Market 
of Southern and Eastern Africa (COMESA) and Eastern African Community (EAC). The 
                                                 
734 Sandrey, R. “An analysis of the SADC Free Trade Area”, Tralac (2013) at 1; “The Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan: SADC’s trade-led Integration Agenda – How is SADC doing?” Tralac Trade 
Brief no. S12TB02/2012, April 2012 at 8; Redvers, L. “Angola, the reluctant SADC Trader” South African 
Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) Occasional Paper no. 152 August 2013 at 13; “Seychelles accedes 
to SADC Protocol”, available at www.engineeringnews.co.za/.../seychelles-accedes-to-sadc-protocol 
(accessed on 7 April 2016). 
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TFTA was launched in June 2015 and its imminent adoption is what necessitated the review 
of the RISDP, and the revised RISDP was adopted in April 2015.735  
  
The revised RISDP led to priority A – “Trade, economic liberalisation and development” 
– being changed to “Industrial development and market integration”. This was to ensure 
that the RISDP is synchronised with the “Industrialization Strategy and Roadmap 2015 – 
2063”, which was also approved in April 2015.736 The Industrialization Strategy is a long-
term development agenda that takes into account the dynamics of events and issues 
affecting not only the Southern African region, but also the rest of the world.737 
 
The Industrialization Strategy is thus aligned with the African Union’s Agenda 2063738 and 
it is, in fact, an acknowledgement of the role that market integration has in industrial 
development, and an effort to pursue these jointly, particularly through the development of 
regional value chains.739  
 
The missing of Target 2, the establishment of customs union by 2010, also means that the 
other targets are missed, as the targets are linear and one has to be completed before the 
next can follow. So it will have to be seen how far the RISDP would have gone by 2020, 
which is its deadline. 
                                                 
735 Communiqué of the Third COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit, adopted on 10 June 2015 at Sharm 
El Sheikh, Egypt; Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the 
Southern African Development Community, Harare, Republic of Zimbabwe, 29 April 2015. 
736 Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Southern 
African Development Community, Harare, Republic of Zimbabwe, 29 April 2015. 
737 Ngwawi, J. “Vision 2050 – SADC ponders future” Southern Africa Today vol. 14 no. 4 (June 2012) 1. 
738 “AU Agenda 2063” is a 50-year Plan adopted in 2013 for the rejuvenation of the continent. According to 
this Plan this would be the ideal continent in 2063: 
1. A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development; 
2. An integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the 
vision of Africa’s Renaissance; 
3. An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of 
law; 
4. A peaceful and secure Africa; 
5. An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics; 
6. An Africa where development is people-driven, unleashing the potential of its women and 
youth; 
7. Africa as a strong, united and influential global player and partner. 
739 Mgidlana, G. “SADC-PF regional parliament roadmap” InSession Magazine vol. 15 issue 5 (June 2015) 
at 9. 
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However, it is important to bear in mind that the RISDP is a non-binding agreement that 
merely outlines the necessary conditions that should be realised towards achieving the 
long-term objectives of the SADC. The legal binding framework still remains the one 
contained in the SADC Treaty and various protocols.740  
 
5.3 Achievements in specific areas of integration 
 
5.3.1 Elimination of Tariff Barriers within the region 
 
In the Preamble of the SADC Treaty, member states allude to the conscience of their duty 
to promote the interdependence and integration of their national economies for the 
harmonious, balanced and equitable development of the region as well as the conviction of 
the need to mobilise their own and international resources to promote the implementation 
of national, interstate and regional policies, programmes and projects within the framework 
for economic integration.  
 
Member states also undertake to adopt adequate measures to promote the achievement of 
the objectives of the SADC,741 and one such measure taken was the adoption of the SADC 
Protocol on Trade.742 The Protocol proposes to achieve a free trade area by the elimination 
of tariffs between member states.743 Its objectives are:  
                                                 
740 Trade Law Centre (Tralac). “The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan: SADC’s trade-led 
Integration Agenda – How is SADC doing?” Tralac (2012) at 11; Saurombe, A. “The Role of SADC 
Institutions in Implementing SADC Treaty Provisions dealing with Regional Integration” Potchefstroomse 
Elektroniese Regsblad vol. 15 no.2 (2012) 454; Chigara, B. Southern African Development Community 
Land Issues: Towards a New Sustainable Land Relations Policy (2013) at 110. 
741 Article 6(1) of the SADC Treaty provides: 
“Member states undertake to adopt adequate measures to promote the achievement of the 
objectives of SADC, and shall refrain from taking any measure likely to jeopardise the sustenance 
of its principles, the achievement of its objectives and the implementation of the provisions of this 
Treaty.” 
742 This was done at the SADC annual meeting of June 1996 in Gaborone, Botswana. 
743 Article 2(5) of SADC Protocol on Trade. 
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i. to further liberalise intra-regional trade in goods and services on the basis of fair, 
mutually equitable and beneficial trade arrangements, complemented by protocols 
in other areas; 
ii. to ensure efficient production within the SADC, which reflects the current and 
dynamic comparative advantages of its members; 
iii. to contribute towards the improvement of the climate for domestic, cross-border 
and foreign investment;  
iv. to enhance the economic development, diversification and industrialisation of the 
region; and 
v. to establish a Free Trade Area in the SADC region.744 
 
The Protocol envisages the elimination of tariffs within eight years of its entry into force. 
The processes and modalities for the elimination of the tariffs are to be determined by the 
Committee of Ministers responsible for Trade (CMT). Member states that consider that 
they may be or have been adversely affected by the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
to trade, may upon application to the Committee of Ministers of Trade, be granted a grace 
period to afford them additional time for the elimination of tariffs. 745 
 
The Protocol also envisages the existence of different common tariffs for different 
products. The actual method of eliminating barriers to intra-SADC trade, and the criteria 
of listing products for special consideration, is yet to be negotiated in the context of 
SADC’s Trade Negotiating Forum (TNF).746 Once adopted, the process and modalities for 
eliminating barriers to intra-SADC trade will be deemed to form an integral part of the 
Protocol.747 
 
The process of eliminating tariffs in the SADC region is to be accompanied by an 
industrialisation strategy to improve the competitiveness of member states’ products.748 
                                                 
744 Ibid. 
745 Article 3(1). 
746 Ibid. 
747 Article 3(2). 
748 Article 4(2) of the SADC Protocol on Trade. 
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After several failed attempts749 at initiating and adopting the SADC industrial policy 
framework, the SADC Industrialization Strategy and Roadmap 2015 – 2063 was launched 
in August 2016, after being adopted in April 2016 by the SADC Heads of State and 
Government. The Strategy is anchored on three pillars, namely:  
 
 Industrialisation as a champion of economic and technological transformation;  
 Competitiveness as an active process to move from comparative advantage to 
competitive advantage; and  
 Regional integration and geography as the contexts for industrial development and 
economic prosperity.750 
 
With regard to the elimination of the technical barriers to trade (TBTs) in the SADC region, 
this is addressed under the framework known as the TBT Annex (Annex IX) to the SADC 
Protocol on Trade. The Trade and Industry, Finance and Investment Directorate is a 
custodian of this framework and it supports the SADC Free Trade Area. The 
Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Accreditation and Metrology (SQAM) Programme751 
has been actively engaged on assisting the member states to have available at least a basic 
technical infrastructure and in further building capacity as required by the TBT Annex to 
the SADC Protocol on Trade.752 
 
Another annex to the Trade Protocol, Annex IX, was approved on 12 July 2008 by the 
Committee of the Ministers of Trade (CMT) on the basis of the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in Standardisation, Quality assurance, Accreditation 
                                                 
749 “Industrial policy co-operation in Southern Africa: Exploring the Opportunities and challenges” – 
Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) Paper, December 2011 at 15; Zarenda, H. “A Comprehensive Regional 
Industrial Policy for SADC” Tralac Working Paper, December 2012; Study Report on SADC Industrial 
Policy and Strategies - SADC Secretariat, November 2009. 
750 “SADC Industrialization Strategy and Roadmap 2015 – 2063” at 1; “SADC Industrialisation Strategy 
and Roadmap at www.tralac.org/news/article/7932-sadc-industrialisation-strategy-and-roadmap.html 
(accessed on 24 May 2016).  
751 This is a programme established under Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on standardisation, 
quality assurance, accreditation and metrology (SQAM) to establish the formal framework in which the co-
operation amongst the national institution in standardisation, quality assurance, accreditation and metrology 
shall take place in the Southern Africa region. The MoU entered into force on 16 July 2000. 
752 Report on the SADC Standardization, Quality Assurance, Accreditation and Metrology (SQAM) 
Programme, Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1 February 2016. 
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and Metrology (SQAM). The MoU served as the implementing instrument of the Trade 
Protocol on technical barriers to trade whilst awaiting the adoption of Annex IX. It was in 
place since 16 July 2000 until 17 July 2014 when Annex IX was adopted by the SADC.753 
 
Under the MoU, the SADC established a SADC-wide accreditation system known as the 
Southern African Development Community Accreditation Service (SADCAS) in March 
2009. The SADCAS is the first multi-economy accreditation body in the world and 
National Accreditation Focal Points (NAFPs) have been launched and appointed in the 
SADC member states which do not have a National Accreditation Body (NAB).754 
 
In May-June 2015, the SADCAS underwent a peer evaluation on the Testing Laboratory 
Accreditation Programme (TLAP) and Calibration Laboratory Accreditation Programme 
(CLAP). The evaluation team confirmed that the overall system of the SADCAS meets the 
African Accreditation Cooperation (AFRAC) and International Laboratory Accreditation 
Cooperation (ILAC) requirements.755 
 
The South African National Accreditation System (SANAS) – which is the SADCAS’ 
focal point in South Africa – represents the SADCAS on the Executive Committee of 
International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC) and the International 
Accreditation Forum (IAF). Attendance at these meetings is very important in ensuring the 
SADC’s participation internationally.756 
 
Member states also commit themselves to the elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTBs).757 
They are prohibited from applying any new quantitative restrictions on imports and 
exports, and are required to phase out existing restrictions on goods originating in other 
member states, except where this is provided for under the Protocol. Member states may 
                                                 
753 Ibid.  
754 “Report of Meeting of Accreditation Body Experts of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite” 16 – 17 
May 2012, Pretoria, South Africa.  
755 Report on the SADC Standardization, Quality Assurance, Accreditation and Metrology (SQAM) 
Programme, Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1 February 2016 at 3. 
756 “Annual Report of the SADC Cooperation in Accreditation (SADCA)” January – December 2015. 
757 Article 6 of Protocol on Trade. 
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also apply for a quota system only where such a quota system is more favourable than that 
applied under the Protocol.758 
 
There is, however, a number of exceptions to the application of these prohibitions. The 
exceptions include measures necessary to:  
1. protect public morals or maintain public order; 
2. protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
3. secure compliance with laws and regulations which are consistent with the 
provisions of the WTO; 
4. protect intellectual property rights, or prevent deceptive trade practices; 
5. the transfer of gold, silver, precious and semi-precious stones, including precious 
and strategic metals; 
6. impose the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological 
value; 
7. prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs in any exporting Member State; 
8. conserve exhaustible natural resources and the environment; and 
9. ensure compliance with existing obligations under international agreements.759 
 
To facilitate the goal of eliminating NTBs, an online NTB reporting mechanism was 
developed and adopted by the Committee of Ministers responsible for Trade (CMT) in July 
2007 and it became effective in 2009. It has now been extended to cover all the countries 
involved in the COMESA-SADC-EAC Tripartite Agreement. A mechanism for 
monitoring NTBs has also been introduced for the SADC, the COMESA and the EAC.760 
The three RECs also agreed to draw up a regional time-bound NTB elimination matrix. 
However, this might take time as the SADC and the COMESA have no regional 
                                                 
758 Article 7 of Protocol on Trade. 
759 Article 9. 
760  Trade Law Centre (Tralac). “The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan: SADC’s trade-led 
Integration Agenda – How is SADC doing?” Tralac (2012) at 9; Viljoen, W. “The proposed Tripartite Non-
tariff Barrier Elimination Mechanism: An Evaluation of Legal Texts and Practice” Tralac (2015) at 6; 
“Non-Tariff Measures and Regional Integration in the Southern African Development Community” Report 
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2015 at 13. 
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elimination matrix. The EAC is the only REC which has developed a time-bound 
elimination matrix.761  
 
The reporting and monitoring mechanisms show that the majority of complaints of non-
compliance are against the SADC member states.762 The non-compliance with the 
provision of the Trade Protocol regarding NTBs should, however, be understood within 
the context of the barriers that member states face. With regard to regulations on trade, for 
example, member states are required to use relevant international standards as the basis for 
their measures. The problem, however, is that there are already national standards in 
existence in these countries, and it is necessary to ensure that these standards are not an 
obstacle to trade in line with international standards.763 
 
However, the SADC FTA has largely eliminated tariffs within SADC, though many 
member states still remain members of multiple overlapping, and sometimes inconsistent, 
agreements on the continent. This, however, must be understood within the context that 
many of these economies are simply too small and this is their way of expanding their 
investment.764 
 
Therefore, the following problems have to be confronted in the case of the SADC: 
 
                                                 
761 “Non-Tariff Measures and Regional Integration in the Southern African Development Community”, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Report – 2015 at 14; East African 
Community Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers Act, 2015 (passed in May 2015 by East African Legislative 
Assembly). 
762 Viljoen (above, fn 760); Chikura, C. “The Non-Tariff Barrier Monitoring Mechanism” Political 
Economy of Regional Integration in Southern Africa (PERISA) Case Study for South African Institute of 
International Affairs (SAIIA), August 2013. 
763 This is in line with Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, commonly referred to as the TBT 
Agreement, which is an international treaty administered by the World Trade Organisation. Its purpose is to 
ensure that technical regulations, standards, testing, and certification procedures do not create unnecessary 
obstacles to trade. 
764 Mahembe, E et al. “The dynamics of foreign direct investment in SADC countries: experiences from 
five middle-income economies” Problems and Perspectives in Management vol. 11 issue 4 (2013); Behar, 
A et al. “How Integrated Is SADC? Trends in Intra-Regional and Extra-Regional Trade Flows and Policy” 
Policy Research Working Paper 5625 for the World Bank, April 2011 at 16. 
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Firstly, there is the fact that five members of SADC belong to the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU).765 The SACU is a free trade area with common external 
tariffs. As such there will have to be an agreed formula on how the SADC and the 
SACU tariffs are to be harmonised with the view to have one level of tariffs for the 
whole SADC.766 
 
Secondly, the application of tariff reduction programmes at different stages by 
different countries can create complex arrangements and undermine the overall 
integrative effect of the elimination of tariffs. The non-compliance by Angola and 
the DRC as well as partial application by Mozambique is a testimony to this. 767 
 
Thirdly, the SADC countries must realise that economic integration, by its very 
definition, is a process designed to completely abolish discrimination between local 
and imported goods, services and sectors over an agreed period of time. In other 
words, economic integration expands the effective market horizon within which 
economic agents can move the resources they hope to utilise productively.768 So if 
one or two member states do not comply fully with the agreement, the whole notion 
of integration is distorted. Again examples of Angola, the DRC and Mozambique, 
by not complying with the SADC FTA requirements, bear reference. 
 
The Protocol also provides for the phased reduction and eventual elimination of import 
duties on goods originating from member states. This is in recognition of the inequalities 
                                                 
765 These are Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. 
766 Mapuva, J et al. “The SADC regional bloc: What challenges and prospects for regional integration?” 
Law, Democracy and Development vol. 18 (2014) 22 at 30; Van der Merwe, C. “Zuma urges SACU to 
tackle EPA negotiations as united front” Engineering News (Online), 23 April 2010. Available at 
http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/zuma-urges-sacu-to-tackleepa-negotiations-as-united-front-2010-
04-22  (accessed on 25 May 2016); Ndulo, M. “African Integration Schemes: A case study of the SADC” 
African Yearbook of International Law vol. 7. No. 7 (1999 - 2001) at 23. 
767 Ndulo, M. “African Integration Schemes: A Case Study of the Southern African Development 
Community” Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Paper 58 (1999) at 19; Ahmed, K. “An analysis of regional 
integration in Southern Africa: A South African perspective” Tralac (2011) at 12. 
768 Weiler, J.H.H et al. “International and Regional Trade Law: The Law of the World Trade Organization. 
Unit I: The Syntax and Grammar of International Trade Law.” New York University Paper (2011) at 12; 
Balassa, B. The Theory of Economic Integration (2013) at 1; Hoekman, B. M et al. The Political Economy 
of the World Trading System (2009) at 474. 
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of the economies of the member states. 769 To minimise the potential negative impacts 
arising from the tariff phase-down, the SADC has opted for an arrangement that is based 
on a variable model, taking into account the asymmetrical level of development in the 
member states. The model is such that countries in the Southern African Customs Union - 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland - are liberalising faster, followed 
by Mauritius and Zimbabwe, while the rest follow.770 
 
The agreed tariff phase-down schedules were such that 85 percent of all product lines 
should be trading at zero tariffs by 2008. The remaining 15 percent, constituting sensitive 
products,771 would have tariff barriers removed from 2008 to 2012. This was in recognition 
of the fact that not all SADC countries were members of the Free Trade Area, as Angola 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo are yet to apply the Trade Protocol.772 
 
5.3.2 Harmonisation of laws 
 
For trade and liberalisation measures to be successful, they must be accompanied by efforts 
to harmonise laws and policies in order to promote economic cooperation and integration. 
Legal integration is critical to the process of integration as laws of different SADC member 
states in matters relating to trade, arbitration and enforcement of judgments can lead to 
conflicts and divergences among member states. These conflicts and divergences rank 
among the major barriers to intra-regional cooperation and integration.773 Hence the need 
for harmonisation of the laws of the different member states.   
 
                                                 
769 Article 4 of the Protocol on Trade. 
770 Sourced from http://www.pambazuka.org/aumonitor/comments/966/ (accessed on 24 May 2016); 
Kalenga, P.  “Regional integration in SADC: retreating or forging ahead?” Tralac Working Paper (2012) at 
2; Mtana, D et al.” Implication of Tanzania’s Multiple Memberships in Trade Performances: Focus of EAC 
and SADC Market” International Journal of Academic Research in Progressive Education and 
Development vol. 3 no. 3 (May 2014) 83 at 88. 
771 These are products listed by various signatories to be excluded from tariff liberalisation. 
772 Kalenga, P.  “Regional integration in SADC: retreating or forging ahead?” Tralac Working Paper (2012) 
at 7; Sandrey, R. “An analysis of the SADC Free Trade Area” Tralac Working Paper (2013) at 1.  
773 Ruppel, O.C et al. “The SADC Tribunal: a legal analysis of its mandate and role in regional integration” 
Monitoring regional integration in Southern Africa Yearbook vol. 8 (2008) at 207; Idris, M.B. 
“Harmonization of Business Laws in Africa – An Insight into the Laws, Issues, Problems and Prospects” 
Unified Business Laws for Africa: Common Law Perspectives on OHADA (2013) at 29. 
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Harmonisation means the removal of discord, and the reconciliation of contradictory 
elements between the rules and effects of two or more legal systems, often by eliminating 
major differences. The main essence of this harmonisation process in the context of 
international trade laws is that the effects of a type of transaction in one legal system are 
brought, as close as possible, to the effects of similar transactions under the laws of other 
countries.774 
 
The membership of the SADC represents at least three main legal systems, namely, the 
Common law, Roman-Dutch law and Civil law.775 Each, in turn, comprises many different 
systems of law that follow colonial patterns, and in some instances include traditional 
customary laws.776 So there is a need for these different legal systems to have a 
convergence point if integration has to work. 
 
Harmonisation of laws is not listed as an objective in Article 5, or an area of cooperation 
in Article 21, of the SADC Treaty. However, member states seem to have realised this 
shortcoming because the Trade Protocol deals extensively with this aspect in Annex II, 
Articles 2 to 5. Article 2 deals with scope and application of the Annex.777 Article 3 of this 
                                                 
774 Goldring J “Unification and the harmonisation of the rules of laws” Federal Law Review vol. 9 no. 3 
(1978) 284 at 289; Coetzee J et al. “Harmonisation of sales law: an international and regional perspective” 
Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and Arbitration vol. 10 No. 1 (2006) 15; Shumba, T. 
“Revisiting legal harmonisation under the Southern African Development Community Treaty: The need to 
amend the Treaty” Law Democracy and Development vol. 19 (2015) 127 at 135. 
775 South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Swaziland (Roman-Dutch); Angola, 
Madagascar, Seychelles, Mauritius and Mozambique (Civil Law) and South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania, 
Malawi and Mauritius (Common Law); Shumba (above, fn 774) at 135 – 136); Rupel, O.C et al. “The 
SADC Tribunal: A legal analysis of its mandate and role in regional integration” Monitoring Regional 
Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook vol. 8 (2008): Chapter 8 at 17.  
776 Allot, A. New Essays in African Law (1970) at 1; McDowell, C.M. “New Essays in African Law: 
Review” Africa (online publication) of 23 January 2012; Joireman, S.F. “Inherited Legal Systems and 
Effective Rule of Law: Africa and the Colonial Legacy” Political Science Faculty Publications Paper 113 
(2001); Bennet, T et al. African Perspectives on Tradition and Justice (2012); “Legal Research Guide: 
Customary Law in Africa” Law Library of the Congress, published on 19 June 2015. Available at 
www.loc.gov/law/help/africa-customary-law.php (accessed on 27 May 2016). 
777 Annex II, Article 2 of the SADC Protocol provides: 
“1. The objective of this Annex is to simplify and harmonise Customs laws and procedures by:  
a) providing for common measures with which Member states shall undertake to comply 
in the formulation of their Customs laws and procedures;  
b) establishing appropriate institutional arrangements at regional and national levels; c) 
co-operating to prevent fraud and illicit trade.  
2. The provisions of this Annex do not apply to areas of Customs co-operation which are covered 
specifically by Annexes I and IV of this Protocol.” 
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Annex deals with “Harmonisation of Customs Tariff Nomenclatures and Statistical 
Nomenclatures”,778 Article 4 with “Harmonisation of Valuation Laws and Practice”,779 and 
Article 5 with “Simplification and Harmonisation of Customs Procedures”.780 
 
                                                 
778 Article 3 provides: 
 
“1. Subject to the exceptions enumerated in paragraph 4:  
a) Each Member State undertakes, except as provided in sub-paragraph (c) of this 
paragraph, to adopt Customs tariffs nomenclatures and statistical nomenclatures which 
are in conformity with the Harmonised System. It thus undertakes that in respect of its 
Customs tariff and statistical nomenclatures – 
(i) it shall use all the headings and sub-headings of the Harmonised System 
without addition or modification, together with their related numerical codes;  
(ii) it shall apply the general rule for the interpretation of the Harmonised 
System and all the Section, chapter and sub-heading notes, and shall notify the 
scope of the sections, chapters, headings or sub-headings of the Harmonised 
Systems; and  
(iii) it shall follow the numerical sequence of the Harmonised System; 
 b) Each Member State shall also make publicity available on its import and export trade 
statistics in conformity with the six-digit codes of the Harmonised System, or at the 
initiative of the Member State, beyond that level, to the extent that publication is not 
precluded for exceptional reasons such as commercial confidentiality or national security;  
c) Nothing in this Article shall require a Contracting Party to use the sub-headings of the 
Harmonised System in its Customs Tariff Nomenclature provided that it meets the 
obligations at (a)(i) - (iii) above in a combined tariff/statistical nomenclature.  
 
2. In complying with the undertakings at paragraph 1 (a) of this Article, each Member State may 
make such textual adoptions as may be necessary to give effect to the Harmonised System in its 
domestic law.” 
779 Article 4 provides: 
 
“Member states undertake to adopt a system of valuing goods for Customs purposes based on 
principles of transparency, equity, uniformity and simplification of application in accordance with 
the WTO Valuation System.” 
780 Article 5 provides: 
 
“1. Member states, undertake to incorporate in their Customs Laws, provisions designed to 
simplify Customs procedures in accordance with internationally accepted standards, 
recommendations and guidelines particularly those which are contained in the International 
Instruments of: 
- the World Customs Organisation (WCO); 
 - the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE) 
 - the International Maritime Organisation (IMO); 
 - the International Civil Aviation Association (ICAO); 
 - the International Standards Organisation (ISO);  
 - the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC); and 
 - the International Air Transport Association (IATA)  
 
2. Member states undertake to adopt in their Customs Laws, common principles for the Customs 
procedures which, in the opinion of CMT, are particularly important in intra-Community trade.” 
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With regard to harmonisation of customs tariff nomenclatures, the Subcommittee on 
Customs Cooperation (SCCC), established in terms of Article 13 of the SADC Treaty,781 
has developed the “Common Tariff Nomenclature”, but its implementation is constrained 
by the overlapping memberships of member states in other regional economic communities 
(RECs), each of which have their own common tariff nomenclature.782 
 
The SADC Customs Act, which is a benchmark model law, was developed and adopted by 
the CMT in 2007 as a benchmark model law for the harmonisation of customs laws in the 
region. Member states are expected to align their national customs legislation to this model 
law. The SADC members also developed and agreed upon a Customs Declaration, a Transit 
Control Form and simplified procedures for risk analysis to facilitate intraregional trade. 
However, member states are having challenges in implementing these, including multiple 
memberships of different RECs; the lack of technical expertise to align the model Customs 
Act with domestic customs legislation; the lack of capacity to implement the instruments; 
the incompatibility of countries’ customs systems with the SADC Customs Declaration; 
and the absence of national legislation to enable countries to use the SADC Transit Control 
Form.783  
 
In 2009 the SADC Committee of Central Bank Governors (CCBG) adopted the Central 
Bank Model Law, which enshrines the central banks’ cooperation through strategies for 
                                                 
781 Article 13 of the SADC Protocol on Trade provides: 
“Member states shall, as provided for in Annex II of this Protocol, take appropriate measures, 
including arrangements regarding Customs administration co-operation, to ensure that the 
provisions of this Protocol are effectively and harmoniously applied.” 
 
In addition, Article 3 of Annex III of the Protocol provide:  
“Each Member State undertakes, to adopt Customs tariffs nomenclatures and statistical 
nomenclatures which are in conformity with the Harmonized System”. 
782 “SADC Subcommittee on Customs Cooperation Indicative Strategic Plan” – July 2011 at 1; “2012 Audit 
of the Implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade: USAID/Southern Africa Technical Report” – June 
2012 at 77 – 78.  
783 “2011 Audit of the Implementation of Regional SADC Customs Instruments and International 
Conventions: USAID/Southern Africa/SADC Technical Report” – October 2011 at 15; Trade Law Centre 
(Tralac). “The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan: SADC’s trade-led Integration Agenda – 
How is SADC doing?” Tralac Working Paper (2012) at 10; Hartzenberg, T. “Economic Integration Matters 
for SADC”, Paper for the SADC Think Tank Conference on Regional Integration Conference Report and 
Policy Papers, Maputo (Mozambique), 10 August 2012 at 18; “Non-Tariff Measures and Regional 
Integration in the Southern African Development Community”, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) Report – 2015 at 18. 
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stabilising financial systems in the SADC region. It also seeks to facilitate the 
harmonisation of their legal and operational frameworks, and sets standards of 
accountability and transparency in those frameworks. It is based on international best 
practices.784 All the SADC member states have passed legislation based on the Model Law 
and have independent central banks.785 
 
In 2012 the SADC also adopted the SADC Model Law on Electronic Transactions and 
Electronic Commerce, which seeks to enhance electronic commerce in the region by 
improving and modernising national laws, and is a product of the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) that it created for the SADC.786 Together with two other 
models, namely, the SADC Model Law on Data Protection, 2012 and the SADC Model 
Law on Cybercrime, 2012, it is intended to build a comprehensive regional framework for 
the development of the information society and the knowledge economy in the SADC; and 
to guide the SADC member states to draft or update their corresponding national 
legislations.787 
 
                                                 
784 Model Law, “Explanatory Note”; SADC “Guide to the SADC Central Bank Model Law (the Guide) 
2011”; Zongwe, D. “Conjuring systemic risk through financial regulation by SADC central banks” SADC 
Law Journal vol. 1 (2011) 99 at 110. 
785 Cabello, M et al. “Cross Border Banking Supervision in SADC Region” Banking on the African 
Moment vol. 4 issue 2 (2013) 36. 
786 “SADC Model Law on Electronic Transactions and Electronic Commerce” available at: 
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Projects/ITU-EC (accessed on 1 June 2015); Shumba, T. “Revisiting legal 
harmonisation under the Southern African Development Community Treaty: The need to amend the 
Treaty” Law Democracy and Development vol. 19 (2015) at 141; Nangela, D. “Harmonisation or 
unification of laws in the context of SADC regional integration: Analysing the SADC’s initiatives in the 
area of e-commerce” online paper, available at www.slideshare.net/DrDeoNangela/harmonisation-of-
national-laws-in-the-context-of- (accessed on 1 June 2016).  
787 Reply by the Minister of Telecommunications and Postal Services to a parliamentary question by Hon K 
Mobu, 25 August 2015. Available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-question/611/ (accessed on 8 June 
2016). 
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So far only South Africa788 and Mauritius789 have domesticated these model laws. 
Botswana and Zambia have their own cybercrime laws, and all other SADC member states 
are still developing such laws.790 However, the biggest stumbling block for these member 
states seems to be the capacity to enact and implement such laws in various member states, 
especially the model laws on data protection and cybercrime, which are very technical.791 
 
Furthermore, in 2012, the SADC introduced the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Template (Model BIT) in line with the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment,792 with 
a view to further foster the harmonisation of investment laws and practice at bilateral treaty 
level. It provides for the resolution of disputes between member states relating to the Model 
BIT and allows them to bring International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
                                                 
788 South Africa have enacted the following legislation based on the Model Law: Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act, 2002 (as amended); Regulation of Interception of Communications 
Act, 2002 (as amended), National Credit Act, 2005; Protection of Personal Information Act, 2013 and 
National Cyber Security Policy Framework for South Africa approved by Cabinet, 2012; Chetty, P. “An 
Analysis of Electronic Signature Regulation in South Africa”, A research report submitted to the Faculty of 
Management, University of the Witwatersrand, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Management (in the field of ICT Policy and Regulation), March 2013. 
789 Mauritius amended its IT-related laws such as Information Technology Act, 1998; Cyber Crime and 
Computer Misuse Act, 2003; Data Protection Act, 2004 and Electronic Transaction Act, 2010 to be in line 
with the SADC model laws United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model 
law for electronic transactions; Blythe, S.E. Certification Authority Law Around The World: The e-
commerce law trilogy vol. 3 (2013) Chapter 17; “Mauritius: e-commerce legislation” at 
http://www.lowtax.net/information/mauritius/mauritius-e-commerce-legislation.html (accessed on 8 June 
2016). 
790 “Electronic Transactions and Electronic Commerce: Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) Model Law”, International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Report 2013; “Computer Crime and 
Cybercrime: Southern African Development Community (SADC) Model Law”, International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) Report 2013; Greenleaf, G et al. “African regional privacy instruments: 
Their effects on harmonization”, 132 Privacy Laws and Business International Report, 19 – 21 December 
2014 at 3; 
791 Jamil, Z. “Cybercrime Model Laws”, Discussion paper prepared for the Cybercrime Convention 
Committee (T-CY), Strasbourg, France, 23 December 2014; Van der Merwe, D. “A comparative overview 
of the (sometimes uneasy) relationship between digital information and certain legal fields in South Africa 
and Uganda” Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad vol. 17 no. 1 (2014) 297; Orji, U.J. “Multilateral 
Legal Responses to Cyber Security in Africa: Any Hope for Effective International Cooperation?” in 
Maybaum, M et al. 2015 7th International Conference on Cyber Conflict Proceedings: Architectures in 
Cyberspace (2015) at 108; Shumba, T. “Revisiting legal harmonisation under the Southern African 
Development Community Treaty: The need to amend the Treaty” Law Democracy and Development vol. 
19 (2015) at 142. 
792 Article 2 of Annex 5 of the Protocol on Finance and Investment requires State Parties to “promote the 
mutual co-operation, co-ordination and harmonisation of the legal and operational frameworks of Central 
Banks which shall culminate in the creation of a Model Central Bank Statute for the Region as 
contemplated by the RISDP.” 
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arbitration proceedings against a host state on behalf of its national who suffered a loss as 
a result of the actions of the host state.793 In addition to ICSID and UNCITRAL, member 
states are allowed to use other alternative forums as alternatives, either regional or 
continental.794   
 
Only Angola795 and South Africa796 have passed legislation based on the Model BIT. All 
other member states either rely on their constitutions or other laws that existed in their 
countries before 2012 having similar provisions to the Model BIT.797 
 
5.3.3 Settlement of disputes 
 
The dispute settlement mechanism is necessary to deal with situations whereby member 
states disagree on the existence of impediments to intra-regional trade. Parties to 
international treaties usually choose non-legalised dispute settlement (that is arbitration, 
mediation, good offices, etc.) or legalised dispute settlement such as courts or tribunals to 
settle their disputes. In most cases treaties provide that the mechanism is binding. However, 
the mere existence of a binding mechanism does not in itself guarantee effective dispute 
settlement. The success of the dispute settlement mechanism depends on the existence of a 
substantial corpus of “community law”. There is no necessity for a binding and compulsory 
                                                 
793 Article 28 of the SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template (Model BIT); Ngobeni, L. “The 
Investor-State Dispute Resolution Forum under the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment: Challenges 
and opportunities for effective harmonisation” Law, Democracy and Development vol. 19 (2015) 175 at 
179; Adeleke, F. “Benchmarking South Africa’s Foreign Direct Investment Policy” South African Institute 
of International Affairs (SAIIA) Policy Insights 13, April 2015 at 5.  
794 Article 29(6).  
795 Private Investment Law No. 14/15, of 11 August 2015; Nadais, J et al. “Approval of New Private 
Investment Law in Angola” Deloitte. Invest in Angola (online) available at 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ao/Documents/tax/Deloitte_TripiticoLIP_EN_web.pdf 
(accessed on 28 July 2016). 
796 Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015 (signed into law by the President in December 2015).  
797 Ngobeni L. “The Investor-State Dispute Resolution Forum under the SADC Protocol on Finance and 
Investment: Challenges and opportunities for effective harmonisation” Law, Democracy and Development 
vol. 19 (2015) at 183 – 184.  
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dispute settlement mechanism if there is a low degree of legal codification of the fields of 
cooperation, 798 as evidenced by the SADC Tribunal-Zimbabwe saga.799  
 
The SADC also follows both the non-legalised and legalised mechanisms of dispute 
resolution. The SADC Trade Protocol provides a procedure to deal with disputes 
concerning the interpretation and application of the Protocol. The first step of resolution is 
through negotiations800 between member states involved in the dispute. These negotiations 
will be in the form of cooperation801 and consultations802 to arrive at a mutually satisfactory 
                                                 
798 Alter, K. J. “The Multiple Roles of International Courts and Tribunals: Enforcement, Dispute 
Settlement, Constitutional and Administrative Review”, Faculty Working Papers. Paper 212 (2012) at 9; 
Staton, J.K. “A Taxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions” Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement vol. 2 no. 1 (2011) 241; Lehmann, J. “Regional Economic Integration and Dispute Settlement 
outside Europe” International Law Forum vol. 7 no.1 – 4 (2005) 54 at 61. 
799 In the two cases involving the Zimbabwean Government (Mike Campbell (PVT) Limited and Another v 
Republic of Zimbabwe (2/07) [2007] SADC (T) 1 (13 December 2007) and Gondo and Others v Republic of 
Zimbabwe Case no. 05/2008 SADC (T)) the Tribunal gave judgments against Zimbabwe, which refused to honour 
them arguing lack of jurisdiction by the Tribunal. This led to the suspension of the operations of the 
Tribunal by the SADC Heads of State or Government Summit of May 2011. 
800 Article 32(1) of the SADC Protocol on Trade Provides: 
“Member states shall endeavour to agree on the interpretation and application of this Protocol, and 
shall make every effort, through co-operation and consultation, to arrive at a mutually satisfactory 
agreement.” 
801 Article 2 of Annex VI to the SADC Protocol on Trade provides: 
“The Member states shall:  
(a) at all times endeavour to agree on the interpretation and application of this Protocol; 
(b) make every attempt through cooperation to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of any 
matter that may affect the operation of this Protocol; and 
 (c) make use of the rules and procedures of this Annex to resolve disputes in a speedy, cost-
effective and equitable manner.” 
802 Article 3 of Annex VI to the SADC Protocol on Trade provides:  
“1. A Member State may request in writing consultations with any other Member State regarding any 
measure that it considers might affect its rights and obligations under the provisions of this Protocol.  
2. The requesting Member State shall notify the other Member states and the CMT of the request, through 
the Sector Coordinating Unit. Any request for consultations shall give the reasons for the request, including 
identification of the measures at issue and an indication of the legal basis of the complaint.  
 
3. The requested Member State shall accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity 
for consultations regarding any representations made by another Member State.  
 
4. The requested Member State shall, unless otherwise mutually agreed, reply to the request within 10 days 
after the date of its receipt and shall enter into consultations in good faith within a period of not more than 
30 days after the date of receipt of the request, with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. If 
the requested Member State does not respond within 10 days after the date of receipt of the request, or does 
not enter into consultations within a period of no more than 30 days, or a period otherwise mutually agreed, 
after the date of receipt of the request, then the requesting Member State may proceed directly to request 
the establishment of a panel.  
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agreement.  If this fails, the second step would be to have recourse to a panel of trade 
experts.803 Referral to the panel of experts includes for any other disputes.804 If this also 
fails, the third and last step would be to refer the dispute to the SADC Tribunal.805  
 
In addition, apart from this linear procedure or approach, Annex VI to the Protocol on 
Trade makes provision for dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms in the form of good 
offices, conciliation and mediation procedures. However, all these are voluntary and per 
agreement.806  
                                                 
5. Whenever a Member State other than the consulting Member states considers that it has a substantial 
trade interest in consultations being held pursuant to a request made under paragraph 1, such Member State 
may notify the consulting Member states and the Sector Coordinating Unit, within 10 days after the date of 
circulation of the request for consultations, of its desire to be joined in the consultations. Such Member 
State shall be joined in the consultations, provided that the requested Member State agrees that the claim of 
substantial interest is well-founded. In that event, the consulting Member states shall also inform the CMT, 
through the Sector Coordinating Unit. If the request to be joined in the consultations is not accepted, the 
applicant Member State shall be free to request consultations under this Article.  
 
6. The consulting Member states shall make every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of 
any matter and, to this end, they shall- (a) provide sufficient information to enable a full examination of 
how the actual or proposed measure or other matter may affect the operation of this Protocol; (b) treat any 
confidential or proprietary information exchanged in the course of consultations on the same basis as the 
Member State providing the information; and (c) seek to avoid any resolution that adversely affects the 
interests of any other Member State under this Protocol.  
 
7. If the consulting Member states fail to resolve a matter pursuant to this Article within: (a) 60 days after 
the date of receipt of the request for consultations; or (b) such other period as they may agree, any such 
Member State may request in writing the establishment of a panel. The requesting Member State shall 
notify the other Member states and the CMT of the request through the Sector Coordinating Unit.  
 
8. In cases of urgency, including those which concern perishable goods, Member states shall enter into 
consultations within a period of no more than 10 days after the date of receipt of the request. If the 
consultations have failed to settle the dispute within a period of 20 days after the date of receipt of the 
request, the requesting Member State may request the establishment of a panel.” 
803 Article 32(5). The procedure and scope of operation for the Panel are laid out in Annex VI of the SADC 
Trade Protocol Articles 5 – 19). 
804 Article 32(2) provides: 
“The settlement of any dispute among Member states shall, whenever possible, imply removal of a measure 
not conforming with the provisions of this Protocol or causing mollification or impairment of such 
provision.” (My emphasis). 
805 Article 32(6) provides: 
“As a last resort, disputes regarding the interpretation and application of this Protocol shall be settled in 
accordance with Article 32 of the Treaty.” 
806 Article 4 of Annex VI to the SADC Trade Protocol provides: 
 “1. Good offices, conciliation and mediation are procedures that are undertaken voluntarily if the 
disputing Member states so agree. 
2. Procedures involving good offices, conciliation and mediation shall be confidential, and may be 
requested at any time by a disputing Member State.  These procedures may begin at any time and be 
terminated at any time.  
232 
 
 
So far no disputes have been filed through the ADR or panel mechanisms yet.807 The SADC 
Tribunal had not dealt with any trade dispute either before its suspension,808 but has given 
a decision which implied “harmonisation of laws”. In the two cases involving the 
Government of Zimbabwe,809 the Tribunal held that section 5(2) of the State Liability Act 
of the Respondent (Zimbabwe) – which absolves the state property to form the subject-
matter of execution, attachment or process to satisfy a judgment debt – is not only in breach 
of the right to an effective remedy, the right to have access to an independent and impartial 
court or tribunal and the right to a fair hearing, but is also in contravention of the right to 
equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law, and, therefore, is 
incompatible with the Respondent’s obligations under Articles 4(c)810 and 6(1)811 of the 
SADC Treaty. 
 
In this regard, the Tribunal drew the attention of the member states to the adverse effect 
which their existing state immunity or state liability legislation has on the principles of 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law in so far as such legislation provides that state 
property cannot be the subject-matter of execution, attachment or process in satisfaction of 
a judgment debt.812 
                                                 
3 The Chairperson of the CMT, or any other Member of the CMT designated by the Chairperson who is 
not a national of a disputing Member State, may offer good offices, conciliation or mediation with a view 
to assisting the disputing Member states.” 
807 Ng’ong’ola, C. “Replication of WTO dispute settlement processes in SADC” SADC Law Journal Vol. 1 
(2011) 35 at 36; Chase, C et al. “Mapping of Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Regional Trade Agreements 
- Innovative or Variations on a Theme?” WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2013-07, Geneva, June 2013 at 
6; “The Settlement of Disputes in the SADC Free Trade Area”, Submission by Trade Law Centre (Tralac) 
for the SADC August 2014 Summit at 3. 
808 It was formally suspended by the SADC Heads of State or Government Extraordinary Summit of 
August 2010, in Windhoek, Namibia after a protracted battle with the Government of Zimbabwe that 
refused to obey its judgments.  
809 Mike Campbell (PVT) Limited and Another v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/07) [2007] SADC (T) 1 (13 
December 2007 (judgment delivered on 28 November 2008) and Gondo and Others v Republic of 
Zimbabwe  05/2008 [2010] SADC (T) (judgment delivered on 9 December 2010). 
810 Article 4(c) of the SADC Treaty provides: 
“SADC and its Member states shall act in accordance human rights, democracy and the rule of law.” 
811 Article 6(1) of the SADC Treaty provides: 
“Member states undertake to adopt adequate measures to promote the achievement of the objectives of 
SADC, and shall refrain from taking any measure likely to jeopardise the sustenance of its principles, the 
achievement of its objectives and the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty.” 
812 Gondo Case (above, fn 809) at 14.  
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The suspension, and non-appointment of judges,813 of the Tribunal effectively means the 
SADC currently has no court to deal with trade disputes if they were to arise. The only 
remaining mechanisms are thus the non-legalised mechanisms of alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) and panel of experts. And the challenge with these mechanisms is that 
they are both not compulsory (they are voluntary) and per agreement by the parties 
involved. This essentially means an aggrieved Member State would not have a recourse if 
the respondent were not to agree to them.814    
 
5.4. Achievements with regard to various relevant protocols 
 
The SADC has passed and adopted various protocols that constitute the SADC law for the 
integration process. Currently, the SADC has 26 Protocols, and out of these 2 have not yet 
entered into force.815  
 
The SADC Protocol on Trade forms the crux of this thesis, and has been dealt with 
extensively (especially under 5.3.1 above), so it will not be dealt with again in this section. 
The other protocol that has already been dealt with extensively – in Chapter 4, dealing with 
“institutions of the SADC” and in this Chapter (above) under “dispute resolution” – is the 
Protocol on the Tribunal and the Rules thereof. It will also not be repeated in this section. 
So is the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security, which establishes the Organ on 
Politics, defence and Security. It was also dealt with in Chapter 4 – “structure and 
institutions of the SADC”. 
 
                                                 
813 The SADC Heads of State and Government Extraordinary Summit of May 2011 resolves that no judges 
should be appointed to the Tribunal.  
814 Erasmus, G. “The New Protocol for the SADC Tribunal: Jurisdictional Changes and Implications for 
SADC Community Law”, Tralac Working Paper No. US15WP01/2015, January 2015; de Wet, E. “The 
Rise and Fall of the Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community: Implications for Dispute 
Settlement in Southern Africa” ICSID Review vol. 28 issue 1 (2013) 45 at 60; Tino, E. “The role of regional 
judiciaries in Eastern and Southern Africa” in Bösl, A et al. Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern 
Africa Yearbook 2012 (2013) at 144. 
815 These are: “Protocol on Facilitation and Movement of Persons” (2005) and “Protocol on Science, 
Technology and Innovation” (2008). 
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The protocols dealt with under this section are others, besides the three, that have come 
into force.  
 
5.4.1 Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology 
 
Recognising that closer integration of these sectors offers benefit to the region, the SADC 
passed the Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology on 24 August 1996. 
This was in pursuance of Articles 22 and 23 of the SADC Treaty, which provide for 
member states to conclude a protocol to expand and deepen their cooperation in the areas 
of infrastructure and services. It entered into force on 6 July 1998.  
 
In terms of this Protocol, member states’ general objective is to establish transport, 
communications and meteorology systems which provide efficient, cost-effective and fully 
integrated infrastructure and operations, which best meet the needs of customers and 
promote economic and social development while being environmentally and economically 
sustainable.816  
 
                                                 
816 Article 2(3) of the Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology.  
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In addition to these tenets the Protocol has specific objectives for each of the areas that it 
covers, that is, transport,817 communications818 and meteorology.819 
                                                 
817 These Articles list objectives with regard to various aspects and modes of transport as follows:  
“3.1 (integrated transport) 
Member states shall promote economically-viable integrated transport service provision in the 
region - 
a. characterized by high performance standards and consistent levels of efficiency and 
reliability of all individual component parts of the transport chain;  
b. on the basis of complementarity and co-operation between modes, modal choice 
optimization, seaport hinterland optimization and with due regard to modal advantages;  
c. bearing in mind the need to preserve the region's transportation infrastructure;  
d. by encouraging the development of multimodal service provision; and  
e. compatible with responsible environmental management;  
to support the development of major regional development corridors and facilitate travel between 
their territories.  
 
4.1 (road infrastructure) 
Member states agree to ensure and sustain the development of an adequate roads network in 
support of regional socio-economic growth by providing, maintaining and improving all roads 
including primary, secondary, tertiary and urban roads, including those segments which 
collectively constitute the RTRN in order to - 
a. ensure access to major centres of population and economic activity;  
b. ensure access between ports of entry between Member states and harbours of importance 
to the region;  
c. minimize total road transport costs;  
d. preserve assets vested in road infrastructure; and  
e. minimize detrimental impacts to the environment. 
 5.1 (road transport) 
 
Member states shall facilitate the unimpeded flow of goods and passengers between and across 
their respective territories by promoting the development of a strong and competitive commercial 
road transport industry which provides effective transport services to consumers. 
 
 6.1 (road traffic) 
Member states shall enhance the overall quality of road traffic in the region with the emphasis on 
promoting acceptable levels of safety, security, order, discipline and mobility on the roads and 
protecting the environment and road infrastructure. 
 
 7. 1 (railways) 
 
Member states shall facilitate the provision of a seamless, efficient, predictable, cost-effective, 
safe and environmentally-friendly railway service which is responsive to market needs and 
provides access to major centres of population and economic activity. 
  
8.1 (maritime and inland waterway transport)   
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Member states shall promote the economic and social development of the region by developing 
and implementing harmonized international and regional transport policies in respect of the high 
seas and inland waterways which - 
a. maximize regional and international trade and exchange;  
b. provide appropriate frameworks for economic and concomitant institutional restructuring;  
c. promote a safe and clean marine, maritime and inland waterway environment;  
d. encourage the provision of accessible, viable and productive landside infrastructure;  
e. establish a customer-sensitive and needs-driven approach; and 
f.  promote the establishment of an integrated transport system set out in Chapter 3. 
9.1 (civil aviation) 
1. Member states, recognizing the importance of air transport as a means of serving the 
national interests of the SADC Member states and the importance of promoting social 
and business relations amongst their nationals, shall ensure the provision of safe, reliable 
and efficient services in accordance with the ICAO SARPs, with a view to improving 
levels of service and cost-efficiency in support of the socio-economic development of the 
region.  
2. Member states recognise further that in order to overcome the constraints of small 
national markets, market restrictions and the small size of some SADC airlines and 
further to ensure the competitiveness of regional air services in a global context, there is a 
need for enhanced co-operation within the regional air transport market. “ 
818 Articles 10.1 and 11.1 provide: 
“10.1 (telecommunications) 
Member states agree to take advantage of international technological developments and to develop 
national telecommunications networks for the provision of reliable, effective and affordable 
telecommunications services in order to - 
a. ensure adequate high quality and efficient services responsive to the diverse needs of 
commerce and industry in support of regional social and economic growth;  
b. achieve regional universal service with regard to telecommunications services and 
regional universal access to advanced information services; and  
c. enhance service interconnectivity in the region and globally 
11.1 (postal services) 
Member states shall provide efficient market-related universal postal services responsive to 
consumer needs which are affordable, of a good quality and meet the social needs of 
communications as a public service mission and maintain complementary and supportive 
relationships between their respective postal administrations in support of the economic needs of 
the region.” 
819 Article 12.1 provides: 
1. Member states acknowledge that they are members of the WMO and, through their national 
meteorological services, they constitute an integral part of the regional and global system or 
network of the WMO programmes and structures, in particular the World Weather Watch 
programme.  
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In order to achieve the objectives of this Protocol, the SADC developed key tenets of the 
Protocol and an implementation road map: 
a) developing a Regional Transport Master Plan to meet the trade and 
developmental requirements of the region, based on regional consensus; 
 
b) packaging of infrastructure development projects identified by the Master Plan 
to be marketed to the private sector through, among others, public-private 
partnerships (PPP) options; 
 
c) implementing corridor infrastructure development to ensure high standard of 
road, rail and inland waterways linkages interconnecting the SADC member states; 
 
d) undertaking transport and trade facilitation along with corridors to ensure smooth 
passage of trucks and people with minimal delays at border posts, through 
application of the one-stop border post concept and standardisation of customs 
procedures and documents; and  
 
e) development of harmonised road transport multilateral agreements in respect of 
licensing, road user charges, vehicle dimensions, overloading enforcement, third 
party, control rules of fair competition and bond guarantee schemes.820 
 
After the coming into operation of this Protocol, the SADC replaced the Southern African 
Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC), which was established in 1981 
                                                 
2. Member states shall, within the regional and international co-operative system of the WMO, 
provide adequate legal frameworks and appropriate financial support to the national 
meteorological services to -  
a. establish an integrated network of observation, data processing and communications 
systems; and  
b. enhance the provision of meteorological services for general and specialized applications 
in the region and internationally. 
820 Makumbe, R. “The SADC regional strategy to intermodal transportation and logistics in southern 
Africa” On the occasion of the 5th Intermodal Africa 2007 South Africa exhibition and conference - 
International Convention Centre Durban, South Africa 30 March, 2007. 
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during the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to 
coordinate regional transport, with the Directorate of Infrastructure and Services of the 
SADC Secretariat.821 
 
Through the Directorate, the SADC recognises the important role that cross-border 
transport plays in facilitating trade flows between member states within the SADC region. 
This is more so because no less than six countries in the SADC are landlocked, which 
means that these countries rely on the availability of efficient cross-border transport to 
reach global markets.822  
 
In recognition of this important role, the SADC started to follow the “Corridor model” for 
both road and railway.823 So far the following transport corridors exist in the SADC region:  
 Lobito Corridor - Angola, via the DRC, to Zambia; 
 Dar es Salaam Corridor – Tanzania, through Malawi, to Zambia; 
 Trans-Kalahari Corridor – from Walvis Bay in Namibia, through Botswana to 
Johannesburg; 
 Beira Corridor – Mozambique to wider region (Agriculture); 
 Nacala Corridor – Mozambique to Malawi; 
 Maputo Corridor – Mozambique to South Africa; 
 Trans-Caprivi Corridor – Namibia to Zambia; and 
 North-South (Durban) Corridor – South Africa to the DRC. 
 
                                                 
821 Carlsson, B.T et al. “Nordic Support to SATCC-TU” (online). Available at 
http://www.sida.se/English/publication/Publications_database/Publications-by-year-2002/april/9912 
(accessed on 22 June 2016); Conjé, J.B. “The road transport sector in the context of the SADC Protocol on 
Transport, Communications and Meteorology” Tralac Working Paper (2015) at 24. 
822 Khumalo, S. “Unlocking South African Cross-Border Transport Challenges: A Case Study of Beitbridge 
Border Post”, Paper delivered at the 33rd Southern African Transport Conference (SATC 2014), 7 – 10 July 
2014, Pretoria, South Africa.  
823 Sindzingre, A. “Trade structure as a constraint to multilateral and regional arrangements in sub-Saharan 
Africa: the WTO and African Union” Centre for Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR) 10th 
Anniversary Conference Paper, University of Warwick 17 – 19 September 2007 at 30; “Seamless transport 
corridors key to regional integration”, Southern African News Features (SANF) 11 no. 30B (online). 
Available at http://www.sardc.net/en/southern-african-news-features/seamless-transport-corridors-key-to-
regional-integration/ (accessed on 23 June 2016). 
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The Trans-Kalahari (TKH) Corridor is now a SADC-wide private/public partnership model 
and has been joined with the Maputo Corridor to form the so-called “Coast to Coast” 
Corridor. The total length of this Corridor is estimated at 2 310km and passes through four 
countries, namely, Namibia, Botswana, South Africa and Mozambique.824 The countries 
involved have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) committing to 
harmonisation of traffic laws and road management plan.825  
 
In November 2009 the SADC launched the “One-Stop Border Post” (OSBP) initiative with 
the introduction of the Churundu One-Stop Border Post, in line with the Trade Protocol, 
which advocates for the elimination of barriers to trade as well as the easing of customs 
and transit procedures.  Under this scheme, immigration and customs procedures are 
carried out just once in each direction, in contrast to the situation at most border posts in 
the region where paperwork must be completed on both sides.826  
 
For now, Chirundu is the only operational OSBP of its kind in the region, but sixteen of 
the 35 most important border posts in the region have been identified as candidates for 
conversion to the one-stop system by 2020. South Africa is in the process of adopting a 
national policy and strategy which will allow the Beit Bridge and Lebombo border posts, 
among others, to work towards operating as OSBPs. In June 2016 South Africa and 
Mozambique integrated the Lebombo/Ressano Garcia border post and this was followed 
by an agreement between South Africa and Zimbabwe in October 2017 to set up the Beit 
Bridge One-Stop Border Post (OSBP) Technical Team. The team will develop the 
necessary legal framework for the establishment of the Beit Bridge One-Stop Border 
Post.827 
                                                 
824 van As, S.C et al. “Maputo to Walvis Bay Road Safety Management Pilot Study”, June 2009 at 2. 
825 Article 4 of Trans-Kalahari Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Botswana, South Africa 
and Namibia, 2003.   
826 “Facilitating trade, reducing time and costs” SADC @35- Success Stories vol. 1 (2015) at 4; De Bruyn, 
C. “Delays along key trade corridors costing ‘billions’ in trade” Creamer Media’s Engineering News 
(online). Available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/delays-along-key-sadc-trade-corridors-
costing-billions-in-trade-study-2015-07-08/rep_id:4136 (accessed on 23 June 2016). 
827 “SA, Zimbabwe push for one-stop Beitbridge border post” The South African Government News 
Agency (SAnews), 3 October 2017; “SA, Zimbabwe push for one-stop Beitbridge border post” The Citizen 
(online), 3 October 2017; Joint Communiqué on the occasion of the Second Session of the Bi-National 
Commission (BNC) between South Africa and Zimbabwe in Pretoria, 3 October 2017. 
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With regard to aviation, the SADC adopted, together with the COMESA and the EAC, the 
“Guidelines, Provisions and Procedures for the Implementation of Regulations for 
Competition in Air Transport Services” on the basis of the Yamoussoukro Decision828 in 
2007.829 In October 2008 the three RECs launched the Joint Competition Authority (JCA) 
to oversee the full implementation of the Yamoussoukro Decision in the three RECs. A 
Yamoussoukro Decision-compliant template has been proposed as an essential component 
of the framework to operationalise the JCA. The Draft Framework has been produced, but 
still has to be adopted by the three RECs.830 
 
With regard to maritime transport, the Protocol encourages member states to facilitate 
development of port and inland waterway infrastructure throughout Southern Africa. 
Though there are still challenges due to lack of technical capacity in many member 
states, the region currently has 64 maritime and inland waterway transport projects under 
development. These projects concentrate on two centres: Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and 
Walvis Bay, Namibia. In addition to these projects, significant developments are also 
underway at Nacala, Beira, and Maputo in Mozambique; Luanda in Angola; and the highly 
productive port of Durban, South Africa. And much of this development stems from private 
sector involvement.831  
 
                                                 
828 The Yamoussoukro Decision is based on the Yamoussoukro Declaration of October 1988, which was an 
African Civil Aviation Policy geared towards a comprehensive reform of the air transport industry and the 
unification of the fragmented African air transport market. The Decision was taken in November 1999, 
aimed at liberalised intra-Africa air transport markets with minimum Government intervention. 
829 “Southern African Development Community - Desk Assessment of the Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan 2005 – 2010”, SADC Council November 2011 at 48; “A Framework for the 
Operationalisation of the COMESA EAC-SADC Joint Competition Authority (JCA)”, Draft Final Report 
of COMESA, EAC and SADC – Part 6 YD-Compliant Air Services Agreement at 10. 
830 “A Framework for the Operationalisation of the COMESA EAC-SADC Joint Competition Authority 
(JCA)” (above, fn 829) at 12; Louga, K. “Air Traffic Competition Law: Africa – To what extent is the 
Southern and Eastern Africa Liberalized?” Research Paper for Leiden University, February 2016 at 12. 
831 “Maritime, ports and inland waterways”, SADC – Towards a Common Future (online). Available at 
http://www.sadc.int/themes/infrastructure/maritime-ports-inland-waterways/ (accessed on 24 June 2016); 
Walker, T. “From missed opportunity to oceans of prosperity”, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) article of 
13 October 2015. Available at https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/from-missed-opportunity-to-oceans-of-
prosperity (accessed on 24 June 2016). 
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With regard to communication, the SADC adopted the “ICT Development Strategy for the 
SADC Region” – called “e-SADC Strategic Framework” – in May 2010 which, among 
others, addresses convergence challenges and harmonisation of information and 
communication technology (ICT) infrastructure, services and indicators and promotes ICT 
usage for regional economic integration, enhancement of connectivity and access to ICT 
services among and within the member states.832 It is a three-pronged strategy, namely: 
 proper regulatory and policy framework for attracting investors; 
 infrastructure development; and 
 deployment of applications. 
 
The main project under this Framework was the SADC Regional Information Infrastructure 
(SRII) Project, which was linked to an undersea fibre optic cable system connecting 
countries of eastern Africa to the rest of the world, the Eastern Africa Submarine Cable 
System (EASSy). The cable entered service on 16 July 2010, with commercial service 
starting on 30 July 2010. 833  Currently all the SADC countries are connected to submarine 
cable landing stations, and many are implementing various national projects in line with 
the SADC Master Plan Vision 2027.834  
 
The Vision 2027 is captured in the SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master 
Plan (RIDMP), which was adopted in August 2012 to deal with infrastructure challenges 
in the region until 2027. It is being implemented over three five-year intervals:  short term 
(2012 - 2017), medium term (2017 - 2022) and long term (2022 - 2027), and cuts across 
                                                 
832 “SADC experts adopt e-commerce strategy to fast-track intra-regional trade, economic integration” ECA 
Press Release No. 54/2012. 
833 “ICT Challenges to Enhance Socio-economic Development and Regional Integration within SADC”, 
presentation to the EuroAfrica-ICT FP7 Awareness Workshop, Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) Secretariat ICT Unit, Gaborone, 08 – 09 October 2007. 
834 The SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan (RIDMP) was adopted by the SADC 
Heads of State and Government at the 32nd Ordinary Summit held in August 2012 in Maputo, Mozambique; 
“Presentation by the Southern Africa Telecommunications Association (SATA) at the AU-SADC Regional 
Internet Exchange Point (RIXP) and Regional Internet Carrier (RIC) Workshop”, 3 - 7 February 2014, 
Grand Palm Hotel, Gaborone, Botswana (online). Available at 
http://pages.au.int/sites/default/files/02SATA%20Activities%20on%20Interconnection%20and%20IXPs%
20in%20the%20SADC%20Region_0.pdf (accessed on 24 June 2016). 
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six sectors, namely Energy, Transport, Tourism, Information and Communication 
technology (ICT) and Postal, Meteorology and Water.835  
 
In the transport sector, the Master Plan focuses on effective regulation of transport services, 
liberalisation of transport markets, development of corridors and facilitation of cross-
border movement, construction of missing regional transport links, corridor management 
institutions establishment for Beira, Lobito and North-South Corridors, and harmonisation 
of road safety data systems.836 
 
In the information communication technology (ICT) sector, the Master Plan’s focus is on 
addressing harmonisation of SADC regional ICT policy and regulatory frameworks; the 
SADC regional ICT infrastructure development, international and regional coordination; 
coordination and harmonisation of the SADC ICT and postal strategic plans and 
programmes; facilitation of policy dialogue and implementation of the Transport, 
Communication and Meteorology Protocol.837 
 
In the meteorology sector, the Master Plan focuses on ensuring availability of timely early 
warning information relating to adverse weather and climate variability impacts. Another 
highlight in the meteorology sector is the development of a framework for harmonised 
indicators for the provision of relevant climate forecasting information to facilitate 
preparations of mitigation measures against droughts, floods and cyclones.838 
 
Following the adoption of the Master Plan, the SADC Secretariat in collaboration with the 
SADC ministries responsible for the six sectors, namely Energy, Transport, Tourism, ICT 
and Postal, Meteorology and Water, are formulating frameworks to guide the 
                                                 
835 “SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan – August 2012”; Dube, M. “Analysing the 
Development Process for Infrastructure Projects in SADC” Political Economy of Regional Integration in 
Southern Africa (PERISA) Series 3 – Infrastructure, August 2013. 
836 SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan – Executive Summary at 8.  
837 SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan – Executive Summary at 10. 
838 SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan – Executive Summary at 12. 
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implementation of efficient, seamless and cost-effective trans-boundary infrastructure 
networks in an integrated and coordinated manner.839 
 
5.4.2 Protocol on Shared Watercourses 
 
In the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, water is seen as one of 
major areas of cooperation and integration. This owes to its nature of often being trans-
boundary and shared between two countries or more. Many watercourses in the region are 
shared among several member states, a situation that demands their development in an 
environmentally sound manner. To this end, the SADC initially passed its “Protocol on 
Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Development Community” on 28 August 
1995, and revised it on 7 August 2000. It came into force in September 2003. 840 
 
The Protocol was originally drafted in 1995 to be aligned with the Helsinki Rules,841 but 
was revised to reflect the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses (UN Watercourses Convention). It further provides the 
flexibility for countries to enter into specific basin-wide agreements, which is the approach 
promoted under the UN Watercourses Convention. Such agreements would allow for 
planned measures, such as environmental protection, management of shared watercourses, 
prevention and mitigation of harmful conditions and emergency situations.842  
 
                                                 
839 “Water and Regional Integration - The role of water as a driver of regional economic integration in 
Southern Africa”, Report to the Water Research Commission of South Africa, no 2252/1/14, March 2015; 
“SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan Implementation Begins”, Southern African 
Development Community – Towards a Common Future. Available at www.sadc.int/.../sadc-regional-
infrastructure-development-master-plan (accessed on 24 June 2016); Dube (above, fn 835).  
840 “SADC Water Sector”, SADC – Towards a Common Future (online). Available at 
http://www.sadc.int/sadc-secretariat/directorates/office-deputy-executive-secretary-regional-
integration/infrastructure-services/sadc-water-sector/ (accessed on 27 June 2016).  
841 The “Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers” is an international guideline 
regulating how rivers and their connected ground waters that cross national boundaries may be used, 
adopted by the International Law Association (ILA) in Helsinki, Finland in August 1966. 
842 “SADC Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourse - Orange-Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM)”, 
available at www.orasecom.org (accessed on 27 June 2016). 
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The Revised Protocol stresses the importance of taking a basin-wide approach to water 
management rather than emphasising the principle of territory sovereignty.843 It outlines 
specific objectives including improving cooperation to promote sustainable and 
coordinated management, protection, and utilisation of trans-boundary watercourses and 
promoting the SADC agenda of regional integration and poverty alleviation.844  
 
In terms of the Revised Protocol, cooperation in the integrated management of shared 
watercourse should be institutionalised through appropriate Shared Watercourse 
Institutions (SWCI), such as Watercourse Commissions, Water Authorities or Boards.   A 
Watercourse Institution shall be established on each shared watercourse to advise and 
coordinate the sustainable development and equitable utilisation of the associated water 
resources for mutual benefit and integration.845 
 
Every SADC watercourse state must participate in the SWCI.  However, this does not 
exclude the possibility of other bilateral or multilateral water institutions for specific 
purposes, particularly the development and operation of joint water projects, but these are 
subject to the framework provided by the watercourse states.846 
 
In the SADC a number of “Joint Water Commissions” and “Joint Technical Committees” 
have been established to discuss and negotiate issues of common interest, to manage the 
water resources or implement joint development projects. The best known water 
commission is the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission, which is responsible for the 
overall management of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (between South Africa and 
Lesotho). Others are: 
 the Komati Basin Water Authority (KOBWA) between South Africa, Swaziland 
and Mozambique established in 1993; 
                                                 
843 Article 3 of the (Revised) Protocol on Shared Watercourses proposes the establishment of River Basin 
institutions that will, among others, be responsible for harmonising national policies and legislation, 
conducting research and data gathering, managing water control and utilisation, promoting environmental 
protection measures, and promoting a hydro-metric monitoring programme. 
844 Article 2. 
845 Article 3 of the Protocol. 
846 Articles 4 – 6 of the Protocol. 
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 the Okavango River Basin Water Commission (OKACOM), originally formed in 
1994 and re-established in April 2007, between Angola, Botswana and Namibia; 
 the Lake Tanganyika Authority (LTA), established in 2003 by Tanzania, the DRC, 
Zambia and Burundi;  
 the Orange-Senqu Commission (ORASECOM), established in 2000 between South 
Africa, Lesotho, Botswana and Namibia to manage the Orange River; 
 the Limpopo Watercourse Commission, which was established in 2004 between 
South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique to manage the Limpopo 
River;847 and  
  the Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM), which became operational in 
January 2015 for the eight countries that share the Zambezi River through an 
agreement signed in 2004. These are Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.848 
 
In 2011 the SADC adopted the SADC Regional Water Infrastructure Programme in terms 
of which member states prioritised 23 projects for promotion and development of water 
infrastructure within the region. These projects are categorised as regional, cross-border 
and members priority projects, and they are either short-term, medium-term or long-
term.849 
                                                 
847 Speech by Mrs. L Hendricks, former Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry (SA) at “Stockholm Water 
Symposium” Stockholm, Sweden, 21 August 2006; Earle, A et al. “A gendered critique of transboundary 
water management” Feminist Review vol. 103 issue 1 (March 2013) 99. 
848 “Permanent Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM) Secretariat Fully Operational” (online), 
available at http://zambezicommission.org/newsite/index.php/2015/01/22/permanent-zambezi-watercourse-
commission-zamcom-secretariat-fully-operational/  (accessed on 27 June 2016). 
849 These are: Regional: INGA 3 Hydropower – DRC, Lesotho Highlands Phase 2 – Lesotho and South 
Africa, Batoka Gorge Hydropower – Zambia/Zimbabwe and Malawi Songwe River Basin Development 
Plan – Malawi;  
Cross-border: Food Security: Upper Okavango – Angola and Namibia, Vaal-Gamagara Water Supply – 
Botswana and South Africa, Ressano Garcia Weir – Water Supply – Mozambique and South Africa, 
Lomahasha/Namaacha Water Supply – Swaziland and Mozambique and Cross Border Locations – Water 
Supply & Sanitation – Zambia/Neighbours; and  
Member states’ Priority: Angola Lubango Water Supply & Sanitation, Botswana Limpopo Basin Joint 
Water monitoring, DRC Kinshasa Water Supply & Sanitation, Lesotho Lowlands Water Supply Scheme – 
Zone, Madagascar Pending, Malawi Mombezi Dam – Multipurpose, Mauritius 13 Housing Estates – Water 
Supply, Mozambique Movene Dam – Multipurpose, Namibia Windhoek – Managed Aquifer Recharge, 
Seychelles Non Revenue Water and Use Efficiency, South Africa Water Demand Management, Swaziland 
Nondvo Dam – Multipurpose, Tanzania Ruhuhu Valley Irrigation, Zambia Climate Change Adaptation – 
AER, Zimbabwe Bulawayo Water Supply from Zambezi River. 
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All the water projects were incorporated into the SADC Regional Master Plan in 2012.850 
The Kunene Trans-boundary Water Supply and Sanitation Project, involving southern 
Angola and northern Namibia, was adopted as the pilot project for regional water supply 
and sanitation. The project entails development and rehabilitation of water supply and 
sanitation infrastructure for communities and towns in the project area. Another important 
component of the project is to establish and build the capacity of a water entity in the 
Kunene Province in Angola. However, this project is being derailed by inadequate 
funding.851 
 
5.4.3 Protocol on Mining 
 
The minerals sector is the backbone of the majority of economies in the SADC region and 
harmonisation of policies in this sector would enhance regional integration. The region is 
reported to have proven reserves approaching $5 Trillion in value, with approximately 3 
000 active registered mines and at least ten countries in the region that have burgeoning 
mining sectors. The countries include Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe.852 
 
The minerals industry also has spin-off benefits to the other sectors of the economy such 
as energy, labour, transport and so on, as rail and road infrastructure built to serve the 
movement of material inputs to, and outputs from, the mines uses energy and human 
labour. Mining is also a hazardous undertaking, impacting on the environment and the 
                                                 
850 “SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan – August 2012”. 
851 “Water management challenges plenty in SADC Regions”, internet article by the South African 
Department of Water and Sanitation, 29 July 2015. Available at 
https://www.dwa.gov.za/stories/Water%20management%20challenges%20plenty%20in%20SADC%20Re
gions.pdf (accessed on 27 June 2016). 
852 “Mining Markets in Southern Africa – 2014” Report by Zurcom International for the Virginia Economic 
Development at 1; “Mining”, SADC – Towards a Common Future (online). Available at 
http://www.sadc.int/themes/economic-development/industry/mining/ (accessed on 29 June 2016). 
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health of the citizens living in the precinct of the mines. As such there is a need for a 
comprehensive regulation of this sector.853 
 
Recognising the significance of the mineral industry within the region, the SADC launched 
the Protocol on Mining in September 1997 and it entered into force on 10 February 2000. 
It is intended to promote the interdependence and integration of mining policies for the 
accelerated development and growth of the mining sector in the region. By agreeing to this 
Protocol member states are determined, through co-operation and collaboration, to develop 
the region’s abundant mineral resources to improve the living standards of people 
throughout the SADC region.854 
 
They intend to do this by promoting the economic and social development and integration 
of their economies with a view to achieving competitiveness and increasing their market 
share in international markets. The Protocol specifies the following areas of cooperation: 
1. harmonising national and regional policies, strategies and programmes; 
2. developing human and technological capacities; 
3. promoting private sector exploitation of mineral resources; 
4. improving availability of information to the private sector, member states and 
other countries; 
5. promoting small-scale mining; 
6. developing and observing internationally accepted standards of health, mining 
safety and environmental protection;  
7. promoting economic empowerment of the historically disadvantaged in the 
sector; and 
8. jointly developing and observing internationally accepted standards of health, 
mining safety and environmental protection.855 
 
                                                 
853 Mining Markets in South Africa – 2014 (above) at 3 – 8; Breslin, S et al. Microregionalism and World 
Order (2016) at 174. 
854 “Preamble” to the SADC Protocol on Mining. 
855 Article 5 of the SADC Protocol on Mining. 
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In September 1997 the Council of Ministers, at their meeting held in Blantyre, Malawi, 
approved the “1997-2001 Mining Sector Strategy”.  The main objective of the Strategy was 
to ensure the harmonisation of mining policies in the member states.856 In 2004, in line 
with the Strategy, the SADC started the process of harmonising mineral policies and 
regulatory frameworks. The aim was to reduce differences in the operating environment 
between the member countries of the region. This process is yielding positive results 
because by mid-2011, the corporate tax range had narrowed from a low of fifteen percent 
to a high of sixty percent in 2004, and to a low of twenty-five percent and the high of forty 
percent in 2011. Branch office tax also narrowed during the period with the low rising from 
twenty percent in 2004 to twenty-five percent in 2011.857  
 
Import and export duties have been almost entirely removed or exempted in the case of 
mining. These are important cost containment items for investment and production. Payroll 
taxes, land taxes, and municipal taxes are payable in all member states. Provincial (state) 
taxes are, however, not the norm in the region as mining is a national competence in all the 
SADC member states.858  
 
In a bid to ensure that the mineral wealth in various member states translates into socio-
economic development, the Southern African Resources Watch (SARW)859 and the 
Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) developed 
the “Southern Africa Resource Barometer” to help the parliamentarians in the region to 
effectively oversee the extractive industries to ensure that natural resources benefit all 
citizens. The Barometer was launched in December 2013 and will be used in two ways: 
 
                                                 
856 Kritzinger-van Niekerk, L et al. “Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Overview of recent 
developments” World Bank Document. December 2002, at 57. 
857 Mtegha, H.D et al. “Mining fiscal environment in the SADC: status after harmonization attempts” 
Journal of the Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy vol. 111 July (2011) 455 at 457.  
858 Ibid.  
859 Southern African Resources Watch (SARW) is a project of Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa 
(OSISA) and works closely with key stakeholders to increase their capacity to monitor the extractive 
industries in an effort to hold both the private sector and government to account. 
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1. Publish country parliamentary reports every year for each SADC country on the 
state of the extractive sector. The country reports will be consolidated into one 
Regional Report; 
2. Parliaments will use these principles and guidelines in their day-to-day oversight of 
the Executive. Members of Parliament will familiarise themselves with these 
principles and use them along with all the other tools at their disposal, such as 
committee hearings, requests for documentation, parliamentary debates, etc., to 
keep a close watch on mining activities to ensure that the country’s mineral wealth 
benefits the country and all its citizens.860 
 
In pursuance of promoting private sector participation in its activities, the SADC has 
established the Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCCI).  It 
has various affiliates in different sectors and in the context of mining, a Mining Industries 
Association of Southern Africa (MIASA)861 has been established. MIASA represents 
national chambers of mines and mining associations in the region and articulates the 
interests of the private sector in the SADC mining programmes and activities.  The SADC 
Women in Mining Trust (WIMT) is also a regional body which co-ordinates activities of 
the national women in mining associations.   It articulates the interests of women in the 
mining industry.862 Both these bodies work closely with governments as major 
stakeholders to address major common challenges such as job creation and poverty 
alleviation in various member states. 
 
In April 2015 the SADC adopted the “SADC Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap 2015 
- 2063”, which is aimed at bringing the SADC member states’ production and trade 
capacities in line with the developed world. It places specific emphasis on the need for 
beneficiation and the development of value added chains in agriculture and mining. It is 
believed that these will yield much higher value returns on exported goods than at present, 
                                                 
860 “Southern Africa Resource Barometer – 2013” at 26. 
861 MIASA currently has seven members: Chambers of Mines of Botswana, The Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
862 Moyo, T. “Extractive Industries and Women in Southern Africa” BUWA! – A Journal on African 
Women’s Experiences (2012) at 68. 
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accelerate industrialisation, create investment and employment opportunities and 
contribute to strengthening intra-regional trade.863 
 
5.4.4 Protocol on Energy 
 
Energy is vital to development in Southern Africa. Beyond its use in daily life, fuel and 
electricity catalyse infrastructure projects that drive both regional integration and economic 
growth. As the SADC region industrialises, as attested to by the adoption of the “SADC 
Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap 2015 - 2063”, energy production and distribution 
will increase in importance. 
 
Recognising the fundamental role of energy in accomplishing its goals, the SADC has 
adopted the Protocol on Energy in 1996, which provides a framework for cooperation on 
energy policy among SADC member states. The Protocol entered into force on 17 April 
1998.864 It intends to promote the harmonious development of national energy policies and 
matters of common interest for the balanced and equitable development of energy 
throughout the SADC region. 
 
The overall objective of the Protocol is to ensure the availability of sufficient, reliable, least 
cost energy services that will assist in the attainment of economic efficiency and the 
eradication of poverty whilst ensuring the environmentally sustainable use of energy 
resources in the region.865 
 
                                                 
863 “SADC Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap 2015 – 2063”, approved by Summit in Harare on 29 
April 2015; Barlow, A. “The Southern African Development Community: IV – Recent Developments in 
the Economic Programme”, Helen Suzman Foundation Brief, 17 November 2015 (online). Available at 
http://hsf.org.za/resource-centre/hsf-briefs/the-southern-african-development-community-iv-recent-
developments-in-the-economic-programme (accessed on 1 July 2016); Tralac. “SADC Legal Texts and 
Policy Documents”, available at http://www.tralac.org/resources/by-region/sadc.html (accessed on 1 July 
2016). 
864 “Energy”, Southern African Development Community – Towards a Common Future (online). Available 
at www.sadc.int/themes/infrastructure/en/ (accessed on 5 July 2016); Ruppel, O.C. “Climate change policy 
positions and related developments in the AU and SADC” SADC Law Journal vol. 2 issue 1 (2012) 14 – 
35. 
865 Preamble to the SADC Protocol on Energy.  
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Since the adoption of the Protocol, the SADC has enacted several strategic plans for energy 
development in the region: the SADC Energy Cooperation Policy and Strategy in 1996, 
the SADC Energy Action Plan in 1997, the SADC Energy Activity Plan in 2000, and most 
recently, the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan and its Energy Sector 
Plan in 2012. These development strategies set out tangible objectives for the SADC and 
its member states for infrastructure development in energy and its subsectors of wood fuel, 
petroleum and natural gas, electricity, coal, renewable energy, and energy efficiency and 
conservation.866 
 
In September 2002 the Regional Electricity Regulators’ Association (RERA) was 
launched, with the main purpose of providing a platform for co-operation between 
independent electricity regulators within the SADC region. It has three strategic objectives:  
 Capacity building and information sharing – to facilitate electricity regulatory 
capacity building among members at both national and regional levels through 
information sharing and skills training;  
 Facilitation of electricity supply industry (ESI) policy, legislation and regulations 
– to facilitate harmonised ESI policy, legislation and regulations for cross-border 
trading, focusing on issues concerning access to transmission capacity and cross-
border tariffs; and  
 Regional regulatory co-operation – to deliberate and make recommendations on 
issues that affect the economic efficiency of electricity interconnections and 
electricity trade among members that fall outside national jurisdiction, and to 
exercise such powers as may be conferred on RERA through the SADC Energy 
Protocol.867  
 
                                                 
866 Barnard, M. “SADC’s response to climate change – the role of harmonised law and policy on mitigation 
in the energy sector” Journal of Energy in Southern Africa vol. 25 no. 1 (February 2014) 26 at 30; Ruppel 
(above, fn 864). 
867 “Basic Electricity – National and Regional cooperation” Department of Energy of South Africa (online). 
Available at http://www.energy.gov.za/files/esources/electricity/electricity_national.html (accessed on 5 
July 2016).  
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Although the number of the RERA membership has risen from four to ten, from 2005 to 
2010,868 progress made by the RERA has been modest. However, in 2011 the RERA 
adopted the “Regulatory Guidelines on Cross-border Power Trading in Southern Africa” 
that the members were urged to adopt.869 Seven member states have adopted these 
Regulatory Guidelines.870 
 
To improve this situation there have been key SADC Power Infrastructure Projects, 
including the following: 
 
(a) The Western Corridor Project (WESTCOR) 
 
WESTCOR is a SADC project conceived through the combined initiative of the 
SADC Secretariat and the power utilities of Angola, Botswana, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Namibia and South Africa in 1996. However, its 
Memorandum of Understanding was only signed in 2004. The aim of the project is 
to harness the large water resources of the Congo River at Inga in order to produce 
                                                 
868 These are: the Electricity Control Board of Namibia (ECB), the National Energy Regulator of South 
Africa (NERSA), the Malawi Energy Regulatory Authority (MERA), the Energy and Water Utilities 
Regulatory Authority of Tanzania (EWURA), the Energy Regulation Board of Zambia (ERB), the 
Zimbabwe Electricity Regulatory Commission (ZERC) , the Institute for Electricity Sector Regulation of 
Angola (IRSE),  Lesotho Electricity Authority (LEA) Office for Electricity Sector Regulation (ORE) of 
Madagascar and the National Electricity Advisory Council of Mozambique (CNELEC). 
869 The nine Guidelines are:  
1. Regulator’s powers and duties in cross-border trading;  
2. Working to ensure compatible regulatory decisions;  
3. Timing of regulatory interactions for proposed cross-border transactions;  
4. Licensing cross-border trading facilities, imports and exports;  
5. Approving cross-border agreements in importing countries;  
6. Approving cross-border agreements in exporting countries;  
7. Approving cross-border agreements in transit countries; 
8. Approving transmission access and pricing and ancillary services;  
9. Promoting transparency in the regulation of cross-border trading; 
Chanakira, M. “SADC regional economic integration in the energy industry” DOUNIA, revue d'intelligence 
stratégique et des relations internationals no. 4 October (2011) 64 at 69. 
870 These are the regulatory bodies of Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, United 
Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia; “Countries adopt RERA cross-border guidelines” SADC Energy in 
Southern Africa (online) April 2013. Available at http://sadc-
energy.sardc.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=124:countries-adopt-rera-cross-border-
guidelines&catid=37&Itemid=143 (accessed on 5 July 2016). 
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and supply electric power, initially for the five countries involved, but ultimately to 
the whole SADC region.871  
 
(b) Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) 
 
The SAPP was created in September 1994, with the primary aim of providing 
reliable and economical electricity supply to the consumers of each of the SAPP 
members, consistent with the reasonable utilisation of natural resources and the 
effect on the environment. Membership of the SAPP is open to all participating 
electricity enterprises situated in a country which was a member of the SADC in 
September 1994. Full membership is for national utilities only and is restricted to 
one per country as designated by the country's government.872 
 
The SAPP has identified six priority trans-boundary transmission projects that are 
expected to improve connectivity and electricity trading in the region by 2017. The 
priority projects, estimated to cost US$5,6 billion, are part of a portfolio of short- 
to medium-term projects being pursued by the SAPP with the aim of increasing the 
availability of electricity in the region and connecting non-participating SADC 
member states to the regional power grid. These priority transmission projects are:  
 Mozambique-Malawi interconnector;  
 Zimbabwe-Zambia-Botswana-Namibia (ZiZaBoNa) interconnector;  
 South Africa energy strengthening project;  
 Zambia-Tanzania-Kenya interconnector;  
 interconnection of Angola; and  
 Mozambique energy backbone projects.873 
                                                 
871 Chanakira (above, fn 869); “Sustainable development in Africa” South Africa Yearbook 2014/15 at 151. 
872 “Southern African Power Pool” at http://www.sapp.co.zw/viewinfo.cfm?id=47&linkid=2&siteid=1 
(accessed on 6 July 2016); “The Potential of Regional Power Sector Integration: South African Power Pool 
(SAPP) Case Study, Report by the Economic Consulting Associates (ECA), October 2009; “Regional 
Power Status In African Power Pools Report”, Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA), November 2011 
at 52. 
873 “Interconnectors - conduits for SADC energy integration” SADC Today vol. 14 no. 6 October 2012; 
Miketa, A et al. “Southern African Power Pool: Planning and Prospects for Renewable Energy” Report of 
the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), 2013. 
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Nine member states of the SADC874 have merged their electricity grids into the 
SAPP and, together with the East African Power Pool (EAPP), the SAPP has 
prioritised the development of critical interconnectors, including the Zambia-
Tanzania-Kenya (ZTK) interconnector, to improve regional integration and energy 
trade within and between the SAPP and the EAPP, as a project of the Tripartite Free 
Trade Area (T-FTA) between the SADC, the COMESA and the EAC. Covering a 
distance of 1 600km, the interconnector will have a capacity of 400 megawatt, and 
will be constructed as a double circuit 400 kilovolt line in sections from Pensulo in 
Zambia to Isinya in Kenya.875 
 
Together with the other development organisations, including the World Bank, the 
African Development Bank (AfDB) and the European Investment Bank, the SAPP 
and the EAPP are partners in the Grand Inga Hydropower Scheme876 that will 
provide cheaper and readily available energy in the SADC region and allow 
Africa’s industrial and manufacturing industry to take off. Grand Inga will generate 
40 000 megawatts, and will be constructed in six phases of which the Inga III Dam 
is the first phase. The construction started in 2016.  
 
In the energy sector, the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan is expected to 
address four key areas of energy security, improving access to modern energy services, 
tapping the abundant energy resources in the continent and up-scaling financial investment 
whilst enhancing environmental sustainability. The above projects have thus been 
incorporated into the Master Plan as part of the identified “hard” infrastructure projects. 877 
 
                                                 
874 These are: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
875 SADC Today (above, fn 873); Barnard, M. “SADC’s response to climate change – the role of 
harmonised law and policy on mitigation in the energy sector” Journal of Energy in Southern Africa vol. 
25 no. 1 (February 2014) 26 at 30. 
876 The Project started with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in November 2011 by 
South Africa and the DRC. In May 2013, the two governments signed a co-operation Treaty to jointly 
develop the Inga III Dam. 
877 “SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan – August 2012”; Luxande, A et al. “Mid-
Term Review of the SADC Renewable Energy Support Programme”, 31 October 2012. 
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In July 2015, during the 34th Meeting of the SADC Energy Ministers, held in Sandton, 
South Africa, the SADC Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
(SACREE) was approved. The Centre is hosted by Namibia and was launched in June 
2016. It will primarily focus on developing renewable energy programmes for the region 
and resource mobilisation.878 
 
5.4.5 Protocol on Fisheries 
 
The SADC recognises the important role of fisheries in the social and economic well-being 
and livelihood of the people of the region, in ensuring food security and alleviating poverty. 
Therefore, in order to support national initiatives taken and international conventions for 
the sustainable use and the protection of the living aquatic resources and aquatic 
environment of the region, the SADC member states signed the Protocol on Fisheries in 
2001. It entered into force on 8 August 2003.879 
 
The objective of the Protocol is to promote responsible and sustainable use of the living 
aquatic resources and ecosystems on the coastline in order to promote and enhance food 
security and human health. The Protocol also aims to safeguard the livelihood of fishing 
communities, to generate economic opportunities, to ensure that future generations benefit 
from these renewable resources and to alleviate poverty.880 It further provides for national 
and regional responsibilities for legislative and policy harmonisation, information sharing, 
and protection of fisheries from over-exploitation in the SADC region by member states.881  
                                                 
878 “SADC Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency to be launched mid-2016” Southern Africa 
Today vol. 18 no. 1 (December 2015) 9; “SADC moves closer to establishing renewable energy centre” 
SADC Energy Thematic Group Bulletin issue no. 13 (April 2016) 1. 
879 “Fisheries”, Southern African Development Community – Towards a common Future. Available at 
http://www.sadc.int/themes/agriculture-food-security/fisheries/ (accessed on 7 July 2016); The Food, 
Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN). FANRPAN. “Policies for 
Enhanced Fisheries Productivity and Security” Policy Brief Series: Fisheries vol. X issue no. 3 (December 
2010);  
880 Preamble to the SADC Protocol on Fisheries; Sumaila, U.R et al. “Management of Shared Hake Stocks 
in the Benguela Marine Ecosystems”, Papers Presented at the Norway-FAO Expert Consultation on the 
Management of shared fish stocks of 7 – 10 October 2002, Bergen, Norway. FAO Fisheries Report no. 695 
at 152. 
881 Article 5(1) provides:  
“State Parties shall take measures, at national and international levels, suitable for the harmonisation of 
laws, policies, plans and programmes on fisheries aimed at promoting the objective of this Protocol.” 
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The Implementation Strategy of the Protocol was approved by Ministers responsible for 
Fisheries in 2010 and it prioritises the following aspects of fisheries: 
 aquaculture (farmed fish); 
 management of shared fisheries resources; and 
 combating illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing.882 
 
Under “trade and investment”, the Protocol calls on member states to promote sustainable 
trade and investment in fisheries and related goods and services by reducing barriers to 
trade and investment, facilitating business contacts and exchange of information and 
establishing basic infrastructure for the fisheries sector. It further calls on them to create 
favourable economic conditions to support sustainable fishing and processing activities so 
as to promote regional food security and fisheries development.883  
 
As a result of the slow pace of the implementation of the Protocol by member states, the 
SADC adopted an implementation plan of the Protocol that produced two regional 
programmes:  
1. Managing for Resilience: Strengthening Co- management of Shared Fisheries 
Resources in the Zambezi basin; and  
2. Aquaculture Development.884 
 
The main objective of the first programme is to promote co-management of shared fisheries 
resources in the Zambezi Basin885 while the Aquaculture programme seeks to enhance 
information sharing, build capacity and review policies and the legal framework in line 
                                                 
882 “Fisheries”, Southern African Development Community – Towards a common Future: Fisheries” 
available at www.sadc.int/themes/agriculture-food-security/fisheries/ (accessed on 7 July 2016). 
883 Article 16 (1) and (2); Winter, G. “Promotion and Management of Marine Fisheries in Namibia”, 
Towards Sustainable Fisheries Law: A Comparative Analysis (2009) at 157. 
884 SADC. “Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources” Desk Assessment of the Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan 2005 – 2010, November 2011 at 62; “Fisheries”, Southern African 
Development Community – Towards a common Future: Fisheries” available at 
www.sadc.int/themes/agriculture-food-security/fisheries/ (accessed on 12 July 2016). 
885 The Zambezi Basin consists of the eight countries of Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe with an area of 1.39 million km². 
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with the Protocol. These programmes were approved in August 2010 and the process of 
mobilising resources is ongoing.886  
 
Aware of the challenges in maintaining and strengthening the benefits from fisheries 
resources, the countries of the Zambezi Basin have developed a SADC Regional Technical 
Programme (RTP) to strengthen co‐management and value chains of shared fisheries 
resources in the Zambezi Basin. The programme also acts as an instrument to aid the 
implementation of the SADC Protocol on Fisheries. The Programme was approved at the 
Ministerial Meeting on Natural Resources and Environment held on 16 July 2010 in 
Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe. The initial RTP was later restructured to enable a more efficient 
resource mobilisation in January 2012 and later developed into a project at a workshop held 
in Kasane, Botswana from 27 to 30 August 2012, with funding support from the European 
Union.887 
 
The overall goal of the RTP is to support the objectives of the SADC and specifically to 
support the implementation of the SADC Protocol on Fisheries through enhancing regional 
food security and rural economic growth, through two linked projects: 
1. Strengthening Co‐Management of Shared Fisheries Resources in the Zambezi 
River Basin. 
2. Enhancing Value Chain Gains of the Shared Fisheries Resources in the Zambezi 
River Basin.888 
 
Another programme undertaken by the SADC promoting an ecosystem approach to 
management was the Benguela Environmental Fisheries Interaction and Training 
Programme (BENEFIT). It ran from 1999 to 2009 and established the Benguela Current 
                                                 
886 Desk Assessment of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 2005 – 2010 (above, fn 884).  
887 “SADC Concept note ‐ Strengthening Co‐management in the Zambezi Basin – October 2012” at 2. 
888 Ibid. 
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Commission (BCC)889 in 2007, which continues to contribute to trans-boundary research 
and cooperative management of this vital marine ecosystem.890 
 
Other programmes developed to respond to the challenges faced by the region in fisheries 
and aquaculture include the establishment of the SADC Regional Fisheries Monitoring 
Control and Surveillance (MCS) Coordination Centre and the SADC Action Plan on 
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.891 These are a response to the “Statement 
of Commitment to combat IUU fishing” signed by the Ministers responsible for Marine 
Fisheries in July 2008. The Statement was later converted into Annex 1 of the Protocol.892 
 
The July 2008 meeting of Ministers also established the SADC Task Force on IUU fishing 
to guide the process of establishing the MCS Centre in Mozambique, which was expected 
to be in operation in 2017. The Draft Charter for the Centre is already in place and needs 
to be approved by the member states to pave the way for the establishment of the Centre.893 
 
In May 2017, the SADC Ministers responsible for Agriculture, Food Security, and 
Fisheries and Aquaculture, at their joint extra-ordinary meeting in Ezulwini, Swaziland, 
identified gaps in the MCS Centre project documents, in particular that there was a lack of 
a clear financial sustainability plan, that provides for financial model incorporating risk 
mitigation plan. They then ordered for a review of the project. In July 2017 the SADC 
Secretariat and its partner organisation, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), presented a 
                                                 
889 The Benguela Current Commission (BCC) consists of the three countries of Angola, Namibia and South 
Africa. 
890 Paterson, B et al. “Integrating the Human Dimension of an Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (EAF) into 
Fisheries Management in the BCC region”, FAO-BCC Project EAF Draft Report, September 2012 at 1; 
Benguela Current Commission Strategic Action Programme 2015 – 2019 at 8. 
891 SADC. “SADC Fisheries and Aquaculture: Progress Report for 2015 – 2016 and Proposed Actions for 
2016-2017 Programme of Work”, 09 June 2016 (SADC/FTC/1/2016/3). 
892 Article 21 of the Protocol on Fisheries provides: 
“1. State Parties may develop and adopt annexes for the implementation of this Protocol.  
2. An annex shall form an integral part of this Protocol.” 
893 Report of the 35th meeting of the SADC Technical Committee on Fisheries, Gaborone, Botswana, 9 – 10 
June 2016 at 8 – 9.  
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reviewed project to the Ministers for the project to proceed. This is expected to start in 
early 2018.894 
 
5.4.6 Protocol on Development of Tourism 
 
As a growth industry with socioeconomic impacts, tourism is of particular interest to the 
SADC. In order to foster the tourism industry in Southern Africa for greater economic 
development of the region, the SADC passed its Protocol on the Development of Tourism 
on 14 September 1998.  The Protocol entered into force on 26 November 2002 and was 
amended on 8 September 2009.895 Article 2 provides the objectives of this Protocol and 
covers a wide range of the tourism sector.896 
 
                                                 
894 “Report of SADC/WWF on Short-term Consultancy to Develop the Financial Sustainability Plan and 
financial model for the proposed SADC Regional Fisheries Monitoring Control and Surveillance 
Coordination Centre”, July 2017. 
895 “Tourism” Southern African Development Community – Towards a common Future. Available at 
www.sadc.int/themes/infrastructure/tourism/ (accessed on 13 July 2016). 
896 Article 2 lists the objectives of this Protocol as: 
1. To use tourism as a vehicle to achieve sustainable social and economic development 
through the full realisation of its potential for the Region;  
2. To ensure equitable, balanced and complimentary development of the tourism industry 
region-wide;  
3. To optimise resource usage and increase competitive advantage in the Region vis-à-vis 
other destinations through collective efforts and co-operation in an environmentally 
sustainable manner;  
4. To ensure the involvement of small and micro-enterprises, local communities, women and 
youth in the development of tourism throughout the Region;  
5. To contribute towards the human resource development of the Region through job creation 
and the development of skills at all levels in the tourism industry;  
6. To create a favourable investment climate for tourism within the Region for both the public 
and private sectors, including small and medium scale tourist establishments;  
7. To improve the quality, competitiveness and standards of service of the tourism industry 
in the Region;  
8. To improve the standards of safety and security for tourists in the territories of Member 
states and to make appropriate provision for disabled, handicapped and senior citizens in 
their respective countries;  
9. To aggressively promote the Region as a single but multifaceted tourism destination 
capitalising on its common strengths and highlighting individual Member State's unique 
tourist attractions;  
10. To facilitate intra-regional travel for the development of tourism through the easing or 
removal of travel and visa restrictions and harmonisation of immigration procedures; 
11. To improve tourism service and infrastructure in order to foster a vibrant tourism industry. 
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Through this Protocol, the SADC intends to ensure even distribution of tourism 
development throughout the region and to create a favourable environment for tourism, 
thereby using tourism as a vehicle for socio-economic development. To facilitate these 
plans, member states agree to encourage private sector involvement in the industry through 
incentives, infrastructure, and a regulatory framework that encourages their participation.  
 
The Protocol urges member states to facilitate travelling in the region by having a tourism 
common visa (UNIVISA), which will facilitate movement of international tourists in the 
region in order to increase the market share and revenue of the region in world tourism on 
the basis of arrangements to be negotiated and agreed upon by member states.897 
 
It also adopts the Regional Tourism Organisation of Southern Africa (RETOSA), which is 
a SADC body responsible for the promotion and marketing of tourism in the region 
established through the RETOSA Charter in 1996, as the promotional and marketing arm 
of SADC tourism sector.898 The RETOSA collaborates with the public and private sectors 
to achieve this mandate.899 
 
The Tourism Sector Ministers approved a five-year Tourism Development Strategy (1995-
1999) for the tourism sector, with the objective of promoting the equitable and sustainable 
growth of the tourism sector in the region. This was reviewed in 2001 (The Tourism 
                                                 
897 Article 5(1)(c). 
898 Article 7 of the Protocol provides: 
“1. The Regional Tourism Organisation of Southern Africa (RETOSA) established in accordance with the 
provision of the RETOSA Charter shall be the promotional and marketing arm of SADC tourism sector.  
2. In accordance with RETOSA Charter, Member states shall:  
a. develop common and coordinated marketing and promotion strategies, action plans, and 
implementation programmes to promote both intra-regional and international tourism in the 
Region and respond to market demand;  
b. in pursuit of the tourism marketing strategies, market the Region as a tourist destination of 
choice and utilise the RETOSA logo and brand to promote the regional destination identity and 
competitiveness;  
c. undertake marketing and promotion activities, which highlight the diversity of the tourist 
product of the Region;  
d. notwithstanding and without prejudice to this Article individual, Member states may collaborate 
in packaging their destinations.” 
899 Article 13(7)(b) of the Protocol provides that RETOSA shall fulfil its objectives as specified in its 
Charter by, inter alia, developing tourism through effective marketing of the region in collaboration with 
the public and private sectors. 
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Development Strategy 2001 – 2005) to be in line with the Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan (RISDP). This Strategy undertook several actions to promote tourism 
in the region, including the following: 
 
 UNIVISA System – to facilitate intra-regional travel for the development of 
tourism through easing and removal of travel and visa restrictions for international 
tourists to increase the market share and revenue of the region in the world tourism; 
 Harmonisation of standards – to design and implement the standard grading and 
classification of hotels and other accommodation establishments and to achieve 
harmonisation of service standards throughout the region; 
 Model Tourism Legislation – to develop model tourism legislation within the 
SADC, which would help member states to align their national tourism legislations 
to that of the SADC; 
 Regional website – to establish, disseminate and maintain relevant information with 
emphasis on tourism development policy of the SADC member states; and 
 Common Tourism Signage Policy – to help tourists by developing effective signs 
that will guide them to various facilities and services.900  
 
The UNIVISA, or common visa, was earmarked for the soccer 2010 World Cup in South 
Africa and the 27th Edition of the 2010 Confederation of African Football (CAF) African 
Cup of Nations tournament in Angola. It was also stated that the UNIVISA would go 
beyond these two events.901 This deadline was missed, but the SADC Univisa Working 
Group’s work is ongoing and aimed at facilitating the implementation of the Univisa 
system by the pilot group of countries (Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Angola, 
Lesotho, South Africa and Zimbabwe). Activities completed by the group include the 
following:  
                                                 
900 Kritzinger-van Niekerk, L et al. “Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Overview of recent 
developments”, World Bank Document December (2002), 75 – 76; Khumalo, N. “Services Trade in 
Southern Africa: A Literature Survey and Overview” South African Institute of International Affairs 
(SAIIA) Trade Policy Report No. 10, May 2006 at 33; Mfune, F. “Tourism Development in Southern 
Africa” SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review 2007/08 (2008). 
901 Statement by Mr. M. van Schalkwyk, SA Minster of Tourism, during the 26th South African Tourism 
Indaba, 19 April 2008; UNCTAD. “Towards SADC Services Liberalization: Balancing Multiple 
Imperatives”, Paper UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/2008/4 (2010) at 66. 
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 harmonisation of rules, regulations, and operational procedures;  
 budget allocation/resources mobilisation;  
 information and communications technologies procurement; and  
 administration and corporate communications (marketing of the concept to 
overseas embassies and agreement on a revenue-sharing model).902 
 
The Tourism Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan proposes the creation 
of Trans-Frontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) as a means of promoting tourism as well 
as ensuring conservation of biodiversity in the region. It is hoped that the TFCAs will 
ensure the ease of movement of tourists across the SADC region, wilderness protection, 
employment creation and income generation in rural areas, which translate into an 
improved quality of life for the citizens of this region. So far the existing SADC TFCAs 
can be divided into three main categories based on their level of development:  
 Category A or Established TFCAs with formal agreements;  
 Category B or Emerging TFCAs in the process of establishment; and  
 Category C or Conceptual TFCAs which only exist as concepts. 903 
 
5.4.7 Protocol on Health 
 
A healthy population is a pre-requisite for the sustainable human development and 
increased productivity in a country. The SADC recognises that close co-operation in the 
area of health is essential for the effective control of communicable and non-communicable 
diseases for addressing common concerns within the region. To this end the SADC member 
                                                 
902 “SADC Univisa: Why the Lack of Progress?” South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) 
Case Study 05 (2015) 55 at 56; SADC. “Media Statement on the Meeting of SADC Ministers responsible 
for Tourism, Grand Baie, Mauritius, 29 March 2012; Douglas, A et al. “Would a single regional visa 
encourage tourist arrivals in southern Africa?” Study for the University of Pretoria Department of Tourism 
Management, 2012 at 6. Available at 
http://repository.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/handle/2263/21590/Douglas_Would(2012).pdf?sequence=1&is
Allowed=y (accessed on 14 July 2016). 
903 SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan: Tourism (TFCAS) Sector Plan – August 2012 
at 5; “SADC TFCAs – Transfrontier Conservation Areas in the Southern African Development 
Community”, GIZ Report 2015; Bertelsmann-Scott, T. “The Impact of Transfrontier Conservation Areas 
on Regional Integration” PERISA Case Study 3 (2013); Hanks, J. “Transfrontier Conservation Areas 
(TFCAs) in southern Africa: their role in conserving biodiversity, socioeconomic development and 
promoting a culture of peace” Journal of Sustainable Forestry vol. 17 issue 1 – 2 (2003) 127. 
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states signed the Protocol on Health on 18 August 1999 to coordinate regional efforts on 
epidemic preparedness, mapping prevention, control and, where possible, the eradication 
of communicable and non-communicable diseases. This Protocol entered into force on 14 
August 2004.904 
 
The Protocol encourages the establishment of institutional mechanisms within the health 
sector of the region to effectively implement the Protocol.905 Its main objective is to ensure 
that state parties co-operate in addressing health problems and challenges facing them 
through effective regional collaboration and mutual support under the Protocol. This 
includes raising funds to acquire medicines, technology and other resources needed by 
citizens.906 
 
The HIV/Aids pandemic is one of the diseases ravaging the region. It is as such no surprise 
that it is one of the diseases that the Protocol deals with.907  This is actually one way of 
                                                 
904 “Protocol on Health (1999)” Southern African Development Community – Towards a common Future. 
Available at http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/804  (accessed on 18 July 2016); 
Kortenbout, W et al. Communicable Diseases in Southern Africa (2011) at 83. 
905 Article 4 provides the institutional mechanisms for the implementation of the Protocol as: 
(a) The Health Sector Co-ordinating Unit;  
(b) Health Sector Committee of Ministers;  
(c) The Health Sector Committee of Senior Officials; and 
(d) Technical Sub-Committees. 
906 Article 3 and 19 of the Protocol on Health; Durojaye, E. Litigating the Right to Health in Africa: 
Challenges and Prospects (2016) at 200. 
907 Article 10 provides: 
“1. In order to deal effectively with the HIV/AIDS/STDs epidemic in the Region and the 
interaction of HIV/AIDS/STDs with other diseases, States Parties shall – 
a) harmonise policies aimed at disease prevention and control, including co-operation and 
identification of mechanisms to reduce the transmission of STDs and HIV infection; 
b) develop approaches for the prevention and management of HIV/AID/STDs to be 
implemented in a coherent, comparable, harmonised and standardised manner;  
c) develop regional policies and plans that recognise the intersectoral impact of 
HIV/AIDS/STDs and the need for an intersectoral approach to these diseases; and  
d) co-operate in the areas of -   
(i) standardisation of HIV/AIDS/STDs surveillance systems in order to facilitate 
collation of information which has a regional impact; 
 (ii) regional advocacy efforts to increase commitment to the expanded response 
to HIV/AIDS/STDs; and  
(iii) sharing of information. 
 2. States Parties shall endeavour to provide high-risk and transborder populations with 
preventative and basic curative services for HIV/AIDS/STDs.” 
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giving effect to the SADC Treaty908 and the “Maseru Declaration on the Fight against 
HIV/AIDS in the SADC Region (2003)”.909 To this end the SADC region is continuing 
with the implementation of various HIV/Aids projects including the following: 
 development of guidelines for the mainstreaming of HIV and AIDS in priority areas 
such as agriculture and food security, basic education (education needs of orphans 
and vulnerable children), transport and labour;  
 improvements in the provision of condoms in high transit points and border sites;  
 strengthening of partnerships through regular forums for key stakeholders such as 
National AIDS Coordinating Agencies and the SADC Editors Forum on HIV and 
AIDS; 
 Regional Minimum Standards for Harmonised Guidance on HIV Testing and 
Counselling in the SADC region;  
 Regional Minimum Standards for the Harmonised Control of HIV and AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria in Militaries in the SADC region; 
 Regional Minimum Standards for Harmonised Approaches to the Prevention of 
Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV in the SADC region.910 
 
An HIV Prevention Strategy has been developed to ensure that prevention is taken as a 
priority area for Tuberculosis, Malaria and HIV interventions in the region. In order to 
realise the targets, regional policy minimum standards have been developed to facilitate 
the harmonisation of policies, strategies and legislation relating to HIV prevention, care, 
treatment and support within the region.  The minimum policy standards have sharpened 
some of the HIV interventions in the region.911 
 
                                                 
908 One of the objectives of the SADC Treaty is to combat HIV/Aids and other communicable diseases (Art 
5(1)(i)). 
909 The Maseru Declaration was adopted in 2003, in Maseru, Lesotho as a commitment by member states to 
dealing with the HIV/AIDS Pandemic in the SADC Region.   
910 “Press Briefing by Director Stephen Sianga, Directorate of Social and Human Development and Special 
Programmes, Council of Ministers February 2006”, available at 
http://www.sadc.int/news/news_details.php?news_id=633  (accessed on 18 July 2016); “Information 
resources from SADC's HIV and AIDS Programme”, Published on K4Health at https://www.k4health.org 
(accessed on 18 June 2016). 
911 SADC. “Southern African Development Community - Desk Assessment of the Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan 2005 – 2010”, SADC Council November 2011 at 93. 
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In addition, with regard to combating of malaria, best practices are being exchanged and 
collaboration strengthened, especially under the malaria control programme in the 
Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative (LSDI) that covers the borders between 
Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland, as part of the SADC Malaria Strategic Plan.912 
The SADC also undertook advocacy activities aimed at increasing awareness on the 
dangers of malaria and social mobilisation for its control. To this end, the SADC Malaria 
Day was commemorated in KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa on 10 November 2005, where 
the SADC Ministers of Health undertook indoor spraying of houses and reaffirmed the 
SADC’s use of dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) as a primary preventive strategy 
to address malaria in the region. Malaria Day is now commemorated annually in the 
SADC.913   
 
The SADC has now partnered with institutions like the University of Pretoria Institute for 
Sustainable Malaria Control to spread malaria awareness by sharing information on the 
disease, and research is being done at the Institute through short articles. The information 
is available on the website of the Institute as well as through a link page on the University 
of Pretoria website.914 
 
All these strategies, together with other strategies for non-communicable diseases, are 
being devised within the context of the RISDP and are reviewed regularly.915 During their 
January 2015 meeting in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, the SADC Ministers responsible for 
Health approved key documents including the “SADC Code and Action Plan of Conduct 
                                                 
912 The Southern Africa Development Community. SADC Malaria Strategic Plan 2007–2015 was adopted 
by the Ministers of Health in 2007, in Gaborone, Botswana; Feachem, R et al. “A new global malaria 
eradication strategy” Viewpoint vol. 371 (May 2008) 1633 at 1634. 
913 Feachem, R et al. “Shrinking the malaria map: progress and prospects” Malaria Elimination Series 
(online), 29 October 2010 at 8 – 9. Available at 
http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/Shrinking%20the%20malaria%20map.pdf (accessed on 19 
July 2016); Smith R.D et al. “Global public goods and the global health agenda: problems, priorities and 
potential” Global Health vol. 3 no. 9 (2007) 1 at 4. 
914 Available at  http://www.up.ac.za/en/up-centre-for-sustainable-malaria-
control/article/2191573/postgraduate-students (accessed on 19 July 2016). 
915 Lezotre, P. “Regional Initiatives: Southern African Development Community”, International 
Cooperation, Convergence and Harmonization of Pharmaceutical Regulations: A Global perspective (2014) 
at 127; Southern African Development Community. “Policy Framework for Population Mobility and 
Communicable Diseases in the SADC Region”, April 2009.  
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on TB in the Mining Sector”, “Minimum Standards for the Integration of Sexual and 
Reproductive Health and HIV in SADC”, “Framework of Action for Sustainable Financing 
of Health and HIV in the SADC Region” and the establishment of “Public-Private Regional 
Partnership” in complimentary health financing.916 
 
5.4.8 Protocol on Education and Training 
 
Member states acknowledge that whilst each Member State has its own policies for 
education and training, and whilst cooperation and mutual assistance in education is 
desirable, this can be facilitated more effectively by the development of harmonised and 
eventually standardised policies regarding education and training. In line with these the 
Protocol on Education and Training Development was signed on 8 September 1997 and 
entered into force on 31 July 2000. It advocates cooperative education and identifies the 
areas of cooperation as follows:  
 Policy; 
 Basic education; 
 Intermediate education and training; 
 Higher education and training; 
 Research and development;  
 Life-long education and publishing; and  
 Library resources.917 
 
                                                 
916 “Southern Africa: SADC Health Ministers Address Public Health Issues”, available at 
http://www.jointlearningnetwork.org/news/southern-africa-sadc-health-ministers-address-public-health-
issues (accessed on 19 July 2016); “Media Statement – Ordinary Joint Meeting of SADC Ministers of 
Health and Ministers Responsible for HIV and AIDS, Victoria Falls, Republic of Zimbabwe, January 15, 
2015. 
917 “SADC Protocol on Education and Training (1997)” Southern African Development Community – 
Towards a common Future. Available at http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/Protocol_on_Education__Training1997.pdf (accessed on 20 July 2016); Articles 4 – 10 
of the SADC Protocol on education and Training.  
267 
 
Member states are convinced that these areas of cooperation will enable the SADC to 
achieve the objectives of the Protocol.918 In addition to these objectives the other salient 
features covered by this Protocol include the following: 
 guaranteeing academic freedom in institutions of learning and research as it is the 
sine qua non for high quality education, training and research and as it ensures 
freedom of enquiry, experimentation and critical and creative thinking.919 
 recommending to universities and other tertiary institutions in their countries to 
reserve at least 5% of admission, for students from the SADC nations, other than 
their own;920 
 promoting free movement of professional personnel.921   
 
                                                 
918 In terms of Article 3 of the Protocol the objectives are: 
(a) to develop and implement a common system of regular collection and reporting of information by 
Member states about the current status and future demand and supply, and the priority areas for provision 
of education and training in the Region; 
(b) to establish mechanisms and institutional arrangements that enable Member states to pool their 
resources to effectively and efficiently produce the required professional, technical, research and 
managerial personnel to plan and manage the development process in general and across all sectors in the 
Region; 
(c) to promote and coordinate the formulation and implementation of comparable and appropriate policies, 
strategies and systems of education and training in Member states; 
(d) to develop and implement policies and strategies that promote the participation and contribution of the 
private sector, non-governmental organisations and other key stakeholders in the provision of education and 
training; 
(e) to promote and coordinate the formulation and implementation of policies, strategies and programmes 
for the promotion and application of science and technology, including modern information technology and 
research and development in the Region; 
(f) to work towards the reduction and eventual elimination of constraints to better and freer access, by 
citizens of Member states, to good quality education and training opportunities within the Region; 
(g) to work towards the relaxation and eventual elimination of immigration formalities in order to facilitate 
freer movement of students and staff within the Region for the specific purposes of study, teaching, 
research and any other pursuits relating to education and training. 
(h) to promote policies for creation of an enabling environment with appropriate incentives based on 
meritorious performance, for educated and trained persons to effectively apply and utilise their knowledge 
and skills for the general development of Member states and the Region; 
(i) to promote the learning of English and Portuguese as the working languages of the Region. 
(j) to achieve gradually and over a period not exceeding twenty years from the date of entry into force of 
this Protocol, the implementation of the ultimate objective as stated in paragraph (k) hereof;  
(k) to progressively achieve the equivalence, harmonisation and standardization of the education and 
training systems in the Region which is the ultimate objective of this Protocol. 
919 Article 2(g). 
920 Article 7(1). 
921 Article 7(4). 
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Since the Protocol came into operation, some substantial progress has been noted including 
the following:  
 most member states are complying with the provisions of the SADC Protocol on 
Education and Training, such as the one on treating the SADC students as home 
students in terms of tuition and accommodation, and they are reserving 5% of 
admission for the SADC students in higher education institutions;  
 net enrolment rate in primary education is ranging from 71 to 95 percent and there 
are no gender gaps at this level;  
 most member states have developed national science and technology policies in 
recognition of the fact that the subjects of mathematics, science and technology are 
critical for economic growth and development;  
 collaboration between teachers’ and students’ associations, as well as through 
multi-lateral organisations such as the Distance Education Association of Southern 
Africa (DEASA);922 Southern African Comparative and History of Education 
Society (SACHES)923 and Southern African Regional Universities Association 
(SARUA);924  
 fifty-seven initiatives for collaboration in programmes for higher education, 
technical and vocational education and open distance learning have been 
established; and 
  all the member states have articulated their education policies and linked them to 
the objectives of the Protocol, as well as the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan (RISDP), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
                                                 
922 Distance Education Association of Southern Africa (DEASA) is the regional powerhouse in Open and 
Distance Education (ODL) in the SADC Region. Member countries are Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
923 Southern African Comparative and History of Education Society (SACHES) holds conferences 
periodically which allow Southern African as well as international researchers to present and discuss their 
research work on education in Southern Africa. It provides good opportunities for researchers to learn about 
each other’s work through conferences and in a digital format. 
924 Southern African Regional Universities Association (SARUA) comprises of 58 public universities 
across all 15 SADC member states.  
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(NEPAD), the African Union Second Decade of Education (2006 – 2015) and the 
Millennium Development Goals (2000 – 2015).925 
 
However, despite these achievements, there are still some challenges. For example, in 
2016, the Southern African Regional Universities Association (SARUA) indicated that 
although there are collaborative projects underway for regional cooperation in higher 
education, too little is known about their extent and success and they face many challenges. 
It stated that to facilitate collaborations that are mutually beneficial and help to develop 
higher education, expertise, activity and strength in the region need to be mapped. It further 
stated that there is also a need to bring people together to facilitate discussion and to build 
networks, and perhaps to develop a framework of basic principles for collaboration which 
stresses equality and mutual benefit.926 
 
This assertion by the SARUA adds to the one it made in 2012, where it stated that by 2010, 
the SADC region was spending more on education than any other region in the world. 
However, most of the expenditure went towards primary education and less was spent on 
higher education. As a result, because the increased demand for higher education has not 
been matched by increased levels of funding, the quality of higher education in the SADC 
region has deteriorated and the number of academic staff has declined.927 
 
Also according to the 2015 SADC Barometer, the SADC region still needs to address 
education for disabled children, especially girls, who are among the most marginalised.928 
 
                                                 
925 “Communiqué on the meeting of Ministers for Education held in Maseru, Lesotho on 27 July 2007”; 
Umlilo weMfundo; “Review of the Status and Capacities for the Implementation of the Protocol on 
Education and Training” Study done for the SADC, June 2007 at 15. 
926 “SADC’s 20 Higher Education Challenges – According to the Southern African Regional Universities 
Association (SARUA)” Southern African News, 27 February 2016. 
927 Mouton, J et al. Leadership and Management Case Studies in Training in Higher Education in Africa 
(2015) at 4; Kotecha, P. “Higher Education in the Southern African Region: Current trends, challenges, and 
recommendations” Presentation to the Extraordinary Meeting of the SADC Ministers of Higher Education 
and Training, 5 June 2012 Johannesburg, South Africa, at 6. 
928 SADC Gender Protocol 2015 Barometer: Chapter 3 at 113; “Education for All 2000 - 2015: 
Achievements and Challenges”, EFA Global Monitoring Report (2015) at 155.  
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5.4.9 Protocol on Culture, Information and Sport 
 
Southern African countries have a common history and tradition that transcend national 
borders in the region. This history includes pre-colonial warfare and colonialism. In 
recognition of this history, the SADC adopted the Protocol on Culture, Information and 
Sport to re-enforce the central role played by culture and sport in the integration and co-
operation of its member states.  The Protocol was signed on 14 August 2001 and came into 
operation on 7 January 2006.929 
 
The Protocol is guided by the following general principles, in the spirit of regional 
integration and co-operation: 
 striving to develop policies and programmes in the areas of culture information and 
sport; 
 pooling of resources (expertise, infrastructure facilities) by member states; and 
 commitment to enhance a regional identity in diversity and the right of access to 
information and participation in the areas of culture, information and sport by all 
citizens.930 
 
Section I of the Protocol deals with culture, and covers the general and specific areas of 
co-operation in this sector including training, capacity-building and research, resource 
mobilisation, language policy formulation, preservation of cultural heritage and arts and 
culture festivals amongst others.931 
 
                                                 
929 “Protocol on Culture, Information and Sports 2001” Southern African Development Community – 
Towards a common Future. Available at http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/Protocol%20on%20Culture,%20Information%20and%20Sport%202001 (accessed on 2 
August 2016); Du Plessis, A.A et al. “Legal perspectives on the role of culture in sustainable development” 
Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad vol. 13 no. 1 (2010) 27 at 53; Chingono, M et al. “The challenges 
of regional integration in Southern Africa” African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 
vol. 3 no. 10 (2009) 396 at 400. 
930 Article 2 of the Protocol.   
931 Articles 11 – 16. 
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Section II deals with information – availability, infrastructure, freedom of media and code 
of ethics;932 and Section III covers regional tournaments, talent development, centres of 
excellence and national policies in the area of sport.933 
 
In the area of culture and arts, the SADC has established the Committee of Ministers for 
Arts and Culture934 which must facilitate the use of arts and culture in the process of 
integration and sustainable development in the SADC and the significance of the cultural 
industries to contribute to the gross domestic product (GDP) of the region. The Committee 
meets at least once per annum in order to evaluate the role of culture in regional integration 
and sustainable development in the SADC region, as well as to evaluate the significance 
and contribution of cultural industries to the GDP in each Member State in particular, and 
of the region in general.935 
 
Some of the initiatives by the Committee of Ministers to promote integration through arts 
and culture include the establishment of a SADC Cultural Fund, the SADC Hall of Fame 
and the Multi-Disciplinary Festival. However, lack of funding prevents these from coming 
into operation.936 
 
In the area of sports, regional bodies like the Confederation of Southern African National 
Olympic Committees (COSANOC) and the Confederation of Southern African Football 
Associations (COSAFA) exist to run the sports in the region. However, sports facilities are 
always at the bottom of the priority list in almost every Member State. Even initiatives to 
                                                 
932 Articles 17 – 23. 
933 Articles 24 – 31.  
934 Committee was established in accordance with Article 11(2)(g) of the SADC Treaty, which provides 
that the Council can create its own committees as necessary; “Deputy Minister Joe Phaahla speaks at the 
SADC Committee Meeting of Ministers of Arts and Culture” Department of Arts and Culture Media 
Statement, 4 July 2013. Available at http://www.dac.gov.za/content/deputy-minister-joe-phaahla-speaks-
sadc-committee-meeting-ministers-arts-and-culture (accessed on 11 August 2016).  
935 Article 33 of the Protocol provides: 
“1. The Committee of Ministers shall be responsible, amongst others, for:  
(a) establishing the policies, priorities and strategies of the Sector;  
(b) supervising the implementation of this Protocol; and 
(c) renewing the determining areas of cooperation as provided for in Article (4) of this Protocol. 
2. The Committee of Ministers shall meet, at least once a year, at such place and time as may be agreed.” 
936 “International Organizations – Southern African Development Community” The Europa World 
Yearbook vol.1 (2016) at 331. 
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encourage the private sector to invest in sports and recreation facilities for communities are 
virtually non-existent.  The identification and development of talent is therefore seriously 
compromised because of a shortage of a wide range of sport facilities.937 
 
In the area of information, the Southern African Broadcasters Association is one of the bodies 
formed to cooperate and share information between broadcasters in the region. However, the 
region still lags behind with regards to information mainly due to information censorship by 
government-controlled state or public broadcasters. This is the reason why about 300 civic 
society delegates under the umbrella of the Southern Africa Civil Society Forum meeting 
(CSF) in Harare on 30 July 2014 made a call to the SADC to review this Protocol. Among their 
reasons was that the Protocol is archaic and out of sync with the rapidly changing information 
and communication trends.938 
 
5.4.10 Finance and Investment Protocol 
 
The signing of this Protocol was necessitated by the need to accelerate growth, investment 
and employment in the SADC region through increased cooperation, coordination and 
management of macroeconomic, monetary and fiscal policies, and to establish and sustain 
macroeconomic stability as a precondition to sustainable economic growth and for the 
creation of a monetary union in the region.939 
 
This Protocol was signed on 16 August 2006 and came into operation on 16 April 2010.  It 
is comprehensive and very complex with eleven annexes. It seeks to foster the 
harmonisation of finance and investment policies of member states, in order to make them 
                                                 
937 Burnett, C. “Olympic Movement Stakeholder Collaboration for Delivering on Sport Development in 
Eight African (SADC) Countries”, final Report for the University of Johannesburg Olympic Studies Centre 
(UJOSC), May 2015; “SADC & Sport: Relevance or obscurity”, The Southern Times of 15 February 2016 
(online). Available at http://southernafrican.news/2016/02/15/sadc-sport-relevance-or-obscurity/ (accessed 
on 10 August 2016).  
938 “Southern Africa: SADC Protocol on Information Should Be Reviewed” Press release by Media 
Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), 1 August 2014 (online). Available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201408042861.html (accessed on 2 August 2016); Communique of the 10th Civil 
Society Forum held on 30th July 2014, Harare, Zimbabwe to the 34th Ordinary Summit of the SADC Heads 
of State & Government.  
939 Preamble to the Protocol. 
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consistent with the objectives of the SADC and to ensure that any changes to the financial 
and investment policies in one Member State do not necessitate undesirable adjustments in 
other member states.940 The Protocol also deals with taxation matters and how to harmonise 
the tax regimes of member states.  
 
The Protocol allows affected investors in a SADC country, from any other state, to institute 
claims for breaches of its prohibition on nationalisation and guarantee of fair and equitable 
treatment. It gives investors the right to submit a claim to binding international arbitration 
for disputes related to admitted investments, where local remedies have been exhausted, 
and at least six months have passed since the SADC Member State was notified of the 
claim. And, most importantly, the dispute must have arisen after 16 April 2010 (i.e. date of 
entry into force of the Protocol).941 
 
It also provides important protection to foreign investors in the SADC member states: it 
prohibits the nationalisation of property or investments and guarantees fair and equitable 
treatment; it allows foreign investors to elevate their disputes with member states to the 
international plane and initiate arbitration under the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), or the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) rules; and, crucially, it broadly provides these protections to all foreign 
investors, regardless of their nationality.942 
 
Apropos these provisions, in 2012 a group of investors (claimants)943 referred a dispute 
against Lesotho to the UNICITRAL arbitration tribunal alleging that Lesotho’s 
participation in the disbandment of the SADC Tribunal constitutes a denial of justice under 
customary international law and a breach of several investor protection provision contained 
                                                 
940 Article 2(1); “The Basis for Harmonisation of Payment System Law in SADC”, the Legal and 
Regulatory Framework for Payments in 14 Member states Master Report, August 2014 at 12. 
941 Articles 5 and 28 of Annex 1; Kotuby, C Jr. et al. “Protecting Foreign Investments in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: The Southern African Development Community and its Protocol on Finance and Investment” Jones 
Day 8 January 2014. Available at www.mondaq.com/...Investment/ (accessed on 28 July 2016).  
942 Kotuby (above).  
943 The nine claimants were: Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd; Josias van Zyl; The Josias van Zyl 
Family Trust; The Burmilla Trust; Matsoku Diamonds (Pty) Ltd; Motete Diamonds (Pty) Ltd; Orange 
Diamonds (Pty) Ltd; Patiseng Diamonds (Pty) Ltd and Rampai Diamonds (Pty) Ltd. 
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in the Protocol (including obligations on fair and equitable treatment, “access to courts and 
tribunals” and a general undertaking to fulfil obligations arising from the protocol).944  
 
On 18 April 2016 the UNCITRAL Arbitration Tribunal issued a partial final award on 
jurisdiction and merits of the case, and ruled in favour of the claimants. It held that Lesotho 
was wrong in participating in the disbandment of the Tribunal, as this resulted in the denial 
of justice to the claimants as well as a violation of other SADC protocols and the respect 
of the “rule of law”.945    
 
However, Lesotho applied to the Singapore High Court to have the award set aside (as 
permissible under Article 27 of the Protocol) and in April 2017 the Singapore High Court 
set aside the award. The Court found that the claimants’ investment, the mining leases, was 
made before 16 April 2010 when the Protocol came into effect and thus it lacked 
jurisdiction, and so did the Arbitration Tribunal. It also found that the claimants did not 
exhaust local remedies in the Lesotho courts.946 The claimants have now lodged an appeal 
in the Lesotho High Court.947  
 
Under this Protocol, the SADC has co-opted the then Committee of Governors of Central 
Banks and renamed it the Independent Committee of Governors of Central Banks.948 The 
(Independent) Committee has established a small Specialised Secretariat and Research 
Facility within the South African Reserve Bank to it.  
 
                                                 
944 Ngobeni, L. “The Investor-State Dispute Resolution Forum under the SADC Protocol on Finance and 
Investment: Challenges and opportunities for effective harmonisation” Law, Democracy and Development 
vol. 19 (2015) 175; 
945 Peterson, L.E. “Investigation: Lesotho is held liable for investment treaty breach arising out of its role in 
hobbling a regional tribunal that had been hearing expropriation case”, 14 July 2016 (online). Available at 
http://www.bankside.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/IA-Article-Swissborough.pdf (accessed on 28 July 
2016).  
946 Kingdom of Lesotho v Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Limited [2017] SGHC 195 (Lesotho). 
947 Searle, N et al. “Singapore court sets aside award against Lesotho” African Law and Business 
Newsletter, 5 September 2017 (online). Available at https://www.africanlawbusiness.com/news/7569-
singapore-court-sets-aside-award-against-lesotho (accessed on 24 October 2017).  
948 This Committee was established in 1995 when South Africa was given the special task of administering 
the erstwhile SADC Finance and Investment Sector.  
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The SADC has also adopted a bottom-up approach with respect to the question of financial 
integration. This approach is based on building financial cooperation by laying an 
appropriate foundation in the form of an effective institutional framework for the financial 
system in each country.949 
 
Pursuant to Article 5(5) of the Protocol that requires state parties to draw up guidelines for 
the effective exchange of information and the implementation of mutual agreements 
procedures, the SADC member states signed the Agreement on Assistance in Tax Matters 
(AATM) in 2012. It provides, among others, for information exchange and mutual 
assistance including a joint audit. The SADC has also facilitated multilateral negotiations 
of Tax Information Exchange Agreements ((TIEA) between the SADC member states and 
identified state and territories. This happened with the state of Guernsey in October 2011 
and with the Isle of Man in March 2012. There is also growth in the network of signed 
double taxation agreements between member states.950   
 
In August 2015 the SADC Committee of Ministers of Finance and Investment approved 
three key regional frameworks for tax cooperation, namely: Value Added Tax (VAT); 
Excise and Tax Incentives Guidelines and their supporting Commentaries, as well as the 
SADC Model Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) and the use of the African 
Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) practical guidelines for information exchange for use 
by the SADC.951 The Guidelines were published in May 2016 and, notwithstanding that 
                                                 
949 Stals, C. “The Role of Financial Co-operation in the Development of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC)”, Lecture presented to the Harvard Institute for International Development Boston, 01 
May 1997 at 3; Zongwe, D. “Conjuring systemic risk through financial regulation by SADC central banks” 
SADC Law Journal vol. 1 (2011) 99 at 111. 
950 Macheli, S. “SADC Work on Exchange of Information”, paper delivered at the ATAF-EU-URA 
Technical Conference on Exchange of Information and Tax Treaties, Kampala, Uganda, 19 – 20 April 2012 
at 20; Oguttu, A.W. “A Critique on the Effectiveness of “Exchange of Information on Tax Matters” in 
Preventing Tax Avoidance and Evasion: A South African Perspective” Bulletin for International Taxation 
vol. 68 no. 1 (2014) 2. 
951 Oahile, I. “Key Regional Frameworks for Tax Cooperation Adopted”, published on 15 October 2015 
(online). Available at www.linkedin.com/pulse/key-regional-frameworks-tax-cooperation-adopted-
itumeleng-oahile (accessed on 29 July 2016).  
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they are non-binding, there is already evidence of member states using them to help tackle 
policy challenges.952 
 
5.4.11 Protocol on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking 
 
The SADC is aware that the region is being increasingly used as a conduit for drugs 
destined for international markets and that illicit drug-trafficking generates large financial 
gains and wealth thus encouraging cross-border criminals and organisations to penetrate, 
contaminate and corrupt society at all levels. To deal with this problem the SADC 
developed the Protocol on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking, which was signed on 24 
August 1996 and entered into force on 20 March 1999.953  
   
In November 2013 the SADC adopted “the Regional Programme 2013-2020” - Making the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region Safer from Crime and 
Drugs, which was jointly developed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) and the SADC, as one mechanism to facilitate the implementation of the 
Protocol. It makes provision for the creation of focal points in each member state and it 
covers all the 15 member states of the SADC.954  
 
However, despite all these efforts illicit drugs and activities associated to them are still 
pervasive in the region and the implementation of the provisions of the SADC Protocol on 
Combating Illicit Drugs is not fully happening in member states. The main reasons for 
                                                 
952 Gondwe, G.E. “2016 - 2017 Budget Statement presented by the Minister of Finance, Economic Planning 
& Development (Malawi)”, 14 December 2016; Hollinrake, D. “Vat as a part of Regional Tax Cooperation 
in the SADC Region” Paper prepared for the VAT Symposium: “VAT in Developing Countries: Policy, 
Law and Practice”, Pretoria, South Africa, 2 October 2016 at 13. 
953 “Protocol on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking 1996”available at http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/Protocol%20Against%20Corruption%20(2001) (accessed on 8 December 2017); USA 
International Business. Southern African Development Community (SADC) Business Law Handbook 
(2011) at 57. 
954 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). “Making the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Region Safer from Crime and Drugs: Regional Programme 2013-2020”.  
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these are the lack of political will among the leadership in various member states and the 
lack of necessary infrastructure.955 
 
Cannabis is reported to be the most common drug used in the region, followed by mandrax, 
then cocaine, heroin, hashish, crystal methamphetamine (usually known as tik) and ecstasy. 
And there seems to be a link between the drug use and the persistent violent crime in the 
region, especially in South Africa.956   
 
5.4.12 Protocol Against Corruption  
 
The SADC Protocol Against Corruption aims to promote and strengthen the development, 
within each member state, of mechanisms needed to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate 
corruption in the public and private sector. It further seeks to facilitate and regulate 
cooperation in matters of corruption among member states and to foster development and 
harmonisation of policies and domestic legislation related to corruption. It was signed on 
14 August 2001 and came into force on 6 August 2003.957  
 
The Protocol has been ratified by thirteen member states and the only two states not to have 
ratified the Protocol are Madagascar and the Seychelles. The Protocol provides that each 
state party undertakes to adopt measures that will protect individuals, who in good faith, 
report acts of corruption. However, despite this provision, legislation in Mozambique, 
Namibia and Swaziland fails to protect whistle blowers. However, other jurisdictions like 
                                                 
955 Mudzingwa, E. “Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Combating Illicit 
Drugs in Southern Africa: The Case of Zimbabwe and South Africa” Thesis to Bindura University of 
Science Education in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements of the Master of Science Degree in 
International Relations, October 2015. 
956 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). “World Drug Report – 2015”; Goredema, C. 
“Drugs and violent crime in southern Africa” SADC Law Journal vol. 1 (2011) 175 at 177. 
957 “Protocol Against Corruption (2001)” available at http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/ 
(accessed on 8 December 2017); Williams-Elegbe, S. “Perspective on Corruption and Public” in  Quinot, G 
et al. Public Procurement Regulation in Africa (2013) 667. 
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South Africa guarantee the protection of whistle blowers through witness protection 
programmes.958 
 
All thirteen member states have a body tasked to investigate acts of corruption, but these 
bodies have numerous problems, including a lack of independence in carrying out their 
functions; political interference is also a problem especially in the appointment process of 
the head of the anti-corruption institution as in most jurisdictions the head is a President-
appointee; lack of capacity for institutions to carry out the necessary investigations and 
day-to-day operations; lack of funding and technical expertise as institutions were 
understaffed and poorly trained, etc. All these factors point to a lack of political will by 
state members to effectively and efficiently combat corruption.959 
 
5.4.13 Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Materials 
 
The Protocol answers to the urgent need to prevent and eradicate the illicit manufacturing 
of firearms, ammunition and other related materials as well as the accumulation, 
trafficking, possession and use of these in the region. It also addresses issues of operational 
capacity, making of fire-arms and record-keeping, transparency and information exchange, 
voluntary surrender of firearms, public education and awareness as well as the institutional 
arrangements for effective implementation of these measures. It was signed on 14 August 
2001 and entered into force on 8 November 2004.960 
 
The SADC has appointed a contact person at the SADC Secretariat for all matters relating 
to the implementation of the Protocol. The Public Security Sub-Committee, part of the 
SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Operation, coordinates illicit trade matters 
                                                 
958 de Soussa, C. “Combatting corruption in the SADC” De Rebus (April 2015) 12; Nsereko, Z et al. “The 
SADC Protocol against corruption: Example of the region's response to an international scourge” Botswana 
Law Journal vol. 1 issue 6 (June 2005) 85. 
959 de Sousa (above).  
960 “Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Materials (2001)” available at 
http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/Protocol%20on%20the%20Control%20of%20Firearms,%20Ammunition%20and%20Ot
her%20Materials%20(2001) (accessed on 8 December 2017); Geneva Academy of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. “2001 SADC Protocol” Weapons Law Encyclopaedia (2017) 1211. 
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with Customs, Police, Immigration and other agencies. Furthermore, a Technical 
Committee on Small Arms was established to coordinate communication between member 
states and sub-regional bodies and provide a place for member states to share information 
on best practices and agree mutual assistance. The SADC has also worked with civil society 
organisations, most notably SaferAfrica and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), to 
further the implementation of the Protocol and to carry out policy development and 
research.961 
 
These measures have, however, not managed to effectively reduce the proliferation and use 
of these illicit firearms. They are the often-used weapons in violent crimes such as murder, 
car hijackings and robberies, especially in South Africa, and these threaten the stability and 
peace of the region.962 According to the world crime statistics, firearms account for 30% 
of all the homicides committed in the region.963 
 
5.4.14 Protocol on Extradition 
 
The SADC Protocol on Extradition was signed with the intention to reduce the crime levels 
by enabling member states to extradite to the other, any person within their jurisdiction 
who is wanted for prosecution or the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the 
requesting member state. By signing the Protocol, member states have agreed to speedy 
response and cooperation to assist the prevention of crime and eliminate threats to security 
of member states by mutual assistance on matters of extradition. It was signed on 3 October 
2002 and entered into force on 1 September 2006.964  
                                                 
961 Human Rights Law in Africa. “Protocol On the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related 
Materials in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region” available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315625497 (accessed on 9 December 2017); Fellmeth, A.X. “The 
Un Firearms Protocol” in Hauck, P et al. International Law and Transnational Organized Crime (2016) at 
216. 
962  Oosthuysen, G. “Shooting the golden goose: Small-arms proliferation in Southern Africa” in Rotberg, 
R.I et al. War and Peace in Southern Africa: Crime, Drugs, Armies, Trade (2010) at 64; Grip, L. “Small 
arms control in Africa” Academic dissertation to Helsinki University Department of Political and 
Economic Studies, May 2017 at 105. 
963 World Association of Investigators. “List of countries by intentional homicide rate” available at 
https://www.crimestatssa.com/international.php (accessed on 13 December 2017). 
964 “Protocol on Extradition (2002)” available at http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/Protocol%20on%20Extradition%20(2002) (accessed on 9 December 2017).  
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However, the Protocol does not enumerate the offences in respect of which extradition may 
be granted. Article 3(1) simply provides: 
For the purpose of this Protocol, extraditable offence are offences that are 
punishable under the laws of both State Parties by imprisonment or other 
deprivation of liberty for a period of at least one year, or by a more severe penalty. 
Where the request for extradition relates to a person wanted for the enforcement of 
a sentence of imprisonment or other deprivation of liberty imposed for such an 
offence, extradition may be refused if a period of less than six months of such 
sentence remains to be served.” 
 
Articles 4 and 5 provide for circumstances under which extradition may be refused.965 One 
of these circumstances, which have been used often, by South Africa in particular, is where 
                                                 
965 Article 4 provides: (Mandatory grounds to refuse extradition)  
“Extradition shall be refused in any of the following circumstances:  
 
(a) if the offence for which extradition is requested is of a political nature. An offence of a political nature 
shall not include any offence in respect of which the State Parties have assumed an obligation, pursuant 
to any multilateral convention, to take prosecutorial action where they do not extradite, or any other 
offence that the State Parties have agreed is not an offence of a political character for the purposes of 
extradition;  
(b) if the Requested State has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition has been 
made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person's race, religion, 
nationality, ethnic origin, political opinion, sex or status or that the person's position may be prejudiced 
for any of those reasons;  
(c) if the offence for which extradition is requested constitutes an offence under military law, which is not 
an offence under ordinary criminal law;  
(d) if there has been a final judgment rendered against the person in the Requested State or a Third State in 
respect of the offence for which the person's extradition is requested;  
(e) if the person whose extradition is requested has, under the law of either State Party, become immune 
from prosecution or punishment for any reason, including lapse of time or amnesty;  
(f) if the person whose extradition is requested has been, or would be subjected in the Requesting State to 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or if that person has not received or 
would not receive the minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings, as contained in Article 7 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights; and  
(g) if the judgment of the Requesting State has been rendered in absentia and the convicted person has not 
had sufficient notice of the trial or the opportunity to arrange for his or her defence and he or she has 
not had or will not have the opportunity to have the case retried in his or her presence.” 
 
Article 5 provides: (Optional grounds for refusal) 
“Extradition may be refused in any of the following circumstances:  
(a) if the person whose extradition is requested is a national of the Requested State. Where extradition 
is refused on this ground, the Requested State shall, if the other State so requests, submit the case 
to its competent authorities with a view to taking appropriate action against the person in respect 
of the offence for which extradition had been requested;  
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the death penalty is likely to be imposed.966 South Africa does however, in other 
circumstances, comply with extradition requests where the provisions or requirements of 
the Protocol are met. Member states that South Africa has extradited wanted fugitives to 
include Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.967 
 
Many of the SADC member states have also signed bilateral extradition agreements 
between themselves, but these are treated as complementary to the Protocol.968  
 
5.4.15 Protocol on Forestry 
 
The Protocol aims to promote the development, conservation, sustainable management and 
utilisation of all types of forest and trees; trade in forest products and achieve effective 
protection of the environment; and safeguards the interests of both the present and future 
                                                 
(b) if a prosecution in respect of the offence for which extradition is requested is pending in the 
Requested State against the person whose extradition is requested;  
(c) if the offence for which extradition is requested carries a death penalty under the law of the 
Requesting State, unless that State gives such assurance, as the Requested State considers 
sufficient that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if imposed, will not be carried out. Where 
extradition is refused on this ground, the Requested State shall, if the other State so requests, 
submit the case to its competent authorities with a view to taking appropriate action against the 
person for the offence for which extradition had been requested;  
(d) if the offence for which extradition is requested has been committed outside the territory of either 
State Party and the law of the Requested State does not provide for jurisdiction over such an 
offence committed outside its territory in comparable circumstances;  
(e) if the offence for which extradition is requested is regarded under the laws of the Requested State 
as having been committed in whole or in part within that State. Where extradition is refused on 
this ground, the Requested State shall, if the other State Party so requests submit the case to its 
competent authorities with a view to taking appropriate action against the person for the offence 
for which extradition had been requested; and  
(f) if the Requested State, while also taking into account the nature of the offence and the interest of 
the Requesting State, considers that, in the circumstances of the case, the extradition of that person 
would be incompatible with humanitarian considerations in view of age, health or other personal 
circumstances of that person.” 
966 Mohamed and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2001] ZACC 18 (CC); 
Tsebe and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others, Phale v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 
[2011] ZAGPJHC 115 (South Gauteng High Court); Ex Parte Minister of Home Affairs and Four Others v 
Tsebe & Phale 2012 (5) SA 467 (CC); Bulman, A. “The Death of Capital Punishment? Ex Parte Minister of 
Home Affairs and Four others v Tsebe & Phale - A Case Analysis” Legal Resources Centre Working Paper 
Series (No. A4/2012), 2 December 2012; “Judge Slams Illegal Deportation of Murder Accused” Business 
Day of 18 September 2014.  
967 S v Khanyisile and Another (CA 12/2012) [2012] ZANWHC 35; S v Shoniwa and Others (CA 41/2010) 
[2011] ZANWHC 25 (27 May 2011); “7 extradited to Lesotho” News24 (online) of 19 April 2011. 
968 Article 19; Phale v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [2011] ZAGPJHC 115 (South Gauteng High 
Court). 
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generations. The Protocol therefore provides guidance on the undertaking of national forest 
assessments and national forest policies, programmes and laws. Through the Protocol, 
member states are encouraged strive to have substantial forest based industries within their 
territories in order to eradicate poverty eradication in their countries. It was signed on 3 
August 2002 and entered into force on 17 September 2009.969 
 
In 2011 the SADC developed and adopted “A SADC Support Programme on Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD): 2012 – 2015”, whose goal 
is to contribute to the sustainable management of the forests of the SADC as well as to 
contribute to poverty reduction and sustainable development, and mitigate climate change. 
The Programme was to be implemented at sub-national, national and Regional levels.970 
 
In line with this Protocol, member states of Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa adopted their own mitigation 
programmes. However, lack of adequate resources hampers full implementation of these 
programmes.971 
 
5.4.16 Protocol on Gender and Development 
 
The SADC Protocol on Gender and Development looks into integration and main-
streaming of gender issues into the SADC Programme of Action and community building 
initiatives which are important to the sustainable development of the SADC region. It aims 
to provide for the empowerment of women, to eliminate discrimination and to achieve 
gender equality by encouraging and harmonising the development and implementation of 
gender responsive legislation, policies and programmes and projects. It is also a tool used 
to set realistic, measurable targets, time frames and indicators for achieving gender equality 
and equity, and monitor and evaluate the progress made by member states thereof. It was 
                                                 
969 “Protocol on Forestry (2002)” available at http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/Protocol%20on%20Forestry%20(2002) (accessed on 11 December 2017). 
970 SADC. “A SADC Support Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD): 2012 – 2015”, May 2011. 
971 Morna, C.L et al. “Gender, Climate Change and Sustainable Development” SADC Gender Protocol 
2015 Barometer (2016) at 332.  
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signed on 7 August 2008 and came into force on 22 February 2013. It was revised in 2016 
so that its objectives are aligned to various global targets and emerging issues such as the 
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 972 
 
Following the signing of the Protocol, the Southern Africa Gender Protocol Alliance was 
established as a regional “network of networks” that championed the ratification of the 
Protocol by each member state. The Alliance also advocates for implementation of the 
protocol and partners with various gender organisations in various member states. It is 
made up of fifteen country networks comprising of different Alliance focal point 
organisations.973 
 
Other notable achievements regarding this Protocol are the following: 
 At end of 2016, the proportion of SADC women in climate change decision-making 
positions was at 24%. Only Lesotho, at 50%, had achieved gender parity for women 
in decision-making.  
 With regard to supply of clean water for the citizens, Mauritius had achieved 100% 
supply of clean water for its population while Angola was the lowest achiever with 
49% supply.  
 In July 2017, the SADC Ministers responsible for gender issues adopted a 
Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting Framework (MERF) that will be the basis of 
future reporting.974  
 
5.4.17 Protocol to the Treaty establishing SADC on Immunities and Privileges 
 
This Protocol grants immunity to the property and assets of the SADC so that they are 
immune from every form of legal process, search, and requisition or confiscation except in 
                                                 
972 “Protocol on Gender and Development (2008)” available at http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/Protocol%20on%20Gender%20and%20Development%20(2008) (accessed on 11 
December 2017). 
973 “SADC Gender Protocol Alliance” available at http://genderlinks.org.za/what-we-do/sadc-gender-
protocol/ (accessed on 11 December 2017); Yaliwe M et al. “SADC gender and development protocol : an 
evaluation of equality, empowerment and gender based violence in South Africa (2008-2012)” Gender and 
Behaviour vol.11 issue 1 (2013) 5175.  
974 Morna, C.L et al. “Gender and Governance” SADC Gender Protocol 2017 Barometer (2017) at 71. 
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instances where such immunity has been expressly waived. Such immunity extends to the 
SADC officials and their immediate families. It also considers all the communications of 
the SADC non- violable. With respect to privileges, the Protocol grants tax exemption and 
non-restrictive financial controls to the SADC, its institutions and officials. Member states 
representatives to the SADC and to conferences convened by the SADC as well as experts 
performing missions for the SADC are also accorded the same immunities and privileges 
in term of this Protocol. It was signed on 17 August 1992 and entered into force on 30 
September 1993.975 
 
The immunities and privileges accorded in terms of this Protocol are comparable to those 
accorded by similar international organisations. As such there has never been a reported 
case wherein the Protocol was flouted by member states that host various institutions and 
officials of the SADC.976  
 
5.4.18 Protocol on Legal Affairs  
 
The Protocol establishes the SADC Legal Affairs Unit to give constant legal support and 
advice to the institutions of the SADC for their effective performance. The main aim of the 
Legal Affairs Unit is thus to provide legal advice and legal related services to the SADC 
and its institutions, interpret, draft and develop legal documents/instruments for 
implementing the Treaty and SADC protocols, facilitate the notification of the status, 
ratification, accession and entry into force of the SADC protocols as well as provide 
litigation services. 977 It was signed on 7 August 2000 and came into effect on 1 September 
2006.978  
 
                                                 
975 “Protocol to the Treaty establishing SADC on Immunities and Privileges (1992)” available at 
http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/Protocol%20to%20the%20Treaty%20establishing%20SADC%20on%20Immunities%20
and%20Privileges%20(1992) (accessed on 11 December 2017);  
976 Kyambalesa, H et al. Economic Integration and Development in Africa (2016) at 117. 
977 Article 2 – Objectives.  
978 “Protocol on Legal Affairs (2000)” available at http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/Protocol%20on%20Legal%20Affairs%20(2000) (accessed on 12 December 2017). 
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The Protocol also encourages member states to harmonise their legal system. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, member states have made some progress with regard to this objective, 
through, inter alia, adopting model laws in various areas or fields.979 
 
5.4.19 Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 
 
The Protocol was signed in pursuance of the goal of regional integration in the areas of 
social welfare, peace and security. It extends to member states the widest possible mutual 
legal assistance within the limits of the laws of their respective jurisdictions. It also sets the 
framework for member states to assist each other in respect of investigations, prosecutions 
as well as proceedings in a criminal matter without regarding whether the act committed 
would be a criminal matter or not in the state being requested for assistance. The protocol 
further provides guidance on how such assistance will be given, the authorities responsible 
and grounds on which such assistance can be denied. It was signed on 3 October 2002 and 
entered into force on 1 March 2007.980 
 
The mutual assistance to be given is limited to state parties and shall not give rise to a right 
on the part of any private person to obtain, suppress or exclude any evidence to impede the 
execution of a request for assistance.981 However, the Protocol requires the state parties to 
ensure respect for the rights of bona fide third parties and victims.982 The assistance to be 
provided includes the following:  
a. locating and identifying persons, property, objects and items;  
                                                 
979 See Chapter 5 part 5.3.2 (harmonisation of laws) above. 
980 “Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (2002)” available at 
http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/Protocol%20on%20Mutual%20Legal%20Assistance%20in%20Criminal%20Matters%2
0(2002) (accessed on 13 December 2017); Cryer, R et al. An Introduction to International Criminal Law 
and Procedure (2010) at 102; Ewi, M.A. “Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism in Africa: The Role of 
the African Union and Sub-Regional Organizations” in de Frías, A.S et al. Counter-Terrorism: 
International Law and Practice (2012) at 990 – 1043; Watney, M. “A South African perspective on mutual 
legal assistance and extradition in a globalized world” Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad (PER) vol. 
15 no. 2 (2012). 
981 Article 2(6). 
982 Article 22(2); Ivory, R. Corruption, Asset Recovery, and the Protection of Property in Public (2014) at 
134. 
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b. serving documents, including documents seeking the attendance of persons and 
providing returns of such service;  
c. providing information, documents and records;  
d. providing objects and temporary transfer of exhibits;  
e. search and seizure;  
f. taking evidence or obtaining statements or both;  
g. authorising the presence of persons from the requesting state at the execution of 
requests;  
h. ensuring the availability of detained persons to give evidence or to assist in 
possible investigations;  
i. facilitating the appearance of witnesses or the assistance of persons in 
investigations; and 
j. taking possible measures for location, restraint, seizure, freezing or forfeiture of 
the proceeds of crime.983 
 
Despite the existence of this Protocol and national legislations in member states 
domesticating it, there is still a lack of information-sharing and cooperation among law 
enforcement agencies in the region. This has led to transnational organised crime groups 
to flourish, taking advantage of the long and porous borders, the ease of cross-border trade 
and the diversity of individual countries’ legislations. There is also a general weakness in 
the criminal justice systems of most jurisdictions in the SADC region, leading to difficulties 
in dealing with complex crimes like money laundering and tax evasion. The exceptions are 
South Africa and the Seychelles.984  
 
South Africa is the most affected member state by these weaknesses and the lack of 
assistance from its neighbours. The rate of vehicle theft in South Africa has increased 
recently, with the majority of the vehicles reported to have ended up in Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe. The authorities in these two member states, are however, not able to assist in 
                                                 
983 Article 2(5). 
984 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). “Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network 
Southern Africa (ARINSA) Annual Report 2016” at 6. 
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recovering these stolen vehicles due to the weaknesses in their criminal justice systems and 
technologies.985  
 
5.4.20 Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement 
 
In recognition of wildlife resources’ potential to affect the region’s economic development 
and environmental protection, the SADC passed its Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and 
Law Enforcement to establish a common framework for conservation and sustainable use 
of wildlife in the region. The Protocol advocates for member states to harmonise legal 
instruments for wildlife, establish management programmes for wildlife, and create a 
regional database of wildlife status and management. It also establishes institutional 
arrangements for the Protocol’s implementation, specifying committees and units, a 
schedule of meetings, and each division’s functions. It was signed on 14 August 1999 and 
entered into force on 30 November 2003.986 
 
The SADC member states have taken meaningful steps towards implementing this Protocol 
by adopting legislations dealing with wildlife. However, the analysis of national 
legislations in the SADC region, through the study conducted by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the International Council for Game and 
Wildlife Conservation (CIC), shows that general statements on wildlife ownership are less 
important than substantive provisions entitling persons to benefit from wildlife use. In the 
majority of the member states ordinary people seem to be unaware of the legislation and 
licences granted in respect thereof. In the majority of cases these licences are granted to 
                                                 
985 Ibid; “MAP: Here's how many cars are hijacked in SA by province” Wheels24 (online) of 31 October 
2017, available at http://www.wheels24.co.za/News/Guides_and_Lists/map-heres-how-many-cars-are-
hijacked-in-sa-by-province-20171031 (accessed on 13 December 2017).  
986 “Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement (1999)” available at 
http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/Protocol%20on%20Wildlife%20Conservation%20and%20Law%20Enforcement%20(19
99) (accessed on 13 December 2017). 
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the rich, who are, in most cases, foreign nationals. There is, as such, a need to strengthen 
the legislation and law enforcement in most of the member states.987  
 
The member states have also embarked on the establishment of the transfrontier 
conservation areas (TFCAs), with the aim of collaboratively managing shared natural and 
cultural resources across international boundaries for improved biodiversity conservation 
and socio-economic development. Currently the following TFCAs have been established 
in the SADC region: 
 /Ai/Ais - Richtersveld Transfrontier Park – made up of /Ai/Ais Hot Springs Game 
Park in Namibia and the Richtersveld Park in South Africa; 
 Chimanimani Transfrontier Conservation Area – made up of Chimanimani Nature 
Reserve in Mozambique and the Chimanimani National Park in Zimbabwe; 
 Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park – Spanning Mozambique, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe; 
 Iona-Skeleton Coast Transfrontier Conservation Area – made up of the Iona 
National Park in Angola and the Skeleton Coast National Park in Namibia; 
 Kagera Transfrontier Conservation Area – made up of the Ibanda Rumanyika Game 
Reserve in Tanzania and the Akagera National Park in Rwanda; 
 Kavango-Zambezi (KAZA) Transfrontier Conservation Area – occupying the 
Okavango and Zambezi river basins, it encompasses areas within the borders of 
Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and includes 36 formally 
proclaimed national parks and a host of game reserves, forest reserves, game 
management areas, and conservation and tourism concession areas; 
 Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park – made up of South Africa’s Kalahari Gemsbok 
National Park and Botswana’s Gemsbok National Park; 
 Liuwa Plains-Mussuma Transfrontier Conservation Area – consists of the 
Mussuma area in Angola and the Liuwa National Park in the western province of 
Zambia; 
                                                 
987 Cirelli, M.T et al. “Wildlife Law in the Southern African Development Community. Joint publication of 
FAO and CIC”, CIC Technical Series Publication no. 9, Budapest (2010). 
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 Lower Zambezi - Mana Pools Transfrontier Conservation Area – composed of the 
Lower Zambezi National Park in Zambia and the Mana Pools National Park in 
northern Zimbabwe; 
 Lubombo Transfrontier Conservation Area – borders Swaziland, Mozambique and 
South Africa; 
 Maiombe Forest Transfrontier Conservation Area – encompasses the Maiombe 
Forest, stretching over four countries, including the south-west corner of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Cabinda Enclave in Angola, the Republic 
of Congo and south-west Gabon; 
 Malawi Zambia (Nyika) Transfrontier Conservation Area - includes Nyika National 
Park, Lundazi, Mitenge and Mikuti Forest Reserves and Musalangu Game 
Management Area in Zambia, and Nyika National Park and Vwaza Marsh Wildlife 
Reserve in Malawi. 
 Maloti Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area 
(MDTFCA/ MDTP) – composed of four sub-regions, namely, (i) the Eastern Cape 
Drakensberg and Witteberge, (ii) the KZN Drakensberg, (iii) the Lesotho Maloti 
mountains, and (iv) the eastern Free State; 
 Mnazi Bay- Quirimbas Transfrontier Conservation Area – covers the Mnazi Bay-
Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park in Tanzania and the Quirimbas National Park in 
Mozambique; 
 Niassa-Selous Transfrontier Conservation Area – covers the Selous Game Reserve 
in the northern Tanzania and the Niassa Game Reserve in Mozambique; 
 Western Indian Ocean Transfrontier Marine Park (WIO TFMP) – covers the marine 
water spaces of Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Tanzania and the 
Comoros; 
 Zimbabwe-Mozambique-Zambia Transfrontier Park (ZIMOZA) – made up of the 
Zumbo and Magoe districts in eastern Mozambique, Luangwa in southern Zambia 
and Guruve in northern Zimbabwe; and 
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 Greater Mapungubwe Transfrontier Conservation Area – at the confluence of the 
Shashe and Limpopo rivers and encompasses areas in Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe.988 
 
Conclusion  
 
Developments over the past few months and years suggest that political and economic 
integration in the Southern African region has reached a delicate phase. Given the 
complexity of the integration process, the question which arose frequently was whether the 
SADC institutions were equipped with required capabilities to manage the integration 
process. The answer to this question now seems to be in the affirmative if one looks into 
developments that have occurred within the SADC, especially after the 1999 Maputo 
Summit that instructed the review of the SADC institutions. There has been a lot of 
achievements since then: the amendment of the SADC Treaty, which brought about new 
institutions; the signing of protocols and agreements such as the Protocol on Trade; the 
passing of model laws on a variety of aspects/fields; etc. 
 
What may be obscured in these achievements, though, is the fact that the real test to any 
integration process comes with the implementation of the instruments of cooperation, 
which must be done by member states. The squabbles in Europe over the Maastricht Treaty 
or the Monetary Union showed that there is no guarantee that regional goals will not be 
derailed by national agendas during the implementation process.989 More, therefore, still 
needs to be done.  
 
However, this inability by member states is in most instances not their own making. As 
shown above, the region’s stagnant trade pattern is explained by three challenges: an 
underdeveloped and non-diversified industrial manufacturing base in most SADC 
                                                 
988 “SADC TFCA Fact Sheets” available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/2514/2122/3333/SADC_TFCA_Fact_Sheetsv_final.pdf (accessed on 13 
December 2017). 
989 Henning, C.R et al. Transatlantic Perspectives on the Euro (2000) at 6; Majone, G. Rethinking the 
Union of Europe Post-Crisis: Has Integration Gone Too Far? (2014) at 48 – 53. 
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countries, an inadequate infrastructure to support trade in goods, and tariff barriers that 
inhibit market access.990 
 
Doing away with sectors was one of the major achievements by the SADC. The trouble 
with these sectors was that the region did not have a say on the appointment of sectoral 
managers or the level of resources put at the sector’s disposal. The effectiveness and control 
of a particular sector depended entirely on the level of commitment and sensitivity of the 
host government. In practice this led to sectors being dysfunctional. 
 
It is pleasing to note that the SADC Secretariat has been given enough and necessary 
powers to ensure that the policies and programmes of the SADC are successful. The 
establishment of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Integration position also shows how 
committed the SADC is to the integration of the region. This will no doubt enable the 
Secretariat to perform in accordance with its being the “principal executive organ of the 
SADC”.991 However, the lack of funds is a serious challenge for the Secretariat to realise 
this goal.  
 
For the implementation of the SADC legislation to materialise, a dedicated high level 
champion should be identified at a regional level to persuade member states to implement 
protocols. A corresponding counterpart should also be identified at national level to work 
with the SADC National Committees (SNCs) to interact with ministries on the SADC 
activities.  This is because the major component of protocol implementation is the 
domestication of the protocol provisions at the national level. Accordingly, a framework 
(or guidelines) for domestication of the protocols should be developed and agreed to.   
 
The failure to move faster on popularising the ideals of the Community could be entirely 
ascribed to the SADC’s lack of coherent strategy to involve the stakeholders in conformity 
with the undertaking of Article 23 of the SADC Treaty, which pledges “to involve fully 
                                                 
990 Vickers, B. “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Small States in the EU–SADC EPA Negotiations” The 
Round Table vol. 100 no. 413 (April 2011) 183 at 185. 
991 Article 14(1) of the SADC Treaty.  
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the peoples of the region” in the integration process. This, however, seems to have been 
corrected by some of the protocols, especially with the involvement of these stakeholders 
in the SADC national committees of member states. The Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan (RISDP) was also drawn by the SADC together with the 
“stakeholders”.992 
 
It can be said that through adopting the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
(RISDP) and aligning it with the various protocols and infrastructural projects, the SADC 
is making progress towards achieving the regional integration. However, the slow pace at 
which this is being done is still a concern.   
 
But at least, there is a development plan, a starting point or rallying point. The Plan 
(RISDP) consolidates a concerted regional effort at equitable development: it translates the 
SADC’s strategic objectives into a plan on key priorities and implementation guidelines 
and institutions. Though it runs until 2020, it is aligned to the long-term programmes such 
as the Industrialization Strategy 2063 and the AU Agenda 2063. This means that the SADC 
sees itself as integral part of the envisaged continental integration agenda.  
 
With regard to protocols, chief among the concerns at the SADC Secretariat is that 
protocols take, on average, two and half years to implement. Due to the range of differing 
legal structures, amongst other reasons, member states have found it difficult to reconcile 
domestic legislation with the SADC protocols. Other issues that hamper the 
implementation of protocols include the scarcity of human and financial resources and 
limited enforcement capabilities. These must be addressed as a matter of urgency for the 
SADC integration to be a success.993 
 
In some instances, however, it seems as though there is not enough political will to ratify 
protocols. A case in point is the Protocol on Facilitation of Movement of Persons, which 
                                                 
992 “Acknowledgments” SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). 
993 This concern was raised during “SADC workshop on protocol and policy implementation in Cape 
Town, South Africa” held on 25 – 26 May 2005.  
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requires the SADC to develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to 
the free movement of capital and labour, goods and services and of the people of the region 
generally amongst member states. Despite being agreed to in 2005, it still has not been 
ratified by the required two-thirds majority for it to come into force. This is more worrying 
because this means that the SADC cannot move into the next stage of integration, which is 
a common market. For a common market to materialise, there must be the free movement 
of capital and labour.  
 
However, other protocols have been ratified and several, including the Protocol on Finance 
and Investment, require state parties to create model laws for the region though these are, 
by their very nature, “soft laws” and are not legally enforceable. This development should, 
however, be welcome because these model laws are generally used to guide governments 
in the crafting and amendment of their own domestic laws. 
 
Other protocols dealing with trade in services, such as the protocols on education and on 
health, will be inspired by the newly adopted UN Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs)994 and Africa’s Agenda 2063 which are outcome-based.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
994 The SDGs were adopted in September 2015 to replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
which had a deadline of 2015.  The SDGs came into operation in February 2016 and each goal has specific 
targets to be achieved over the next 15 years. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE SADC COMPARED TO THE EUROPEAN UNION  
 
Introduction 
 
The SADC has adopted the European Union (EU) model of integration and this is mainly 
because the “EU is a living laboratory for the integration theory”.995 The EU’s relationship 
with Africa has been formalised since its creation in 1957. The Treaty of Rome (1957) 
included articles providing for the association of African colonies996 and this seems to have 
                                                 
995 De Melo, J et al. “The New Regionalism” Finance and Development vol. 29 no. 4 (1992) 37; Saurombe, 
A. “The European Union as a model for regional integration in the Southern African Development 
Community: A selective institutional comparative analysis” Law, Democracy and Development vol. 13 
(2013) 457 at 458.  
996 Part Four of the Treaty of Rome Provided” 
“The Association of Overseas Countries and Territories: 
 
Article 131 
The Member States hereby agree to bring into association with the Community the non-European countries 
and territories which have special relations with Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands. These 
countries and territories, hereinafter referred to as “the countries and territories”, are listed in Annex IV to 
this Treaty. 
The purpose of this association shall be to promote the economic and social development of the countries 
and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the Community as a whole. 
In conformity with the principles stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, this association shall in the first 
place permit the furthering of the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and territories 
in such a manner as to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development which they expect. 
Article 132 
Such association shall have the following objects: 
1. Member States shall, in their commercial exchanges with the countries and territories, apply the same 
rules which they apply among themselves pursuant to this Treaty. 
2. Each country or territory shall apply to its commercial exchanges with Member States and with the other 
countries and territories the same rules which it applies in respect of the European State with which it has 
special relations. 
3. Member States shall contribute to the investments required by the progressive development of these 
countries and territories. 
4. As regards investments financed by the Community, participation in tenders and supplies shall be open, 
on equal terms, to all natural and legal persons being nationals of Member States or of the countries and 
territories. 
5. In relations between Member States and the countries and territories, the right of establishment of 
nationals and companies shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions, and by application of the 
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been a deliberate act on the part of EU to  externalise its model of integration over time. 
Accordingly, the strategy has been to secure market access for European products while 
                                                 
procedures, referred to in the Chapter relating to the right of establishment and on a non-discriminatory 
basis, subject to the special provisions made pursuant to Article 136. 
Article 133 
1. Imports originating in the countries or territories shall, on their entry into Member States, benefit by the 
total abolition of customs duties which shall take place progressively between Member States in conformity 
with the provisions of this Treaty. 
2. Customs duties imposed on imports from Member States and from countries or territories shall, on the 
entry of such imports into any of the other countries or territories, be progressively abolished in conformity 
with the provisions of Articles 12, 13, 14, 15 and 17. 
3. The countries and territories may, however, levy customs duties which correspond to the needs of their 
development and to the requirements of their industrialisation or which, being of a fiscal nature, have the 
object of contributing to their budgets. 
The duties referred to in the preceding sub-paragraph shall be progressively reduced to the level of those 
imposed on imports of products coming from the Member State with which each country or territory has 
special relations. The percentages and the timing of the reductions provided for under this Treaty shall 
apply to the difference between the duty imposed, on entry into the importing country or territory, on a 
product coming from the Member State which has special relations with the country or territory concerned 
and the duty imposed on the same product coming from the Community. 
4. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to countries and territories which, by reason of the special international 
obligations by which they are bound, already apply a non-discriminatory customs tariff at the date of the 
entry into force of this Treaty. 
5. The establishment or amendment of customs duties imposed on goods imported into the countries and 
territories shall not, either de jure or de facto, give rise to any direct or indirect discrimination between 
imports coming from the various Member States. 
Article 134 
If the level of the duties applicable to goods coming from a third country on entry into a country or territory 
is likely, having regard to the application of the provisions of Article 133, paragraph 1, to cause diversions 
of commercial traffic to the detriment of any Member State, the latter may request the Commission to 
propose to the other Member States the measures necessary to remedy the situation. 
Article 135 
Subject to the provisions relating to public health, public safety and public order, the freedom of movement 
in Member States of workers from the countries and territories, and in the countries and territories of 
workers from Member States shall be governed by subsequent conventions which shall require unanimous 
agreement of Member States. 
Article 136 
For a first period of five years as from the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, an Implementing 
Convention annexed to this Treaty shall determine the particulars and procedure concerning the association 
of the countries and territories with the Community. 
Before the expiry of the Convention provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, the Council, acting by 
means of a unanimous vote, shall, proceeding from the results achieved and on the basis of the principles 
set out in this Treaty, determine the provisions to be made for a further period.” 
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selling the concept of the European model of regional integration.997 This relationship 
between the EU and Africa, which still exists today, has helped shape the trends of regional 
integration in most of the regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa, including the 
SADC.998 Currently the EU is Southern Africa’s most important trading partner, which 
gives it some leverage to influence regional integration in the SADC.999 The Treaty of 
Lisbon (2009) also makes provision for this kind of arrangement.1000  
 
The EU is ranked among the most successful regional integration arrangements (RIAs) in 
the world today, hence other bodies, like the SADC, that are engaged in integration efforts 
would like to learn from it. Its success owes a lot to the way it works – its unique method 
of interaction between institutions such as the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Commission, supported by a number of agencies and other bodies. It has a single 
market as its core as well as a common currency – the euro. The single market basically 
means that barriers are removed, and people, goods, services and money move around 
Europe as freely as within one country. The people of Europe travel at will across the EU’s 
internal frontiers for business and pleasure or, if they choose, they can stay at home and 
enjoy a dazzling array of products from all over the European Union.1001 
 
It started as an economic bloc for the Western European states, but it is becoming a fully-
fledged continental bloc, after many Eastern European countries joined it in 2004 and 
                                                 
997 Holmes, P et al. “Exporting rules: The European Union as model for international regimes?” Paper 
delivered at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) 6th Biennial Conference, Pittsburgh, 2 -5 June 
1999; Farrell, M. “The EU and Inter-regional Cooperation: In Search of Global Presence?” in Verdun, A et 
al. The Political Economy of European Integration: Theory and Analysis (2005) at 19; Saurombe, A. “The 
European Union as a model for regional integration in the Southern African Development Community: A 
selective institutional comparative analysis” Law, Democracy and Development vol. 13 (2013) 457 at 460. 
998 African countries and the EU cooperate through multiple frameworks such as the Cotonou Agreement 
(2000) and the Joint Africa EU Strategy as well as through formal dialogues, such as the EU-Africa 
summits. 
999 Muntschick, J. “SADC: Extra-Regional Trade Relations Constrain Deeper Market Integration” in 
Kraphol, S. Regional Integration in the Global South (2016) at 179. 
1000 Title VI of the Consolidated EU Treaty (Treaty of Lisbon) entitled: “The Union's Relations with 
International Organisations and Third Countries and Union Delegations”. 
1001 Article 45 of the Lisbon Treaty; The Preamble of the Treaty of Lisbon provides, among others, that the 
signatories: 
“Resolved to facilitate the free movement of persons, while ensuring the safety and security of their 
peoples, by establishing an area of freedom, security and justice, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”. 
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thereafter.1002 Currently it is a union of twenty-eight independent states1003 based on the 
European communities and founded to enhance political, economic and social co-
operation. It was formerly known as the European Community (EC) or the European 
Economic Community (EEC) through the Treaty of Rome (Treaty establishing the 
European Community), which was signed in 1958. It transformed into the European Union 
on 1st November 1993 through the Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty establishing the European 
Union). However, the Treaty establishing the European Union (TEU) did not replace the 
Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), which meant the EU operated on the 
basis of the two treaties.1004 
 
In June 2004, leaders of the Union agreed on a new Constitution (Constitutional Treaty) to 
merge the two treaties, which would have taken effect on 1st of November 2006 once 
ratified by all member states. However, France and the Netherlands voted against the 
Constitution in their respective referendums, thus putting a halt on its operation. The results 
of the referendums meant that the European Union was still operating under two treaties: 
Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) and the Treaty establishing the 
European Union (TEU).1005 
 
This led to the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon (initially known as the Reform Treaty) in 
December 2009, which is a compromise agreement to replace the failed Constitutional 
Treaty. It amended and synchronised the two treaties (TEC and TEU) and thus created a 
                                                 
1002 In 2004, the following countries joined the union: Cyprus (Greek part), Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In 2007 Romania and Bulgaria joined, 
and Croatia was the latest to join in 2013; Wallace, H et al. Policy-making in the European Union (2015) at 
7.  
1003 The membership of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) will lapse after it 
voted in a referendum in June 2016 to withdraw from the EU, which will leave the membership at 27. 
However, the withdrawal will apply two years after being officially communicated to the EU, which the 
UK Government did in March 2017; “Here’s the full Brexit letter Britain sent to the EU”, available at 
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/29/heres-the-brexit-letter-britain-sent-to-the-eu.html (accessed on 3 May 
2017). 
1004 McCormick, J. Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction (2014) at 13; Nugent, N. 
“The creation of the European Community” in Nugent, N. The Government and Politics of the European 
Union (2010) at 19 – 26; Dinan, D. Ever Closer Union? – An Introduction to the European Community 
(2005) 1. 
1005 Craig, P et al. EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (2011) at 1.  
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consolidated legal personality for the EU.1006  It also renamed the Treaty establishing the 
European Community (TEC) “Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union” (TFEU). 
The Treaty of Lisbon also made the Union’s bill of rights, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, legally binding.1007 It further, for the first time, gave member states the explicit 
legal right to leave the EU or re-join it and procedures to do so.1008  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon also provides a legal basis for the promotion of integration at EU 
level, which is such an explicit act by any EU treaty. In Article 79(4), it states that “the 
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, may establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of 
member states with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing 
legally in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the 
member states.” 
 
It is, however, not only the two institutions – Parliament and Council – that are at the centre 
of the EU integration. All the seven principal institutions1009 are integral to the whole 
integration effort. 
 
6.1 HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION WORKS 
 
6.1.1 Institutions of the EU 
 
                                                 
1006 Clark, S. “How Will the Crisis in the European Single Currency Change the Direction of Integration in 
Europe?” Interstate - Journal of International Affairs vol. 2011/2012 no. 2 (2012) 1. 
1007 Articles 51 and 52 Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
1008 Article 50 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
1009 These are:  
the European Council,  
the Council of the European Union,  
the European Commission,  
the European Parliament,  
the Court of Justice of the European Union,  
the European Central Bank, and  
the European Court of Auditors. 
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As stated in the Introduction, the EU’s success owes a lot to the way it works, 
especially the interactions between its institutions. It is a supranational body and 
like any government, the Union has a legislative and an executive branch and an 
independent judiciary, though it is a non-state body. The seven principal decision-
making bodies – known as the institutions of the European Union – are 
the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the European 
Commission, the European Parliament, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, the European Central Bank, and the European Court of Auditors.1010 
 
6.1.1.1 The European Council  
 
The European Council is the highest political body of the Union and consists 
of heads of state or government of the EU member states plus the President of the 
Commission. It meets four times a year to define the Union’s policy agenda and 
give impetus to integration by, among others, effectively deciding if and when the 
EU should welcome new members. It has its own General Secretariat that assists it 
and its meetings are held behind closed doors.1011  
 
6.1.1.2 The Council of the European Union (Council) 
 
The Council is the main decision-taking body. It is the voice of the member states, 
consisting of ministers from each one, and has both legislative function, which it 
shares with the European Parliament, and an executive function, which it shares 
with the European Commission.1012 It used to have the final say in most legislative 
matters, but this is now vested with the EU Parliament, especially after the adoption 
                                                 
1010 Article 13 of the TEU. 
1011 Article 15 of the TEU and Articles 235 – 236 of the TFEU; Alexandrova, P et al. “Policy Punctuations 
and Issue Diversity on the European Council Agenda” Policy Studies Journal vol. 40 no. 1 (2012) 69; 
Tallberg, J. “Bargaining Power in the European Council” Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS) vol. 
46 no. 3 (2008) 685. 
1012 Article 16 of the TEU and Articles 237 – 243 of the TFEU; Lewis, J. The European Council and the 
Council of the European Union” in Cini, M et al. European Union Politics (2016) at 138. 
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of the Treaty of Lisbon.1013 In terms of the new Constitution (Constitutional Treaty), 
this Council would have been called “the Council of Ministers” to distinguish it 
from the European Council.1014  
 
With regard to the legislative role, the Council adopts the EU legislation and the 
budget. On the executive side it coordinates the broad economic policy goals of the 
member states, concludes international agreements of the EU, coordinates security 
and judicial cooperation, and proposes reforms to the EU treaties.1015 
 
The Council is headed by the President, but the presidency is not an individual. It 
is rather the position held by a national government and rotates among the member 
states of the EU every six months. It uses a system of presidency trios, where the 
three successive presidencies cooperate on a common political programme for 
better coordination of the work and long-term priorities of the Council.1016 It meets 
in various formations where its composition depends on the topic discussed.  For 
example, the Minister of Agriculture for the member state holding the presidency 
chairs the Agriculture Council.  
 
6.1.1.3 The European Commission 
 
The European Commission is the executive arm of the Union and also deals with 
the day-to-day running of the Union.  It is responsible for drafting all laws of the 
EU and has a near monopoly on proposing new laws (bills), and as such has the 
                                                 
1013 Greenwood, J et al. “Conceptualising collective action in the European Union: An Introduction” in 
Greenwood, J et al. Collective Action in the European Union: Interests and the New Politics of 
associability (2013) at 2. 
1014 Article I-19 of the new Constitution provides: 
“The institutional framework (of the Union) comprises: The European Parliament; The European Council; 
The Council of Ministers (hereinafter referred to as the “Council”); The European Commission (hereinafter 
referred to as the “Commission”); and The Court of Justice of the European Union.” 
1015 Hix, S et al. The Political System of the European Union (2011) at 9. 
1016 Article 16(9) of the TEU; Naurin, D. “The councils of the EU: intergovernmental bargaining in a 
supranational polity” in Richardson, J et al. European Union: Power and Policy-making (2015) at 135. 
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duty of upholding the law and treaties. It is sometimes referred to as the “guardian 
of the treaties” because of this role.1017  
 
Because of this role, it is also given a responsibility of giving a legal opinion before 
a matter can be referred to court for a suspected violation of the EU law.1018 When 
it performs its responsibilities, it is completely independent and does not take any 
instruction from any other institution of the EU or government of any Member 
State. It has thus greater authority on external relations matters than any other 
institution of the EU.1019 
 
It is composed of commissioners, each representing a Member State. The President 
of the Commission is elected from among these commissioners by the European 
Parliament, on a proposal by the European Council. It also has the Secretary-
General of the Commission, who is the most senior civil servant. The Commission 
is thus a political hybrid, both in terms of its functions and its composition.1020  
 
6.1.1.4 The European Parliament 
 
The European Parliament shares the legislative and budgetary authority of the 
Union with the Council of the European Union (Council). They both can amend or 
reject the legislation or budget proposed by the Commission. While it, together with 
                                                 
1017 Article 17 of the TEU and Article 244 – 250 of the TFEU; Koskinen, K. Translating Institutions: An 
Ethnographic Study of EU Translation (2014) at 15.  
1018 Article 259 of the TFEU provides:  
“A Member State which considers that another Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the 
Treaties may bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union. Before a Member State 
brings an action against another Member State for an alleged infringement of an obligation under the 
Treaties, it shall bring the matter before the Commission. The Commission shall deliver a reasoned opinion 
after each of the States concerned has been given the opportunity to submit its own case and its 
observations on the other party's case both orally and in writing. If the Commission has not delivered an 
opinion within three months of the date on which the matter was brought before it, the absence of such 
opinion shall not prevent the matter from being brought before the Court.” 
1019 Article 17(3) of the TEU; Thomas, D.C. Making EU Foreign Policy: National Preferences, European 
Norms and Common Policies (2012) at 12; Bocquillon, P et al. “An elephant on the 13th floor of the 
Berlaymont? European Council and Commission relations in legislative agenda setting” Journal of 
European Public Policy vol. 21 no. 1 (2014) 20. 
1020 Nugent, N et al. The European Commission (2015) at 9 – 21; Shore, C. Building Europe: The Cultural 
Politics of European Integration (2013) at 130; Egeberg, M. European Union Politics (2003) at 126 – 136. 
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the Council, does not have legislative initiative, it has powers over the Commission 
which the Council does not have, in that the Commission reports and accounts to it 
only.1021 Its members are elected by universal suffrage directly by voters every five 
years according to political allegiance. The criteria used to determine the number 
of seats per Member State include population and economic strength of a 
country.1022   
 
When adopting the draft legislation by the Commission, it functions in an ordinary 
legislative procedure or process, previously called “co-decision”, with the Council. 
In this way the Parliament and the Council work together in a way similar to that 
of the two chambers in a national legislature. The Parliament will decide first and 
refer the matter to the Council for concurrence or approval, or vice versa.1023 
 
However, when dealing with areas of justice and home affairs, budget and taxation, 
and certain aspects of fiscal policy such as the environment, the two (Parliament 
and Council) follow special legislative procedures in which each decides alone.1024 
 
The Parliament also has other powers of general supervision. It has the power to set 
up a committee of inquiry, can call other institutions to answer questions and if 
necessary to take them to court if they break EU law or treaties. It also has powers 
over the appointment of the members of the Court of Auditors as well as the 
                                                 
1021 Article 17(8) of the TEU; Cram, L. “The EU institutions and collective action: Constructing a European 
Interest?” in Greenwood, J et al. Collective Action in the European Union: Interests and the New Politics of 
associability (2013) at 63. 
1022 Article 14 of the TEU and Articles 223 – 234 of the TFEU; Hix, S et al. Democratic Politics in the 
European Parliament (2007) at 1 – 25; Judge, D et al. The European Parliament (2008) at 113; Hix, S et al. 
“Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament” American Journal of Political Science vol. 50 no. 2 
(April 2006) 494. 
1023 Drachenberg, R. “Policy-making in the European Union” in Cini, M et al. European Union Politics 
(2016) at 203; Kelemen, R.D. The Rules of Federalism: institutions and regulatory politics in the EU and 
beyond (2009) at 24. 
1024 Drachenberg (above); European Commission. “Explaining the Treaty of Lisbon” at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-531_en.htm (accessed on 17 January 2017).  
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President and Executive Board of the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB 
President is also obliged to present an annual report to the Parliament.1025 
 
6.1.1.5 The Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), previously called the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), is the judicial authority of the EU and its main task is to 
uphold the law and ensure that the EU law is interpreted and applied in the same 
way by all member states. This avoids situations where national courts might rule 
in different ways on the same issue, thereby ensuring that the EU law is equal for 
all those to whom it applies. The Court of Justice of the European Union includes 
the Court of Justice, the General Court and the specialised courts.1026  
  
The General Court shall include at least one judge per member state. The number 
of the judges of the General Court is determined by the Statute of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (the Statute). The members of this Court are chosen 
from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the ability 
required for appointment to the high judicial office.1027 
 
The difference between the General Court and the Court of Justice is that the former 
is the court of first instance whereas the latter is the court of appeal.1028 The 
qualification requirements for the two courts are also different in that for the 
appointment to the Court of Justice candidates must possess qualifications required 
for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries, whereas 
                                                 
1025 Raube, K. “The European External Action Service and the European Parliament” Hague Journal of 
Diplomacy vol. 7 issue 1 (2012) 65; Quaglia, L. “The politics of financial services regulation and 
supervision reform in the European Union” European Journal of Political Research vol. 46 issue 2 (2007) 
269; Rittberger, B. “The Creation and Empowerment of the European Parliament” Journal of Common 
Market Studies vol. 41 issue 2 (2003) 203. 
1026 Article 19 of the TEU and Article 253 of the TFEU; Hix, S et al. The Political System of the European 
Union (2011) at 9.  
1027 Article 19(2) of the TEU; Chalmers, D et al. European Union Law: Cases and Materials (2010) at 44. 
1028 Article 256 of the TFEU. 
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for appointment to the General Court only qualifications required for appointment 
to high judicial office is necessary. 
 
Where the General Court considers that the case requires a decision of principle 
likely to affect the unity or consistency of Union law, it may refer the case to the 
Court of Justice for a ruling. Decisions given by the General Court on questions 
referred for a preliminary ruling may exceptionally be subject to review by the 
Court of Justice, under the conditions and within the limits laid down by the Statute, 
where there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of Union law being 
affected.1029 
 
The specialised courts are not peremptory and may be established by the European 
Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure to hear and determine at first instance certain classes of action or 
proceeding brought in specific areas.1030 
 
The Court has jurisdiction in all the fields except for foreign and security policy, a 
clear sign that the EU has not reached the status of a political union.1031 However, 
policy and judicial-cooperation in criminal matters are no longer explicitly 
excluded as it was the case under the Maastricht Treaty.1032 It is open to any person, 
                                                 
1029 Ibid. 
1030 Article 257 of the TFEU; Kallestrup, M. “European integration and European Court of Justice. Can 
European Court of Justice be seen as a pro-integrative institution?” Lecture for the University of 
Copenhagen Faculty of Social Science, Winter 2009 at 5. 
1031 Article 275 of the TFEU provides: 
“The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions 
relating to the common foreign and security policy nor with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those 
provisions.” 
Puetter, U. The European Council and the Council: New Intergovernmentalism and Institutional Change 
(2014) at 1. 
1032 Kallestrup (above, fn 1030); Under the Maastricht Treaty the EU legally comprised three pillars, 
namely: 
1. The European Communities pillar handled economic, social and environmental policies. It 
comprised the European Community (EC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, until 
its expiry in 2002), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). 
2. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar took care of foreign policy and military 
matters. 
3. Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM) brought together co-operation in 
the fight against crime. This pillar was originally named Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). 
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natural or juristic, but such a person must be persons “directly and individually” 
concerned.1033 It is a reactive, and not a proactive, institution as it is not empowered 
to initiative cases.  
 
There are other agencies established to deal with judicial co-operation in criminal 
matters, such as the Eurojust and Europol, with the former being responsible for 
prosecutions and the latter for policing. 1034 These agencies are necessary because 
the removal of barriers of trade and free movements of people and goods might be 
exploited by criminal elements.  
 
Eurojust was established in 2002 to improve the handling of serious cross-border 
and organised crime by stimulating investigative and prosecutorial co-ordination 
among agencies of the EU member states. However, it is not empowered to 
investigate or prosecute crimes, but instead works to coordinate investigations and 
prosecutions between the EU member states when dealing with cross-border 
crime.1035 
 
Europol handles criminal intelligence and combating of serious 
international organised crime by means of cooperation between the relevant 
authorities of the member states, including those tasked with customs, immigration 
services, border and financial police, etc. Its officials are, however, not entitled to 
conduct investigations in the member states, or to arrest suspects.1036 
 
 
 
                                                 
1033 Article 263 of the TFEU.  
1034 Article 85 of the TFEU. 
1035 Maylis L et al. “The Role and organisation of Eurojust: added value for judicial co-operation in 
criminal matters” in Jörg M. The institutional dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (2010) at 195; Horváth, Z. Handbook on the European Union (2012) at 302. 
1036 “Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol)” Official Journal 
of the European Union L(121), 5 May 2009; Riekmann, S.P. “Security, Freedom and Accountability: 
Europol and Frontex” in Geyer, F. Security Versus Justice?: Police and Judicial Cooperation in the 
European Union (2016) at 19. 
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6.1.1.6 The European Central Bank 
 
The European Central Bank (ECB) is the central bank of the EU and is responsible 
for managing the euro, the EU’s single currency, and setting the EU’s monetary 
policy.1037 It is as such a lender of last resource to member states, as it happened 
during the so-called “Eurozone financial crisis”. During this period, starting in late 
2009, several Eurozone member states 
(Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Cyprus) were unable to repay or refinance 
their government debt, or to bail out over-indebted banks under their national 
supervision without the assistance of third parties. These member states were then 
bailed out by the ECB.1038 
 
6.1.1.7 The Court of Auditors 
 
The Court of Auditors is responsible to check that the EU budget, funded by the 
European taxpayers, is spent correctly. It has no judicial powers, despite being 
called a “court”.1039 
  
6.1.1.8 Other Institutions 
 
The EU Treaty or Treaty of Lisbon creates other bodies that lie outside the Union’s 
main institutional structure. These bodies have no legislative or other decision-
making powers. Their main role is to advise the European Commission, the Council 
of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Parliament on 
legislative and policy proposals. These include the Committee of the Regions, the 
                                                 
1037 Article 282 – 284 of the TFEU; Hix, S et al. The Political System of the European Union (2011) at 9. 
1038 De Grauwe, P. “The European Central Bank: Lender of last resort in the government bond markets?” 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo) Working Paper: Monetary 
Policy and International Finance, No. 3569 (2011); Buiter, W.H et al. “The ECB as lender of last resort for 
sovereigns in the euro area” Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Discussion Paper No. 8974, 
May 2012. 
1039 Articles 285 – 287 of the TFEU; Hix (above, fn 1037).  
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Economic and Social Committee, European Investment Bank1040 and the 
Ombudsman.1041 
 
(a) The Committee of the Regions  
 
The Committee of the Regions (CoR) is an advisory body which assists the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, especially in cases which 
concern cross-border cooperation.  
 
(b) The Economic and Social Committee  
 
Economic and Social Committee (ESCC), like the Committee of the Regions, is an 
advisory and consultative body to the Union.  It advises on matters such as social 
policy, social and economic cohesion, environment, education, health, customer 
protection, industry, trans-European networks, indirect taxation and structural 
funds. These two are totally independent of the institutions of the EU and are 
consulted only when necessary.1042 
 
(c) The European Investment Bank  
 
The European Investment Bank is a lending institution created to fund the projects 
in the EU’s poorer regions and to promote the development of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). Its role has, however, developed to include projects of 
common interest to several member states which are of such a size or nature that 
they cannot be entirely financed by the various means available in the individual 
member states. Unlike the CoR and ESCC, it has a legal personality and operates 
on a non-profit-making basis, granting loans and giving guarantees which facilitate 
the financing of the projects.1043 
                                                 
1040 Article 300 of the TFEU. 
1041 Article 228 of the TFEU. 
1042 Article 304 of the TFEU. 
1043 Article 308 – 309 of the TFEU. 
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(d) The European Ombudsman  
 
The European Ombudsman is elected by the European Parliament and investigates 
complaints against EU institutions from citizens, businesses and other bodies 
concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the Union institutions, 
bodies, offices or agencies, with the exception of the Court of Justice and acting in 
its judicial role. The Ombudsman is completely independent in the performance of 
his or her duties. 1044 
 
6.1.2 Comparisons between the EU institutions and the SADC organs  
 
6.1.2.1 The European Council versus the SADC Summit  
 
The European Council is the counterpart of the Summit of Heads of State and 
Government in the SADC. They both consist of the heads of state and government.  
 
The difference between the two is that European Council shares its executive 
powers with the other principal institutions of the EU, whereas the SADC Summit 
of Heads of State and Government (SADC Summit) is the supreme policy-making 
body, and is responsible for overall policy direction and control of the functions of 
the SADC.1045  
 
                                                 
1044 Article 228(1) of the TFEU provides: 
“A European Ombudsman elected by the European Parliament shall be empowered to receive complaints 
from any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a 
Member State concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the Union institutions, bodies, 
offices or agencies, with the exception of the Court of Justice and acting in its judicial role. He or she shall 
examine such complaints and report on them.” 
Kourtikakis, K. “Imitation and supranational politics: some lessons from the European Ombudsman and the 
European Court of Auditors” European Political Science Review vol. 2 issue 1 (2010) 27; Moure Pino, 
A.M. “The European Ombudsman in the Framework of the European Union” Revista Chilena de Derecho 
vol. 38 no. 3 (September - December 2011) 421. 
1045 Article 10 of the SADC Treaty. 
309 
 
Another difference between the two is that, since 2009 when the Treaty of Lisbon 
came into force, the President of the European Council shall not hold a national 
office. In other words, the President of the European Council is a full-time 
president.1046 This means no President or Prime Minister of a member state will 
concurrently be President of the European Council. It also means that if a President 
or Prime Minister of a Member State were to be elected a President of the European 
Council, such a President or Prime Minister would have to vacate his or her national 
position. However, this has never happened in the history of the EU. Rather the 
drafters of the Lisbon Treaty seem to have had former Presidents and/or Prime 
Ministers in mind when they drafted this particular sub-article (15(6)(d) of the 
TEU).1047 This is supported by the two choices so far of former Belgium Prime 
Minister Herman van Rompuy (1 December 2009 – 30 November 2014) and former 
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk (1 December 2014 – to date). 
 
In the SADC, the Chairman of the Summit of Heads of State and Government is 
always a sitting head of state – president, prime minister or king (in the case of 
Swaziland) – of a member state.  
 
6.1.2.2 The Council of the European Union vis-à-vis the SADC Council of 
Ministers 
 
The Council of the European Union is the counterpart of the Council of Ministers 
in the SADC. The main difference between the two councils is that in the SADC 
the Council is composed of ministers responsible for foreign affairs or international 
relations,1048 whilst in the EU the Council meets in various formations depending 
on the topic to be discussed.  
                                                 
1046 Article 15(6)(d) of the TEU; Lewis, J. “The Council of the European Union and the European Council” 
in Magone, J.M. Routledge Handbook of European Politics (2015) at 220; Puetter, U. The European 
Council and the Council: New Intergovernmentalism and Institutional Change (2014) at 111. 
1047 ley Berry, P.S. “[Comment] The new EU president: standard bearer or shaker?” The EU Observer, 16 
November 2007. 
1048 Article 11(1) of the SADC Treaty provides:  
“The Council shall consist of one Minister from each Member State, preferably a Minister responsible for 
Foreign or External Affairs.” 
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In the EU, for example, the Minister of Agriculture for the member state holding 
the presidency chairs the Agriculture Council. In the SADC it is always the Minister 
responsible for foreign affairs or international relations from the member state that 
holds the chairpersonship of the Summit who chairs the SADC Council of Ministers 
meetings. 
 
Another difference is that the EU Council has both a legislative function, which it 
shares with the European Parliament, and an executive function, which it shares 
with the European Commission, whilst the SADC Council has neither.1049 
 
6.1.2.3 The European Commission vis-à-vis the SADC Secretariat  
 
The European Commission is the counterpart of the Secretariat in the SADC and 
they are both responsible for administration in their respective bodies.  
 
The main difference between the two is that the EU Commission has executive 
powers, whereas the SADC Secretariat does not. The EU Commission also has a 
legislative function, which it shares with the European Parliament, whereas the 
SADC Secretariat does not.1050 
                                                 
1049 Article 11(2) of the SADC Treaty lists the functions of the SADC Council as to: 
“1. oversee the functioning and development of SADC;  
2. oversee the implementation of the policies of SADC and the proper execution of its programmes;  
3. advise the Summit on matters of overall policy and efficient and harmonious functioning and 
development of SADC;  
4. approve policies, strategies and work programmes of SADC;  
5. direct, coordinate and supervise the operations of the institutions of SADC subordinate to it;  
6. recommend, for approval to the Summit, the establishment of directorates, committees, other institutions 
and organs;  
7. create its own committees as necessary;  
8. recommend to the Summit persons for appointment to the posts of Executive Secretary and Deputy 
Executive Secretary;  
9. determine the Terms and Conditions of Service of the staff of the institutions of SADC;  
10. develop and implement the SADC Common Agenda and strategic priorities;  
11. convene conferences and other meetings as appropriate, for purposes of promoting the objectives and 
programmes of SADC; and  
12. perform such other duties as may be assigned to it by the Summit or this Treaty.” 
1050 Article 14(1) of the SADC Treaty provides:  
“The Secretariat shall be the principal executive institution of SADC, and shall be responsible for:  
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The EU Commission also consists of commissioners each representing a Member 
State, and the Secretary-General of the Commission, who is the most senior civil 
servant. It is headed by the President who is elected by the European Parliament 
from among the other commissioners. It is thus a political hybrid, both in terms of 
its functions and its composition. The SADC Secretariat, on the other hand, is 
purely administrative, headed by the Executive Secretary.  
 
6.1.2.4 The European Parliament vis-à-vis the SADC Parliamentary Forum 
 
The European Parliament is the counterpart of the Southern African Development 
Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) in the SADC. The main difference 
between the two is that the European Parliament is a legislative body whilst the 
SADC-PF is not. The SADC-PF is not yet an institution or organ of the SADC and 
its role is thus limited to providing a platform for parliamentarians of the SADC to 
support and improve regional integration, and promote best practices in the role of 
parliaments in regional integration and cooperation.1051 
 
6.1.2.5 The Court of Justice of the European Union vis-à-vis the SADC 
Tribunal 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the counterpart of the SADC 
Tribunal in the SADC. They are both judicial authorities in their respective bodies.  
 
The main difference between the two is that the CJEU is totally independent 
whereas the SADC Tribunal is subject to the executive control of the Summit of 
                                                 
1. strategic planning and management of the programmes of SADC;  
2. implementation of decisions of the Summit, Troika of the Summit, Organ on Politics, Defence 
and Security Co-operation, Troika of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, 
Council, Troika of the Council, Integrated Committee of Ministers and Troika of the Integrated 
Committee of Ministers.” 
1051 Karuuombe, B. “The role of parliament in regional integration – the missing link” in Bösl, A et al. 
Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook vol. 8 (2008) at 233. 
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Heads of State and Government. It was because of this executive control that the 
Summit suspended the Tribunal, after the Tribunal had given two judgments against 
the Government of Zimbabwe on its land policy, which it refused to honour:  Mike 
Campbell (PVT) Limited and Another v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/07) [2007] SADC 
(T) 1 (13 December 2007) and Gondo and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe 05/2008 
[2010] SADC (T) (9 December 2010). 
 
With regard to jurisdiction, the CJEU has jurisdiction in all the fields except for 
foreign and security policy, whilst the SADC Tribunal’s mandate would be 
confined to the interpretation of the SADC Treaty and protocols relating to disputes 
between member states. This is in terms of the new Tribunal Protocol that was 
adopted by the 34th SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government, held in 
August 2014 in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, which is yet to come into operation.1052 
In terms of the revised Tribunal Protocol, only states can be litigants in the 
Tribunal.1053 In contrast, the CJEU is open to both natural and juristic persons.  
 
6.2. THE EU ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
 
Europe’s economic integration process narrative can be traced from coming into operation 
of the Treaty of Rome in 1958. It went through the five recognised “stages” of integration, 
namely, the free trade area (FTA); customs union; common market; economic community 
and monetary union. However, the first stage of the establishment of an FTA was not 
explicit in the Treaty of Rome.1054  
                                                 
1052 Communiqué of The 34th Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, Victoria Falls, 
Zimbabwe, 17-18 August 2014. This decision is not immune to challenges though. In South Africa the Law 
Society of South Africa (LSSA) has taken the Government to court insisting that it (Government) must 
ensure public participation prior to voting in favour of the new protocol. This is in line with the promise 
made in the Preamble of the SADC Treaty – “to be mindful of the need to involve the people of the region 
in the process of development and integration, particularly through the guarantee of democratic rights, 
observance of human rights and the rule of law.” Also Sections 59 and 72 of the Constitution of South 
Africa oblige Parliament to facilitate public participation in its legislative processes; Manyathi-Jele, N. 
“SADC stakeholders form coalition to lobby for restoration of a SADC Tribunal” De Rebus (October 
2014) 5; Erasmus, G. “The New Protocol for the SADC Tribunal: Jurisdictional Changes and Implications 
for SADC Community Law” Tralac Working Paper No. US15WP01/2015 (2015) at 1. 
1053 Erasmus (above, fn 1052). 
1054 Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome provided: 
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6.2.1 Free trade area and customs union 
 
The Treaty of Rome did not explicitly make provision for establishment of the free 
trade area (FTA), but this was implied in Article 3(a). It provided that the activities 
of the European Community (EC) shall include the elimination, as between member 
states, of customs duties and of quantitative restrictions on the import and export of 
goods, and of all other measures having equivalent effect. However, the EU FTA 
would be an imperfect form of free trade area since it was not, and is still not, 
equipped with rules of origin to prevent trade deflection.1055 
 
With regard to the customs union, the provision was both implicit and explicit in 
the Treaty of Rome. Article 3(b) made provision for the establishment of a common 
customs tariff and of a common commercial policy towards third countries whilst 
Article 9(1) stated: 
“The Community shall be based upon a customs union which shall cover all 
trade in goods and which shall involve the prohibition between Member 
states of customs duties on imports and exports and of all charges having 
equivalent effect, and the adoption of a common customs tariff in their 
relations with third countries.” 
 
                                                 
“ . . . the activities of the Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in  accordance with the 
timetable set out therein:  
(a)  the elimination, as between Member states, of customs duties and of quantitative restrictions on 
the import and export of goods, and of all other measures having equivalent effect;  
(b)  the establishment of a common customs tariff and of a common commercial policy towards third 
countries; 
(c)  the abolition, as between Member states, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, 
services and capital; 
. . . 
(j)  the establishment of a European Investment Bank to facilitate the economic expansion of the 
Community by opening up fresh resources.” 
1055 Bourdet, Y et al. “Completing the EU Customs Union. The Effects of Trade Procedure Harmonization” 
Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 50 issue 2 (March 2012) 300 at 305. 
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Article 12 of the Treaty of Rome prohibited the introduction of customs duties 
between member states on imports and exports1056 and Article 13 provided for 
progressive abolishment of customs duties during the transitional period outlined 
in Article 14.1057 Article 14 then made provision of the timetable and modalities of 
the reductions of the customs duties.1058 Member states also committed themselves 
to setting up the common customs tariff.1059 The first intra-EC tariff reductions were 
scheduled for 1 January 1959 and indeed took place as scheduled.1060 
 
The Common Commercial Policy1061 was also introduced in 1957 as the EC’s 
external trade policy. It  focused on tariffs and other border measures which affected 
trade in goods, and its formulation  involved member states’ representatives, who 
were closely consulted on a regular basis, and each Member State’s government 
ministers, who took key decisions about the direction of trade policy through 
                                                 
1056 Article 12 provided: 
“Member states shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new customs duties on imports or 
exports or any charges having equivalent effect, and from increasing those which they already apply in 
their trade with each other.” 
1057 Article 13 provided: 
“1. Customs duties on imports in force between Member states shall be progressively abolished by them 
during the transitional period in accordance with Articles 14 and 15.  
2. Charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties on imports, in force between Member states, shall 
be progressively abolished by them during the transitional period. The Commission shall determine by 
means of directives the timetable for such abolition. It shall be guided by the rules contained in Article 
14(2) and (3) and by the directives issued by the Council pursuant to Article 14(2). 
1058 Article 14 provides: 
“1. For each product, the basic duty to which the successive reductions shall be applied shall be the duty 
applied on 1 January 1957.  
2. The timetable for the reductions shall be determined as follows:  
(a) during the first stage, the first reduction shall be made one year after the date when this Treaty enters 
into force; the second reduction, eighteen months later; the third reduction, at the end of the fourth year 
after the date when this Treaty enters into force; 
(b) during the second stage, a reduction shall be made eighteen months after that stage begins; a second 
reduction, eighteen months after the preceding one; a third reduction, one year later; 
(c) any remaining reductions shall be made during the third stage; the Council shall, acting by a qualified 
majority on a proposal from the Commission, determine the timetable therefor by means of directives.” 
1059 Article 18 provided: 
“The Member states declare their readiness to contribute to the development of international trade and the 
lowering of barriers to trade by entering into agreements designed, on a basis of reciprocity and mutual 
advantage, to reduce customs duties below the general level of which they could avail themselves as a 
result of the establishment of a customs union between them.” 
1060 Dinan, D. Ever Closer Union? – An Introduction to the European Community (2005) at 46; Duina, F.G. 
The Social Construction of Free Trade: The European Union, NAFTA, and MERCOSUR (2006) at 17. 
1061 The Common Commercial Policy means it is the EU that sets external tariffs and negotiates trade deals, 
rather than individual member states. 
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majority (or in some areas, unanimous) voting within the EU’s Council of 
Ministers.1062 
 
The Customs Union eventually came into being on 1 July 1968,1063 but checkpoints 
at borders between member states eventually disappeared only in 1993 with the 
coming into operation of the Treaty establishing the European Union (Maastricht 
Treaty). In addition to the abolishment of customs duties at internal borders, a 
uniform system for taxing imports was put in place. Customs officers are now found 
at the EU’s external borders.1064 
 
The Treaty of Nice,1065 which came into operation in 2003, expanded the scope of 
the Common Commercial Policy into the fields of trade in services and trade-related 
aspects of intellectual property.  
 
Having joined the EU in 2004, the central and eastern European states (CEECs) 
also entered into the customs union of the EU (Common External Tariff and 
Common Commercial Policy) and abolished border controls.1066 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon has now confirmed the EU as a customs union. Article 28 of 
the TFEU states that all trade in goods between the EU countries must be free of 
customs duties and that member states must apply a common customs tariff for 
goods imported from outside the EU. This means that all goods that have been 
imported into an EU country can then be moved freely within the EU without 
further customs checks.1067 
                                                 
1062 Manchin, M et al. “External Trade Policy” in El-Agraa, A.M The European Union: Economics and 
Policies (2011) at 383; Cremona, M. “The external dimension of the internal market” in Barnard, C et al. 
The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the premises (2002) at 354. 
1063 Dinan (above, fn 1060). 
1064 European Union Commission Memorandum on Croatia’s accession to the European Union, Brussels, 
28 June 2013.  
1065 The Treaty of Nice mainly amended the Maastricht Treaty, by reforming the institutional structure of 
the European Union to withstand eastward expansion.  
1066 De Benedictis, L et al. “Hub-and-Spoke or else? Free trade agreements in the ‘enlarged’ European 
Union”, Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica (ISAE) Working Paper No. 52, June 2005 at 11. 
1067 Viner, J. The Customs Union Issue (2014) at 51; Horspool, M et al. European Union Law (2012) at 71. 
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The Treaty of Lisbon also extends the Common Commercial Policy to the second 
most important field of international economic relations, namely foreign 
investment. It empowers the Union to take external action in most fields of foreign 
investment regulation and facilitates the exercise of its current, fragmented and 
incomplete competence over foreign investment by establishing a single legal basis. 
Furthermore, the scope of the foreign direct investment (FDI) competence extends 
to specific aspects of foreign investment regulation, such as performance 
requirements and movement of key personnel.1068 
 
The Treaty also brings a change with regard to decision-making in the field of the 
Common Commercial Policy. Articles 207 and 218 of the TFEU render the 
European Parliament a co-legislator, together with the Council, in the definition 
and implementation of the framework of the Common Commercial Policy. The 
consent of the European Parliament is necessary not only for the adoption of 
autonomous measures, but also for the negotiation and conclusion of international 
agreements, which is the basic means of action in the field of the Common 
Commercial Policy.1069 
 
However, Bourdet et al1070 argue that in practice, the EU does not meet the customs 
union condition of having a common external trade policy and as such it is not a 
pure customs union. They state that there is a lot of variations in trade procedures 
between EU countries with delays that range from merely five days in the most 
efficient countries to twenty-five days in some others. This, they state, happens 
despite the existence of the Common Commercial Policy that is entrenched in the 
Treaty.   
                                                 
1068 Article 206 – 207 of the TFEU; Cremona (above, fn 1062) at 30.  
1069 Krajewski, M. “External Trade Law and the Constitutional Treaty: Towards a federal and more 
democratic common Commercial Policy?” Common Market Law Review (CMLR) vol. 42 (2005) 96 at 123; 
Dimopoulos, A. “The Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: Establishing parallelism between internal 
and external economic policy?”, Seminar on Re-thinking the European Constitution in an Enlarged 
European Union Faculty of Law - University of Zagreb, Jean Monnet Seminar 6th Session, 26 April 2015. 
1070 Bourdet, Y et al. “Completing the EU Customs Union. The Effects of Trade Procedure Harmonization” 
Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 50 issue 2 (March 2012) 300 at 311. 
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One of the consequences of the EU Customs Union is that the EU negotiates as a 
single entity in international trade deals such as the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), instead of individual member states negotiating for themselves. As such 
the EU sets its imports tariffs and other customs rules on the basis of international 
agreements and, in principle, these apply to all imports.1071  
 
The average level of EU customs duty on industrial products is 4 percent, but the 
EU offers cut-rate entry and often duty-free access for goods from other countries. 
This is done within the framework of several agreements that it has concluded with 
third countries, and in the framework of autonomous preferential arrangements for 
some beneficiary countries, tariff concessions are provided for a pre-determined 
volume of goods. These tariff concessions are called “preferential tariff quotas”.1072  
 
Customs officers have to ensure compliance with both the EU and international 
rules on protection of the environment, and of consumer health and safety. They 
also do a vital job in collecting statistics. For example, they have to keep records of 
goods that have, or might become subject to quotas because they are not competing 
fairly with EU products. The data that they collect on trade flows helps 
policymakers to understand key trends in the economy.1073 
 
Another task for customs is to ensure that anyone travelling with large amounts of 
cash or its equivalent (such as bearer bonds or cheques) is entitled to do so and is 
not using these as a way of laundering money. Customs officers help to fight illicit 
traffic in people, drugs, firearms, etc. They combat organised crime and support the 
work of the police and immigration services.    
                                                 
1071 “Finance Guides” – EUbusiness (online). Available at 
http://www.eubusiness.com/topics/finance/guides/atct_topic_view?b_start:int=300&-C (accessed on 28 
October 2016).  
1072 “Taxations and Customs Union” https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/calculation-customs-
duties/what-is-common-customs-tariff/tariff-quotas_en;  http://europa.eu.int/pol/cust/overview_en.htm 
(accessed on 28 October 2016).  
1073 Alevantis, P.E. “History and Evolution of the European Union Institutions and Policies” Text for the 
course “International Business – Europe”, Napier University, Edinburgh (2013) at 12. 
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Before 1988, customs offices across the European Union used 150 different forms 
in their dealings with business. Now they use a single document and most trade is 
processed electronically through the New Computerised Transit System (NCTS), 
launched in 2003. These simplified procedures for handling more than 20 million 
transit operations annually apply to all EU countries and also to non-EU European 
states, such as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. And the EU and its 
member states are constantly updating these automated procedures, spending well 
over 400 million euros between 2003 and 2013 on automating customs 
procedures.1074 
 
The NCTS is part of the e-Europe, launched in December 1999 by the Commission 
to bring the benefits of the information technology to all Europeans. One of its aims 
is to stimulate the growth of e-commerce (buying and selling online) and the 
inherent re-organisation of business processes to digital technologies. The EU is, 
therefore, constantly working on updating customs procedures with the twin aims 
of radically simplifying intra-EU trade and trade with other countries, and of 
optimising the use of information technology.1075 
 
At all times, the EU balances the goal of easy trade and travel against the need for 
customs officers to collect statistics and to check containers – for example, to see 
that they do not contain arms and are not being used for human trafficking. 
Automation, through the use of container scanners, for example, helps to achieve 
this objective. This helps to achieve current goals of tightening security controls, 
but avoids the need for lengthy manual container searches.1076 
 
                                                 
1074 Ibid. 
1075 e-Europe Act, 1999, titled “eEurope - An information society for all” available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al24221 (accessed on 31 October 2016).  
1076 Brian, T et al. Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration (2014) at 32; European 
Commission. “Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in European Commission External 
Cooperation”, November 2010 at 40. 
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Customs officers play a crucial role in collecting duty on imports and value-added 
tax. They ensure imports are not avoiding duty by claiming to fall into a category 
that pays a lower tariff. They also detect fraud in value-added tax declarations and 
payments, or the evasion of excise duties on items such as cigarettes. Without this 
work by customs officers, it would be all too easy for goods to disappear into the 
black economy rather than entering the tax system, or for unscrupulous business 
people to report fictitious trade.1077 
 
This is important not just for the sake of fair trade, but also for the EU’s budget. 
Some of the EU budget comes from customs duties and levies on non-EU imported 
products.1078   
 
6.2.2 The Common or Single Market 
 
One of the original core objectives of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
was the development of a common market offering free movement of goods, 
services, people and capital.1079 The tangible attempt to establish the common 
market was done through the Delors Commission,1080 which took the initiative to 
publish a White Paper in 1985 identifying 300 measures to be addressed in order to 
create a single market. The Delors Commission relied, among others, upon 
the European Court of Justice’s Cassis de Dijon1081 jurisprudence of non-
discrimination, under which member states were obliged to recognise goods which 
had been legally produced in another member state, unless the member state could 
justify the restriction by reference to a mandatory requirement. 
 
                                                 
1077 European Commission (above). 
1078 “How is the EU Funded?” (online), available at https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/money/revenue-income_en (accessed on 31 October 2016). 
1079 Article 2 of the (Rome) Treaty establishing the European Economic Community provides that it shall 
be the aim of the Community to establish a common market. Article 3(c) provides that this shall be done 
through, inter alia, abolishing, as between member states, of the obstacles to the free movement of persons, 
services and capital. 
1080 The Delors Commission was the administration of Jacques Delors, the eighth President of the European 
Commission (1985 – 1994).  
1081 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (1979) Case 120/78. 
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The White Paper was well-received and led to the adoption of the Single European 
Act in 1986, a treaty which reformed the decision-making mechanisms of the EEC 
and set a deadline of 31 December 1992 for the completion of a single market. It 
essentially entailed combining market and political integrations.1082 
 
The single market was eventually achieved in 1993 when the Treaty of Maastricht 
(Treaty establishing the European Union) came into operation.  The single market 
was the EU’s greatest achievement and also its toughest challenge, and is the core 
of today’s Union. It basically means that barriers are removed, and people, goods, 
services and money move around Europe as freely as within one country. The free 
movement of “goods”, “people”, “services” and “capital” are commonly referred 
to as the “four freedoms” of the EU.1083 
 
Free movement of goods within the European Union is achieved by a customs 
union, and the principle of non-discrimination. The free movement of persons, on 
the other hand, means EU citizens can move freely between member states to live, 
work, study or retire in another country. This is done through Article 45 of the 
TFEU, which prohibits restrictions on the basis of nationality. In terms of Article 
20 of the TFEU, citizenship of the EU derives from the nationality of a member 
state. The Court of Justice (ECJ) also held that “citizenship is destined to be the 
fundamental status of nationals of the member states.”1084 
 
The “freedom to provide services” applies to people who give services “for 
remuneration”, especially commercial or professional activity. “Services” in 
                                                 
1082 Barnard, C. “Competence Review: the internal market” (online) at 10. Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/226863/bis-13-1064-
competence-review-internal-market.pdf (accessed 31 October 2016); Gabel, M.J. Interests and Integration: 
Market Liberalization, Public Opinion and European Union (2009) at 6. Fligstein, N et al. “How to Make a 
Market: Reflections on the Attempt to Create a Single Market in the European Union” American Journal of 
Sociology vol. 102 no. 1 (July 1996) 1 at 14; Ross, G. Jacques Delors and European Integration (1995) at 
8. 
1083  Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. European Union Law (2016) at 534 Nugent, N. The Government and Politics 
of the European Union (2010) at 33 -50. 
1084 Judgment of the Court of Justice in Grzelczyk v Centre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignes-Louvain-la-
Neuve (2001) C-184/99, [2001] ECR I-6193. 
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particular include: activities of an industrial character; activities of a commercial 
character; activities of craftsmen; and activities of the professions.1085 The ECJ has 
held that this means activities such as prostitution or other quasi-legal activities that 
are subject to restriction in other member states do not qualify as services.1086 
 
In terms of Article 63 of the TFEU, “all restrictions on the movement of capital 
between member states and between member states and third countries shall be 
prohibited.” This means capital controls of various kinds are prohibited, including 
limits on buying currency, limits on buying company shares or financial assets, or 
government approval requirements for foreign investment. The EU Capital 
Movement Directive 1988 Annex I covers thirteen categories of capital which must 
move freely.1087 
 
To make it happen, the EU institutions and the member states have adopted 
hundreds of directives and policies needed to do away with technical, regulatory, 
legal, bureaucratic, cultural and protectionist barriers that stifled free trade and free 
movement within the Union. And the single market has opened up economic and 
                                                 
1085 Article 57 of the TFEU provides: 
“Services shall be considered to be “services” within the meaning of the Treaties where they are normally 
provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of 
movement for goods, capital and persons.” 
1086  Josemans v Burgemeester van Maastricht C-137/09 [2010] I-13019. 
1087 In terms of the Capital Movement Directive 1988 (88/361/EEC) Annex I, the following are covered: 
(i) investment in companies; 
(ii) real estate;  
(iii) securities;  
(iv) collective investment funds;  
(v) money market securities;  
(vi) bonds;  
(vii) service credit;  
(viii) loans;  
(ix) sureties and guarantees;  
(x) insurance rights;  
(xi) inheritance and personal loans;  
(xii) physical financial assets; and 
(xiii) other capital movements. 
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working opportunities that have transformed the lives of hundreds of millions of 
Europeans.1088 
 
According to the European Commission, the single market has achieved, among 
others, the following:  
  created 2.77 million new jobs since 1993 and generated more than 800 
billion euro in extra wealth;  
 helped by new technology – the opening of national EU markets has brought 
down the price of national telephone calls by 50% since 1998; 
 the removal of national restrictions has enabled more than 15 million 
Europeans to go to another EU country to work or spend their retirement; 
 intra-EU trade in goods soared from 800 billion euro in 1992 to 2 800 billion 
euro in 2012, an increase of 22%.1089 
 
The creation of the single market also gave the European Union countries a stronger 
incentive to liberalise previously protected monopoly markets for utilities such as 
telecommunications, electricity, gas and water. The independent national regulators 
who supervise the now-liberalised markets for telecoms and energy coordinate their 
activity at EU level. Not just big industries, but households and small business 
across Europe are increasingly able to choose who supplies them with electricity 
and gas.1090  
 
The achievements of the single market seem to have vindicated Jacques Delors, 
former European Commission President and instigator of the whole single market 
project, who was quoted as saying that when he launched his vast single market 
project in 1985, he knew just how much potential for growth and odd jobs remained 
                                                 
1088 Weatherill, S. Cases and Materials on EU Law (2016) at 250; OECD. APEC-OECD Co-operative 
Initiative on Regulatory Reform: Proceedings of the Fourth Workshop, Vancouver, Canada, 2004 (2008) at 
41. 
1089 European Commission. 20 Years of the European Single Market (2012) at 4; Kalimo, H et al. “The 
United Kingdom and the (Digital) Single Market”, Institute for European Studies Policy Brief issue 2016/ 9 
(April 2016) at 2. 
1090  European Commission (above) at 17 – 24. 
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locked up behind national frontiers. He stated that tariffs and quotas had been 
abolished at the end of the 1960s, but many technical and administrative obstacles 
to free trade still persisted.1091 
 
Despite the huge success of the single market, it also had some slight shortcomings. 
For example, the services sector has opened up more slowly than markets for goods. 
This is particularly the case for a wide range of financial services, and for 
transportation, where separate national markets still exist, especially for rail and air 
transport.1092 
 
There is also a need to remove more red tape, those administrative and technical 
barriers to the free flow of goods and services. These include the reluctance of EU 
countries to accept each other’s standards and norms or sometimes to recognise the 
equivalence of professional qualifications. The fragmented nature of national tax 
systems also puts a brake on market integration and efficiency.1093  
 
Free movement of labour has also caused problems of net migration, especially 
from Eastern Europe to Western Europe, and this has resulted in overcrowding in 
some of the Western Europe cities. This migration has pushed up house prices and 
increased congestion on the roads.1094  
 
To respond to these challenges, the European Commission, in April 2011, adopted 
the Single Market Act, which launched twelve key projects designed to give a new 
                                                 
1091 Jacques Delors. “The Single Market, Cornerstone of the EU”, Speech at a Conference by the European 
Commission and the French Ministry for Economic Regeneration, in partnership with Notre Europe – 
Jacques Delors Institute, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the single market, Paris, 22 November 
2012. 
1092 Monti, M. “A New Strategy for the Single Market: At the Service of Europe’s Economy and Society” 
Report to the President of the European Commission, 9 May 2010 at 64. 
1093 Ibid. 
1094  Atoyan, R et al. Emigration and Its Economic Impact on Eastern Europe”, IMF Discussion Note 
SDN/17/07, July 2016; Springford, J. “Is immigration a reason for Britain to leave the EU?” Report for the 
Centre for European Reform, October 2013; Kahanec, M et al. “Migration in an enlarged EU: A 
challenging solution?” Economic Paper no. 363, EU Commission Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs, March 2009; Bruder, J. “East-West Migration in Europe, 2004 – 2015” University of 
Rostock Thűnen-Series of Applied Economic Theory Working Paper No. 40, November 2003. 
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momentum to the Single Market and help stimulate economic growth. The twelve 
projects relate to competitiveness, social progress and growth, and range from 
worker mobility and SME finance to digital content and taxation. These are: 
1. Access to finance for SMEs; 
2. Worker mobility in the Single Market; 
3. Intellectual property rights; 
4. Consumers: Single Market players; 
5. Services: strengthening standardisation; 
6. Stronger European networks; 
7. Digital Single Market; 
8. Social entrepreneurship; 
9. Taxation; 
10. More social cohesion in the Single Market; 
11. Regulatory environment for business; and 
12. Public procurement.1095 
 
All these are continuing under the Europe 2020 strategy, which is a 10-year strategy 
proposed by the European Commission on 3 March 2010, and adopted in August 
2010, for the advancement of the economy of the European Union. It aims at 
“smart, sustainable, inclusive growth” with greater coordination of national and 
European policy by 2020.1096  
 
In May 2015, the European Commission introduced a Digital Single Market (DSM) 
for the continent as part of the Europe 2020 Strategy. It aims to encourage trade 
between member states; remove barriers; and encourage free movement of goods, 
services and people through technology. It targets information and communication 
technology (ICT) standards and interoperability, the modernisation of intellectual 
property rights enforcement, parcel delivery, the collaborative economy and e-
                                                 
1095 “Single Market Act: Twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen confidence”, Communication from 
the European Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions – April 2011. 
1096 “Europe 2020: A European Strategy for Smart, Sustainable, and Inclusive Growth”, August 2010 at 1. 
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commerce. The European Commission estimates that the completion of the DSM 
could contribute €415 billion per year to the EU economy and create hundreds of 
thousands of new jobs.1097 
 
The DSM has already delivered some achievements for European citizens in terms 
of access to services: the success most touted by the European Commission is the 
reduction of mobile roaming costs for European travellers. Industrial growth has 
been supported by research and development funds, currently disbursed through 
(among others) the Horizon 2020 programme. And it is hoped that in the near 
future, EU regulations will also help provide a (more) secure online environment 
for all Europeans (notably regarding data protection).1098 
 
6.2.3 The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)   
 
The economic union essentially means the existence of a single market plus close 
coordination of member states’ economic policies. The monetary union, on the 
other hand, involves fixed exchange rates and a common monetary policy, possibly, 
but not necessarily, with a single currency. And the European leaders seem to have 
wanted to combine the two from the beginning.1099 
 
The original Treaty of Rome espoused, and implicitly endorsed, the economic and 
monetary union through Articles 105 – 109.1100 In 1972 the Community leaders 
made a call for the attainment of the economic and monetary union (EMU) by the 
end of the decade (i.e. by 1980). Though this was unrealistic due to the difficult 
                                                 
1097 Kalimo, H et al. “The United Kingdom and the (Digital) Single Market” Institute for European Studies 
Policy Brief issue2016/ 9 (April 2016) at 2; “The European Single Market” at 
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market_en (accessed on 21 November 2016). 
1098 Kalimo (above).  
1099 Verdun, A. “Economic and Monetary Union” in Cini M et al. European Union Politics (2016) at 297. 
1100 The articles called for coordination of economic and monetary policies of member states through, inter 
alia, a monetary committee. 
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economic climate of the time, it nevertheless constituted an important political 
assertion of the EMU’s significance for European integration.1101  
 
With the single market already off to a strong start in 1987, the next step for the 
community was to work towards achieving the single or common market and the 
EMU concurrently. This was in line with the 1990 communication by the EU 
Commission developing the linkage between the single market and the EMU:  
“A single currency is the natural complement of a single market. The full 
potential of the latter will not be achieved without the former. Economic 
and monetary union therefore offers the prospect of consolidating the single 
market as well as bringing its own value-add to the performance of the 
Community economy.”1102 
 
In the same year, 1990, the Commission produced a cost-benefit analysis of an 
EMU, One Market, One Money, in which it reinforced its message that “one market 
needs one money.”1103 When the Maastricht Treaty came into operation in 1993, it 
adopted the three-stage process, as proposed by the Delors Commission in 1989, 
towards the achievement of the EMU: 
 Stage 1 – had already begun on 1 July 1990 until 31 December 1993 and 
involved the abolishment of exchange controls, thus capital movements were 
completely liberalised in the European Economic Community. 
 Stage 2 – would automatically begin on 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1998 
and involved the establishment of the European Monetary Institute, as the 
forerunner of the European Central Bank (ECB), with the task of 
strengthening monetary cooperation between the member states and their 
national banks, as well as supervising European Currency Unit (ECU) 
banknotes. This would culminate in the establishment of the European 
                                                 
1101 The October 1972 Paris Summit Communique made a solemn declaration: “The member states of the 
Community, the driving force of European construction, affirm their intention before the end of the present 
decade to transform the whole complex of their relations into a European Union.”  
1102 European Community Commission (ECC). Economic and Monetary Union (1990) at 11. 
1103 European Community Commission. One Market, One Money: An Evaluation of the Potential Benefits 
and Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union (1990) at 9. 
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Central Bank on 1 June 1998 and the establishment of the single currency, 
the euro, on 31 December 1998. 
 Stage 3 – 1 January 1999 and continuing. The euro is now a real currency, 
and a single monetary policy is introduced under the authority of the ECB 
for the participating member states, the so-called “Eurozone”.1104 
 
All EU member states are part of the EMU, but not of the Eurozone. This is because 
each of the three stages consists of progressively closer economic integration, and 
only once a state participates in the third stage it is permitted to adopt the euro as 
its official currency. So far only nineteen of the twenty-eight member states are part 
of the Eurozone.1105 
 
The consequence of the Eurozone is monetary policy inflexibility. Since 
membership of the Eurozone establishes a single monetary policy for the respective 
member states, they can no longer use an isolated monetary policy, for example, to 
increase their competitiveness at the cost of other Eurozone members by printing 
money and thus devalue their currencies, or to print money to finance excessive 
government deficits, or to pay interest on unsustainable high government debt 
levels. As a consequence, if member states do not manage their economy in a way 
that they can show a fiscal discipline (as they were obliged to by the Maastricht 
Treaty),1106 they will sooner or later risk a sovereign debt crisis in their country 
without the possibility to print money as an easy way out. This is what happened to 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus, and Spain during what is commonly called 
“Eurozone financial crisis”.1107 
                                                 
1104 Enderlein, H. “25 years after the Delors Report: Which lessons for economic and monetary union?” 
Jacques Delors Institute Policy Paper 109, April 2014; Mayes, D et al. “The development of EU economic 
and monetary integration” in El-Agraa, A.M The European Union: Economics and Policies (2011) at 163; 
Dinan, D. Ever Closer Union? – An Introduction to the European Community (2005) at 426.  
1105  These are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. 
1106 The Maastricht Treaty introduced a detailed rule and procedure to control excessive deficits, with 
specific numerical targets and the possibility of sanctions (Article 104(c) TEC, the so-called “excessive 
deficit procedure”). 
1107 At the end of 2009 these countries were faced with high structural deficits, a slowing economy and 
expensive bailouts that led to rising interest rates, which exacerbated their governments’ tenuous positions. 
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The Treaty of Lisbon also provides measures for economic and monetary discipline. 
Member states of the EU regard their economic policies as a matter of common 
concern and coordinate them within the Council. The Council, on a 
recommendation from the Commission, formulates a draft for broad guidelines of 
the economic policies of the member states and of the Union, and reports its 
findings to the European Council. The European Council, on the basis of the report 
from the Council, discusses a conclusion on broad guidelines of the economic 
policies of the member states and of the Union. On the basis of this conclusion, the 
Council shall adopt a recommendation setting out these broad guidelines. It then 
informs the European Parliament of its recommendation.1108  
 
6.2.3.1 The single currency 
 
The single currency of the EU, the euro, was introduced on 1 January 1999 after the 
conversion rates between it and the currencies of the participating EU countries 
were irrevocably fixed on 31 December 1998. The “Eurosystem”, composed of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks (NCBs) of the euro-
area countries, then took over responsibility for the monetary policy in the new euro 
area, the Eurozone. This was the beginning of a transitional period that was to last 
three years and end with the introduction of euro banknotes and coins, and the 
withdrawal of national banknotes and coins, in the participating member states in 
2002.1109 
 
During the transition period, an extensive publicity campaign to familiarise the 
general public with the euro and the coming introduction of its banknotes and coins 
was conducted. This included the appearance of dual pricing on labels in shops and 
                                                 
This situation was commonly referred to as “Eurozone financial crisis”; De Grauwe, P. “Crisis in the 
eurozone and how to deal with it”, Centre for European Policy Studies (CESP) Policy Brief No. 204, 
February 2010; Mody, A et al. “The Eurozone Crisis: How Banks and Sovereigns Came to be Joined at the 
Hip”, the IMF Working Paper WP/11/269, November 2011. 
1108 Article 118 of the TFEU. 
1109 European Commission. One currency for one Europe: The road to the euro (2015) at 8. 
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petrol stations, etc. For administrations and businesses there was a longer transition 
period as they gradually switched their systems for accounting, pricing and 
payments over to the euro.1110 
 
The cash changeover was completed within two months. National banknotes and 
coins ceased to be legal tender by the end of February 2002 at the latest, and earlier 
in some euro area countries. By that time, more than 6 billion banknotes and close 
to 30 billion national coins had been withdrawn, and for over 300 million citizens 
in 12 Eurozone countries the euro had finally arrived.1111 
 
All the EMU members are eligible to adopt the euro and they may choose to wait 
if they think that their economies are not yet ready. They thus have to weigh the 
disadvantages (less control over their inflation, interest and exchange rates) against 
the likely benefits – which include having the same currency as major trading 
partners, greater credibility in international financial markets, and consequently 
greater flows of investment.1112 
 
The EMU member states wanting to introduce the euro must meet certain economic 
criteria. There are four main criteria, called the “convergence criteria”, that must be 
met, and these are a set of macroeconomic indicators which measure: 
 price stability, to show inflation is controlled; 
 soundness and sustainability of public finances, through limits on 
government borrowing and national debt to avoid excessive deficit; 
 exchange-rate stability, through participation in the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM II)1113 for at least two years without strong deviations 
from the ERM II central rate; 
                                                 
1110 Ibid. 
1111 Ibid. 
1112 European Commission. “Economic and Financial Affairs – Who can join and when?”, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/adoption/who_can_join/index_en.htm (accessed on 21 
November 2016). 
1113 The first Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was introduced in 1979, hence the current one, introduced 
after the adoption of the euro, is referred to as “ERM II”.  
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 long-term interest rates, to assess the durability of the convergence achieved 
by fulfilling the other criteria.1114 
 
In addition to meeting the economic convergence criteria, a euro-area candidate 
country must make changes to national laws and rules, notably governing its 
national central bank and other monetary issues, in order to make them compatible 
with the Treaty. In particular, national central banks must be independent, such that 
the monetary policy decided by the European Central Bank is also independent.1115 
 
The Commission and the European Central Bank assess the progress made by the 
euro-area candidate countries, publish their conclusions in respective convergence 
reports to determine whether these criteria are met and then report to the Council 
thereon. This is done at least once in every two years or at the request of a non-
Eurozone member state.1116   
 
The euro is now a recognised international currency used increasingly by 
international travellers and for invoicing commercial transactions with countries 
outside the euro-area, thus reducing the risk for euro-area business. It is also used 
by central banks worldwide as a reserve currency. Individuals also benefit from this 
process; they make savings by not having to change money when travelling within 
the euro area, by being able to compare prices more readily, and by benefitting from 
lower costs for the cross-border money transfer.1117 
 
With regard to trade, there is no doubt that trade among member countries of the 
EMU has moderately increased after the introduction of the euro. Several studies 
                                                 
1114 These criteria, also called the “Maastricht criteria” were agreed to by the EU Member states in 1991 as 
part of the preparations for introduction of the euro; Haynes, P. “The European Single Currency Project and 
the Concept of Convergence for European Welfare States – The Ideal and the Reality” Social Policy and 
Administration vol. 49 issue 4 (July 2015) 466. 
1115 Articles 136 – 137 of the TFEU. 
1116 Article 140 of the TFEU; Haynes (above, fn 1114). 
1117 Investopedia Staff. “The 6 Most-Traded Currencies And Why They’re So Popular”, at 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/11/popular-currencies-and-why-theyre-traded.asp (accessed on 
22 November 2016). 
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have found that this increment applies across all trade, including sectoral trade as 
well as firm level trade. These studies have found that the euro has increased the 
number of products that exporters ship to the euro-area. Further, they found that the 
newly exported products appear to be characterised by lower unit values than those 
that firms already export. All these effects are stronger for smaller and less 
productive firms.1118 
 
The Eurozone, however, raises some questions with regard to integration. One 
obvious question would be: can the EMU function in a European Union, in which 
not all countries have or use the single currency?  The question is important, 
especially when considering that the Delors Report, which is the basis of the EMU, 
stated that there is a direct link between the single market and the single currency 
in order to achieve the integration in Europe.1119 
 
However, it should be noted that the single currency is not necessarily a requirement 
for the economic and monetary union stage of integration. However, the EU still 
expects all the member states to adopt the euro, albeit on meeting the “convergence 
criteria”. What this means for now is that the EU is not a pure or full-fledged 
monetary union. In other words, it is a weak version of a monetary union.1120  
 
The “Eurozone financial crisis” has also cast some doubt over the whole single 
currency notion. It exposed one major flaw of having a single currency: the 
                                                 
1118 Baldwin, R et al. “Study on the Impact of the Euro on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment”, Economic 
Papers 321, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (2008); Berger, 
H et al. “Zooming Out: The Trade Effect of the Euro in Historical Perspective” Journal of International 
Money and Finance vol. 27 issue 8 (2008) 1244; Nitsch, V et al. “Scalpel, Please! Dissecting the Euro’s 
Effect on Trade,” ETH Zurich and National Bank of Belgium (2008); Flam H et al. “Euro effects on the 
intensive and extensive margins of trade” Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic 
Research (CESIfo) Working Paper No. 1881, December 2006; Glick, R et al. “Does a Currency Union 
Affect Trade? The Time-Series Evidence” European Economic Review vol. 46 (June 2002) 1125; Rose, A. 
K. “One Money, One Market: The Effect of Common Currencies on Trade” Economic Policy 30 (April 
2000) 7. 
1119 Enderlein, H. “25 years after the Delors Report: Which lessons for economic and monetary union?” 
Jacques Delors Institute Policy Paper 109, April 2014 at 16.  
1120 Thygesen, N. “Why Did Europe Decide to Move to a Single Currency 25 Years Ago?” Leibniz 
Information Centre for Economics Forum (2016) at 6.  
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vulnerability of individual member states in trading in a currency that is not under 
their remit, but under the remit of the ECB.1121   
 
6.3 LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE EU INTEGRATION 
 
Having made reference to the EU integration, it is proper to draw some lessons thereof 
from which the SADC integration can learn. However, these lessons must be made within 
certain contexts, taking into account different economic levels of the two continents.  
 
However, the EU and the SADC integrations have some similarities. They both started 
against the backdrop of wars. The EU integration started against the backdrop of World 
War II and was entrenched during the “cold war”. The SADC, on the other hand, started 
against the backdrop of the liberation struggles in various member states.1122 
 
6.3.1 Role played by institutions 
 
Jean Monnet, widely regarded as the father of European integration, is quoted as 
having said: “Nothing is possible without men; nothing is lasting without 
institutions.”1123 
 
6.3.1.1 Role played by EU institutions  
 
The EU institutions play an active part in the integration agenda of the EU. All its 
seven principal institutions have decision-making powers and the EU Parliament 
and the Council have legislative and budgetary authority as per the TEU and the 
                                                 
1121 Stiglitz, J. “A split euro is the solution for Europe’s single currency” Financial Times of 17 August 
2016.  
1122 Almost all the SADC country went through wars of colonial resistance, whilst Angola, Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa also had overt liberation wars or struggles; Saul, J. “The Liberation 
of Southern Africa: The struggle continues” International Journal of Socialist Renewal vol. 12 (May – 
October 2010) 2.  
1123 Tiersky, R. François Mitterrand: A Very French President (2003) at 215; Dinan, D. Ever Closer 
Union? – An Introduction to the European Community (2005) at 1. 
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TFEU. The Council is the main decision-taking body because it consists of 
ministers responsible for topics for discussion. 
 
The European Council does not possess executive powers. Instead, it is given a 
particular responsibility of defining the EU’s policy agenda and giving impetus to 
integration. Because of this strategic role, its President is a full-time appointee so 
that he or she will not share this responsibility with national obligations.  
 
The Commission is, in addition to decision-making, also given powers to enforce 
the decisions of the EU.  
 
In the EU, it is the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure, that may amend the provisions of the Statute of 
the European Court regarding its existence.1124  
 
The EU institutions have been instrumental in the integration agenda of the EU. 
The Commission, for instance, is credited with the establishment of the EMU, 
through the “Delors Commission”. The European Council also adopts various 
programmes such as the Stockholm Programme (2009 – 2014), which urged 
member states to support their integration policies through the further development 
of structures and tools for knowledge exchange and coordination with other 
relevant policy areas, such as employment, education and social inclusion. 
 
The EU experience shows that the character and strength of regional institutions are 
no doubt a pre-requisite for successful regional integration. The EU benefitted from 
having well-developed institutions before it eventually reached the last stage of 
integration, the monetary union. 
 
However, it is important to note that the powers of the principal EU institutions 
have evolved over time. More importantly, this evolvement is made easier by the 
                                                 
1124 Article 281 of the TFEU. 
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national governments of member states by ceding significant powers to these EU 
institutions.  
 
These powers, however, are not without complexities. In the EU’s case they have 
led to what is known as “intergovernmentalism versus supranationalism” debate. 
Supranationalism refers to a large amount of power given to an authority which in 
theory is placed higher than the state, whereas intergovernmentalism focuses on the 
importance of member states in the process of creating EU-wide regulations. The 
powers of the EU institution would thus point to the EU as being a more 
supranational institution than intergovernmental.1125 
 
This “supranationality” of the EU is confirmed by the Court of Justice’s 
jurisprudence. In the early case of NW Algemene Transporten Expeditie 
Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Admniistratie der Belastingen the 
European Court of Justice held that: 
 
“The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the 
benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only member states 
but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of member states, 
community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is 
also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal 
heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the 
treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the treaty imposes in a clearly 
defined way upon individuals as well as upon the member states and upon 
the institutions of the community.”1126 
                                                 
1125 Schmidt, V.A. “The New EU Governance: New Intergovernmentalism, New Supranationalism, and 
New Parliamentarism”, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Working Papers 16, 11 May 2016; Kassim, H et 
al. “The principal–agent approach and the study of the European Union: promise unfulfilled?” Journal of 
European Public Policy vol. 10 no.1 (February 2003) 121; Nugent, N. Government and Politics of the 
European Union (2003) at 475. 
1126  N. V. Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlanse Administratie 
Der Belastingen C-26/62 at 11.  
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The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has also used its judicial powers to foster an 
integrated economy of the EU. Indeed, a large measure of credit for creating the 
EU single market goes to the CJEU’s judicial activism. This resulted from the 
decisions that the court gave in cases where firms in various member states, which 
were confronted with restrictions across national borders sought redress from the 
Court through the Community legal system.1127 Beck1128 argues that the CJEU has 
to take this integrationist approach, because the EU treaties and secondary 
legislation are characterised by a high degree of vagueness and value pluralism 
which embody political compromises between member states whereby they 
effectively delegated key questions to the CJEU. 
 
6.3.1.2 Role by the SADC institutions 
 
The SADC does not accord its institutions similar powers to their EU counterparts. 
It is instead only the Summit of Heads of States and Government that has executive 
control of the SADC, including all other organs.1129 Even the court of the SADC, 
the Tribunal, is not immune from this control by the Summit, as the suspension of 
the Tribunal in 2010, and the eventual revision of its protocol, by the Summit 
attests.1130  
 
The SADC should learn that integration needs to be championed by supranational 
institutions with appropriate powers. It should as such consider amending the 
                                                 
1127 Egan, M. “The Single Market” in Cini, M et al. European Union Politics (2016) at 259; Case 8/74 
Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837; Joined Cases C-267/91 and 268/91 Keck and Mithouard 
[1993] I-6097. 
1128 Beck, G. The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU (2012) at 437. 
1129 Article 10(2) of the SADC Treaty provides: 
“The Summit shall be responsible for the overall policy direction and control of the functions of 
SADC.”  
1130 The SADC Tribunal was suspended by the Summit after it had given (two) judgments against the 
Government of Zimbabwe on its land policy, which it refused to honour:  Mike Campbell (PVT) Limited 
and Another v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/07) [2007] SADC (T) 1 (13 December 2007) and Gondo and 
Others v Republic of Zimbabwe 05/2008 [2010] SADC (T) (9 December 2010. In terms of the revised 
(Tribunal) Protocol only states can be litigants in the Tribunal.  
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SADC Treaty to provide a legal basis for such supranational institutions. There is 
no need to adopt the entire panoply of institutions as they apply in the EU. What is 
needed is to import the substantial elements of the EU model to the already existing 
institutions.1131  
 
6.3.2 Political will and leadership 
 
6.3.2.1 Political will and leadership in the EU 
 
There is no doubt that regional integration is a political process that involves giving 
up of some form of national sovereignty. This is more so because it is done at the 
international level where the decisions are taken by political leaders. The political 
leaders in the EU, especially in big member states like Germany and France, 
personally understood that the European project was ultimately about peace and 
prosperity, and they were willing to fight for it. Others, like Britain, were against 
this and wanted the EU to remain narrowly focused on economic integration and 
not political integration. But they were eventually influenced by those who saw the 
concurrent or twin economic and political integration as the path that the EU must 
follow.   
 
The EU political leadership realised that in practise, there is a strong relationship 
between economics and politics because the performance of the economy is one of 
the key political battlegrounds. Many economic issues are inherently political 
because they lend themselves to different opinions. Also the economics needs 
political support, hence it is said that “it is the politicians who run the economy, not 
the economists.”  
 
                                                 
1131 Saurombe, A. “The European Union as a model for regional integration in the Southern African 
Development Community: A selective institutional comparative analysis” Law, Democracy and 
Development vol. 13 (2013) 457 at 471.  
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Looking at the peace and prosperity that prevail in Europe today, these leaders are 
vindicated with regard to this belief. Europe has never experienced any major war 
since the Treaty of Rome came into operation in 1958, thanks mainly to the EU 
integration project.  
 
6.3.2.2 Political will and leadership in the SADC 
 
In the SADC, lack of political will has been listed as one of the factors to explain 
the lethargic state of regional integration and development in the region. Absence 
of reliable champions or leaders of the integration project is also listed as another 
factor.1132  
 
This lack of political will and leadership has led to the SADC not achieving the 
goals and targets it set itself. For example, in the SADC Trade Protocol, the 
countries sought to liberalise 85% of intra-regional trade by 2008, liberalise 100% 
of trade by 2012, and form a customs union for the region by 2010. All these targets 
have since been missed. The suspension of the SADC Tribunal was also due to the 
SADC leaders bowing to the pressure by the Government of Zimbabwe because it 
did not want to implement or respect the judgement given by the Tribunal against 
it.1133 
 
It is, therefore, important for the SADC leaders to develop the vision for regional 
integration and provide the leadership to get it done, even if it is unpopular at times. 
In particular, they could learn from the experiences of the EU the following:  
 how to generate a political will for regional integration; and  
                                                 
1132 Nganje, F. “South Africa and SADC: Options for Constructive Regional Leadership” Institute for 
Global Dialogue (IGD) Policy Brief, Issue 105/May 2014, at 1 - 2; Peters-Berries, C. Regional Integration 
in Southern Africa – A Guidebook (2010) at 137.  
1133 Mapuva, J. “The SADC regional bloc: What challenges and prospects for regional integration?” Law, 
Democracy and Development vol. 18 (2014) 22 at 26; De Melo J et al. “Regional integration in Africa: 
Challenges and prospects” WIDER Working Paper 2014/037 (2014). Available at 
http://www.imvf.org/ficheiros/file/wp2014-037_1.pdf. (accessed on 22 February 2017); Hartzenberg T, 
“Regional integration in Africa” Tralac Staff Working Paper ERSD-2011-14 (October 2011). 
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 how to allow the private sector to play a more active role.1134 
 
6.3.3 Go through all stages of integration 
 
First “complete” the integration, then “deepen” it and thereafter “expand or 
enlarge”. 
 
When the Treaty of Rome came into operation in 1958, its aim was to establish the 
economic community for Europe, albeit the Western Europe, starting with the 
customs union, then a common market and eventually reaching the economic 
community. This was explicit in Article 2 of the (Rome) Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community, which provided that “it shall be the aim of the 
Community to establish a common market.” However, there was no timeframe 
given for this.  
 
The timeframe was introduced in 1972 with regard to the EMU when the European 
Community leaders made a call for the attainment of and economic and monetary 
union (EMU) by the end of the decade (i.e. by 1980). At this point the leaders had 
already decided to deepen the integration believing that the common market, and 
thus “completion of the integration” was a given. This inherently meant the 
“completion” (i.e. attainment of common market) and “deepening” (the EMU) 
would be done concurrently. However, there were others who were not in favour of 
this approach and instead advocated for “widening”, which related to the 
membership increment of the Common Market. This led to what was 
called “deepening vs. widening”1135 tensions in the EU, the consequence of which 
was that the 1980 target for the EMU was missed, and the common or single market 
was only achieved in 1993 when the Maastricht Treaty came into operation.  
 
                                                 
1134 Peters-Berries (fn 1132) at 166.  
1135 Deepening and widening are two schools of thought as to how the EU should develop. The notion of 
deepening refers to the ever closer union and is seen in the increased integration of the EU in terms of 
stages of integration whereas widening refers to expansion in terms of increased membership. 
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The “deepening” was eventually achieved in 1999 with the introduction of the euro 
as a single currency, and the “enlargement”, which is actually the “widening”, came 
with the accession of mostly Eastern European states in 2004 and thereafter.1136 
 
The EU experience shows that the EU Customs Union created political and 
economic pressures for further economic, financial and monetary integration, 
which in turn created pressure for political integration. This, of course resonates 
with the “spill-over” concept of the neo-functionalist theory of integration.1137 
 
6.3.4 Develop or strengthen the less or underdeveloped Member states 
 
6.3.4.1 The EU situation 
 
Some states of the EU are economically deprived and this would naturally lead to 
migration from less developed member states to more developed ones. In a bid to 
narrow the disparities between developed and underdeveloped regions in member 
states, the EU has developed two types of structural funds. One is the European 
Regional Development Fund designed to create infrastructure and support 
investment in job production, and the European Social Fund that invests in training 
measures to help unemployed and disadvantaged members of the population to 
enjoy a working life.1138 
 
Through the Regional Development Fund, the EU focuses its investments on 
several key priority areas. This is known as “thematic concentration”: 
 Innovation and research; 
                                                 
1136 Ruiz-Jiménez, A.M. “Is there a trade-off between deepening and widening? What do Europeans think?” 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) Working Paper No. 17, April 2008. 
1137 Eichengreen, B. “European Integration: What Lessons for Asia?” Paper for University of California, 
Berkeley, May 2007 at 4. 
1138 Akbulut, H. “Testing Growth Effects of European Union Structural Funds According to Size of 
Government: A Dynamic Approach” Journal of Business Economics and Finance vol. 3 no. 1 (2014) 50; 
Puigcerver-Peñalver, M. “The Impact of Structural Funds Policy on European Regions’ Growth. A 
Theoretical and Empirical Approach” European Journal of Comparative Economics vol. 4 no. 2 (2007) 
179. 
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 The digital agenda; 
 Support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); 
 The low-carbon economy.1139 
 
The Fund’s resources allocated to these priority areas will depend on the category 
of a region. In more developed regions, at least 80% of the funds must focus on at 
least two of these priorities; in a transition region, this focus is for 60% of the funds; 
and 50% in less developed regions. Furthermore, some Fund’s resources must be 
channelled specifically towards low-carbon economy projects as follows: 
 more developed regions: 20%; 
 transition regions: 15%; and 
 less developed regions: 12%.1140 
 
Through the European Social Fund (ESF), the EU helps about fifteen million 
people to find employment, or to improve their skills to find work in future.1141 This 
is important, in the short term, to mitigate the consequences of the current economic 
crisis, especially the rise in unemployment and poverty levels and, in 
the longer term, as part of Europe’s strategy to remodel its economy, creating not 
just jobs, but an inclusive society. Funding is given to a wide range of 
organisations – public bodies, private companies and civil society – which give 
people practical help to find a job, or stay in their job.1142 
 
Since the less developed countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) became 
members of the EU, these regional funds have become essential for their 
                                                 
1139 European Commission. “European Regional Development Fund” available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/EN/funding/erdf/ (accessed on 28 November 2016). 
1140 Ibid. 
1141 Article 151 of the TFEU declares that the Union and the member states, having in mind fundamental 
social rights, have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and working 
conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, proper 
social protection, dialogue between management and labour and the development of human resources. This 
last goal entails effectual education and training policies. 
1142 European Commission. “ESF - European Social Fund” available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=325 (accessed on 28 November 2016).  
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development, accounting for 11.3% to 25% of their annual gross domestic product 
(GDP).1143 
 
There is also the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF), which was set up to 
respond to major natural disasters and express European solidarity to disaster-
stricken regions within Europe. The Fund was created as a reaction to the severe 
floods in Central Europe in the summer of 2002. Since then, it has been used for 
seventy-two disasters covering a range of different catastrophic events including 
floods, forest fires, earthquakes, storms and drought. More than twenty different 
European countries have been supported so far with an amount of over 3,8 billion 
euros.1144 
 
This policy of transferring resources from affluent to poorer regions is commonly 
referred to as policy of “solidarity and cohesion.” The two words, solidarity and 
cohesion, sum up the values behind regional policy in the EU: “Solidarity” because 
the policy aims to benefit citizens and regions that are economically and socially 
deprived compared to EU averages. “Cohesion” because there are positive benefits 
for all in narrowing the gaps of income and wealth between the poorer countries 
and regions and those which are better off.1145 
 
The dynamic effects of EU membership, coupled with a vigorous and targeted 
regional policy, can have positive results. The gap between richest and poorest 
regions of the EU has narrowed over the years. Since these regional funds took 
effect, many regions in the eastern parts of the EU, especially capital city regions, 
have seen their GDP per capita (adjusted for price level differences) rise in absolute 
terms and in relation to the average of all twenty-eight EU member states.1146 
                                                 
1143 KPMG. “EU Funds in Central and Eastern Europe: Progress Report 2007 – 2013” May 2014 at 6. 
1144 European Commission. “EU Solidarity Fund” available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/solidarity-fund/#2 (accessed on 29 November 2016).  
1145 Promotion of “Solidarity and Cohesion” is one of the objectives of the EU (Articles 3 of the TEU and 
174 of the TFEU).   
1146 This data was as of March 2016, available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/GDP_at_regional_level (accessed on 29 November 2016). 
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6.3.4.2 The SADC situation 
 
The SADC’s envisaged regional development fund is yet to be established.1147 In 
August 2016, during the 36th Ordinary Session of the SADC Summit held in 
Mbabane, Swaziland, the SADC leaders resolved to open the SADC Regional 
Development Fund (RDF). Member states would be required to contribute to the 
Seed Capital of the Fund to the tune of US$120 million for the next three years 
commencing from the 2017/2018 SADC Budget. Other sources of financing the 
Fund will be from the private sector and the international cooperating partners 
(ICPs).1148 
 
It is therefore crucial that the RDF comes into operation.  
 
6.3.5 Involve the people or citizens 
 
6.3.5.1 Situation in the EU 
 
One of the fundamental principles of the Treaty establishing the European Union 
(TEU) is representative democracy and thus direct representation of the EU 
citizens. To this end citizens of the EU are directly represented in the European 
Parliament through regular elections.1149 
 
                                                 
1147 Article 26A of the SADC Treaty provides: 
“1. There is hereby established a special fund of SADC to be known as the Regional Development Fund in 
which shall be accounted receipts and expenditure of SADC relating to the development of SADC.  
2. The Regional Development Fund shall, subject to this Treaty, consist of contributions of Member states 
and receipts from regional and non-regional sources, including the private sector, civil society, non-
governmental organisations and workers and employers organisations.  
3. The Council shall determine the modalities for the institutionalization, operation and management of the 
Regional Development Fund.  
4. The Regional Development Fund shall be governed in terms of financial regulations made in accordance 
with Article 30 of this Treaty.” 
1148 Ndhlovu, A. “Southern Africa: SADC Countries to Open Development Fund – Kasaila” Nyasa Times 
of 7 September 2016.  
1149 Article 10 of the TEU.  
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Article 10(3) of the TEU also provides that “every citizen shall have the right to 
participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall be taken as openly 
and as closely as possible to the citizen.” Member states of the EU have 
practicalised this provision in the form of referendums with regard to EU issues or 
matters, even though the EU does not require any member state or candidate 
country to hold a referendum.  
 
In most instances, the referendums have been held on whether to become a member 
of the European Union as part of the accession process. In 2006 the member states 
also used referendums to decide as to whether to adopt the “new EU Constitution” 
(Constitution Treaty), which needed to be agreed upon by all member states. This 
was defeated when France and the Netherlands voted against it in their respective 
referendums.  
 
Recently the United Kingdom used a referendum to decide on the issue of 
continued membership of the EU, the so-called “Brexit Referendum”. 51,9% of the 
Britons voted against continued membership and as a result the membership of the 
United Kingdom in the EU is expected to cease two years after Article 50 procedure 
of the Lisbon Treaty has been initiated, which the United Kingdom Government 
did on 29 March 2017.1150 The UK is thus on course to leave the EU on 29 March 
2019. 
 
The “Brexit” Negotiations with the EU officially started in late June 2017, after 
the United Kingdom general election which took place on 8 June 2017, and are 
ongoing. According to the European Parliament, the withdrawal agreement and any 
                                                 
1150 Gross, J. “Britain Delivers Stunning Rejection to EU” The Wall Street Journal, 24 June 2016; “UK 
votes to leave EU” at http://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results (accessed on 13 January 
2017); “Here’s the full Brexit letter Britain sent to the EU”, available at 
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/29/heres-the-brexit-letter-britain-sent-to-the-eu.html (accessed on 3 May 
2017). 
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possible transitional arrangement(s) should enter into force “well before the 
elections to the European Parliament of May 2019.”1151 
 
However, despite the use of referendums for public involvement, there are still 
some sections within various EU member states who think that ordinary people are 
not being involved in the EU matters. This sentiment has led to the rise of Euro-
sceptic parties in various member states such as France, Netherlands, Finland, 
Denmark and Italy, who, among others, are also arguing for an exit from the EU. 
This shows the importance and significance of involvement of ordinary people in 
integration efforts.1152   
 
In order to gauge the knowledge of the citizens about the EU and how it works, the 
EU uses regular surveys, called “Eurobarometer”, conducted by the Commission, 
in each member state. In the 2013 Survey, 93% of the EU citizens reported that they 
know about the EU and how it works. 77% also felt that they are being kept 
informed about the developments in the EU.1153 
 
The EU Commission is also obliged to consider proposals for legal measures made 
by petitions of one million citizens, who are nationals of a significant number of 
member states (citizens’ initiatives).1154 
 
The ordinary people in the EU can be litigants in the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). Article 270 of the TFEU also provides that the CJEU shall 
have jurisdiction in any dispute between the Union and its servants within the limits 
                                                 
1151 “European Parliament Resolution on negotiations with the United Kingdom following its notification 
that it intends to withdraw from the European Union” European Parliament, 29 March 2017. 
1152 These parties are: The National Front (France), Party for Freedom (Netherlands), Finns (Finland), 
Danish People’s Party (Denmark), and the Five Star Movement (Italy); Richardson, J. “The EU as a policy-
making state: a policy system like any other?” in Richardson, J et al. European Union: Power and Policy-
making (2015) at 26. 
1153 European Commission. “How much do European citizens know about the EU?” Eurobarometer Report, 
2013 at 15. 
1154 Articles 11(4) of the TEU and 24(1) of the TFEU; Chalmers, D et al. European Union Law: Cases and 
Materials (2010) at 47. 
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and under the conditions laid down in the Staff Regulations of Officials and the 
Conditions of Employment of other servants of the Union. 
 
The citizens also elect the EU Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) 
directly through universal adult suffrage. 
 
The involvement of the people in the EU is also extended to the civil society. Article 
11 of the TEU provides that the institutions of the EU shall, by appropriate means, 
give representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly 
exchange their views in all areas of Union action. The institutions are to maintain 
an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil 
society. And the Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties 
concerned in order to ensure that the EU’s actions are coherent and transparent.1155 
 
To this end the EU Commission has a policy of dialogues with non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) in various member states. It dialogues with these groups 
whenever an approach is made by the group or a member thereof. Another 
mechanism that the Commission uses is to give these groups places in its advisory 
committees.1156 
 
6.3.5.2 Situation in the SADC 
 
In the SADC, there has never been a referendum by member states on the SADC 
matters. This is so despite the Preamble to the SADC Treaty stating, among others, 
that it is “mindful of the need to involve the people of the Region centrally in the 
process of development and integration, particularly through the guarantee of 
democratic rights, observance of human rights and the rule of law.” 
 
                                                 
1155 Article 11(1) – (3) of the TEU; Greenwood, J. Interest Representation in the European Union (2011) at 
2; Chalmers, D et al. European Union Law: Cases and Materials (2010) at 45. 
1156 Greenwood (above) at 14. 
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In most cases the decisions are taken by the Summit of Heads of State and 
Government without the knowledge of the very same people that the Summit 
purports to represent. In fact, most of the people in the region seem not to know 
about the SADC and what it stands for. The former Executive Secretary of SADC, 
Dr Simba Makoni, once used an episode he experienced with a Zambian vendor, 
during the SADC meeting in Zambia, to gauge the popularity of the organisation. 
He said that when asked how important the SADC was to him, the vendor replied: 
“because my President goes there every year”.1157 
 
Unlike the EU, the SADC does not have a barometer or similar instruments to gauge 
the opinion of its citizens.  
 
With regard to litigation and access to court, the new SADC Tribunal Protocol 
provides that only states, and not private persons, will be litigants.  
 
Also, with regard to representation, the ordinary people have no say regarding 
“their” representation at the SADC. The Southern African Development 
Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF), on the other hand, is not even a 
parliament nor an organ or institution of the SADC. However, there are plans to 
transform the Forum into a legislative body, albeit this is without timeframe.1158  
 
The SADC on the other hand, while it makes provision for working with the civil 
society, this is fraught with difficulties.1159 The reason for this seems to stem from 
                                                 
1157 Ndulo, M. “African integration schemes: a case study of the Southern African Development 
Community” African Yearbook of International Law vol. 7 no. 7 (1999 - 2001) 3 at 11; Ndulo, M. “Can 
SADC deliver? Southern African Political and Economic Monthly vol. 9 no. 11 (August 1996) 5. 
1158 In its Constitution the SADC Parliamentary Forum provides that “upon the Forum becoming a 
Parliament structure, the Plenary Assembly would be the legislative body in full consultation with SADC 
authorities and without infringing on the sovereignty of SADC National Parliaments’ legislative functions.” 
1159  Article 23 of the SADC Treaty provides: 
“1 In pursuance of the objectives of this Treaty, SADC shall seek to involve fully, the people of the Region 
and key stakeholders in the process of regional integration.  
. . . 
3. For the purposes of this article, key stakeholders include:  
1. private sector;  
2. civil society  
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the fact that there is not even a dedicated institution for this purpose, unlike with 
the EU where the Commission is tasked with this role. However, the SADC does 
have a number of entry points for civil society engagement at both the regional and 
national levels. At the regional level, it works, or is supposed to work, primarily 
through two channels: the Southern Africa Development Community Council of 
Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO) and the SADC Civil Society 
Forum; and at the national level, it engages with the SADC national committees 
(SNC).1160 
 
The SADC-CNGO has a memorandum of cooperation with the SADC Secretariat 
and aims to facilitate civil society contribution to regional integration for 
sustainable people-centred development, open and accountable governance and 
participatory democracy.  However, in spite of the efforts of the SADC-CNGO to 
build a structure of civil society interaction with regional policy and institutional 
frameworks, a structured civil society interaction in the SADC is lacking.1161 
 
With regard to the SADC national committees (SNC), there tends to be a low level 
of awareness of SNCs in most of the SADC member states. This is so despite these 
being provided for by the SADC Treaty.1162 
 
 
                                                 
3. non -governmental organisations; and  
4. workers and employers organisations.” 
1160 Mukumba, C et al. “Civil society role in SADC integration: A missed opportunity” GREAT Insights 
Magazine vol. 5 issue 4 July/August 2016 at 24; Vanheukelom, J et al. “The political economy of regional 
integration in Africa: The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Report” Report of the 
European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), January 2016 at 8.   
1161 Mukumba (above).  
1162  Article 16A of the SADC Treaty states: 
“Each Member State shall create a SADC National Committee, which has to consist of key stakeholders 
which should:  
a) provide input at the national level in the formulation of SADC policies, strategies and 
programmes of action; 
b) coordinate and oversee, at the national level, implementation of SADC programmes of action; 
c) initiate projects and issue papers as an input to the preparation of the Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan; and  
d) create a national steering committee, sub-committees and technical committees.” 
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Conclusion  
 
The discussion above shows that there are vast differences between the SADC and EU, 
showing that it would be an error to simply copy the EU model as it is to the SADC in 
order for it to achieve integration. The SADC, and other RECs in Africa, still has much to 
do in order to reach the EU level. Oppong attributes this ineffective economic integration 
in Africa to many factors including socio-economic, political and infrastructural problems 
as well as the state of existing laws.1163   
 
The European Union is a body that has gone through all types of economic integration 
since 1958. It had achieved a customs union and common market for all its members as 
well as an economic community, before it was transformed from being the European 
Community to the European Union. This was done in order to cover the other aspects of 
political, social and cultural nature in addition to the economic aspects that the European 
Community stood for. 
 
It is also a monetary union, albeit not a fully-fledged one as only nineteen out of twenty-
eight member states are participating in the Eurozone. However, all member states are 
encouraged and expected to join the Eurozone. This is because the EU understands that a 
fully-fledged monetary union is apt to foster further integration, including the integration 
of the financial sector. However, it is at this stage of the integration process that there are 
complications as the “Eurozone financial crisis” has attested. There is, therefore, a need to 
build in safeguard mechanisms for integration to succeed, as the EU did with the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM),1164 albeit after the fact.  
 
One feature of the monetary union, the creation of a supranational central bank, calls for 
political cooperation too. There must be agreed arrangements for choosing the bank’s 
                                                 
1163 Oppong, R.F. Legal Aspects of Economic Integration in Africa (2011) at 1.  
1164 The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was set up in 2012 to take the ECB out of the front line 
during crises. This step allowed the ECB to announce its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) 
programme, a commitment to purchase sovereign bonds with exceptionally high interest rates – provided 
the issuer had negotiated an adjustment programme with the ESM. 
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leadership and holding the bank accountable for its monetary policy. There is also a need 
for constraints on the members’ fiscal policies, even the harmonisation of those policies. 
 
It is important to note that the process of economic integration in Europe has been always 
incremental in nature. It took thirty-five years to establish the internal market, and yet in 
this period, there was no doubt about the path of economic integration to be followed. It is 
only lately in the Union era, as the “Eurozone financial crisis” has shown, that there were 
some uncertainties and ambiguity with regard to some of its final goals. This is in turn a 
by-product of the very high degree of national sovereignty pooling implied at this stage, 
which calls for properly addressing the ultimate question of democracy. 
 
Experience over the last five decades has shown clearly that economic integration 
(removing barriers to the free movement of goods, services, money and people) gives 
Europe a much better chance of creating jobs and sustainable growth. Removing barriers 
to trade and free movement is a huge benefit for those engaged in commerce or travelling 
for legitimate reasons. But the disadvantage here is that criminals also seek to turn the 
system to their advantage. The EU’s response for frontier-free crime has been to create a 
system of frontier-free police and criminal justice cooperation such as the Europol, 
Eurojust and the Schengen Information System,1165 whereby national police and 
prosecutors as well as border guards exchange information on wanted and suspected 
wrongdoers or illegal goods. Under this system member states second senior prosecutors, 
policemen and lawyers to a central team working together to fight organised crime. 
 
The Union also advocates for one-kind approach in applying and interpreting the European 
laws. This is to avoid one law being applied and interpreted differently by member states. 
This in itself is “integration” of laws and it augurs well with “single trade law system” for 
international trade. It should be remembered that international or transnational traders face 
                                                 
1165 The Schengen Information System (SIS) is a highly efficient large-scale information system that 
supports external border control and law enforcement cooperation in the Schengen States. The SIS 
enables competent authorities, such as police and border guards, to enter and consult alerts on certain 
categories of wanted or missing persons and objects. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-
we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen-information-system_en (accessed on 4 May 2017).  
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a dilemma of diversity of national laws and the complexity of the rules of private 
international law - or conflict of laws as some would call it - when determining which 
system applies to their transactions. If these laws were grouped together to form one 
system, it would be easier for international trade. The EU has thus adopted the so-called 
“Rome II Regulation”, 1166 which creates a harmonised set of rules within the European 
Union to govern choice of law in civil and commercial matters.  
 
However, above all these achievements, the EU has still not mastered the art of involving 
ordinary people. This has led to the rise of Euro-sceptic parties in various member states, 
which has the potential of negatively affecting the unity of the EU. It would, therefore, do 
the EU a great deal if it were to heed the call to create a greater involvement of ordinary 
people in its activities.   
 
The SADC, and the African Union in general, would do better in fostering regional 
integration if it continues learning from the European Union’s model. It must not only 
learn, but also apply and modify the model to suit the African situation, which is different, 
and unique, from the European situation. And particular attention would be needed when 
the monetary union stage is reached, lest it experiences its own “financial crises”. At all 
times ordinary people must be at the centre of this integration process.  
 
The fundamental lesson from the EU experience, therefore, is that deeper integration 
requires governance that transcends individual member states within the region to a level 
where decision-making is delegated to regional institutions that are to some extent 
independent of the influence of member states.1167 
 
 
 
                                                 
1166 “Regulation (EC) no. 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations, of 11 July 2007”.  
1167 Saurombe, A. “The role of SADC Institutions in implementing SADC Treaty provisions dealing with 
regional integration” Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal vol. 15 no. 2 (2012) 459 at 569; Mattli, W. The 
Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond (1999) 189. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
PART A: CONCLUSION 
 
Regionalism has gained momentum since the 1990s and became more appealing following 
the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in 1994. Even the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) – the chief proponent of multilateralism – has conceded 
that a multilateral trade system is no longer appealing to many countries, and regional 
integration is an emerging force in global trade. The United States of America (USA), 
having lost absolute control over the destiny of the multilateral trade system, has also 
shifted the formulation of its trade policy, abandoning the traditionally favoured 
multilateralism, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), for regionalism in 
the form of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA).1168  
 
South America is continuing the process of South American integration through the 
Common Market of the South (Mercosur) and the Andean Community of Nations. In Asia 
there is an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) that facilitate economic integration amongst 
states of Southeast Asia and the Gulf region respectively. The Caribbean has the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) that promotes economic integration and cooperation among its 
members. In fact regional blocs exist on all continents, except the Antarctica.1169 
 
So it is not odd that the countries of Southern Africa are also taking their claim in this 
phenomenon of regionalism. They have realised that by organising themselves into a 
regional bloc, they will be poised for significant growth. And in this way, they will become 
                                                 
1168 Drabek, Z. Is the World Trade Organization Attractive Enough for Emerging Economies? (2010) at 72; 
World Trade Organisation. Regionalism in the World Trading System (1995) at 1. 
1169 Gough, G.M. “Regional Economic Cooperation” International Business and Economics Research 
Journal vol. 5 no. 2 (February 2006) 49; “WTO Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-
IS)” available at http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx (accessed on 2 February 2017). 
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a more reliable partner in global trade. However, these countries must work together to 
accelerate this process. This is more so, as it has been shown in the preceding chapters, that 
this phenomenon, regional integration, is very complex. Southern African countries, for 
example, have to navigate multilateral trade liberalisation at the WTO, several trade 
arrangements at the regional level,1170 and bilateral free trade agreements with third parties 
such the European Union (EU),1171 which impact on their regional organisation.  
 
The success or failure of a regional integration initiative should be evaluated in the context 
of the objectives it sets to achieve and the political, economic and institutional context 
under which it operates. In the case of regional integration in Africa, all the African 
Economic Community (AEC)-recognised regional groupings, including the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), set out to eventually form either a common 
market or a community among member countries.1172  
 
However, judged against the achievements of their objectives so far, the consensus seems 
to be that none of these regional groupings have to date successfully fulfilled the 
requirements of a functional common market,1173 and in many cases, not even that of a 
                                                 
1170 Southern Africa has the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Common Market of 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Southern African Customs Union (SACU) as the three main 
regional schemes which exist alongside one another. The SADC and COMESA also concluded the 
tripartite free trade agreement (T-FTA) with the East African Community (EAC), which came into 
operation in June 2015.  
1171 The EU signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) on 10 June 2016 with 
the SADC EPA Group comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and 
Swaziland. Angola has an option to join the agreement in future. The other six members of the Southern 
African Development Community region – the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe – are negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements with the EU as part 
of other regional groups, namely Central Africa or Eastern and Southern Africa; European Commission. 
“Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the European Union and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) EPA Group” June 2016.  
1172 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)’s aim is the Monetary and Economic 
Union in West Africa – it’s still at customs union level, having achieved this in 2015; the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS) aims for monetary community or union and it’s still at FTA 
level, since 1994; the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)’s objectives of establishing a free trade area by 1992 
and common market by 2000 is still to be realised; the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA)’s eventual objective is a common market and is still at customs union level since 2010 and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC)’s eventual aim is a community, but it is still at FTA 
level since 2008.   
1173 Even the COMESA, which is supposedly a common market, does not meet one of the requirements of a 
common market, namely, “requirement of free flow of other means of production”. In 2001 the COMESA 
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customs union.1174 This is substantiated by the fact that intra-REC trade in Africa is 
generally found to be very low compared with each REC’s trade with non-member 
countries, in particular with that of European countries.1175 
 
However, there is a general agreement that most, if not all, of these African regional 
groupings have achieved free trade areas (FTA) status. Both the SADC and the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the two regional blocs recognised by 
the African Union (AU) for the Southern Africa region, have achieved this status. The 
COMESA launched its FTA in October 2000, whilst the SADC FTA came into operation 
in January 2008 as proposed by the SADC Protocol on Trade.1176 Among some of the 
Protocol’s objectives are to liberalise intra-regional trade in goods and services1177 as well 
as to enhance the economic development, diversification and industrialisation of the 
region.1178  
 
These objectives show that the SADC regards the impact of trade and industrial policy on 
market structure and economic geography in the region as crucial. And the key to 
facilitating intra-regional trade and socio-economic progress lies in the support and 
accelerated development of industries in the member states.  
 
In order to operationalise these objectives, the SADC adopted the Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), which is the overall framework for the 
organisation’s regional integration activities. As a specific approach to industrial 
development in the region, the SADC adopted the Industrial Development Policy 
                                                 
adopted the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, and Rights of Establishment and 
Residence in 2001, but this was ratified only by Burundi. 
1174 The SADC has so far only achieved the FTA status. It missed the 2010 target of a customs union as 
well as a common market by 2015. 
1175 Robson, P. Regional Economic Integration in Africa (2012) at 63; United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa. Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV - Enhancing Intra-African Trade 
(2010) at 357; Seid, E.H. “Regional Integration and Trade in Africa: Augmented Gravity Model Approach” 
Horn Economic and Social Policy Institute (HESPI) Working Paper No. 3/13, December 2013. 
1176 Article 2(5) of the SADC Protocol on Trade provides:  
“The objectives of this Protocol are . . . to establish a Free Trade Area in the SADC Region.” 
1177 Article 2(1). 
1178 Article 2(4). 
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Framework and the 2015-2063 Industrialization Strategy and Roadmap. This 
industrialisation strategy or approach has “increasing intra-regional trade” as one of its 
crucial components.1179 
 
While the SADC Trade Protocol requires a systematic phase-down of tariffs by all member 
states, there are still many factors that may constitute barriers to intra-regional trade. Of 
these barriers the lists of sensitive products are probably the most obvious, but the 
uncertainty associated with the range of invisible non-tariff barriers (NTBs) is likely to be 
the most significant obstacle to integration. The following can be singled out as the most 
important NTBs that impede trade in the region: 
 
 Communication problems; 
 Customs procedures and charges; 
 Transport problems; 
 Lack of market information; 
 Other border procedures; and  
 Services: financial, electricity and technical support.1180 
 
These have contributed to the challenges that the countries in Southern Africa are facing, 
which range from macroeconomic issues to trade, education, infrastructural developments, 
etc. However, there are protocols that the SADC countries have signed and ratified as 
mechanisms to solve these challenges. These include the SADC protocols on Trade, 
                                                 
1179 The SADC 2015-2063 Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap provides:  
“Regional integration is one of the three cornerstones of the SADC Industrialisation Strategy. Deeper 
regional integration is a sine qua non for collective development. To that end, Member states should 
accelerate implementation of SADC policies, protocols and agreements. Collective development requires 
complementarity of production and trade structures and policy convergence over time” (at 20).  
1180 Mbekeani, K.K. “Understanding the Barriers to Regional Trade Integration in Africa” Paper prepared 
by staff of the African Development Bank in collaboration with World Bank and WTO staff for the 2011 
G20 Summit in France (2013) at 19; Sandrey, R., et al. “Non-tariff measures inhibiting South African 
exports to China and India” Tralac Working Paper No 6/2008 (2008). 
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Transport, Communications and Meteorology, Energy, Education and Training, etc. The 
biggest challenge with regard to these protocols, though, remains their implementation.1181 
 
With regard to communication, the cellular network has made some improvements. 
However, although the cellular network has become available to a large part of the region, 
there are still countries in which roaming is impossible or difficult due to a failure to 
establish roaming agreements or to a lack of signalling links. The use of cellular phones 
has the potential to solve the communication challenges that the region is facing. The 
SADC should thus take advantage of this phenomenon.1182 
 
As was stated in Chapter 5, the SADC FTA has largely eliminated tariffs within the SADC 
through various other mechanisms. These include the adoption of the technical barriers to 
trade (TBT) to the SADC Protocol on Trade Annex (“Annex IX”), and the SADC-wide 
accreditation system known as Southern African Development Community Accreditation 
Service (SADCAS) for the technical barriers, as well as the online reporting mechanism 
for the non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The online reporting mechanism has also been extended 
to the SADC-COMESA-EAC tripartite free trade area (T-FTA).1183 
 
The elimination of tariffs, however, can have a negative impact on the economy of a 
country, especially small countries like the ones in the SADC. As tariffs are a tax placed 
by the government on imports, their elimination would necessarily mean a loss of this tax 
revenue for the importing country. It may also lead to the flooding of local markets with 
cheap imports, which could result in the elimination of those local markets. Therefore, a 
                                                 
1181 Monyepao, K. “The impact of non-operationalisation of the SADC protocol and international transport 
agreements on cross border road transport movement in the SADC region” Report of the proceedings of the 
34th Southern African Transport Conference (SATC) 2015, at 636. 
1182 Communication Regulators Association of Southern Africa (CRASA) Report to the SADC Roaming 
Policy Workshop, 26 June 2016, Walvis Bay, Namibia; Clarke, R. “Regulatory analysis of international 
mobile roaming services” Report of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), March 2014 at 8. 
1183 Hove, V.S. “An analysis of how the online non-tariff barriers mechanism facilitates reporting, 
monitoring and elimination of NTBs in the COMESA, EAC and SADC Region” Thesis for the Masters of 
Commerce (MCom) Degree, University of Cape Town (2015); Viljoen, W. “The proposed Tripartite Non-
tariff Barrier Elimination Mechanism: An Evaluation of Legal texts and Practice” Tralac Trade Brief No. 
S15TB03/2015, March 2015. 
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country that wants to enter into an integration scheme such as an FTA should consider this 
decision carefully, as this would mean removing the tariffs.1184 
 
It is in the light of this impact by removal of tariffs that the SADC had to make provision 
for a systematic phase-down of tariffs. This was in recognition of the vulnerability of many 
of the economies of the member states and thus to allow them to strengthen.  When 
contemplating the decision to join a regional economic scheme, governments of these 
countries should be certain that this would create market contestability of their industries 
and enable them to actively engage in expanding their activities in the region. 
 
However, despite this negative impact the removal of tariffs generally leads to trade 
liberalisation, thus intra-regional trade. For the SADC this is a progressive step as intra-
regional trade in Southern Africa is still low, except for South Africa, which is prominent 
in terms of intra-regional trade volumes and patterns. This low level of intra-regional trade 
reflects the structure of production of countries composing the Southern African regional 
groups, and which are dominated by few commodities.1185 
 
The achievement by the SADC of an FTA must, therefore, be applauded, as minimal as it 
may be. Together with other achievements, such as the SADC’s decision to realign its 
regional institutional machinery and processes with its regional integration agenda, by 
clustering its sectors into four directorates and centralising these within a strengthened 
Secretariat, as well as that of designing and managing a regional development strategy 
(RISDP), this must be seen as an important step towards deeper integration.  
 
With the launch of the RISDP, the SADC has every reason to look forward with confidence 
to dealing with the new challenges that it is facing. More so that the RISDP takes into 
account the impact and benefits of globalisation. However, there is much that the SADC 
                                                 
1184 Tarver, E. “How do tariffs protect domestic industries?” Investopedia (online). Available at 
http://www.investopedia.com/ (accessed on 31 January 2017); World Trade Organisation (WTO). “Trade 
and public policies: A closer look at non-tariff measures in the 21st Century” World Trade Report 2012 at 2. 
1185 Geda, A et al. “The potential for internal trade and regional integration in Africa” Journal of African 
Trade (December 2015); Mbekeani, K.K. “Intra-Regional Trade in Southern Africa: Structure, 
Performance and Challenges” Nepad Regional Integration Policy Papers No. 2, June 2013 at 32. 
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must do to integrate more usefully with the global market. Whether we like it or not, 
globalisation has arrived and it is here to stay.1186 As such the SADC needs to build a strong 
voice in the international arena, and at all forums for equitable global governance. 
 
In as much as the achievement of an FTA is applauded, there is still much to be done for 
the SADC to achieve the eventual status of a “community” and the time is running out. In 
terms of the targets, as laid out in the RISDP, the SADC was supposed to achieve the 
customs union status by 2010, a common market by 2015, and a monetary union by 2018.  
 
It is common knowledge that both the customs union and the common market targets have 
been missed and, by the look of things, the monetary union target will be missed as well. 
It is, therefore, necessary to examine critically why these targets were missed, and the 
implications thereof, for the integration process, especially the customs union, as it is the 
next step after the FTA step. 
 
The main challenge for the SADC regarding the customs union is its multiple membership 
of its member states with other regional blocs, especially the COMESA and the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU).  It is an accepted argument among integrationists that 
multiple memberships are a hindrance to regional integration since, among other things, 
they introduce duplication of effort, and they are inefficient and costly.1187  Also, with 
regard to a customs union, technically a state cannot maintain membership of two customs 
unions as it cannot apply two different external tariffs. This is because a customs union 
creates a common trade barrier for members with regard to third-party states.1188 
 
                                                 
1186 Ramakrishnan, K. “Preface” Managerial Leadership in Multicultural Organisations (2013); Lule, J. 
Globalization and Media: Global Village of Babel (2012) at 25; Sinha, Y. “Entrepreneurial and innovative 
education” in Sharma, K et al. Encyclopaedia of Higher Education: The Indian Perspectives vol. 4 (2005) 
at 440. 
1187 Corrigan, T. “Puzzling Over the Pieces: Regional Integration and the African Peer Review Mechanism” 
South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) Research Report, January 2015 at 28; Geda, A et 
al. “The potential for internal trade and regional integration in Africa” Journal of African Trade vol. 2 
(2015) 19 at 21; Saurombe, A. “The role of SADC Institutions in implementing SADC Treaty provisions 
dealing with regional integration” Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal vol. 15 no. 2 (2012) 459. 
1188 Centre for Economic Policy Research, London. “Trade and Investment Competence Review -  
 A study for the Department for Business Innovation & Skills” November 2013 at 14 – 17. 
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Whilst it is technically possible for the COMESA and the SADC FTAs to co-exist, this is 
impossible for customs unions, unless each regime adopts the same customs union 
regulations. This problem befell Zambia, which announced that it will not join the 
COMESA Customs Union because of its participation in the SADC FTA implementation 
programme.1189 
 
For Swaziland, its joint membership of the COMESA and the SACU became a dilemma 
with the introduction of the COMESA FTA. Swaziland has been unable to implement 
preferential tariffs for other COMESA countries and cannot introduce free trade imports 
from other COMESA countries in terms of this FTA. The SACU Agreement on common 
external tariff (CET) can also not be broken by some members granting preferences in 
terms of other FTA regimes, unless all the other members agree to this arrangement. South 
Africa, Botswana and Lesotho have not given their consent to such action by Swaziland, 
because once the CET wall is broken, it would be difficult to prevent goods illegally 
crossing to other SACU members without payment of duty.1190 
 
This problem of multiple memberships, called a “spaghetti bowl effect”,1191 also spoils the 
ability of the Southern Africa region to negotiate trade arrangements with other regions. 
For example, it took the six SADC member states1192 sixteen years to sign an economic 
partnership agreement (EPA) with the European Union in terms of the Cotonou 
                                                 
1189 Edwards, L et al. “Zambian Regional Integration Policy Challenges” International Growth Centre 
(IGC) Working Paper, March 2012. 
1190 Kritzinger-van Niekerk, L et al. “Regional Integration in Southern Africa – Overview of recent 
developments” Discussion Paper for the World Bank, December 2002 at 5; de la Rocha, M. “The Cotonou 
Agreement and its Implications for the Regional Trade Agenda in Eastern and Southern Africa” World 
Bank e-library (2003) at 11. 
1191 Bhagwati, J. “U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Agreements” in The Dangerous Drift 
to Preferential Trade Agreements (1995); Bhagwati, J et al. “Trading preferentially: Theory and Policy” 
Economic Journal vol. 108, no. 449 (1998) 1128; Baldwin, R, “Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti 
Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade” World Economy vol. 29 issue 11 (2006) 1; 
Tavares, R. et al. “Regional economic integration in Africa: impediments to progress?” South African 
Journal of International Affairs vol. 18 no2 (2011) 217. 
1192 These are Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland - the so-called 
“SADC EPA Group”. 
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Agreement.1193 The mere fact that only six out of fifteen SADC member states could sign 
this EPA shows how problematic the issue of multiple membership in the SADC is.  
 
This, however, should not be too surprising because ten of the SADC’s members are now 
members of two or three different customs unions since 2004.1194 And customs unions have 
common external tariffs (CETs), and therefore forbid any single Member State to negotiate 
a trade agreement bilaterally. It seems, therefore, that what has happened with this EU-
SADC EPA is that these member states, the so-called “SADC EPA Group”, have decided 
to prioritise their individual trade with the EU, rather than reach a consensus within the 
SADC. This has a potential of harming the consensus, and thus unity, in the SADC. 
 
As for South Africa, which is one of the six states, its signing of this EPA is more 
surprising, because it stated as its main objective in joining the EPA Group in 2004 “to 
minimise, as far as possible, the threat of fragmentation to regional integration and 
development processes underway in Southern Africa.”1195 However, if one looks at the 
members of this SADC EPA Group, one would realise that it is actually the members of 
the SACU plus Mozambique.   
 
Mozambique has long expressed its desire for the SACU membership,1196 but this is 
resisted by the BLNS (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) countries, as this 
would mean an overhaul of the revenue-sharing formula, thus resulting in a very substantial 
decline in their revenues from the SACU Revenue Pool. So this EU-SADC EPA provides 
                                                 
1193 The Cotonou Agreement was signed in June 2000 between the European Union (EU) and the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group, and allows the ACP member states enter into Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) with the EU, either individually or collectively, taking into account the regional 
integration processes already in existence. This EPA between “SADC EPA Group” and the EU was signed 
in June 2016.  
1194 These are: DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe.  
1195 Davies, R. “The SADC EPA and beyond” Great Insights Magazine vol. 3 issue 9 (October/November 
2014) 9 at 10. 
1196 “Should Mozambique Join SACU? A Review of Key Policy Issues” Report of the Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce, Government of Mozambique, August 2004; Bertelsmann-Scott, T. “SACU – One Hundred 
Not Out: What future for the Customs Union?” South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) 
Occasional Paper no. 68, September 2010 at 12. 
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Mozambique with an opportunity to trade within the SACU, though not necessarily being 
part of the SACU Revenue Pool. 
 
The EPA might also help the SACU to function like an ordinary customs union.  Currently 
the SACU is not functioning in an optimal way in terms of treatment for EU imports, as 
these are exempted from the SACU CET. Also the SACU members currently do not all 
impose the same duty to EU imports because of the various current bilateral agreements 
between the EU and the SACU countries.1197  
 
The new EU-SADC EPA also comes with different rules of origin, and these have a 
potential of complicating intra-regional trade, as new controls will be required at borders 
of the SADC member states.  This will also complicate the process to forge common policy 
positions in the unfolding integration agenda in Africa. However, the EPA also comes with 
the flexible rules of origin known as “cumulation”.1198 This means that the countries are 
allowed to source inputs from each other, as well as from other African countries under 
other EPAs for export to the EU. Such provisions will encourage intra-African trade and 
industrialisation in Africa. If this were to indeed happen, EPAs with the EU would 
complement, rather than harm, Africa’s integration agenda.1199 
 
Angola has indicated that it may join the agreement at a later stage and six other SADC 
member states, namely the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Madagascar, 
                                                 
1197 European Commission. “Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the European Union and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA Group – Key advantages” June 2016 at 3.  
1198 Cumulation is a concept used in preferential trade agreements, which essentially widens the definition 
of originating products and helps manufactured goods to meet the relevant origin rule. It is used to describe 
a system that allows originating products of country A to be further processed or added to products 
originating in country B, just as if they had originated in country B. The resulting product would have the 
origin of country B. It can only be applied between countries operating with identical origin rules; 
“Cumulation in free trade agreements” Federal Department of Finance of Switzerland, February 2016 
[online]. Available at https://www.ezv.admin.ch/dam/ezv/.../cumulation_in_freetradeagreements.pdf 
(accessed on 24 February 2017); “Decision of the World Trade Organization: Least Developed Countries 
Group” (Paragraph 1.7 of the Decision), 8 October 2015, Florence, Italy.  
1199 Davies (above, fn 1195); Statement by Ms Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Trade, at Signing 
Ceremony of the EU-SADC Economic Partnership Agreement, Kasane, Botswana, 10 June 2016. 
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Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe are negotiating EPAs with the EU as part of 
other regional groups, namely Central Africa or Eastern and Southern Africa.1200 
 
All these challenges show that the political momentum in Africa appears to have run ahead 
of economic reality, and the commitments that have been made, particularly of eventual 
monetary unions, are not based on any detailed analysis of whether a monetary union is 
suitable in an African context.1201 
 
While trade integration almost certainly makes sense for Africa in general, through the 
pursuit of free trade areas or customs unions, a monetary union - at least on a continent-
wide basis - almost certainly does not. There are exceptionally wide disparities in incomes 
and development levels in Africa that, in themselves, pose a barrier to monetary integration. 
A monetary union also requires high, and preferably uniform, standards of financial sector 
supervision, and most of the SADC countries lack adequate capacity for this. It could, 
therefore, amount to a “policy straitjacket” that inhibits governments’ abilities to respond 
to differing economic, social and political circumstances. More generally, the very diverse 
development levels in Africa may well be an obstacle to economic integration, with 
resistance among the economically stronger members that may argue that it will prove 
expensive for them - similar to concerns expressed in Europe with its eastward expansion 
and admission of new members.1202 
 
With regard to transport, it is obvious that the removal of barriers in this sector is of crucial 
importance in the SADC region. The SADC has the highest number of land-locked 
countries in Africa and as such it needs a well-functioning and inexpensive transport 
system. Measures such as the Regional Transport Master Plan, “Corridor model” and “e-
SADC Strategic Framework” were put in place, but some challenges still remain. 
                                                 
1200 European Commission (above, fn 1197).  
1201 Jefferis, K.R. “The Process of Monetary Integration in the SADC Region” Journal of Southern African 
Studies vol. 33 no. 1 (March 2007) 83 at 92. 
1202 Ibid; Debrun, X et al. “Should African Monetary Unions Be Expanded? An Empirical Investigation of 
the Scope for Monetary Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa” IMF Working Paper WP/10/157, July 2010; 
Masson, P et al. “The Monetary Geography of Africa and ‘A Single Currency for Africa’” Finance and 
Development (December 2004). 
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According to the case study done on NTB monitoring mechanisms,1203 the largest number 
of unresolved complaints has to do with transport-related NTBs. 
 
Another area that poses an integration challenge in the SADC is dispute settlement. Annex 
VI to the SADC Trade Protocol sets forth a trade dispute settlement mechanism between 
the SADC members that is based largely on the WTO settlement mechanism. All the SADC 
member states are also members of the WTO, and there is a large overlap between the 
SADC Trade Protocol and the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), as applied 
to the SADC members. This means that one dispute can be a subject of two different 
tribunals. To make matters worse, both instruments impose an obligation to provide 
national treatment, or rather an obligation not to treat imports differently from domestic 
products once inside a country.1204 
 
An overlap problem may arise in a situation where one SADC member thinks that its 
dispute with another SADC member falls under the general SADC Treaty and/or one of its 
protocols other than the Trade Protocol, while the opposing SADC member in the dispute 
insists that the dispute falls under the Trade Protocol. In this situation the first member 
would bring the dispute to the SADC Tribunal and the second member would bring it to a 
Trade Panel under Annex VI.1205 
  
Annex VI states that “the remuneration of panellists and experts, their travel and lodging 
expenses and all other general expenses of panels shall be borne in equal parts by the 
disputing member states or in a proportion as determined by a Panel”.1206 In contrast, the 
DSU provides that “panellists’ expenses, including travel and subsistence allowance, shall 
                                                 
1203 South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). “Non-Tariff Barrier Monitoring Mechanism” 
Case Study 8, done for the SADC, 2013 at 81.  
1204 Articles 7 and 11 of the SADC Trade Protocol and Articles III and XI of the GATT 1994. 
1205 Pauwelyn, J. “Going Global, Regional or Both – Dispute Settlement in the Southern African 
Development Community and overlaps with the WTO and other jurisdictions” Minnesota Journal of 
Global Trade vol. 13 (2004) 231 at 240. 
1206 This is in accordance with Art. 19(2) of the SADC Trade Protocol. 
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be met from the WTO budget.”1207 The expenses, in cases of an appeal, of the Appellate 
Body members are also met from the WTO budget.1208 
 
These costs of litigation are one of the factors that will most certainly lead to the SADC 
member states choosing the WTO channel rather than the SADC channel in settling their 
trade disputes. In addition, the WTO has established an “Advisory Centre on WTO Law” 
in Geneva to offer free legal advice to its developing country member states and least 
developed countries, up to a certain number of hours. The SADC on the other hand, does 
not have a similar “Dispute Resolution Centre”.1209 
 
There is no doubt that these overlaps encourage “forum shopping”1210 among member 
states of the SADC, especially in the light of the suspension and revised mandate of the 
SADC Tribunal. The member states would thus attempt to have their action tried in a 
particular court or tribunal where they feel they will receive the most favourable 
judgment.1211 
 
On the other hand, settling a dispute between the SADC members under the SADC 
umbrella may be particularly important where the dispute involves sensitivities or 
complexities that are unique to the SADC region. This will also augur well with the AU 
objective of promoting African and/or regional unity. However, the advantage of bringing 
a dispute to a world body like the WTO is that more countries would be notified of an 
alleged violation and may exert pressure on the aggressor state. Another advantage to the 
WTO is that it also has a “special treatment clause”1212 for the least developed countries, 
whereas the SADC mechanisms offer no such preferential treatment. 
                                                 
1207 Article 8(11) of the WTO Treaty. 
1208 Article 17(8) of the WTO Treaty. 
1209 Pauwelyn (fn 1205) at 245. 
1210 Forum shopping is the practice adopted by some litigants of having their legal case heard in 
the court thought most likely to provide a favourable judgment for them; Whytockt, C.A. “The evolving 
forum shopping system” Cornell Law Review vol. 96 (2011) 481. 
1211 Saurombe, A. “An Analysis and Exposition of Dispute Settlement Forum Shopping for SADC Member 
states in the Light of the Suspension of the SADC Tribunal” South African Mercantile Law Journal vol. 23 
no. 3 (2011) 392; Pauwelwyn (fn 1205) at 242. 
1212 Article 24 of the DSU - Special Procedures Involving Least-Developed Country Members: 
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However, apart from all these challenges, there is hope for the SADC integration agenda. 
The SADC is still considered young compared to other regional blocs and as such, with 
time, greater success will be realised. The conclusion of this thesis, therefore, is that 
regional trade integration and cooperation in Southern Africa is possible and achievable, 
but it needs to be accelerated. As Clapham said:   
“The future of Africa, for better or worse, will be determined regionally.”1213 
 
Such hope is now buttressed by the recently-established Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-
FTA), which the SADC concluded with the COMESA and the East African Community 
(EAC) in June 2015. The T-FTA will go a long way in resolving some of the integration 
challenges in the continent such as proliferation of regional economic bodies. These many 
regional bodies often create confusing mixture of overlapping and, sometimes, 
incompatible preferential trade regimes.1214 
 
The T-FTA agreement does not only contain tariff liberalisation measures, but places a 
heavy emphasis on non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs), the development of transport 
infrastructure, and the development of a common industrial policy. All of these require a 
                                                 
1. At all stages of the determination of the causes of a dispute and of dispute settlement procedures 
involving a least-developed country Member, particular consideration shall be given to the special 
situation of least-developed country Members. In this regard, Members shall exercise due restraint 
in raising matters under these procedures involving a least-developed country Member. If 
nullification or impairment is found to result from a measure taken by a least-developed country 
Member, complaining parties shall exercise due restraint in asking for compensation or seeking 
authorization to suspend the application of concessions or other obligations pursuant to these 
procedures. 
2. In dispute settlement cases involving a least-developed country Member, where a satisfactory 
solution has not been found in the course of consultations the Director-General or the Chairman of 
the DSB shall, upon request by a least-developed country Member offer their good offices, 
conciliation and mediation with a view to assisting the parties to settle the dispute, before a request 
for a panel is made. The Director-General or the Chairman of the DSB, in providing the above 
assistance, may consult any source which either deems appropriate. 
1213 Clapham, C. “The changing world of regional integration in Africa” in Clapham, C et al. Regional 
Integration in Southern Africa: Comparative International Perspectives (2001) at 59. 
1214 Zamfir, I. “The Tripartite Free Trade Area Project Integration in southern and eastern Africa” European 
Parliamentary Research Service Briefing, March 2015; Erasmus, G et al. The Tripartite Free Trade Area: 
towards a new African integration paradigm? (2012) at 1.  
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large amount of co-ordination and co-operation among member states, something which 
African states have struggled with in the past.1215 
 
Non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs) remain a pertinent obstacle to intra-African trade and 
have not been successfully dealt with by regional economic communities (RECs). In 
preparation for the T-FTA, each of the RECs implemented an NTB Monitoring Mechanism 
which allows private sector actors to register NTBs they experience online, which then get 
sent directly to the offending state to be resolved.1216 
 
Once fully operational, the T-FTA will usher in a single tripartite policy framework 
covering twenty-six countries in key regulatory areas affecting and promoting trade and 
investment. Because it covers half of Africa in terms of membership, economic and 
geographical size, the T-FTA has the critical political and strategic importance of being a 
launch pad for the continental free trade area (CFTA). The whole world is thus looking on 
and waiting with bated breath for progress in the implementation of the T-FTA.1217 
 
PART B: RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Having concluded that integration of Southern Africa as a region is possible, the following 
are recommended to make it a reality: 
 
1. Move from an era of commitments to an era of implementation. 
 
The main stumbling block to integration in the SADC, and Africa generally, is non-
implementation of undertakings. Too many commitments to integration in the form 
of protocols, policies, programmes, plans, etc. have been made, but these are not 
                                                 
1215 Schoeman, M. “What does the TFTA really mean for regional integration in Africa?” Available at 
http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/what-does-the-tfta-really-mean-for-regional-integration-in-africa 
(accessed on 24 February 2017).  
1216 Ibid. 
1217 Walters, L et al. “The Impact of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Agreement on the 
South African Economy” Economic Research Southern Africa (ERSA) Working Paper 635, September 
2016 at 3. 
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matched by implementation. It is about time that implementation of all these plans 
and programmes happened and this must also happen at national levels. Hentz1218 
puts it thus: “The issue has become not whether the region should integrate 
economically, but the logistics – who, how and when.” 
 
The “who” part relates mainly to the institutions and political leadership of the 
SADC. The leaders of the SADC, especially the Summit of Heads of State and 
Government, must realise that deeper integration needs capable institutions. As 
such the Summit must share the executive powers with some of the organs, 
especially the Secretariat and the Council of Ministers. This is what maintains in 
the EU and is yielding many positive results.  
 
The Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) 
must be converted into the regional parliament as a matter of urgency. This will 
enable the people of the region to be represented adequately at the SADC and also 
be able to participate in its programmes. It should then gradually evolve into 
elections of its members through direct adult suffrage, just like the European 
Parliament. As discussed in chapters 3 and 6, there are plans to transform the 
SADC-PF into a legislative body, but this is without a timeframe. Therefore, the 
“urgency” should entail timeframes. This is one example of the “how” part. 
 
The “how” part also relates to resources. Integration is costly, but it is worth it. 
Many integration projects in the SADC do not reach completion due to a lack of 
resources. Some of them are dependent on donor-funds because member states lack 
adequate finances to fund them. It is, therefore, incumbent upon member states to 
plan in accordance with available resources for the proposed projects. This “proper 
planning” will then enable determination of time-frames, the “when” part.  
 
                                                 
1218 Hentz, J.J. “South Africa and the political economy of regional cooperation in Southern Africa” 
Journal of Modern African Studies vol. 43 no. 1 (2005) 21 at 23. 
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The planning must also involve technical experts to a larger extent than at present.  
Most dates for the SADC and targets seem to have been set by political, rather 
than technical, principals, and this is the main reason for not achieving them as 
per the set time-frames. 
 
The above recommendations would necessarily need to be regulated through 
legislation. For the laws, and the dispute settlement system to work properly, the 
SADC needs to have a court which is endowed with powers to give directives and 
make binding decisions. This can be done by the establishment of a “SADC Court”, 
as opposed to the Tribunal as it is currently the case. 
 
This court must also be given total independence, especially with regard to 
personnel and financial resources, to become the full judicial authority in the 
SADC. This means that the revised Tribunal Protocol, which limits the mandate of 
the Tribunal to member states only, will have to be revised again or amended to 
provide for the establishment of the SADC Court. Such a court must be accessible 
to both natural and juristic persons, including private sector companies, as opposed 
to the current proposal for the Tribunal, which limits this access to states only. The 
proper juridical system is important for steady progress of the integrative process. 
 
It is, therefore, submitted that the SADC should adopt the amended SADC Treaty, 
the Protocol establishing the SADC Parliament and the Protocol establishing the 
SADC Court with the following provisions: 
 
1.1 Amendment to the Southern African Development Community Treaty 
 
1.1.1 Article 6 of the Treaty is amended to read as follows: 
 
“1. Member states undertake to adopt, within reasonable time, adequate 
measures to promote the achievement of the objectives of SADC, and shall 
refrain from taking any measure likely to jeopardise the sustenance of its 
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principles, the achievement of its objectives and the implementation of the 
provisions of this Treaty. 
 
  . . . 
 
5. Member states shall take all necessary steps to accord this Treaty the 
force of national law within reasonable time after ratifying it. 
6. Member states shall co-operate with and assist institutions of SADC in 
the performance of their duties as well as respect, and where needed, 
implement, their decisions. 
7. Member states shall take all reasonable measures, including providing 
necessary resources, to achieve the objectives of SADC.” 
 
1.1.2 Article 9 of the Treaty is amended to read as follows: 
 
  “The following institutions are hereby established:  
1. the Summit of Heads of State or Government;  
2. the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation;  
3. the Council of Ministers; 
4. the Integrated Committee of Ministers;  
5. the Standing Committee of Officials;  
6. the Secretariat;  
7. the [Tribunal] Court;  
8. SADC National Committees; and  
9. the Parliament” 
 
1.1.3 Article 10(2) of the Treaty is amended to read as follows: 
 
“The Summit shall facilitate the development of the Community, and 
shall be responsible for the general political directions and priorities 
thereof.” 
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1.1.3       Article 14(1) of the Treaty is amended to read as follows: 
 
“1. The Secretariat shall be the principal executive institution of SADC, 
and shall be responsible for: 
1. strategic planning and management of the programmes of 
SADC, and shall take appropriate initiatives thereof where 
necessary.” 
 
1.1.4 Article 16 of the Treaty is amended as follows: 
 
“Substitution of the word ‘Tribunal’ with the word ‘Court’ in the Article, 
and everywhere else where it appears.” 
 
 1.1.5 Article 16B (new) 
 
“1. Parliament shall exercise legislative, oversight and budgetary 
functions. The Secretariat shall report to it. 
2. The composition, powers, functions, procedures and other related 
matters governing the Parliament shall be prescribed in a Protocol, which 
shall, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 22 of this Treaty, form an 
integral part of this Treaty, adopted by the Summit. 
 
1.2 Protocol establishing the Parliament of the Southern African 
Development Community 
 
Articles of the Protocol establishing the Parliament of the Southern 
African Development Community should include the following: 
 
 1.2.1. Article 1: Composition  
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(1) For the first term, which shall be five years, Parliament shall be 
composed of five representatives from each of the member states of the 
Community. The composition shall, thereafter, be reviewed in line with the 
provision of Article 5 (Review of the Protocol). 
(2) At least two of the five members of each delegation shall be women.  
(3) Eligibility for membership of Parliament shall be the same as for 
national parliaments or legislatures, as the case may be.  
 
1.2.2. Article 2: Elections 
 
(1) For the first term, Members of Parliament shall be elected from among 
the members of national parliaments or legislative bodies, using their 
internal procedures.  
(2) After the first review of the Protocol, in line with Article 5, the Members 
of Parliaments shall be elected through adult universal suffrage. 
(3). Elections of Members of Parliament shall, as far as possible, be 
conducted during the same time throughout the member states.  
 
  1.2.3. Article 3. Objectives of the Parliament 
   
(1) The objectives of the Parliament shall be to: 
   (a) give a voice to the citizens of the Region; 
(b) encourage good governance, respect for the rule of law, 
transparency and accountability in member states; 
(c) facilitate and promote integration of the Region as envisaged by 
the treaty establishing the Southern African Development 
Community. 
(d) familiarise the people of the Region with the objectives and 
policies aimed at integrating the Region. 
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  1.2.4 Article 4: Participation by the citizens 
 
The Parliament shall facilitate participation of the citizens of the 
Community, including the civil society organisations in member states, in 
its proceedings. 
 
1.2.5 Article 5: Review of the Protocol 
 
(1) Member states shall organise a conference to review the Protocol within 
one year after the first term came to an end, with a view to ensuring that the 
objectives and purposes of this Protocol are being realised. 
(2) Other subsequent conferences to review the Protocol may be organised 
by member states if such a need arises. 
 
1.3 Protocol establishing the Court of the Southern African Development 
Community  
 
The Protocol should include the following articles:  
 
1.3.1 Article 1: Repeal of the Protocol on the Tribunal in the Southern 
African Development Community 
 
The Protocol shall repeal and replace the Protocol on the Tribunal in the 
Southern African Development Community. 
 
1.3.2 Article 2: Establishment of the Court  
 
The Court of the Southern African Development Community (herein 
referred to as “the Court”), is hereby established in terms of Article 16 of 
the Southern African Development Community Treaty. 
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1.3.3 Article 3: Access to the Court 
 
Natural and juristic persons, including private sector companies and civil 
societies registered in the member states, shall have access to the Court.  
 
1.3.4. Article 4: Jurisdiction  
 
The Court shall have jurisdiction over all disputes and all applications 
referred to it in accordance with the Treaty and this Protocol which relate 
to: 
 
(a) the interpretation and application of the Treaty; 
(b) the interpretation, application or validity of the Protocols, all 
subsidiary instruments adopted within the framework of the 
Community, and acts of the institutions of the Community; 
(c) Any other act arising from international law. 
 
  1.3.5 Article 5: Enforcement 
 
The governments of member states shall take all reasonable steps to, 
diligently and without delay, enforce the judgments of the Court.  
 
2. Improve infrastructure  
 
Infrastructure and trade are inextricably linked. In order to allow trade to flow 
regionally, investment in physical infrastructure – roads, railways, power lines, air 
services and telecommunications – is necessary. As such all member states of the 
SADC must work together to improve infrastructure in their countries, especially 
that connects them with other Member states. This also entails availing resources 
to invest in infrastructure.  
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The following should thus happen: 
 
2.1 The governments of these member states must establish partnerships with the 
private sector to develop infrastructure, as the governments cannot do it alone. 
This is more so because most member states in the SADC are poor or least 
developed.1219 
2.2 Member states must invest more in information and communication technology 
(ICT). 
As discussed in Chapter 6, infrastructure improvement programmes such as “e-
Europe” has tremendously simplified intra-EU trade and trade with other 
countries. The EU also introduced the Digital Single Market (DSM) in May 
2015, which is estimated that it could contribute €415 billion per year to the 
EU economy and create hundreds of thousands of new jobs.1220 
2.3 Member states must give special attention to mobile telephones, as they play an 
extremely important role in the SADC region for two reasons: 
- the poor state of the fixed network and the high cost of extending it; and 
- telephone services that can be extended to rural areas via cellular networks. 
 
3. Overlapping membership of the SADC countries in a number of other regional 
bodies should be addressed urgently.  
 
The problem of overlapping membership, the “spaghetti bowl effect”, in the SADC, 
and African Union (AU) generally, has been mentioned over long time as one of 
the main challenges to integration. To deal with this problem the AU has already 
pronounced on the regional blocs for the five regions of the continent and as such 
this should just be adhered to.  
                                                 
1219 According to the United Nations, least developed countries are those that exhibit the lowest indicators 
of socioeconomic development, with the lowest Human Development Index ratings of all countries in the 
world. For a country to be classified as least-developed it must meet the three UN criteria of poverty, 
Human resource weakness and economic vulnerability.  
1220 Kalimo, H et al. “The United Kingdom and the (Digital) Single Market” Institute for European Studies 
Policy Brief issue 2016/ 9 (April 2016) at 2; “The European Single Market” at 
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market_en (accessed on 21 November 2016). 
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The SADC shares members in the region mainly with the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU) and the Common Market of Southern and Eastern Africa 
(COMESA). All members of the SACU (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South 
Africa and Swaziland) are also members of the SADC, whilst seven other member 
states of the SADC (the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe) are also members of the COMESA. 
 
To deal with this challenge of overlapping membership the following must happen: 
  
3.1 The AU should go a step further and adopt a resolution to strengthen positions 
of the proposed regional economic communities (RECs) as building blocks of 
the AU towards the achievement of the African Economic Community (AEC); 
3.2 The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) must either dissolve, to make way 
for the SADC Customs Union, or be converted into the SADC Customs Union.  
However, there is a likelihood of resistance, especially from the Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) countries, who, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, prefer the current status to remain. This is because they fear that the 
inclusion of other members will dilute the revenue-sharing formulae of the 
SACU and thus reduce their revenue share. However, this argument could not 
necessarily be true because as membership of the SACU increases, so would its 
revenue. So it’s a zero sum equation. 
3.3 Membership of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles and Tanzania in the SADC should cease. 
This will pave way for the envisaged Southern Africa Economic Community 
(SAEC) by the AU.1221 
 
4. Align the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan with the African 
Economic Community timelines   
                                                 
1221 In terms of the AU proposal, the Southern Africa Economic Community (SAEC) would include 
Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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The African Economic Community (AEC) envisages the establishment of a 
continental free trade area (CFTA) by 2017, a Continental Customs Union (CCU) 
by 2019, an African Common Market (ACM) by 2023 and a Pan-African Economic 
and Monetary Union (PAEMU) by 2028. These dates do not correspond with the 
SADC targets in terms of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
(RISDP). 
 
The SADC integration targets in terms of the RISDP should thus be revised as 
follows: 
4.1 Establishment of a customs union by 2019 – from 2010; 
4.2 Establishment of a common market by 2023 – from 2015; 
4.3 Establishment of a monetary union by 2028 – from 2016. 
 
5. Improve efficiency and effectiveness  
 
The human barriers, in the form of customs and immigration officials, are not given 
the necessary attention and yet are also contributing to the delay of integration. 
Bureaucratic delays in removing bottlenecks are crippling, and legislative 
frameworks for investors to move their plant and machinery from one place to 
another are not always easy to comply with. Southern Africa, therefore, needs to 
instil more efficiencies and effectiveness in its civil services and synchronise its 
legislative instruments to allow for the flow of investment within the region.1222 
 
In this regard member states must:   
5.1 avail necessary resources for personnel training; and  
5.2 purchase quality instruments to bring about the desired results. 
  
6. Harmonise trade laws and commercial practices  
                                                 
1222  “Regional Economic Integration & Globalization Process” 
http://www.opm.gov.na/pm/speeches/speech87.htm (accessed on 4 December 2016). 
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This is an important ingredient of regional integration, without which meaningful 
economic integration cannot be achieved. This is more so given the different legal 
systems followed by member states of the SADC.1223 
 
 The following should happen in this regard: 
 
6.1 The SADC must develop a body of “SADC law”, including model laws dealing 
with trade-related issues, that each member state must adopt and incorporate 
into its national laws within reasonable time after its adoption;  
6.2 A significant part of this law must include uniform commercial/trade law, which 
is a tool in developing the internal market;  
6.3 This must be accompanied by an action plan on the harmonisation of 
commercial/trade law within the SADC as a building block for the AU. 
 
7. Involve the people 
 
Involvement of the people in the SADC matters should happen at both individual 
and civil society levels. To achieve this the following must happen: 
 
Member states must conduct public education programmes, especially with 
regard to regional integration arrangements (RIAs) or regional economic 
communities (RECs), for their citizens. 
People, especially ordinary people, should be informed of the existence of these 
RIAs, their functions, how they can benefit them, etc. This will necessarily 
mean that member states must make provision for funding this education, as 
well as accessibility for citizens to participate in the activities of these RIAs or 
RECs.  
                                                 
1223 The membership of the SADC represents at least three main legal systems: South Africa, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Swaziland (Roman-Dutch); Angola, Madagascar, Seychelles, Mauritius 
and Mozambique (Civil Law) and South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi and Mauritius (Common Law).  
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8. Diversify the economies of member states 
 
There is a need for diversification in Southern Africa. At present regional economic 
arrangements exhibit narrow patterns of trade, depend on primary products and 
involve low levels of inter-country trade. This is in spite of the fact that most 
Southern African countries produce raw materials. Because these countries export 
these raw materials, and not processed goods, they are not interested in importing 
from each other. This must change for the region to fully benefit from its raw 
materials.1224 
 
9. Think regional 
 
Currently the benefits of regional integration in Southern Africa, especially of intra-
regional trade, is skewed in favour of large economies such as South Africa, and 
this is not good for regional integration.1225  
To address this situation, the following must happen. 
 
9.1 The proposed SADC Regional Development Fund must as such come into 
operation by 2018 to boost the economies of struggling member states to meet 
the integration targets.  
9.2 The member states should incorporate regional and continental integration 
projects and programmes at the national level within reasonable time after their 
adoption.1226 
                                                 
1224 Amponsah, W.A. “Analytical and empirical evidence of trade policy effects of regional integration: 
Implications for Africa”, paper prepared for the session on “Trade Policies” during the Africa Development 
Forum III, “Defining Priorities for Regional Integration,” 3 – 8 March 2002, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia at 4; 
Tumwebaze, H.K et al. “Regional Economic Integration and Economic Growth in the COMESA Region, 
1980–2010” African Development Review vol. 27 issue 1 (March 2015) 67. 
1225 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Economic Report on Africa 2015: 
Industrializing Through Trade (2015) at 142; de Melo, J et al. “Regional integration in Africa: Challenges 
and prospects” United Nations University (UNU) WIDER Working Paper 2014/037, February 2014.  
1226 Mapuva, J. “The SADC regional bloc: What challenges and prospects for regional integration?” Law, 
Democracy and Development vol. 18 (2014) 22 at 25. 
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9.3 The Secretariat must develop a register to monitor the enforcement of the 
decisions of the SADC institutions by member states; 
9.4 Every SADC member state must also use measures such as regional peer review 
mechanisms to encourage compliance with the SADC decisions and the pursuit 
of good economic policies that exist in other parts of the world as well as to 
learn from each other. 
 
Concluding remarks  
 
The success or failure of the regional trade integration in Southern Arica, and thus the 
African integration agenda in general, is largely dependent on the political will by leaders 
of the various member states. Many programmes and plans have been developed, and many 
treaties and protocols signed and ratified, but inadequately, and in some cases never, 
implemented. And this inadequate or non-implementation is mainly due to a lack of 
political will on the part of political leaders. 
 
The SADC Heads of States and Government, as the executive representatives of their 
member states in the SADC, should seriously consider these recommendations lest this 
project of Southern African regional integration becomes just a pipe dream.  
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